Chapter 3b - Appendix on Tātparya (the Purport)

The concept of vākya-vaiśiṣṭya (the specialty of the real statement) is a subtle and charming aspect of poetical theory. It is based on Mammaṭa’s tātparya-vṛtti (the Purport). It is not the same as the tātparya-vṛtti (the Drift) expounded in the previous chapter (2.3).

Mammaṭa’s elaboration on his sūtra about tātparya in the previous chapter is simply this:

ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhi-vaśād vakṣyamāṇasvarūpāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣa-vapur apadārtho’pi vākyārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvaya-vādināṃ matam. vācya eva vākyārtha ity anvitābhidhāna-vādinaḥ,

“The opinion of the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs is as follows: Although it is not the expressed meaning of the words, tātparya artha, whose form is a particularity, is the sense of the statement and is apparent in the syntactical connection of the meanings of the words, whose essential natures are going to be described,^[1] by the force of ākāṅkṣā (mutual requirement), yogyatā (congruity), and sannidhi (mutual proximity) (tātparya artha = vākya artha = apadārtha). The Anvitābhidhāna-vādīs, however, say the expressed meanings of the words are the sense of the statement (vācya artha = vākya artha)” (Kāvya-prakāśa 2.6).

According to Ānandavardhana, however, the tātparya (Drift) of the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs is vācya (literally expressed). He paraphrases the Mīmāṃsakas:

tasmāt tātparya-viṣayo yo’rthaḥ sa tāvan-mukhyatayā vācyaḥ,

“Therefore, the meaning that is the object of the tātparya is vācya, due to being primary to that extent” (Dhvanyāloka 3.33).^[2]

Mammaṭa’s interpretation of the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs’ vākyārtha (the sense of the sentence) as apadārtha (not exactly the expressed meaning of the words) might be a twist on the grammarians’ opinion that the first perception of the meanings of the words of a sentence is unreal: padārtha-pratītir asatyaiveti kaiścid vidvadbhir āsthitam (Dhvanyāloka 3.33); kaiścid iti vaiyākaraṇaiḥ (Locana 3.33).

Mammaṭa’s explanation of the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs’ tātparya refers to the definition of a sentence stated in Nyāya philosophy:

ākāṅkṣā yogyatā sannidhiś ca vākyārtha-jñāna-hetuḥ padasya padāntara-vyatireka-prayuktānvayānanubhāvakatvam ākāṅkṣā. arthābādho yogyatā. padānām avilambenoccāraṇaṃ sannidhiḥ.

“Mutual requirement (ākāṅkṣā), congruity (yogyatā) and mutual proximity (sannidhi) are the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Ākāṅkṣā is the fact that a word does not bring about the perception of the syntactical connection that is being used without another word.^[3] Yogyatā means the meaning is not incongruent. Sannidhi means the words, which are grammatically declined, are uttered without delay” (Tarka-saṅgraha 7.2).

In the poetical theory itself, the concept of yogyatā is the same as aucitī (congruity), one of the factors that restrict several possible literal meanings down to one (2.36). Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (2.36) and Paṇḍita-rāja Jagannātha explain aucitī as yogyatā.^[4]

Abhihitānvaya-vāda and Anvitābhidhāna-vāda are the two schools of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. They were founded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara respectively. In Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, there is yet another tātparya (the Purport). This tātparya is applied all the time, even after the other tātparya (the Drift). Moreover, according to Jīva Gosvāmī, the universal tātparya (the Purport) must be applied even in the classic example: gām ānaya (bring a cow) (2.8).^[5]

The tātparya which Mammaṭa propounded, in the fifth chapter of Kāvya-prakāśa, is the well-known “purport” of the Mīmāṃsakas. Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa does not mention this tātparya at all. Mammaṭa wrote keṣucit (according to some persons) (2.3),^[6] implying that he does not acknowledge it. P.V. Kāṇe explains: “But it does not appear that Mammaṭa entirely approved of this view. Otherwise he would not have said “keṣucit”, but would have simply declared that tātparya is one of the functions. Our author also appears to hold views similar to Mammaṭa.”^[7]

In that regard, Kavikarṇapūra eliminated vākya-vaiśiṣṭya from poetical theory. Sometimes an implied sense seems to be the purport, thus on occasion the difference between the two is unclear. Still, Mammaṭa’s legacy should be preserved.

Mammaṭa himself does not accept the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs’ tātparya (the Drift) because he follows the Anvitābhidhāna-vādīs’ viewpoint that the literal meaning of a sentence is vācya (literally expressed). All the poetical theorists after Mammaṭa followed him in this respect.

Mammaṭa’s tātparya is the purport, which is not literally stated (avācya). Mammaṭa explains:

yad eva vidheyaṃ tatraiva tātparyam ity upāttasyaiva śabdasyārthe tātparyam,

“The Purport occurs only in what is actually being ordained, thus the Purport relates to the meaning of a word which is obtained as an addition” (Kāvya-prakāśa 5.47).

He gives this example:

havanasyānyataḥ siddheḥ “dadhnā juhoti” ity-ādau dadhy-ādeḥ karaṇatva-mātraṃ vidheyam,

“In the sentence “One should offer oblations with yogurt,” since the injunction “One should offer oblations” is already obtained from another source, what is really being stated is this injunction: “Yogurt is a means to offer an oblation”” (Kāvya-prakāśa 5.47).

According to Mammaṭa, in that sentence the phrase “with yogurt” is literally expressed (vācya), but the notion of its specificity is not, because there is no assignation of the meaning of ‘yogurt’ as “a means to offer an oblation”, therefore as the purport it is avācya (not literally expressed). This is Mammaṭa’s opinion in the scope of Anvitābhidhāna-vāda, but as regards Abhihitānvaya-vāda he simply says that the specificity of the meaning is not inherently syntactically connected, thus it is automatically in the sphere of the Purport; the Purport is not in the scope of the actual words.^[8]

Viśvanātha Kavirāja shows this verse to illustrate vākya-vaiśiṣṭya (the specialty of the real statement), among other specialties:

kālo madhuḥ kupita eṣa ca puṣpadhanvā dhīrā vahanti rati-kheda-harāḥ samīrāḥ |
kelī-vanīyam api vañjula-kuñja-mañjur dūre patiḥ kathaya kiṃ karaṇīyam adya ||

“The time is spring, and Cupid, whose arrows are flowers, is incensed: Gentle breezes that dispel the fatigue of lovemaking are blowing; this pleasure grove is lovely with an arbor of aśoka trees; and my husband is far away. Tell me: What should I do now?” (Sāhitya- darpaṇa 2.16)

Viśvanātha Kavirāja elaborates:

atraitaṃ deśaṃ prati śīghraṃ pracchanna-kāmukas tvayā preṣyatām iti sakhīṃ prati kayācid vyajyate,

“The speaker, a woman, implies this to her confidante: “Quickly send my secret lover to this place”” (Sāhitya-darpaṇa).^[9]

Śeṣarāja Śarmā explains:

atra vaktryāḥ kāmukatvasya ramaṇecchā-bodhakasya vākyasya, rati-kheda-haratvena samīra-vahanasya pati-dūra-sthiti-rūpasya prastāvasya, vañjula-kuñja-mañjoḥ kelī-vanī-rūpa-deśasya, vasantartu-rūpasya kālasya ca vaiśiṣṭyāt.

“That implied sense is made to be perceived from the specialty of the speaker; from the specialty of the actual statement (vākya-vaiśiṣṭya), which lets one know that she wants to make love, which means that she is lusty; from the specialty of the context, i.e. firstly the breeze is blowing in terms of being a dispeller of the fatigue of lovemaking and secondly the husband is far away; from the specialty of the place, a pleasure grove which is a lovely arbor of aśoka trees; and from the specialty of the time, spring” (Candra-kalā 2.16).

The purport of the sentence “Gentle breezes that dispel the fatigue of lovemaking are blowing” is that she wants to meet her lover. That is the paryāyokta ornament (circumlocution). It is not really an implied sense because that idea is more than obvious. Here the paryāyokta ornament, the Purport, is suggestive (Quickly send my secret lover to this place). Since the Purport is suggestive, the Purport is called vākya-vaiśiṣṭya (the specialty of the real statement). Commenting on this verse, Maheśvara Bhaṭṭa says that vākya-vaiśiṣṭya occurs here insofar as it involves a poetic expression that is being perceived and that is not the way it is (there is no actual fatigue of lovemaking).^[10]

The Abhihitānvaya-vādīs’ Tātparya

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa wrote Tantra-vārttika and Śloka-vārttika. The latter is a metrical paraphrase of Śabara Svāmī’s commentary on Jaiminī’s Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra.

Commenting on: arthasya tan-nimittatvāt, “because a meaning is the cause of it” (Pūrva-mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.25), Śabara Svāmī writes:

amūni padāni svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛtta-vyāpārāṇi, athedānīṃ padārthā abhihitāḥ santo vākyārtham avabodhayanti,

“After the words of a sentence have denoted their respective meanings, their function ceases. Thereafter the words’ meanings, having finished with abhidhā at this time, make one understand the sense of the sentence (by the function called tātparya)” (Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra-bhāṣya 1.1.25).^[11]

Abhinavagupta states that tātparya is the power which brings about the syntactical connection between the words of the sentence.^[12]

According to Dr. Satyavrata Siṅgh, the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs, the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, say Denotation ceases after it conveys both the possible main meanings of one word and the meaning of its case ending in a general way, and then tātparya-vṛtti is the function by means of which the syntactical connection of that word with another is done, so that by tātparya’s aspects of ākāṅkṣā (the mutual need of words) and yogyatā (congruity) the actual meaning of each word is understood. Thereafter the syntactical connection of words one by one automatically makes the overall sense of the sentence.^[13] This is similar to Jayaratha’s opinion: “Tātparya is the power that makes one perceive the particular meaning, when the words are mutually syntactically connected in a general way.”^[14]

However, Śeṣarāja Śarmā says that according to the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs, Denotation ceases after denoting the actual meaning of the word and after making known the usage of its case ending.^[15] Ācārya Viśveśvara holds a similar opinion about Abhihitānvaya-vāda.^[16]

In that regard, Śrīvidyā Cakravartī, another commentator on Ruyyaka’s Alaṅkāra-sarvasva, writes:

tātparyaṃ nāma padārthādhigama-samanantara-bhāvinī samanvaya-śaktiḥ,

“Tātparya is the power which occurs after the meanings of the words are understood and by means of which the connection between the words is made” (Sañjīvanī commentary on the introduction in Alaṅkāra-sarvasva).

The followers of Prabhākara, the Anvitābhidhāna-vādīs, say the meaning of a word is already syntactically connected with another word in the sentence because that is the scheme of assignation, along the model of gām ānaya (bring a cow) (2.8).

Nonetheless, words do not always occur in a set phrase: Assignation takes place from a dictionary and so on. Therefore the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa say that the meaning of a word is not automatically syntactically connected with another word in the sentence, consequently tātparya-vṛtti is needed to achieve the syntactical connection of the words, which is equal to the literal meaning of the sentence.

Ānandavardhana’s Usage of Tātparya

When Viśvanātha Kavirāja mentioned the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs,^[17] he was also referring to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The tātparya of the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs is an inherent aspect of Ānandavardhana’s system. According to Abhinavagupta, when an implied sense is based on abhidhā, three functions are involved: abhidhā, tātparya, and vyañjanā. And when an implied meaning is based on lakṣaṇā, all four functions are involved, since even then abhidhā is somewhat taken in consideration insofar as the main meaning is judged incompatible, by means of tātparya, before lakṣaṇā is applied.^[18] Viśvanātha Kavirāja agreed with him in principle,^[19] but not in usage.

In poetics, Ānandavardhana, the founder of the Dhvani theory, was the first to use the notion of tātparya. The wording ‘tātparya-vyāpāra’, now called tātparya-vṛtti, was formulated by Abhinavagupta, who also coined the term tātparya-śakti (the power which is the Drift).^[20]

Ānandavardhana’s tātparya is the Abhihitānvaya-vādīs’ tātparya. For instance he explains the word tātparyeṇa in his kārikā as: sva-sāmarthyāt (Dhvanyāloka 2.22). In a similar context, Abhinavagupta comments: sva-sāmarthyam ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhayaḥ, “The term sva-sāmarthya means ākāṅkṣā (mutual requirement of words), yogyatā (congruity) and sannidhi (proximity)” (Locana 1.11).

Ānandavardhana invented the function called Suggestiveness: vyañjakatvaika-mūlasya dhvaneḥ, “because a dhvani (implied sense) is only based on Suggestiveness” (Dhvanyāloka 1.18). However, he included tātparya in the procedure to arrive at an implied sense.

In Ānandavardhana’s system, the rasa is also implied by means of the Drift (tātparya):

yasmin raso vā bhāvo vā tātparyeṇa prakāśate saṃvṛttyābhihitau vastu yatrālaṅkāra eva vā |
kāvyādhvani dhvanir vyaṅgya-prādhānyaika-nibandhanaḥ sarvatra tatra viṣayī jñeyaḥ sahṛdayair janaiḥ ||

“When on the path of poetry a rasa, or else a bhāva, manifests by the Drift, or when either a vastu (an idea) or an alaṅkāra (an ornament) manifests after covering over (but not eclipsing) the rasa or the bhāva, then in all cases the category of poetry called dhvani-kāvya (first-rate poetry), defined as a unique arrangement of words where what is predominant is an implied sense, is the object of attention which can be understood by the connoisseurs”” (Dhvanyāloka 3.42).

On several occasions, Ānandavardhana seemed to equate tātparya with Suggestiveness:

vācya-vyatiriktasyārthasya vācya-vācakābhyāṃ tātparyeṇa prakāśanaṃ yatra vyaṅgya-prādhānye sa dhvaniḥ,

“The manifestation, by the drift from the literal meaning and from the literally expressive words, of a sense that is entirely distinct from the literal meaning is a dhvani, in which the main aspect is the fact of being implied” (Dhvanyāloka 1.14).^[21]

Abhinavagupta specifies that in this passage only the function of Suggestiveness is meant to be stated, not tātparya-śakti.^[22]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

This denotes jāti, guṇa, kriyā, and saṃjñā, or else only jāti (2.9).

[2]:

Abhinavagupta comments: bhaṭṭa-mate hi, “vākyārtha-mitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam, pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṃ padārtha-pratipādanam (Śloka-vārttika)” iti śabdāvagataiḥ padārthais tatparyeṇa yo’rtha utthāpyate sa eva vākyārthaḥ, sa eva ca vācya iti. prabhākara-darśane’pi dīrgha-dīrgho vyāpāro nimittini vākyārthe, padārthānāṃ tu nimitta-bhāvaḥ pāramārthika eva, vaiyākaraṇānāṃ tu so’pāramārthika iti viśeṣaḥ (Locana 3.33).

[3]:

Narahari Sarasvatī Tīrtha explains: pratipattur jijñāsā ākāṅkṣā, “Ākāṅkṣā is the perceiver’s desire to understand” (Bāla-cittānurañjinī on Kāvya-prakāśa 5.47). That desire must be satisfied.

[4]:

aucitī yogyatā (Rasa-gaṅgādhara, KM p. 124).

[5]:

athaivaṃ sarveṣāṃ veda-vākyānāṃ prāmāṇya eva sthite kecid evam āhuḥ, kārya evārthe vedasya prāmāṇyam, na siddhe, tatraiva śakti-tātparyayor avadhāritatvāt. tatra śaktir yathā, uttama-vṛddhena madhyama-vṛddham uddiśya gām ānaya ity ukte taṃ gavānayana-pravṛttam upalabhya bālo’sya vacasaḥ sāsnādimat-piṇḍānayanam artha iti pratipadyate. anantaraṃ gāṃ cāraya, aśvam ānaya ity-ādāv āvāpodvāpābhyāṃ go-śabdasya sāsnādimān arthaḥ, ānayanaśabdasya ca āharaṇam arthaḥ iti saṅketam avadhārayati. tataḥ prathamata eva kāryānvita eva pravṛttes tatraiva śakti-grahaḥ, tathā ca tātparyam api tatraiva bhavet. (Sarva-saṃvādinī 11.41 of Tattva-sandarbha). The term śakti is a synonym of abhidhā (Denotation).

[6]:

tātparyārtho’pi keṣucit (Kāvya-prakāśa 2.6).

[7]:

Kane (1995), The Sāhitya-darpaṇa, p. 65.

[8]:

Mammaṭa writes: ity anvitābhidhāna-vādinaḥ. teṣām api mate sāmānya-viśeṣa-rūpaḥ padārthaḥ saṅketa-viṣaya ity ativiśeṣa-bhūto vākyārthāntara-gato’saṅketitatvād avācya eva yatra padārthaḥ pratipadyate tatra dūre’rthāntara-bhūtasya niḥśeṣa-cyutety-ādau vidhy-ādeś carcā. ananvito’rtho’bhihitānvaye padārthāntara-mātreṇānvitas tv anvitābhidhāne anvita-viśeṣas tv avācya eva ity ubhaya-naye’py apadārtha eva vākyārthaḥ (Kāvya-prakāśa 5.47).

[9]:

In reality, Viśvanātha Kavirāja, a Vaiṣṇava, is not implying that he promotes adultery. Rather, elsewhere he states his opinion that adultery is a form of rasābhāsa (semblance of relishment): anaucitya-pravṛttatva ābhāso rasa-bhāvayoḥ, anaucityaṃ cātra rasānāṃ bharatādipraṇīta-lakṣaṇānāṃ sāmagrī-rahitatve eka-deśa-yogitvopalakṣaṇa-paraṃ bodhyam. tac ca bāla-vyutpattaye eka-deśato darśyate, upanāyaka-saṃsthāyām…, “When the meanings occur by inappropriateness, there is a semblance of a rasa or of a bhāva. Inappropriateness is understood by a partial indication, when the characteristics that were propounded by Bharata and others lack the apparatus (such as a proper ālambana). And to spell it out to simple-minded folks, the characteristics of inappropriateness in śṛṅgāra are shown in one place: upanāyaka-saṃsthāyām (when there is the presence of a paramour), …” (Sāhitya-darpaṇa 3.262).

[10]:

eṣa ity anena tat-kālānubhūyamānonmādakatvaṃ kāmasya sūcitam. patir iti, patir bhartā na tu priyaḥ. atra vaktryā madana-vihvalatādinā vaiśiṣṭyaṃ vākyasya tathābhūtānubhūyamānavicchitti-yuktatvena prastāvasya pati-dūra-sthity-ādinā, deśasya ca krīḍā-vana-rūpasya bakula-kuñjādinā, kālasya vasantavattvena, evam eṣāṃ vaiśiṣṭyena vakroktyā vyaṅgyārthaprakāśanaṃ sphuṭam eva (Vijña-priyā-ṭīkā 2.16).

[11]:

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa comments: na vimuñcanti sāmarthyaṃ vākyārthe’pi padāni naḥ |
vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti ca sthitiḥ || sākṣād yadyapi kurvanti padārtha-pratipādanam |
varṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale || vākyārtha-mitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttyā nāntarīyakam |
pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṃ padārtha-pratipādanam || (Śloka-vārttika) (cited by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, Uddyota 2.6).

[12]:

tata eva padārtham abhidhāyānvayaṃ ca tātparya-śaktyāvagamayyaiva bādhaka-vaśena tam apahatya (Locana 1.13).

[13]:

tātparya-vṛtti kī ādhāra-śilā hai jise vākyārtha kahate hai vah pṛthak-pṛthak padārtha nahi, api tu padārthoṅ kā paraspara sambandha athavā anvaya-rūpa artha hai, vastutaḥ tātparyārtha hai. udāharaṇa ke liye yadi “gām ānaya” is vākya ko hī le to yah spaṣṭa hai ki yahaṅ go-pada kā artha “sāsnādimān padārtha” hai aur yah artha eka sāmānya-rūpa artha hai na ki viśeṣa-rūpa. isī prakāra “am” pratyaya kā abhiprāya sāmānya “karmatva” hai aur “nī” is kriyā-pada se gati-sāmānya kā hī bodha huā kartā hai. yahaṅ go-pada ke liye vaktṛ-vivakṣita “karmatva” ke āśraya-bhūta sāsnādimān prāṇi-rūpa artha-viśeṣa kā pratipādana sambhava nahi. yah to ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā aur āsatti kī hī mahimā hai jo yahaṅ eka pada ke artha ke sāth dūsre pada ke artha kā sambandha batāyā kartī hai, aur jab padārthoṅ kā pārasparika sambandha patā cal jātā hai tabhī vah artha pratīta huā kartā hai jise “tātparyārtha” kahā karte haiṅ jo ki padārtha-rūpa nahi api tu vākyārtharūpa artha hai. (Siṅgh, Satyavrata (2007), Sāhitya-darpaṇa, p. 96).

[14]:

sāmānyānāṃ parasparānvitatvena viśeṣārthāvabodhana-śaktis tātparyam (Alaṅkāravimarśinī, Kāvya-mālā edition of Alaṅkāra-sarvasva p. 9).

[15]:

ayaṃ bhāvaḥ, ghaṭaṃ karoti ity-ādi-vākye abhidhā ghaṭa-padena kambu-grīvādimantaṃ padārtham am-vibhaktyā karmatvam abhidhāya viramati, vṛttitā tu na kasyāpi iti apadārtho’pi vṛttitā tātparya-vṛtti-vaśāt anayoḥ saṃsarga-vidhayā bhāsate. itthaṃ tātparya-vṛttyaiva padārthānāṃ mithaḥ anvayo bhavatīty abhihitānvaya-vādinaḥ (Candrakalā-ṭīkā on Sāhitya-darpaṇa 2.20).

[16]:

abhihitānvaya-vāda meṅ pahile padoṅse kevala ananvita padārtha upasthita hote haiṅ, uske bād padoṅkī ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā tathā sannidhike balase ‘tātparya-śakti’ dvārā un padārthoṅke paraspara-sambandha-rūpa vākyārthoṅke bodha hota hai. yah ‘abhihitānvaya-vādī’ kumārilabhaṭṭake matakā sārāṃśa grantha-kārane yahāṅ prastuta kiyā hai (Ācārya Viśveśvara Śiromaṇi (2011), Kāvya-prakāśa, pp. 36-37).

[17]:

abhidhāyā ekaika-padārtha-bodhana-viramād vākyārtha-rūpasya padārthānvayasya bodhikā tātparyaṃ nāma vṛttiḥ. tad-arthaś ca tātparyārthaḥ. tad-bodhakaṃ ca vākyam iti abhihitānvaya-vādināṃ matam (Sāhitya-darpaṇa 2.20) (rendered by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa in text2.3).

[18]:

atra ca traya eva vyāpārāḥ, abhidhā tātparyaṃ dhvananaṃ ceti, mukhyārtha-bādhādyabhāve madhyama-kakṣyāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyās tṛtīyāyā abhāvāt. […] tena dvitīye’pi bhede catvāra eva vyāpārāḥ (Locana 1.13).

[19]:

śabda-buddhi-karmaṇāṃ viramya vyāpārābhāva iti nayenābhidhā-lakṣaṇātātparyākhyāsu tisṛṣu vṛttiṣu svaṃ svam arthaṃ bodhayitvopakṣīṇāsu yayāparo’nyo’rtho bodhyate sā śabdasyārthasya prakṛti-pratyayādeś ca śaktir vyañjana-dhvanana-gamana-pratyāyanādi-vyapadeśa-viṣayā vyañjanā nāma. (Sāhitya-darpaṇa 2.13)

[20]:

svatas tātparyeṇety abhidhā-vyāpāra-nirākaraṇa-param idaṃ padaṃ dhvanana-vyāpāram āha na tu tātparya-śaktim (Locana 2.22).

[21]:

Another instance is: yadā vakroktiṃ vinā vyaṅgyo’rthas tātparyeṇa pratīyate tadā tasya prādhānyam (Dhvanyāloka 3.39).

[22]:

svatas tātparyeṇety abhidhā-vyāpāra-nirākaraṇa-param idaṃ padaṃ dhvanana-vyāpāram āha na tu tātparya-śaktim (Locana 2.22).