Sahitya-kaumudi by Baladeva Vidyabhushana

by Gaurapada Dāsa | 2015 | 234,703 words

Baladeva Vidyabhusana’s Sahitya-kaumudi covers all aspects of poetical theory except the topic of dramaturgy. All the definitions of poetical concepts are taken from Mammata’s Kavya-prakasha, the most authoritative work on Sanskrit poetical rhetoric. Baladeva Vidyabhushana added the eleventh chapter, where he expounds additional ornaments from Visv...

भेदाव् इमौ च सादृश्यात् सम्बन्धान्तरतस् तथा ।
गौणौ शुद्धौ च विज्ञेयौ ॥ २.१२abc ॥

bhedāv imau ca sādṛśyāt sambandhāntaratas tathā |
gauṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau ||2.12abc||

bhedau imau—these two varieties; ca—(a verse filler); sādṛśyāt—because of a similarity; sambandha-antarataḥ—because of another connection; tathā—and; gauṇau—are qualitative; śuddhau—are pure; ca—and; vijñeyau—should be understood.

Those two varieties should be understood as gauṇa (qualitative) and śuddha (pure). Gauṇa-lakṣaṇā takes place because of a similarity, and śuddha-lakṣaṇā because of another kind of connection.

imāv āropādhyavasāna-rūpau bhedau sādṛśyāt sambandhād gauṇau, sambandhāntaras tu śuddhau. tatra gauṇau darśitau. śuddhau yath “āyur ghṛtam” “āyur evedam” ity-ādau. atra sādṛśyād anyat kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvādi-sambandhāntaraṃ tat-pūrvake āropādhyavasāne. evaṃ “hari-bhakti-mahatsaṅgaḥ” “hari-bhaktir evāyam” ity-ādau ca, asmin bheda-dvaye’nya-vailakṣaṇyenāvyabhicāreṇa ca kārya-kāritvādi phalam.

kvacit tādarthyāt sambandhād upacāraḥ. yathā “indrārthāḥ sthūṇā indraḥ” “kṛṣṇa-sevārtho vyāpāraḥ kṛṣṇa-sevā.” atreṣṭārthapradatvam. kvacit sva-svāmi-bhāvāt. yathā “rāja-sevako rājā” “hari-sevako hariḥ.” atrānullaṅghyājñatvādi. kvacid avayavāvayavibhāvāt. yathā “hastāgre hastaḥ” “jagad viṣṇuḥ.” atra hasta-vyāpārakāri-sāmarthyādi. kvacit tātkarmyāt. yathā “brāhmaṇo’pi takṣāsau” “īśvaro’pi kṣatriyo’sau.” atra tat-karma-naipuṇyam.

Those two varieties, in the form of a superimposition (āropa) and an introsusception (adhyavasāna), are qualitative (gauṇa) because of a similarity (sādṛśya), which is the connection, or are pure (śuddha) only in the sense that the connection is different than similarity. Of the two, sāropā gauṇa-lakṣaṇā and sādhyavasānā gauṇa-lakṣaṇā have been illustrated (“The outsider is an ox” and “the ox”).

An example of sāropā śuddha-lakṣaṇā is: āyur ghṛtam (ghee is longevity), and an instance of sādhyavasānā śuddha-lakṣaṇā is: āyur evedam (the longevity): Here sāropā lakṣaṇā and sādhyavasānā lakṣaṇā involve another kind of connection, different from similarity (and are therefore śuddhā), such as kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva (the relation of cause and effect).[1] A similar instance of cause and effect is: “Associating with a great soul is devotional service to Hari,” and “This is devotional service to Hari.”

In sāropā śuddha-lakṣaṇā (“Ghee is longevity”), the result (the implied sense) is the idea of bringing about the effect, and so on, in a much better way than anything else does. In sādhyavasānā śuddha-lakṣaṇā (“the longevity”), the result is the notion of invariably bringing about the effect, and so on.

Sometimes a figurative superimposition (upacāra)[2] takes place from a connection such as tādarthya (being for the sake of that). An example is: “The sacrificial posts are Indras.” Here the things referred to are sacrificial posts for the sake of a sacrifice to Indra. Another such example is: kṛṣṇa-sevā, “service to Kṛṣṇa” which signifies some particular activity for the sake of serving Kṛṣṇa. In this one (tādarthya), the result is the idea of being something that eminently gives the desired goal.[3]

Sometimes the connection is the relation of sva-svāmī (master and servant; or owner and owned). Examples are “the king,” when in fact the person is the king’s servant, and “Hari,” when the person is a servant of Hari. In this one, the result is the notion of being someone whose orders should not be transgressed.

Sometimes the connection is the relation of avayavāvayavī (mentioning the whole instead of a part) (synecdoche), such as “This is the hand” when only the fingers are referred to. In this one, the result is the idea of having the ability to do the function of a hand.[4] Another example is: “The universe is Viṣṇu.”

Sometimes the connection is tātkarmya (being one whose activity is like the well-known activity of another): “He is a carpenter,” although the pronoun “he” refers to a Brāhmaṇa. Another example is: “He is a Kṣatriya,” although the person is the Lord. In this one, the result is the ideas of an expertise in working wood and a skill in a Kṣatriya’s activities respectively.

Commentary:

Patañjali states these four kinds of connections: (1) tātsthyam (being located there), with the examples: mañcā hasanti (The beds laugh, i.e. the babies on the beds laugh) and girir dahyate (The mountain is burning, i.e. the trees on the mountain are burning), (2) tāddharmyam (having a similar attribute): jaṭī brahmadattaḥ, “Brahmadatta is an ascetic” (by virtue of having dreadlocks), (3) tat-sāmīpyam (proximity to that): gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ (the cowherd settlement on the Ganges), and (4) tat-sāhacaryam (going along with it): kuntān praveśaya (Make the spears enter) and yaṣṭīḥ praveśaya (Make the lances enter) (Mahā-bhāṣya 4.1.48).

Mammaṭa’s category of tātkarmya is included in Patañjali’s tāddharmya (similarity of attribute), which includes a similarity of either guṇa (quality) or kriyā (action or state of being): dharmo guṇa-kriyā-rūpaḥ, “An attribute is either a quality or an action” (Sāhitya-darpaṇa 10.48).

Patañjali does not discuss the topic of implied sense. Pīyūṣa-varṣa Jayadeva points out that in Indication sometimes the implied sense is negligible.[5] This marks the difference between the lakṣaṇā of grammar and the lakṣaṇā of poetics, because although in poetics the implied sense of purposeful Indication is either subtle or unsubtle (2.18), an unsubtle implied sense of poetics is not negligible (2.20).

Another example of the connection called sāmīpya (proximity) is: na nivāso gurāv api, “The gopīs did not reside near a spiritual master” (Bhāgavatam 10.23.43), where the word gurau (in a guru) means guru-samīpe (near a guru).

Many more types of connections that explain a figurative usage exist. Mukula Bhaṭṭa refers to a verse, ascribed to Bhartṛmiśra, where five connections between the main meaning and the indirect sense are stated. Notably, this is Mukula Bhaṭṭa’s example of the third category, samavāya (inherence): chattriṇo yānti, “Those who have umbrellas are going.” Mukula Bhaṭṭa explains this as the law of the majority (perhaps not everyone of them has an umbrella).[6] The fourth category is vaiparītya (opposite sense, i.e. irony): Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa gives examples of reverse figurative usage (viparītalakṣaṇā) (4.3; 4.83). The fifth category is kriyā-yoga (connection through an action): mahati samare śatrughnas tvam, “In a great war, you are a Śatrughna” (Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātṛkā 10). The category of kriyā-yoga is the same as Mammaṭa’s tātkarmya.

The last example by Mukula is a form of synecdoche, such as: “He is an Einstein.” Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa mentions the opposite variety of that synecdoche, sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva (mentioning the general instead of the specific) (Commentary 4.2). Not all aspects of synecdoche are included under avayavāvayavin. An instance of mentioning a part instead of the whole, included in avayavāvayavin, is in Commentary 10.212.

The Nyāya-sūtra lists ten kinds of connections: sahacaraṇa-sthānatādarthya-vṛtta-māna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya-yoga-sādhanādhipatyebhyo brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa-rāja-sukta-candana-gaṅgā-śakaṭānna-puruṣeṣv atad-bhāve’pi tad-upacāraḥ (Nyāya-sūtra 2.2.63).

In Nyāya, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s example “The universe is Viṣṇu” is explained by the connection of ādhipatya (rulership). Otherwise Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s example is best explained by the relation of “container and contained” (ādhārādheya-bhāva), which is characterized by samavāya (inherence).[7] This is because the part (the universe) is pervaded by the whole (Viṣṇu). Jīva Gosvāmī explains that there are four kinds of substratums (āśraya): (1) aupaśleṣika (existing in the same place), (2) sāmīpika (existing in proximity), (3) vyāpta (pervasion), and (4) vaiṣayika (also known as viṣaya-saptamī, the object of emotions, etc.) (Hari-nāmāmṛta-vyākaraṇa 649). Patañjali’s tātsthya (being located there) corresponds to the first kind of āśraya. Sāmīpya (proximity), in “the cowherd settlement on the Ganges,” corresponds to the second kind. Samavāya (inherence) relates to the third category, thus Viṣṇu is in this category of āśraya, called vyāpta (pervasion).

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Viśvanātha Kavirāja explains: atrāyuṣ-kāraṇam api ghṛtaṃ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvasambandha-sambandhy āyus-tādātmyena pratīyate, “Although it is the cause of longevity, ghee, related to it by the relation of cause and effect, is thought of as identical with longevity” (Sāhitya-darpaṇa 2.8-9).

[2]:

This refers to the universal meaning of upacāra. It is not the technical upacāra (gauṇī-vṛtti) because there is no metaphor proper here since no similarity between two things is implied.

[3]:

Mammaṭa does not specify what the implied sense of tādarthya is. The connection called tādarthya (being for the sake of that)is the basis of the understanding that minor activities, such as eating, which are done for the sake of performing devotional service, are figuratively called devotional service. Further, in all these examples, the term connection (sambandha) denotes the second essential characteristic of Indication: It is the connection between the main meaning and the figurative sense, since the main meaning is incompatible (2.11).

[4]:

However, according to P.V. Kāṇe, the text means: ““This is the arm” when only the hand is referred to.” He writes: “When there is meant only the foremost portion of the arm from the elbow (the whole arm being, in Sanskrit, called hasta), one employs the word hasta (to denote a part only of what is really the hand).” (Kane, P.V. (1995), Tha Sāhitya-darpaṇa, p. 53). P.V. Kāṇe is explaining what Mammaṭa had in mind, yet Mammaṭa is wrong because the word hasta has the dictionary meaning of “hand”: hastau tu pāṇi-nakṣatre, “Hasta signifies a hand, and a particular constellation”(Amara-koṣa 3.3.58). Mammaṭa made a similar mistake with the word kuśala (Kāvya-prakāśa 2.9) and that mistake was pointed out by Viśvanātha Kavirāja (Sāhityadarpaṇa 2.5) and by Kavikarṇapūra (Alaṅkāra-kaustubha 2.10). Śeṣarāja Śarmā clarifies the matter: paṭaika-deśe dagdhe’pi paṭo dagdha iti vyavahāra-vat, “A similar example is: “My shirt is burnt,” when in fact only a part of the shirt is burnt” (Candrakalā-ṭīkā 2.8-9). Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa gives this example: gaṅgā tu harate pāpaṃ dṛṣṭvā pītāvagāhitā, ity-ādau pītety aṃśe gaṅgā-padasya tad-avayave lakṣaṇā, “‘The Ganges, whether drunk or immersed into, dispels sinful reactions.’ With regard to the aspect of “being drunk”, the word Ganges is figurative in the sense that a part is meant (some water of the Ganges)” (Uddyota 2.12).

[5]:

paṭo’yaṃ dagdha ity-ādau sphuṭaṃ nāsti prayojanam (Candrāloka 9.7).

[6]:

samavāya-nibandhanāyāṃ tasyām—upādāne vācyasya vivakṣitatvaṃ, yathā “chattriṇo yānti” iti. atra hi yadā chattrī bahutvopetatvāt sva-gata-bahutvānvaya-saṃsiddhy-arthatvena chattra-śūnyān api ākṣipati tadā samavāya-nibandhane kriyamāṇe vācyaś chattrī vivakṣitaḥ (Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā 10).

[7]:

vyāpta iti, pṛthag-deśa-bhāgān abhivyāpya tiṣṭhatīti vyāptaḥ. ādhārādheyayos tulya-janyā, samavāya-lakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ (Amṛta commentary on Hari-nāmāmṛta-vyākaraṇa 649).

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