Chapter 1 - Introduction

Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is a subject of controversy among the different schools of Indian philosophy. Whether such type of cognition is possible at all and if possible what its nature is, are some of the important questions in Indian epistemology. In Indian epistemology every system developed their epistemology in accordance with the metaphysics prevailed in that system. In Indian philosophy epistemology goes together with the metaphysics. Metaphysics, discusses the general problems regarding the reality of objects, man, nature and God. But epistemology enquires into the nature of human knowledge, as to how it develops and how far it is able to grasp reality. In other words, metaphysics deals with the objects whereas the epistemology deals with knowledge of those objects.

The English word ‘epistemology’ is derived from the two Greece words; ‘episteme’ and ‘logos’. The Greece word ‘episteme’ means ‘cognition’ and ‘logos’ means ‘theory’. Thus, epistemology means theory of cognition. We know that without cognition the universe becomes dark. Therefore, cognition is very essential for human life for knowing the universe.

Epistemology is an important branch of philosophy, which deals with the possibility of cognition, the limits of cognition, the source of cognition, the nature of cognition, the forms of cognition, different kinds of cognition, conditions of cognition, and the validity and invalidity of cognition.

Both in the western and Indian tradition epistemology is the most important branch of philosophy. It investigates and evaluates our method of reasoning, criteria of knowledgeclaims. In Indian philosophy epistemology is known as pramāṇa-śāstra. Pramāṇa-śāstra deals with the theory of cognition and its nature, instruments, objects, conditions, and grounds.

In Nyāya epistemology cognition is defined as “sarvavyavaḥārahetuḥ guṇaḥ budhiḥ jñānam”^[1] i.e. the cognition is that quality which is the ground of all linguistic usage. In Nyāya epistemology cognition is broadly divided into presentative cognition (anubhava) and representative or non-presentative cognition (smṛti [smṛtiḥ]). Here the latter cognition is such type of the consciousness which results from mental trace alone is called the representative cognition.^[2] And the former as a state of consciousness other than representative cognition is called presentative cognition.^[3] Each of these two varieties is further divided into two kinds: valid cognition (yathārtha-jñāna) and invalid cognition (ayathārtha-jñāna). Valid cognition is the apprehension which agrees with the real character of the object apprehended. It is the certain and unerring presentation of the object. In other words, valid cognition is the cognition of an object as endowed with the qualities which really exist in the object. For example, when I apprehend a pot as possessing the quality of potness which really exists in it, then my cognition is valid cognition. In short, valid cognition is the certain cognition of the real nature of an object.

Between these two kinds of valid cognition, the valid presentative cognition (yathārtha anubhava) is called pramā. Valid presentative cognition is that cognition (yathārtha anubhava) of a relation to ‘something’, when that relation to something does actually exist.^[4] For instance, cognition like ‘that is a jar.’

On the other hand, invalid presentative cognition (ayathārtha anubhava) is that cognition of a relation to ‘something’, when that relation to something does not actually exist.^[5] And such type of invalid cognition is called apramā. In other words, invalid presentative cognition (apramā) is cognition of the qualities in an object which do not really exist in that object. Shortly, apramā does not represent the real character of its object or apprehends what does not exist in it. For instance, when we perceive a snake in a rope, we apprehend a quality, viz., snake-ness which does not actually exist in that rope. Representative cognition (smṛti) whether it is valid or invalid is always treated as apramā in Nyāya epistemology.

Invalid presentative cognition is divided into doubt (saṃśaya), error (bhrama or viparyaya), and hypothetical argument (tarka).^[6] Besides these three types of presentative invalid cognition, memory (smṛti), and dream (svapna) etc. are also treated as invalid cognition. According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy invalid presentative cognition (avidyā) is of four kinds, viz, doubt (saṃśaya), illusion (viparyaya), indefinite perception (anadhyavasāya) and dream (svapna).^[7] Kumārila (700 A.D) says that there are three kinds of invalid cognition, viz., error or illusion (mithyājñāna), non-cognition or ignorance (ajñāna) and doubt (saṃśaya).^[8] According to Nyāya philosophy,^[9] memory is not pramā, as it is nonpresentative or a mere reproduction of past cognition, it may also be valid or invalid, according as it is a reproduction of some previous valid or invalid presentative cognition. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakās also exclude memory from pramā, on the ground that it does not give us any new cognition. It is only a reproduction of some past experience and not cognition of anything not known before. According to Buddhists, every object has only momentary existence. When the object is recollected it does not exist. So, an object can never produce its recollection. On the other hand, in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophy of thought, apart from pramā many other states such as viparyaya, smṛti, nidrā and vikalpa are mentioned.^[10]

Let us now clear some terminological difficulties often found in Indian epistemology. In Indian epistemology two words are often used to mean cognition. These are jñāna and pramā. The word ‘jñāna’ or knowledge is used in a wider sense. It includes both the veridical (yathārtha) and non-veridical (ayathārtha) cognition. These two types of cognition may be again either presentative or representative. Thus we get four types of cognition in all i.e., (i) presentative veridical (yathārtha anubhava), (ii) presentative non-veridical (ayathārtha anubhava), (iii) non-presentative veridical (yathārtha smṛti), and (iv) non-presentative nonveridical (ayathārtha smṛti). All these four types of cognition states are called jñāna. But only the first type of cognitive state is called pramā. And other three types are called apramā.

The Saṃskṛt word pramā is derived from the root mā with a prefix pra and tāp which means valid cognition. But the different systems of Indian philosophy have forwarded different definitions of pramā. The Vaiśeṣikas consider certainty, non-contradictoriness and definiteness as the marks of vidyā. According to them, vidyā is what apprehends an object in its real nature.^[11]

According to the Buddhist thinkers, pramā is the cognition that is capable of successful volition in revealing an object^[12] or as the cognition which makes us reaches the object revealed by it.^[13] According to the Advaita Vedānta school, pramā is the uncontradicted cognition of an object that is not already known.^[14] On the other hand, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta holds that pramā consists in both the faithfulness to the object and prompting to the fruitful activity. According to them, pramā is apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity.^[15] The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas define pramā as the cognition of an unknown real object. According to Kumārila, pramā is a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions.^[16] Pārthasārathi Miśra (900 A.D) defines,“kāraṇadoṣavādhakajñānarahitama-gṛhitagrāhijñānaṃ pramāṇamiti”^[17] i.e. pramā as the cognition which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which was not contradicted by subdued cognition. He mentions three distinctive features of pramā, viz., (i) its object is not remembered as having been previously known, (ii) it conforms to the real nature of its object, and (iii) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object.^[18] According to the Prabhākaras, all cognition is valid. Experience (anubhūti) is pramā, and cognition other than memory is experience.^[19] Śālikanātha (800 A.D), a commentator, gives the definition of pramā as follows: pramā is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises from the impression left by some previous experience.^[20] According to the Jaina logicians definiteness is the essential mark of pramā. The Jainas hold that judgmental cognition which is other than doubt, error, etc., is pramā. In other words, right judgment about an object is pramā.^[21] The Sāṃkhya-Yoga holds that pramā consists in certainty, correspondence to the object and novelty. Vācaspati Miśra (1000 A.D) defines pramā as the cittavṛtti which apprehends an object that is undoubted, real and unknown.^[22]

Pramā is divided into pratyakṣa, anumiti, upamiti, śabda, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi, sambhava, aitihya etc. according to the different systems of Indian philosophy. The last two pramāṇas are accepted only by the Paurāṇikas.

The special cause (karaṇa) of a particular pramā is called pramāṇa.^[23] The Saṃskṛt word pramāṇa is derived from the root mā with a prefix pra and suffix lyut which means the instrument of valid cognition (pramāyāḥ karaṇam). Pramāṇa is generally defined as the karaṇa of a pramā. In other words, pramāṇa is the cause of valid cognition of objects inasmuch as it gives us a cognition of objects as they really are and exist in themselves. Thus the above eight types of pramā is nothing but the result produced by the eight types of pramāṇas such as pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi, sambhava, aitihya.

Though all the systems of Indian philosophy accept pramāṇa as the karaṇa or the special cause of pramā yet there is difference of opinion about the nature of pramāṇa. Here I like to include one of the great Nyāya commentators Vātsyāyana’s (400 A.D) interpretations which are very important in Indian philosophy.

In Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya^[24] successful activity results when the object is cognized by the pramāṇa. There is no cognition of object without the help of pramāṇa, without cognition of object there is no successful activity. On being aware of the object with the help of the instrument of knowledge, the knower wants either to get it or to avoid it. By object is meant pleasure and its cause as well as suffering and its cause. Those objects of pramāṇa are innumerable.

An objection had been raised mainly by the Śūnyavādin Buddhists that the right cognition of pramāṇa is impossible, because there is no way to ascertain their validity. But Vātsyāyana answered that it is possible to establish the validity of pramāṇa with the help of an inference. And the inference as thus: ‘pramāṇam arthavat, pravṛttisāmarthyāt.^[25]

Vātsyāyana says that by the probans ‘pravṛtti-sāmarthya’ probandum ‘pramāṇam arthavat’ has been established. So there should be no doubt about the validity of pramāṇa. If pramāṇa were not valid the successful activities could not be occurred. But successful activities are found to occur; therefore pramāṇas are reliable sources of cognition.

But the question arises that if the validity of pramāṇa is sought to be established with the help of an inference, than, how are we to establish the validity of this inference it-self? It can possibly be done with the help of another inference; but then, to establish the validity of this other inference, a further inference will be necessary, and so on.

The Nyāya answer is that it is not necessary to establish the validity of any and every inference. The need of ascertaining the validity of an inference is felt only when there is doubt as to its validity and doubt does not appeared everywhere.

The numbers of pramāṇas admitted by the different schools of Indian philosophy are different. The Cārvākas accept only one source of valid cognition or pramāṇa i.e. pratyakṣa (perception). The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas admit two sources of valid cognition or pramāṇa i.e. pratyakṣa (perception) and anumāna (inference). The Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Jaina,

Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Śuddhādvaita and the Dvaitādvaita Vedānta schools recognize three sources of valid cognition or pramāṇas i.e. pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference) and śabda (testimony). The Nyāya recognizes four sources of valid cognition or pramāṇas i.e. pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (testimony) and upamāna (comparison). The Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā recognizes five sources of valid cognition or pramāṇas i.e. pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (testimony), upamāna (comparison), and arthāpatti (presumption). The Kumārila school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and the

Advaita school of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā admit six pramāṇas, namely, pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (testimony), upamāna (comparison), arthāpatti (presumption) and anupalabdhi (non-apprehension). The Paurāṇikas admit eight pramāṇas, namely, pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (testimony), upamāna (comparison), arthāpatti (presumption), anupalabdhi (non-apprehension), sambhava (probability) and aitihya (tradition).^[26]

We may now briefly explain this pramāṇas as follows:

i) Pratyakṣa (perception): Pratyakṣa is that cognition which is produced by the contact of a sense organ with an object. It is a direct cognition of reality which is not derived through the medium or instrumentality of any other cognition.

ii) Anumāna (inference): Anumāna literally means the after cognition. In other words, anumāna is the cognition (māna) which we get after (anu) other cognition. It is sometimes defined as cognition which is preceded by perception.

(iii) Śabda (testimony): Śabda is the right cognition which is derived from the utterance of infallible and absolutely truthful persons. In other words, śabda is the right cognition which depends on reliable authority and also depends on ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, āsattiḥ, and tātparya.

(iv) Upamāna (comparison): Upamāna is the means of knowing an unknown object through its resemblance with another well known object. In other words, upamāna is a cognition which arises from the presence of some common factors in a thing, which was experienced previously in another thing. In short, it is the cognition of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.

(v) Arthāpatti (presumption): Arthāpatti as assumption of some unperceived fact in order to reconcile some inconsistency. In other words, arthāpatti is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. For example, when a particular person named Devadatta known to be alive is not found in his house, it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside.

(vi) Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension): Anupalabdhi is an independent source of cognition by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object. In other words, anupalabdhi is the means of knowing the non-existence of an object, which cannot be known by other pramanas. For example, when we say, ‘there is no jar in this place’, we cognize the absence of the jar.

(vii) Sambhava (probability): The Paurāṇikas regard sambhava as a valid source of cognition. They require sambhava to get the knowledge of a part from the knowledge of the whole. If one says that he has five mobile phones in his bag, listening this the listeners remark that it is highly probable that he has one mobile phone in his bag. The Paurāṇikas call this process of knowing as sambhava. Vallabha (12^th Century A.D) holds that an unperturbed knowledge of a segment from a plenteous association of aggregate is regarded as concurrence.^[27] None of the other major systems share the Paurāṇika view. The Buddhists like Śāntarakṣita (749 A.D) and Kamalaśīla (750 A.D) state that the knowledge of a hundred from that of a thousand is inferred in the form of deduction because element of combination lies in the formation of an aggregate.^[28] In the opinion of Vācaspati Miśra, sambhava is included within inference.^[29] Māṭhara^[30] and Jayamaṅgalā^[31] include sambhava within inference. Gauḍapāda (800 A.D) includes sambhava within verbal testimony.^[32]

(viii) Aitihya (tradition): The Paurāṅikas are the profounder of aitihya as an independent means of valid cognition. It is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot be traced. It has no particular speaker but has come from tradition. It is a belief transmitted from generation to generation. “There is a ghost in this tree,” is an example provided to explain the nature of aitihya. None of the other major systems share the Paurāṅika view. Vācaspati Miśra includes aitihya in verbal testimony.^[33] Vācaspati states that aitihya is a mere continuity of a vague statement, the speaker of which is not known. The word aitihya conveys two contrary meanings: (i) the authentic statement and (ii) the popular sayings based on belief only. The authors of Jayamaṅgalā, and the Sāṃkhya-candrikā as well as Gauḍapāda and Vijñānabhikṣu^[34] (1600 A.D) also include aitihya under verbal testimony. Māṭhara includes it under inference.^[35]

From the above discussion, we have seen that the numbers of pramāṇas admitted by the different systems of Indian philosophy are different. But the only one pramāṇa accepted by every system of Indian philosophy is pratyakṣa. In other words, all the schools of Indian philosophy both āstika and nāstika are unanimous about the authenticity of pratyakṣa pramāṇa.^[36] It is the primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid cognition. According to the Naiyāyikas, pratyakṣa is the strongest pramāṇa, because it gives us a direct or immediate cognition of reality and provides the basis of the other sources or means of cognition.^[37] Other pramāṇas e.g., anumiti, upamiti, śabda etc. depend on pratyakṣa. So its importance is great in Nyāya epistemology.

Let us now turn to the stages of pratyakṣa which is the main subject of discussion in this dissertation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, the Mīmāṃsā, the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta recognized two stages of pratyakṣa, namely, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. According to the Buddhists, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is the only mood of pratyakṣa. But the Grammarians admit savikalpaka pratyakṣa as the only possible form of pratyakṣa. According to them, there is no nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. There is difference of opinion among the different systems of Indian philosophy regarding the definition as well as the nature of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. The subject of the work under taken is the nature and critical examination of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as it is held in Nyāya and Buddhist philosophy.

We shall discuss all the issues regarding nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as held by the Naiyāyikas and Buddhists in detail in the following chapters. We may now close this introductory chapter by giving an outline of the work undertaken. Each chapter will contain separate caption of its own.

I have decided to confine my dissertation into six chapters including an introduction and a conclusion.

The first chapter of my dissertation is an introduction. In this chapter I have discussed the definition of cognition, its classification, the nature of pramā and pramāṇa, classification of pramāṇa, definition of pramāṇas, and importance of pratyakṣa pramāṇa in Indian epistemology.

In the second chapter I have discussed Nyāya definition of pratyakṣa. In old Nyāya, pratyakṣa was first defined by Gautama (200 B.C). The Nyāya commentators like Vātsyāyana (400 A.D), Uddyotakara (600 A.D), Udayana (1050 A.D), and Vācaspati Miśra (1000 A.D) have explained this definition in their own ways.

Gautama says in his Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4,

“indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-utpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātma kaṃ pratyakṣam”.^[38]

It means pratyakṣa is that cognition which is produced by the senseobject contact and which is not due to words, which is invariably related to the object and which is well-defined i.e. certain. The definition of pratyakṣa is given first by the author of ‘Nyāya-sūtra’, because without pratyakṣa no other instrument of valid cognition is possible. Hence it is considered strongest among the pramāṇas (pramāṇa-jyeṣṭha).

The above definition of pratyakṣa includes the following terms:

(i) indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ (pratyakṣa is that cognition which is produced from the sense-object contact),

(ii) jñānam (it is the cognition of an object),

(iii) avyapadeśyam (it is not due to words),

(iv) avyabhicāri (it is invariably related to the object), and

(v) vyavasāyātmakaṃ (it is well defined i.e. certain).

I have discussed each one of the above terms following the commentaries of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and some other old Naiyāyikas. In this chapter I have also discussed separately Vācaspati’s view on Gautama’s definition of pratyakṣa. None of the commentators except Vācaspati Miśra in old Nyāya philosophy clearly divided pratyakṣa into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. Vācaspati Miśra was the first old Nyāya thinker who clearly divided pratyakṣa into nirvirkalpaka and savikalpaka. According to him, Gautama in his Nyāya-sūtra (1.1.4) uses the words ‘avyapadeśyam’ and ‘vyavasāyātmakaṃ’ to mean respectively nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Nirvikalpaka is the earlier stage of pratyakṣa and savikalpaka is the latter stage of pratyakṣa.^[39] I have also discussed in this chapter Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s (10^th century A.D) interpretation on ‘avyapadeśyam’ term occurring in the definition of pratyakṣa given by Gautama. In the old Nyāya philosophy we have seen that after Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of kāśhmira gives the various explanations of the term ‘avyapadeśyam’.

In the third chapter I have explained first Gaṅgeśa’s theory of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Gaṅgeśa (1200 A.D), the founder of Navya-Nyāya, at first raises a number of objections against Gautama’s sense-object contact theory of pratyakṣa. And then he offers the definition of pratyakṣa as thus: “pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ”^[40] i.e. pratyakṣa is the direct apprehension or immediate cognition. He further says, “jñānākaraṇakaṃ jñānam iti tu vayam”^[41] i.e. it is such a cognition whose instrumental cause is not any previous cognition.

That is to say the instrumental cause of pratyakṣa is the sense organ, which is not cognition. In other words, pratyakṣa is such a cognition whose instrumental cause is not any other cognition. I have also discussed in this chapter Gaṅgeśa’s view on nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Gaṅgeśa was the first Nyāya thinker who clearly defined nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Gaṅgeśa says in his Tattvacintāmaṇi, pratyakṣa is of two kinds: nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Of this two kinds, “tatra nāmajātyādiyojanārahitaṃ vaiśiṣṭyān-avagāhi niṣprakārakaṃ nirvikalpakam”^[42] i.e.

nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is that pratyakṣa which has no names, universals etc., and which does not have any mode. In other words, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is not a cognition of an entity as qualified. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyakṣa is a cognition of a qualificandum qualified by a qualifier, where the qualifier is provided by a prior cognition.^[43] After the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa Gaṅgeśa offers a number of arguments to prove the actual occurrence of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa which have been discussed in details in this chapter. I have also discussed the views of the latter Naiyāyikas, i.e. Annaṃbhaṭṭa (1623 A.D) and Viśvanātha (1634 A.D) in this regard.

In the fourth chapter I have discussed the Buddhist view of pratyakṣa. In this connection my discussion will particularly cover the renowned Buddhist philosophers such as Dignāga (400 A.D), Dharmakīrti (7^th century A.D) and the Buddhist commentators like Vinītadeva (700 A.D), Dharmottara (847 A.D.), Śāntarakṣita (749 A.D), and Kamalaśīla (750 A.D). The master logician Dignāga defines pratyakṣa as: “pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādyasaṃyutam”^[44] i.e. pratyakṣa is that cognition which is free from conceptual construction (kalpanā) that is from the association of name, class character, genus etc. Dharmakīrti also accepts Dignāga’s definition of pratyakṣa, but adds another epithet ‘abhrānta’(non erroneous) to it. So his definition becomes: “tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam”^[45] i.e. pratyakṣa is that cognition which is free from conceptual construction and which is non-erroneous. Here, kalpanāpoḍha means free from conceptual construction. Dharmakīrti has added ‘abhrānta’ epithet to Dignāga’s definition of pratyakṣa with a view to exclude errors from the category of pratyakṣa. If we look into the definition of Dignāga and the definition of Dharmakīrti, it can be seen that both of them unambiguously highlight the indeterminate character of perception which is “free from conceptual construction” (kalpanāpoḍha). It is a kind of pure sensation–a piece of cognition by which the object is revealed only in its simple and pure nature, devoid of all attributes and associations. Like the sensation of a child or of the dumb, such a piece of cognition can never be verbally communicated inasmuch as any connection with a verbal expression (abhilāpa) would necessarily involve an element of construction. So, the definition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti applies only to the nirvikalpaka form of pratyakṣa. Dharmakīrti further states that “abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā tayā rahitam”^[46] i.e. kalpanā as a distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal expression. Again he says, “timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhita vibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam”^[47] i.e. pratyakṣa is such a cognition as is free from such construction when it is not affected by an illusion produced by colour-blindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, and sickness or other causes.

After the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa Dharmakīrti proceeds to point out its different varieties. According to him, it is of four kinds,^[48] viz.,

(i) sense-perception (indriya-pratyakṣa),

(ii) mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa),

(iii) selfcognition (svasaṃvedana) and

(iv) yogic apprehension (yogījñāna).

In the fifth chapter I have discussed the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, as it is discussed in other systems of Indian philosophy. The discussion on nirvikalpaka is found also in Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta and the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta systems of Indian philosophy. In this chapter we have discussed the nature of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as held by those systems.

The last chapter of my dissertation is conclusive one. In this concluding chapter I have intended to make a comparative study between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists concerning the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. However, strain comparison has always been avoided. In this chapter the evaluation of the Nyāya and Buddhists views on nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa has also been undertaken. The method of this work is exploratory, explanatory and evaluative.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Tattvasaṃgraha, Annaṃbhaṭṭa, Translated and elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya, p. XVIII.

[2]:

“saṃskāramātrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ”. Ibid, p. XVIII.

[3]:

“tadbhinnam jñānam anubhavaḥ”. Ibid, p. XIX.

[4]:

“tadvati tatprakārakaḥ anubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ”. Ibid, p. XIX.

[5]:

“tadabhāvavati tatprakārakaḥ anubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ”. Ibid, p. XIX.

[6]:

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, by Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, p. 157.

[7]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-I, by Jadunath Sinha, p. 312-313.

[8]:

The basic ways of knowing, by Govardhan P. Bhatt, p. 87.

[9]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-II, by S. Radhakrishnan, p. 115-116.

[10]:

Bhāratīya Darśana, by Pradyot Kumar Mandal, p. 194-195.

[11]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-I, by Jadunath Sinha, p. 312.

[12]:

“pramāṇamavisaṃvādijñānaṃ; avisaṃvādanaśabdanirukti”—-Pramāṇavārttika, 1.2.

[13]:

“prāpakaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ”—-Nyāyabinduṭīkā, p. 4.

[14]:

“pramāttvamanadhigatāvādhitārthaviṣayakajñānattvam”.—-Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 4.

[15]:

“yathāvasthitavyavahārānuguṇaṃ jñānaṃ prameti’—-Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 36.

[16]:

“tasmāt dṛḍhaṃ yadutpannaṃ nāpi saṃvādamṛcchati. jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ tatpramāṇaṃ pratiyatām.”—-Ślokavārttika, 2.80.

[17]:

“kāraṇadoṣavādhakajñānarahitama-gṛhitagrāhijñānaṃ pramāṇamiti”. —-Śāstradīpikā, p. 45.

[18]:

Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 35.

[19]:

“anubhūti pramāṇaṃ sā smṛterarṇyā——-.”—-Prakaraṇa pañcikā, 5.1, p.104. “smṛti-vyāvṛttaṃ pramātvam”.—-Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 5.

[20]:

“anubhūtiḥ pramāṇaṃ sā smṛteranyā smṛtiḥ punaḥ. pūrvavijñānasaṃskāramātrajaṃ jñānamucyate”.—-Prakaraṇa pañcikā, p. 127.

[21]:

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, p. 3. Collected from Pushpa Bothra’s ‘The Jaina Theory of Perception’, p. 21.

[22]:

“taccāsandigdhāviparītānadhigataviṣayā cittavṛttiḥ”.—-Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī under Sāṃkhyakārikā Kārikā 5.

[23]:

Annaṃbhaṭṭa (1623 A.D) in his ‘Tarkasaṃgraha’ says “asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam”, i.e. a karaṇa is conceived as the unique or uncommon cause through the action of which a particular effect is produced.

[24]:

Nyāya Philosophy, Part–I, by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya & Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, p. 6.

[25]:

Quoted from Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkabāgīśa’s ‘Nyāyadarśana, Prathama Khaṇḍa, p. 1.

[26]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol. -I, by S. Radhakrishnan, p. 112.

[27]:

“prācura-sāhacarya sambhedanāt buddhir abādhitā sambhavaḥ yathā sambhavati meghejalaṃ iti”.—-Nyāyalīlāvatī, p. 542.

[28]:

“samudāya vyavasthāyā hetavaḥ samudāyinaḥ śatādi sambhava jñānam sahasrāt kārya liṅgajam”.—-Ts, p. 590. Quoted from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’, p. 226.

[29]:

“sā cānumānameva”.—-Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 5.

[30]:

“sāpyanumānameva”.—-Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṃkhyakārikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 4.

[31]:

Jayamaṅgalā on Sāṃkhyakārikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 4.

[32]:

“sambhava————āptavacane”.—-Gauḍapadabhāṣya on Sāṃkhyakārikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 4.

[33]:

“āptavaktṛkatvaniścayetvāgama eva”.—-Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 5.

[34]:

“aitihyādinām cānumānaśabdayoḥ praveśaḥ”.—-SPB, 1. 88.

[35]:

“aitihyam yathā asminvate yakṣiṇī prativasatīti janā vadantītyukte sā vighnam karoti dhanādi yacchatitijñānam tadapyanumānameva”.—-Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṃkhyakārikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 4.

[36]:

“pratyakṣasya pramāṇeṣu jyeṣṭhatvāditi”.—-Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 6.

[37]:

“sarvapramānānāṃ pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt”.——Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, 1.1.3.

[38]:

Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4. Quoted from Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkabāgīśa’s ‘Nyāyadarśana, Prathama Khaṇḍa, p. 104.

[39]:

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol-1, by Surendranath Dasgupta, p. 337.

[40]:

Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 330.

[41]:

Ibid, p. 334.

[42]:

Quoted from Sibajiban Bhattacharyya’s ‘Gaṅgeśa’s theory of Indeterminate Perception’, Part-Two, p. 4.

[43]:

“savikalpakaṃ ca viśiṣṭa-jñānaṃ yathā gaur ayam iti. tac ca sāmānyādīnāṃ paramārtha-sattvena arthajatvād indriyajatvāc ca pratyakṣam. kvacit saṃskāra-sahakāri-vaśena tattā-viśiṣṭasya idantā-viśiṣṭā-bhedôllekhī aindriyako vikalpaḥ”.—-Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 658.

[44]:

Pramāṇasamuccaya, verse 3. Quoted from Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣana’s ‘A History of Indian logic’, p. 277.

[45]:

Nyāyabindu, p. 8.

[46]:

Ibid, p. 11.

[47]:

Ibid, p. 14.

[48]:

Buddhist Logic, Vol-II, by TH. Stcherbatsky, p. 25-33.