2. Debate with the Personalist

The Personalist. – How do you know there is no Ātman?

1^st Argument. – Each person in particular conceives the idea of ātman in respect to his own person (svakāya), and not in respect to that of another. Therefore if he wrongly considers as ātman the non-ātman of his own person, he ought also to wrongly consider as ātman the non-ātman of another.

2^nd Argument. – If there is no inner (ādhyātma) ātman, (given that) the cognition of colors arises and perishes from moment to moment (kṣaṇotpannaniruddha), how does one distinguish and recognize the color blue (nīla), yellow (pīta), red (lohita) or white (avadāta)?

3^rd Argument. – If there is no ātman, and since the evolving human consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna), constantly arising and ceasing, all disappear with the life of the body, who is bound by the actions – sins (āpatti) or merits (puṇya)? Who endures suffering (duḥkha) or happiness (sukha)? Who is liberated (vimukta)?

For all of these reasons, we know that the ātman exists.

ANSWER:

Refutation of the 1^st Argument.

1) The difficulty is common to us, for if the man conceived the idea of ātman with reference to another person, one must still ask why he does not conceive the idea of ātman in reference to his own person.^[1]

2. Furthermore, arising from causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpānna), the five aggregates (skandha) are empty (śūnya) and are not ātman.^[2] But because of ignorance (avidyā), the twenty kinds of satkāyadṛṣṭi (belief in “me” and “mine”) arise.^[3] This satkāyadṛṣṭi arises relative to the five aggregates. Since it arises from the five aggregates, it is these five aggregates and not the person of another that is considered to be the ātman, and that is due to the impregnations (vāsanā) of [ignorance].

3. Furthermore, if there were any ātman [whatsoever], the ātman of a third person should exist; but without even knowing if your own ātman exists or not, you are questioning me about the ātman of a third person. It is as if somebody, questioned about the horns of a rabbit (haśviṣāṇa), should answer that they are like the horns of a horse (aśvaviṣāṇa). If the horns of a horse really existed, one could resort to them to establish [the existence] of the horns of a rabbit; but if the horns of a horse are also uncertain (avyakta), how could one resort to them to establish the horns of a rabbit?

4. Furthermore, it is because the man conceives the idea of ātman in reference to his own person that he himself affirms the existence of the ātman. But you are speaking of a universal (vyāpin) ātman which should also be attributed to other people. This is why one cannot say that the fact of conceiving the idea of ātman in reference to one’s own person and not in reference to [148c] another’s person proves the existence of the ātman.

5. Furthermore, there are people in whom the idea of atman arises in reference to something [other than themselves]: thus, heretic contemplatives (tīrthikadhyāyin), practicing the seeing of the totality of earth (pṛthivīkṛtsnāyatana), see the earth as being the ātman and the ātman as being the earth,^[4] and the same also for water, fire, wind and space. But it is out of error (viparyāsa) that the idea of ātman is conceived in reference to another.

6. Moreover, there are circumstances (samaya) where the idea of self is conceived in reference to another.

[The man whose limbs were replaced by those of a corpse].

Thus there are circumstances where one conceives the idea of self in reference to another. But under the pretence that there are distinctions between “that” and “this”, one cannot say that there is a “me”.

7. Finally, the true nature (bhūtasvabhāva) of the ātman cannot be established with precision (niyama); one cannot establish whether it is eternal (nitya) or transitory (anitya) independent (svatantra) or dependent (asvatantra), [149a] active (kāraka) or inactive (akāraka), substantial (rūpin) or non-substantial (arūpin), and other characteristics (nimitta) of this kind. Where there are characteristics (nimitta), there is reality (dharma); but without characteristics, there is no reality. Since the ātman has no characteristics, we know that it does not exist.

a. If the ātman were eternal (nitya), the sin of murder (vadhāpatti) would not exist. Why? The body can be killed bcause it is transitory, whereas the ātman would be indestructible because eternal.

Question. – Without a doubt, the ātman which is eternal cannot be killed, but the sin of murder is only killing the body.

Answer. – If killing the body were murder, why does the Vinaya say that suicide (ātmavadha) is not murder? (see appendix on suicide) Sin (āpatti) and merit (puṇya) result from evil done to another (paraviheṭhana) or good done to another (parahita) respectively. It is not by taking care of one’s own body or by killing one’s own body that one gains merit or commits a sin. This is why the Vinaya says that suicide is not a sin of murder but is tainted with ignorance (moha), desire (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa).

If the ātman were eternal, it would not die and would not be reborn. Why? Because according to your system, the ātman which is eternal, completely fills the five destinies (gati); how would there be birth and death? Death (cyuti) consists of leaving this place, and birth (upapatti) consists of appearing in that place. This is why it cannot be said that the ātman is eternal.

If the ātman were eternal, it would be unable to experience sorrow (duḥkha) and happiness (sukha). Why? When sorrow prevails, one is sad, and when happiness prevails, one is joyful. But that which is modified (vikṛta) by sorrow and joy is not eternal.

If the ātman were eternal, it would be like space (ākāśasama); rain would not moisten it and heat would not dry it up. There would be no hither (ihatra) or thither (paratra) in it. If the ātman were eternal, it could not be reborn over there or die here.

If the ātman were eternal, the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) would exist permanently and one would never be able to attain nirvāṇa.

If the Ātman were eternal, it would be without arising (utpāda) and ceasing (nirodha) and there would be no falsehood or error, for there must be non-self (anātman) and impermanence (anitya) for there to be forgetfulness and error.

Therefore the ātman is not eternal and, for many reasons of this kind, we know that the ātman is not eternal.

b. If the ātman were transitory (anitya), there would, again, be neither sin (āpatti) nor merit (puṇya). The body (kāya) being impermanent and likewise the ātman, both would perish together [at death] and final annihilation (ucchedānta) would be reached. Swallowed up in this annihilation, one would not go on to future existences (parajanman) and undergo there [the retribution] of sins and merits. If this annihilation were nirvāṇa, it would not be necessary to cut the bonds (bandhanadamuccheda), and one would only commit sins and merits, the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of future existences. For many reasons of this kind, we know that the ātman is not transitory.

c. If the ātman were independent (svatantra) and active (kāraka), it would be able to have everything according to its desires. Now it does not [always] get what it wants and it [often] gets what it does not want.

If the ātman were independent, no one would commit evil deeds and fall into the bad animal destinies (tiryagyonidurgati).

Furthermore, every being hates suffering (duḥkha); but whoever seeks happiness (sukha) finds suffering. This is how we know that the ātman is neither independent nor active.

[149b] Moreover, out of fear of punishment, people make an effort to practice the good. If it were independent, why would it be forced to cultivate merits (puṇyabhāvana) out of fear of punishment?

Finally, beings do not realize their wishes (manoratha); they are pulled about (ākṣipta) by the afflictions (kleśa) and the bonds of craving (tṛṣṇābandhana). For many reasons of this kind, we know that the ātman is neither independent nor active.

d. Is the ātman dependent (asvatantra) and inactive (akāraka)? No, those are not the characteristics of the ātman. What is called the ātman is not different from the six consciousnesses (ṣaḍvijñāna).

Moreover, if the ātman is inactive, why does king Yen lo (Yama)^[6] ask the fisherman: “Who commanded you to commit this sin?” And the fisherman answered: “I myself committed it.” This is why we know that the ātman is not inactive

e. It is not correct that the ātman is substantial (rūpin). Why? Because all substance is transitory (anitya).

Question. – Why do people say: substantiality is one of my own characteristics?

Answer. – Some say that the ātman resides in the mind (citta) and that it is as fine (sūkṣma) as a mustard grain (sarṣapa); pure (viśuddha), it is called subtle material body (prasādarūpakāya). According to other opinions, it is like a grain of wheat (yava), a bean (māṣa, masūra) half an inch high (ardhāṅguṣṭha), an inch high (aṅguṣṭha).^[7] As soon as it takes on a body, it resumes its former form, the way the skeleton of an elephant (gajāsthi), when it has reached its complete form, is like that of the entire elephant. Some say that the size [of the subtle body] corresponds to that of the human body and that after death the dimensions re-appear. But all of that is wrong (ayukta). Why? Because all matter (rūpa) is made of the four great elements (mahābhūta); being the result of causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna), all matter is impermanent (anitya). If the ātman were material, since matter is transitory, the ātman too would be transitory. For this hypothesis, see what has been said above (p. 743F).

Question. – There are two types of bodies (kāya), the coarse body (sthūlaśarīra) and the subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra). The coarse body is transitory (anitya), but the subtle body is the ātman; eternally it passes from existence to existence and penetrates the five destinies (gati).^[8]

Answer. – This subtle body does not exist (nopalabhyate). If the subtle body existed, there should be a place (sthāna) where it could be found, as is the case for the five internal organs or the four parts of the body. But we may search for it everywhere without finding it.

Question. – This subtle body is extremely fine (paramasūkṣma). At death, when it has gone, how would you see it if, during life, you couldn’t find it? Besides, the five organs can neither see nor cognize this subtle body; only the ārya endowed with the superknowledges (abhijñā) could see it.

Answer. – If that is so, it is no different than nothing at all. When a person, at the moment of death, abandons the aggregates (skandha) of the present existence to enter into the aggregates of the intermediate existence (antarābhava),^[9] there is no relationship of anteriority or posteriority between the moment when the body of the actual existence disappears and when it assumes the body of the intermediate existence: the birth occurs at the same time as the disappearance. It is as if one presses a wax seal (mudrā) onto clay and, the clay having received the imprint, the imprint were to be broken at once; the impression and the disappearance of the imprint are simultaneous, without anteriority or posteriority. At the very same moment when one takes on the aggregates and the mode of being of the intermediate existence, one abandons the aggregates of the intermediate existence (antarābhava) to assume the mode of being of existence-birth (upapattibhava). You say that the subtle body constitutes this intermediate existence, but this [alleged] body of intermediate existence comes [from nowhere] and goes [nowhere]. It is like the burning of a lamp (dīpa) characterized by a succession of productions and disappearances (utpādanirodha-prabandha), without permanence (śāśvata), but also without interruption (uccheda).^[10]

[149c] Finally, the Buddha said: “Whether past, future or present, coarse or subtle, all substance is transitory.”^[11] Therefore your [alleged] subtle matter constituting the ātman would also be transitory and perishable.

For many reasons of this kind we know that the ātman is not substantial.

f. Neither is the ātman non-substantial (arūpin). The four aggregates (skandha)^[12] and the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) factors are non-substantial. The four aggregates in question, being impermanent (anitya), dependent (asvatantra), dependent on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpekṣa) cannot be the ātman. As for the three non-conditioned factors, they cannot be considered as being the ātman because they are not taken on (upātta). For many reasons of this kind we know that the ātman is not non-substantial.

Search for the ātman in the heavens or on earth, inside (adhyātmam) or outside (bahirdhā), in the three times (tryadhva) or the ten directions (daśadiś), you will never find it anywhere. Only the coming together of the twelve bases of consciousness [dvādaśāyatana, i.e., the six sense organs and their respective objects] produce the six consciousnesses (ṣaḍvijñāna). The coming together of the three [trisaṃnipāta, or the coming together of the organs, the objects and the consciousnesses] is called contact (sparśa). Contact produces feeling (vedanā), concept (saṃjñā), the act of attention (cetanā) and other mental dharmas (caitta, caitasikadharma).^[13] According to the Buddhist system (ihadharma), it is by the power of ignorance (avidyā) that satkāyadṛṣṭi (belief in me and mine) arises. As a result of satkāyadṛṣṭi, the existence of ātman is affirmed. This satkāyadṛṣṭi is destroyed by seeing the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatyadarśana, the knowledge of the law relating to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñāna) and the subsequent knowledge relating to suffering (duḥkhe ’nvayajñāna). When satkāyadṛṣṭi is destroyed, one no longer believes in the ātman.

Refutation of the 2^nd argument.

Above (p. 736F) you said: “If there is no inner (adhyātma) ātman, given that the consciousness of colors arises and perishes from moment to moment (kṣaṇotpannaniruddha), how does one distinguish and cognize the color blue, yellow, red or white?” But if the ātman existed, neither could it cognize it by itself; it would have to depend (āśrī) on the visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna) to be able to cognize it. If that is so, the ātman is futile (niṣprayajana). The visual consciousness cognizes color; color arises and perishes, and [the visual consciousness] arises in similarity with it and perishes in similarity with it. However, in the mind that [immediately] follows, there arises a dharma called memory (smṛti); this memory is a conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharma; although it perishes and disappears, this memory is capable of cognizing.^[14] In the same way that the ārya, by the power of his wisdom (prajñābala), is able to cognize future things (anāgatadharma), so successive moments of memory are able to cognize past moments (atītadharma). On disappearing, the previous visual consciousness gives birth to the subsequent visual consciousness. This subsequent visual consciousness is endowed with power by the energy of its activity (pravṛttikṣṇatvāt) and, although the color is temporary and unstable, it can be cognized thanks to the energy of memory. This is why, while arising and ceasing from moment to moment and despite its impermanence, consciousness can distinguish and cognize color.

Refutation of the 3^rd argument.

You said (p. 736F): “If there were no Ātman, since the evolcing human consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna), which are always arising and perishing, all disappear with the life of the body, who then is related to actions – sins or merits? Who endures the suffering (duḥkha) or enjoys the happiness (sukha)? Who is liberated (vimukta)?” Now we will reply.

1. In the person who has not yet obtained the true Path (mārga), the afflictions (kleśa) cover over (āvṛṇvanti) the mind (citta); he performs actions (karman) that are the causes and condition for his rebirth (jātihetupratyaya); after death, the five aggregates [of the future existence] arise from the series of five aggregates (pañcaskandhasaṃtāna) of the present existence in the same way that one lamp lights another. And in the same way that, in the production of rice (śāli), three causes and conditions intervene, namely, soil (bhūmi), water (vāri) and seed (bīja), so for a future existence to be produced, a body (kāya), defiled actions (sāsravakarman) and the fetters (saṃyojana) are necessary. Of these three causes and conditions, the body and actions cannot be cut through, cannot be suppressed; only the fetters can be cut through. When the fetters are cut through, even though a body and actions remain, one can obtain liberation [150a] (vimukti). If there is a rice seed (śālibīja) and earth (bhūmi), but water (vāri) is missing, the rice will not grow. Similarly also, despite the presence of a body (kāya) and despite the presence of actions (karman), one is not reborn when the water of the fetters (saṃyojana) has dried up. Thus, even though there is no ātman, one can obtain liberation (vimukti). Bondage (bandhana) is due to ignorance (avidyā); liberation is due to wisdom (prajñā); the ātman plays no part.

2. Finally, the complex of name-and-form (nāmarūpasāmagrī) is commonly (prajñaptitaḥ) called pudgala (person, individual). This pudgala is chained by all the bonds (bandhana); but when it has found the tab of pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñānakha), it unties all the knots; from that time onward, this person has found liberation (vimukti). It is like a rope which one knots or unknots (rajjuninirmocana): the rope is the knot, and the knot is not something distinct (bhinnadharma); but in common usage (loka), we say: to tie the rope, to untie the rope. It is the same for name-and-form (nāmarūpa): the coming together of these two things, i.e., name (nāman) and form, is commonly called (prajñaptitaḥ) pudgala, but the fetters are not something different from name-and-form. With regard to name-and-form, it is just a matter of being chained [by the fetters] or liberated [from the fetters].

It is the same for receiving punishment or reward. Although no dharma is truly pudgala, it is by means of name-and-form that one gathers the fruit of sins and merits; and yet the pudgala has the name of the gatherer. It is like the chariot (ratha) that carries goods: by examining it piece by piece, there is no real chariot [distinct from its constitutive parts]; nevertheless, the chariot has the name of the transporter of goods. In the same way, the pudgala receives punishment and reward [in the sense that] name-and-form receive punishment or reward, whereas the pudgala has [merely] the name of receiver. It is the same for what feels suffering or happiness.

For many reasons of this kind, the ātman is non-existent. [Here] ātman means the donor (dāyaka), but it is the same for the recipient (pratigrāhaka). According to you, the ātman is the pudgala. This is why the pudgala who gives is non-existent and the pudgala who receives is non-existent. For many reasons of this kind, it is said that the thing given, the donor and the recipient do not exist.

Question. – If, among all the dharmas, the gift has as the true nature as its characteristic (tathatālakṣaṇa), if it is indestructible, non-perishable, unborn and uncreated, why do you say that the three elements [of which it is constituted], namely gift, donor and recipient] are broken and non-existent?

Answer. – If ordinary people (pṛthagjana) [think] they see a donor, a recipient and a gift, that is an error (viparyāsa) and a wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi); they are reborn in this world (loka) and enjoy happiness here; but when their merit (puṇya) is exhausted, they go backward. This is why the Buddha wants to lead the bodhisattva to follow the true Path (satyamārga) and obtain the true fruit of reward (vipākaphala). The true fruit of retribution is Buddhahood. To destroy wrong views, the Buddha says that the three things (donor, beneficiary and gift] do not exist and are truly indestructible. Why? Because from the very beginning (āditaḥ), all dharmas are absolutely empty (atyantaśūnya). For innumerable reasons of this kind, they are non-existent, and that is what is meant by perfection of the virtue of generosity.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Āryadeva meets this objection in his Catuḥśataka, v. 228 (cited in Madh. vṛtti, p. 199):
yas tavātmā mamānātmā tenātmā niyamān na saḥ,
nanv anityeṣu bhāveṣu nāma jāyate.

“What is self for you is non-self for me; therefore it is not certain that it concerns a self. Do these hypotheses not arise on the basis of impermanent things?”

[2]:

To understand the discussion that follows, one should remember that the idea of the self applies to the five skandhas, the elements constituting the individual, namely, substance or body (rūpa), perception (saṃjñā), feeling (vedanā), formations (saṃskāra) and consciousness (vijñāna). A synonymous expression is “name-and-form” (nāmarūpa) which the Mppś will use later. Nāman is the four non-material skandhas, perception, feeling, formations and consciousness; Rūpa is the material skandha, the body or substance.

[3]:

Satkāyadṛṣṭi, the etymology of which is obscure (cf. Kośa, V, p. 15, n. 2) means the belief in “me” and “mine” (ātmātmīyagrāha). See Majjhima, III, p. 17; Saṃyutta, III, p. 16; Vibhaṅga, p. 364; Dhammasaṅgaṇi, p. 320; Paṭisaṃbhidā, I, p. 143–149; Mahāvyutpatti, no. 1684–4704; P’i p’o cha, T 1545, k. 8, p. 36–49 (tr. J. Rahder, La satkāyadṛṣṭi d’après Vibhāṣā, 8, in MCB, I, 1931–32, p. 227–239; Kośa, V, p. 15–17; Siddhi, p. 348

The satkāyadṛṣṭi takes as ātman either the five skandhas or one of the five skandhas: it has twenty aspects or “points” on which scholars disagree; the Pāli system counts four different aspects for each of the five skandhas: 1) rūpa is ātman; 2) ātman is endowed with rūpa; 3) rūpa is within the ātman; 4) the ātman is within rūpa, and so on for each of the other four skandhas. The Abhidharma system is explained in Mahāvyutpatti and Vibhāṣā (l.c.) and is more complicated.

[4]:

On the power of these contemplatives, see above, p. 731F.

[5]:

In its version of this macabre story, the Mppś is very close to Tchong king siuan tsa p’i yu king, T 208, no. 3, p. 531c–532a (tr. Chavannes, Contes, II, p. 72–74). The story is summarized in King liu yi siang, T 2121, k. 46, p. 241a–b. – According to the legend of Aśoka, the victim of the story was the son of a noble family of Mathurā: he had become a monk under Upagupta, but decided to return to the world; on going home, he stopped for the night in the temple of a deva, where two yakṣas appeared and substituted his body for that of a corpse. The next day, he returned to Upagupta and, completely detached from his body, he attained arhathood: cf. A yu wang tchouan, T 2042, k. 6, p. 122b (tr. Przysluski, Aśoka, p. 381–382); A yu wang king, T 2043, k. 9, p. 165b.

[6]:

Yama, king of death and the hells in Hindu mythology (cf. Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 171–174; Hopkins, Epic Mythology, p. 107–116): he plays only a minor role in the Buddhist pantheon (see Malalasekera, II, p. 680–681; Akanuma, p. 777a).

[7]:

Here we have a very clear allusion to the speculations of the Upaniṣads which often contrast the Brahman, world soul, with the brahman, the psychic principle; as such the Being dwells in the citadel of the body (puriśayaḥ puruṣaḥ: Praśna Up., V, 5), in the lotus of the heart (daharaṃ puṇḍaīkaṃ puruṣaḥ: Cāndogya Up. VIII, 1, 1). It is tiny (vāmana: Katha Up. V, 3) a span in length (pradeśamātra: Cāndogya Up. V, 18, 1), an inch high (aṅguṣṭhamātra: Katha Up. IV, 12), smaller than a grain of rice, than a grain of wheat, than a millet seed aṇiyayān vrīher yavād vā sarṣapād vā śyāmākataṇādulādd vā: Śvetāś. Up. III, 14, 3), the size of a needle-point (ārāgramātra: Candogya Up. V., 8). It is the vital wind (prāṇa: Kauṣitakī Up. III, 9), the witness (sākṣin), the person who appears in the pupil of the eye (ya eṣo ‘kṣaṇi puruṣo dṛśyata: Cāndogya Up. Iv, 15, 1).

In the Buddhist texts references are rarely found as clear as in the rantings of the Upaniṣads.

[8]:

The Vedānta accepts the existence of this subtle body; at the same time as the indriyas, the seeds of the organs of the coarse body, the soul carries with it at death the subtle body composed of subtle particles of the elements, which will be the seeds of a new coarse body. The subtle body is material but transparent; thus no one can see it when it exits. The animal heat belongs to it: if the corpse is cold, it is because the subtle body, enveloping the soul and the organs, has abandoned the coarse body. Cf. Śaṃkara ad Brahmasūtra, I, 4, 1: IV, 2, 9; P. Deussen, Das System des Vedānta, 1883, p. 399–404. – The Sāṃkhya also believe in the existence of a subtle body that does not come from the parents but results from a projection; cf. Sāṃkhyapravachanabhāṣya, III, 7, ed. R. Garbe, p. 89; Sāṃkhyasūtra, V, 103, ed. R. Garbe, p. 241.

[9]:

Some Buddhists are of the opinion that between existence-death and existence-birth there is an intermediate existence (antarābhava) – a body, five skandhas – that goes to the place of rebirth; this theory is proposed mainly by the Sāṃmitīyas (cf. Kathāvatthu, II, p. 361). But most of the sects do not agree, deny this antarābhava (see Kośa, III, p. 32, n) for the good reason that birth immediately follows the death.

[10]:

In its reasoning and its examples, the Mppś seems to take its inspiration directly from the Madh.vṛtti, p. 544: tatrabimbapratibimbanyāyena svādhyāyadīpamudrāpratimudrādinyāyena vā maraṇāntikeṣu skandheṣu nirudhyamāneṣv ekasminn eva kṣaṇe tulādaṇḍanāmonnāmanyāyenaiva avpapattyāṃśikāḥ skandhā yathākarmākṣepata upajāyante: “In the example of the image and the reflection or the example of reading and the lamp, the seal and the impression, etc., when the present skandhas are destroyed at death, at that very moment, as is the case for the (simultaneous) rising and falling of the pans of a balance, the skandhas relating to birth are produced by a projection in harmony with the actions.”

For the example of the image and the reflection (bimbapratibimba), see Kośa, III, p. 34: for the example of the seal and the impression (mudrāpratimudrā), Lalitavistara, p. 176, l. 15; Madh. vṛtti, p. 428, 551; for the example of the pans of a balance (tulādaṇḍa), Madh. avatāra, p. 94 (tr. LAV., Muséon, 1910, p. 291–292).

Also according to the Visuddhimagga (p. 604), birth immediately follows death and there is no intermediary (tesaṃ antarikā natthi).

[11]:

Cf. Vinaya, I, p. 14; Saṃyutta, II, p. 252, 253; III, p. 47, 68, 80. 89; IV, p. 382: Yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītÌāgatapaccuppannam ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dāre sāntīke vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ n’ etaṃ mama n’ eso ‘ham asmi na me so attāti.

[12]:

I.e., saṃjñā, vedanā, saṃskarā and vijñāna; cf. above, p. 77F, n. 2.

[13]:

Extract of a sūtra the Sanskrit version of which is known to us by the Vijñānakāya (tr. LAV., EA, I, p. 370) and Kośa, III, p. 105; IX, p. 245: cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam, trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ vedanā saṃjñā cetanā. The Pāli version which is slightly different occurs in Saṃyutta, II, p. 72; Iv, p. 33, 67–69, 86–87, 90: cakkhuṃ ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṃgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇha, ayaṃ kho dukkhasso samudayo.

[14]:

For the problem of memory, see Kośa, IX, p. 273 sq.