Chapter 3.2 - Epistemology of Sāṅkhya System

[Full title: Vācaspati Miśra’s contribution of Epistemology to Sāṅkhya System]

In the modern age epistemology is considered as an essential part of the Indian philosophy. In the course of the development of the Indian system interest in epistemology increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussions of almost every school. The reason can be found in the fact that all schools of Indian philosophy, without exception, regarded ignorance as the root cause of human suffering, so that they were all bent upon discovering the means and processes of true knowledge by means of which reality could be known and life could be so lived as to overcome misery or minimize suffering.

The term “epistemology” has been derived from ‘episteme’ meaning knowledge and ‘logos’ meaning science or theory. Epistemology, therefore, is the theory of science of knowledge. Epistemology is a science which enquires into the nature, origin, range and conditions of knowledge. It is especially concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It can be explained as a systematic reflection concerning knowledge and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science. To study and generalize the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from non-knowledge to knowledge, is dealt in epistemology.

Epistemology enquires into the general conditions of the validity of knowledge. It does not enquire into the details of the various process of proof. Logic is the special enquiry into the confirmation of evidence. Epistemology is more a general study than logic, which enquires into the various kinds of proof and the conditions of valid knowledge. Epistemology is more metaphysical than logic. It thus becomes closely linked up with metaphysics or ontology and both of them again with ethics.

Three kinds of pramāṇas

Vācaspati Miśra closely follows Kārikā-Sāṅkhya, but there are at least two important extensions beyond what is found in the Kārikā itself. First, regarding the problem of inference, Vācaspati Miśra discusses the threefold inferences in terms of positive (vīta) and exchasionary (avīta) types placing both Pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛsṭa under vīta, and śeṣavat under avīta. Vācaspati Miśra’s discussion shows a familiarity with logical problems and technical logical issues that arose considerably later than the time of the Kārikā itself, problems and issues that were becoming prominent in the various traditions of Vedānta Philosophy after Śrī Śaṅkara. Second, regarding the problem of perception, Vācaspati Miśra argues that the sense capacities are only capable of mere sensing (ālocanāmātrā), for they apprehend sense objects without any mental ordering or verbal characterization whereas the mind performs the task of ordering and verbalizing the impressions of the senses. Such a distinction had perhaps been hinted at in the earlier texts, but it was Vācaspati Miśra who spelled out this important distinction. In Vācaspati Miśra's view, the Sāṅkhya system accepts the three pramāṇas viz. perception, inference and valid testimony and includes three other means of cognition posited by other systems, i.e. upamāna, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi in these three.

In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga concept of pramāṇa, Patañjali holds that pramāṇa is the function of citta.^[1] He says that the buddhi through the discipline of Yoga gets truth-bearing knowledge, having no trace of wrong or perverted knowledge.^[2] This knowledge comprehends the particularity residing in the Puruṣa or in the subtle elements, which is not known through any of the worldly means of knowledge. Patañjali, like the Sāṅkhya, recognizes three pramāṇas, perception, inference and testimony.^[3] Vyāsa defines perception as the mental mode, which apprehends a real object possessing generic and specific characters, which particularly apprehends its specific properties, when buddhi goes out to an external object through the channel of the external sense organs and is modified into its form.^[4]

Perception

Perception or pratyakṣa pramāṇa is defined as the definite cognition of particular objects obtained through the contact of the sense organs.^[5] Inference is depending on perception, and valid testimony on both perception and inference. Moreover, perception as a means of correct knowledge is universally recognized. Hence it can be considered as the most important pramāṇa among the three means of cognition.

The definition of perception shows it as distinguished from other means of definite knowledge, such as inference, memory and so on. It gives the ‘genus’ and the “differentia”^[6] because it produces definite or certain knowledge without doubt and error, and it is the result of the contact of sense organs with the objects of knowledge. Perception is the primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid knowledge. It is most powerful among the means of valid knowledge, because it gives a direct or immediate knowledge of the reality of an object and therefore is the root of all other pramāṇas.

Vācaspati Miśra states that perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense object contact. In his opinion, through buddhi,ahaṃkāra, citta and the senses, the external object is apprehended by the subject when an object incites the senses, the mind arranges the sense impression into a percept, the ego, refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept.^[7] In Sāṅkhya works, Vācaspati Miśra is the pioneer to subdivide perception into two subclasses, viz. savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka.

Divisions of perception

Vācaspati Miśra interprets alocanajñānamas indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa) which does not determinate the two elements of an object viz. the particular from the universal. He states that the determinate perception (savikalpa) is due to the operation of the mind. Mind alleviates the doubt regarding the definiteness of the object cognized. Ahaṃkāra then determines the relation of an object with the cognizer. Finally buddhi decides whether to accept or to reject the object. This is the final state called determinate knowledge (adhyavasāya). At this stage knowledge is turned into determinate.^[8] Adhyavasāya is defined by Vācaspati Miśra himself as the form of determinate knowledge.^[9] Thus Vācaspati Miśra gives a clear exposition of the pratyakṣapramāṇa according to the Sāṅkhyas by explaining the different constituents of the definition of pratyakṣa given in the Sāṅkhyakārikā.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as determinate knowledge of an object due to its intercourse with a sense organ.^[10] Vācaspati Miśra further explains the characteristics of Perception. First, it must have a real object, either external or internal. This characteristic distinguishes perception from illusion. Secondly, a particular kind of perception is brought about by the intercourse of a particular sense-organ with a particular kind of object. Visual perception is brought about by the intercourse of the visual organ with color. This characteristic distinguishes perception from inference, memory and the like. Thirdly, perception involves the operation of buddhi. When the sense organs are stimulated by their objects, tamas of buddhi is overcome and its sattva becomes manifest and brings about determinate knowledge. Determinate knowledge consists in the reflection of the self in buddhi modified into an object.^[11] This characteristic distinguishes perception from doubt or indefinite knowledge.

Vācaspati Miśra opines that there are two stages of perception, indeterminate and determinate, and regards them as valid. He defines indeterminate perception as the immediate apprehension of an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relation between the qualified object and its qualifications, like the apprehension of a baby and a dumb person. He defines determinate perception as definite cognition of an object as qualified by its generic and specific characters and other properties. It is a perceptual judgment which distinguishes between the qualified objects and its qualifications and relates them to each other. It involves analysis and synthesis, assimilation and discrimination.

Indeterminate perception is the function of the external sense organs of knowledge. Determinate perception is the function of the internal organ, mind. The external senses apprehend an object as merely ‘this’ or 'unlike this'. It assimilates the object to like objects, and discriminates it from unlike objects. Assimilation and discrimination involved indeterminate perception is the functions of mind. The external senses yield indeterminate perception or non-relational apprehension of an object. Mind yields determinate perception involving analysis and synthesis, assimilation and discrimination, subject -predicate relation. It is the relational apprehension of an object. ^[12]

But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are given by the external sense-organs. Vācaspati Miśra wrongly holds that the external senses give the indeterminate perception while mind turns it into determinate perception.Vijñānabhikṣu cites the authority of Vyāsa who holds that the external senses perceive an object as endued with generic and specific characters.^[13] But Vācaspati Miśra seems to be right. Assimilation and discrimination are the functions of mind and they cannot be ascribed to the external senses.

Vācaspati Miśra describes the functions of the external and internal sense-organs in the process of perception. An external sense organ stimulated by an external object gives the indeterminate perception of it. Then mind turns it into determinate perception by analysis and synthesis, assimilation and discrimination. Then ahaṃkāra appropriates and perceives it, and turns the impersonal apprehension of the object into a personal experience. Then buddhi turns it into definite knowledge and assumes a practical attitude to react to it. Then the self is reflected in the mode of buddhi modified into the form of its object. The self wrongly identifies itself with its reflection in buddhi assuming the form of the object, and has knowledge of the object. In dim light a person at first apprehends an object as something indiscriminate, then attentively reflects upon it and knows it to be a terrible thief by his bow and arrow, then thinks him in reference to himself (e.g. He is running towards me) and then resolves ‘I must fly from this place’. This example illustrates the successive functions of an external sense organ, the mind, ahaṃkāra and buddhi Sometimes the succession of the functions of the external and internal organs is so rapid, that they seem to occur simultaneously. When a person perceives a tiger in utter darkness illuminated by a sudden flash of lightning, and runs away from it at once, the functions of the visual organs, mind, ahaṃkāra and buddhi seem to occur at the same moment, though really they are successive.^[14] The external sense -organs can apprehend external objects, while the internal-organs can apprehend internal objects, pleasure, pain, and the like. The former can apprehend only present objects, while the latter can apprehend past and future objects as well.^[15]

In Yogatattvavaiśāradī also Vācaspati Miśra brings out the implications of the definition of perception. He opines that first, perception as valid knowledge apprehends a real object. It does not mistake one object for another. It apprehends an object as it really is. Secondly, the perception apprehends an external object directly. It does not apprehend the form of cognition. It does not indirectly apprehend an external object through the medium of cognition. Perception is direct or presentative.^[16] It is not indirect or representative. Thirdly, the form of cognition corresponds to the external object because buddhi goes out of it and is modified into its form. Fourthly, perception apprehends neither generality (sāmānya) only, nor particularity (viśeṣa) only, nor a substance in which they inhere, but both generality and particularity characterizing an object (sāmānyaviśeṣātmā), in which apprehension of particularity is the predominant factor (viśeṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā).

The Advaita Vedāntist holds that indeterminate perception apprehends generality or Being only. The Buddhist holds that it apprehends specific individuals (srlakṣaṇaya) only. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds that it apprehends a substance in which both generality and particularity in here.

Inference

The Sāṅkhyakārikā defines inference or anumāna pramāṇa as the knowledge derived from sign and signate.^[17] Vācaspati Miśra explains the definition elaborately. He states that liṅga means pervaded (vyayapyam) and liṅgi means pervasive (vyayapakam).^[18] He states that in the wording of Sāṅkhyakārikā liṅga and liṅgi stand for inferential knowledge. Thus, inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that liṅga like smoke is pervaded and liṅgi like fire, is pervasive.^[19] Vācaspati Miśra further realizes that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to inferential knowledge. Everything like light on burnt up ashes existing on the mountain is not helpful in inferring fire from smoke. Therefore, it requires, in addition, on application of liṅga on the subject or the place whence liṅgi, is inferred.

In Yogatattvavaiśāradī Vācaspati Miśra opines that the object of inference is the substance endued with the inferable property (jijñāsitadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmyanumeyaḥ |).^[20] When the existence of fire is inferred from the existence of smoke perceived in a hill, the generality of fire is already known, the hill is perceived, but the hill possessing fire is inferred. Vyāsa defines inference as definite knowledge in which apprehension of generality is the predominant factor (sāmānyāvadhāraṇapradhānam |) and which depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the mark of inference and the inferred property, the latter pervading the former and being present in all homogeneous instances and being absent from all heterogeneous instances.

Yogabhāṣya says:

"anumeyasya tulyajātīyeṣu anuvṛtto, bhinnajātīyebhyo vyāvṛttaḥ saṃbandho yaḥ, tat viṣayā sāmānyāvadhāraṇa- pradhānā vṛttiranumānam |"

Types of Inference

Various divisions of Inference based on various principles are found in the system of Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhyakārikā refers to the division of anumāna into three kinds, pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛsṭa and Vācaspati Miśra incorporate division of inference into vīta and avīta. Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines inference as the knowledge which is preceded by the knowledge of the sign (liṅgaḥ [liṅga]) and the signate (liṅgin) and the middle term (vyāpyam [vyāpya]) and the major term (vyāpakam [vyāpaka]). Vācaspati Miśra explains it as the knowledge which is preceded by, or based on, the knowledge of the relations of the middle, the major and the minor terms to one another. Inference is the knowledge derived from the major and minor premises.^[21]

According to Sāṅkhyakārikā , the pūrvavat is that in which an effect is inferred from its cause, e.g. from the rise of cloud it is inferred that it will rain. The śeṣavat is that in which the cause is inferred from its effect, e.g. seeing the water of river as different from that in the past, as also the fullness of the river, i.e. stream and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that it had rained. The sāmānyatodṛsṭa is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place is caused by movement, as the moon is observed at different place. Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the moon, though imperceptible.

Vācaspati Miśra in his “Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī ” mentions twofold divisions of inference, vīta and avīta.^[22] The vīta is based upon affirmative concomitance or universal agreement in the presence. For instance, whatever is smoky is fiery, the hill is smoky, and therefore the hill is fiery. The avīta is based upon negative concomitance or universal agreement in absence. For instance, what is non-different from other elements has no smell; the earth has a smell; therefore the earth is different from other elements. He subdivides the vīta into two kinds, Pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛsṭa.^[23] Purvavat inference is based on observed uniformity of concomitance of the middle term and the major term. For instance, fieriness of the hill is inferred from its smokiness on the ground of the observed uniformity of concomitance of smokiness and fieriness in the kitchen and other places.

Sāmānyatodṛsṭa inference is not based on observed uniformity of concomitance between the middle term and the major term, but on the similarity of the middle term with what is invariably concomitant with the major term. For instance the existence of the sense-organs, which are imperceptible, is inferred from the perception of colour, sound, and the like, because they are of the nature of actions, like the act of cutting. The existence of an axe an instrument, which is required for the act of cutting, has been observed. But the sense-organs, which are supersensible, are inferred as organs or instruments of perceptions because perceptions are actions like the act of cutting. Here, the sense organs are not inferred from the observed uniformity of concomitance between perceptions and the sense-organs. They are inferred from the fact that perceptions are actions, like the act of cutting, and require instruments in the shape of the sense-organs, like it.

The avīta is śeṣavat or-pariśeṣa inference. It is inference by exclusion of all other alternatives to it. It is inference by elimination. For instance, sound is a specific quality of ether, because it is not a specific quality of earth, water, fire, air, space, time, the mind and the self. So by elimination of the ether alternatives it can be inferred that sound is the specific quality of ether the remaining substance.^[24] Here in the construction of anumāna Vācaspati Miśra deviates from the traditional line of Naiyāyikas.

Verbal testimony

Verbal testimony or śabda pramāṇa is a matter of common observation that a sentence or a statement is not sufficient to denote any knowledge of things. Nor the mere perception of words of a sentence does give any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meaning that he acquires the knowledge of a verbal statement. Hence, śabda or testimony as a source of valid knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person.^[25] It is, however, in the context of verbal testimony that ‘śabda’ has aroused a long discussion in the domain of Indian philosophy. The Sāṅkhya admits verbal testimony as an independent means of knowledge in addition to perception and inference.^[26]

Vācaspati Miśra brings out the purpose of the term ‘āpta’ in the definition of ‘śabda’, stands for the assertion of the reliable persons such as theist, and ‘mlecchas’ but not of those thinkers who are pervaded by delusion such as Bouddhas, Jainas, etc. It is to be noted that, by taking the instance of ‘mlecchas’, Vācaspati Miśra means to say that the word of even a ‘mleccha’ could be true and reliable.^[27] Hence, He asserts that for being an ‘āpta’ it is not necessary that one should be completely free from all defects. Vedic testimony is authoritative statement. It is another source of valid knowledge. Valid testimony is a true revelation.^[28] The Vedas are revelations of supersensible realities, which are beyond the range of perception and inference, to inspire Seers.^[29] They are not composed by any person. They are impersonal.^[30] They are not composed by God, since there is no proof of His existence. God is nonexistent. So the Vedas are not of divine origin.

Vācaspati Miśra opines that Vedic testimony is self-evident.^[31] It is free from doubt and discrepancy, since it is not of a personal origin.^[32] The Vedas have an intrinsic power of revealing truths. Vedic testimony is self-evident. It is not irrational. The assertions of the Buddha are irrational and antagonistic to the Vedas. So they are not-trustworthy. Testimony is an authoritative statement. It takes the form of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence is the object to be proved by it. The sentence is not its property which may serve as the mark of inference. Nor does a sentence, expressing a meaning, depend upon the knowledge of the relation between a mark of inference and the object inferred. A sentence composed a new poet can express its meaning and denote an unknown object. So testimony is not an inference.^[33] By putting forward these arguments Vācaspati Miśra establishes the distinct nature of verbal testimony as a source of knowledge.

Trustworthy instructor communicates his valid knowledge to another person for the latter’s attainment of good and the avoidance of evil. Perception is stronger than inference and testimony, as a means of valid knowledge. Inference, and testimony both apprehend generality. Testimony is verbal knowledge. It is derived from the words. Words denote classes, and not individuals. So, all subtle, hidden and remote objects cannot be apprehended by inference or testimony. Nor can they be apprehended by normal perception. They cannot be said to be nonexistent because they are not objects of ordinary perception. They are apprehended by the highest yogic intuition, which apprehends all truths.^[34] It is different from testimony and inference since it apprehends all supersensible individuals. It is absolutely valid. It is free from all taint of falsehood.

Inclusion of other Pramāṇas

Vācaspati Miśra includes all the other means of cognition posted by other systems in these three: perception, inference and valid testimony.

He deals with five other means of cognition namely:

1. analogy (upamāna),
2. presumption (arthāpatti),
3. absence (abhāva),
4. probability (sambhava) and
5. rumour (aitihya).

He splits the first, upamāna, up into perception, inference and valid testimony.^[35] The following example is given for upamāna.

A man who has not seen a ‘gavaya’ recognizes that in the forest, with the help of the previous knowledge he infers that ‘gavaya’ is like a cow. This process of cognition can be split up into three stages. First of all he acquires the knowledge that ‘gavaya’ is like a cow, which is purely verbal. In the second stage when he sees, ‘gavaya’ the perception is at work; though the cow recalled to the mind is not present at the moment to the organs of cognition, the attributes common to it and the animal ‘gavaya’ are perceived by him. In the last stage, the knowledge that this is ‘gavaya’ is inferential.^[36] The term ‘gavaya’ is used by exile person in inference to the animal similar to the cow. Therefore, the term ‘gavaya’ must be regarded as denotative of that animal. Thus; upamāna is included under verbal testimony, perception and inference. Other commentators differ with Vācaspati Miśra. Māṭharavṛtti regards upamāna to be anumāna.^[37] Jayamaṅgalā includes upamāna under anumāna and śabda.^[38] Gauḍapāda bhāṣya regards it as śabda.^[39]

Vācaspati Miśra includes arthāpatti under inference. A famous example for arthāpatti is as follows. Caitra, who is alive, is not in the house. This leads to the presumption of his being somewhere outside. This presumption is based upon the knowledge that if a living being is absent is one place, he is present elsewhere. It can be easily recognized the premise that when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place, and also that ‘when a finite object is present in one place it is absent in another place’. Therefore, when it is found that the living Caitra is not in the house, from this minor premise, it can be deduced the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house. Thus, all presumptions can be included under inference.^[40] Arthāpatti is a kind of anumāna, which is vyatireki anumāna. Vedānta School does not accept this kind of anumāna. In their view arthāpatti is a separate source of knowledge. But Sāṅkhya accepts vyatireki anumāna and hence it includes arthāpatti in anumāna.53

According to Vācaspati Miśra ‘abhāva’ (absence) is only a form of perception.^[41] ‘Abhāva’ can be perceived through "saṃyuktatādātmyasannikarṣaḥ"^[42] For example the absence of a jar at a certain place is not anything distinct from a modification at the place itself in the form of vacancy. Thus, all the cases of abhāva are only modification and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses. Hence abhāva is not a separate pramāṇa in Sāṅkhya. Jayamaṅgalā includes it as perception.^[43] Māṭhara regards it under inference.^[44] But Gauḍapāda consider it under śabda or anumāna.^[45]

According to Vācaspati Miśra ‘saṃbhava’ comes under inference. Cognition of the lighter weights such as droṇa, aḍhaka and prastha in the heavier weights such as khāri, etc., is an example of probability. In this example the heavier weight has been found to be invariably associated with the lighter weights. It is this invariable relation that helps one to infer the existence of the lighter weights in the heavier weights.^[46] Jayamaṅgalā and Māṭhara also include saṃbhava under anumāna.^[47] But Gauḍapāda includes it under śabda.^[48]

Sāṅkhya does not accept ‘aitihya’ as a valid means of cognition. Vācaspati Miśra says; “If the original source of rumour is trustworthy it includes under śabda; if not, it is invalid”^[49] but Māṭhara includes it in Anumāna.^[50] Gauḍapāda joins with Vācaspati Miśra and includes aitihya in śabda.64

The Sāṅkhya accepts only three pramāṇas and includes all others in these three. Vācaspati Miśra elaborates the three pramāṇas accepted by Sāṅkhyakārikā and he establishes that the other five pramāṇas recognized by other philosophers can be included in these three. So he doesn’t reject the other five pramāṇas but only establishes their existence in these three pramāṇas. This is also one of the notable contributions of Vācaspati Miśra to Sāṅkhya.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ| Yogasūtra.I.6

[2]:

ṛtambarā tatra prajñā| Yogasūtra.I.48

[3]:

pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni| Yogasūtra.I.7

[4]:

Vyāsabhāṣya on Yogasūtra.I.7

[5]:

prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam| Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[6]:

S.S.Sūryanārāyaṇa Śastri:Sāṃkhyakārikā with an introduction, Translation and notes, p.13 and also see Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[7]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[8]:

saṅkalpeṇarūpeṇa manolakṣyate| 'ālocitamindriyeṇa vastvidam' iti sammugdham 'idamekaṃ naivaṃ' iti samyak kalpayati viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvena vivecayatīti yāvat| Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 27

[9]:

"adhyavasāyaśca buddhivyāpāro jñānam| upāttaviṣayāṇāmindriyāṇāṃ vṛttau satyāṃ, buddhestamobhibhave sati yaḥ sattvasamudrekaḥ so'dhyavasāya" iti||
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[10]:

Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[11]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 6

[12]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 27

[13]:

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, II.32

[14]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 30 and SāṃkhyapravacanaSūtra, II.32

[15]:

Sāṅkhyakārikā 33

[16]:

Yogatattvavaiśāradī. I.7

[17]:

trividhamanumānamākhyātaṃ, tat liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam| Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[18]:

liṅgaṃ vyāpyaṃ liṅgi vyāpakam| Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[19]:

dhūmādirvyāpyaṃ vahnyādirvyāpakam| Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[20]:

Yogatattvavaiśāradī on Yogasūtra.I.7

[21]:

śaṅkitasamāropitopādhinirākaraṇena ca svabhāvapratibaddhaṃ vyāpyam, yena pratibaddhaṃ tat vyāpakam|
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[22]:

tatra prathamaṃ tāvat dvividham vītamavītaṃ ca| anvayamukhena pravartamānaṃ
vidhāyakaṃ vītam, vyatirekamukhena pravartamānaṃ niṣedhakamavītam|
Ibid

[23]:

vītaṃ dvedhā-pūrvavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca| tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviṣayaṃ yattatpūrvavat, pūrvaṃ prasiddham, dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyamiti yāvat, tadasya viṣayatvenāstyanumānajñānasyeti pūrvavat|
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī 5

[24]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[25]:

"āptāścāsau śrutiścetyāptaśrutiḥ|" Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[26]:

Bibhupadhi: Indian philosophy of religion, p.198

[27]:

ayuktaṃ caiteṣāṃ vijñānāt vicchinnamūlatvātpramāṇaviruddhārthābhighānācca kaiścideva mlecchādibhiḥ puruṣāpasadaiḥ paśuprāyaiḥ parigrahādbhoddhavyam|
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[28]:

āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ| Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra, I.101

[29]:

na tribhirapauruṣeyatvādvedasya tadarthasyātīndriyatvāt|
Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra, V.41

[30]:

nijaśaktyabhivyakteḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyam|
Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra, V.51

[31]:

taśca svataḥ pramāṇam| Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[32]:

apauruṣeyavedavākyajanitatvena sakaladoṣāśaṅkāvinirmukteryuktaṃ bhavati|
evaṃ vedamūlasmṛtītihāsapurāṇavākyajanitamapi jñānaṃ yuktaṃ bhavati|
Ibid

[33]:

Ibid

[34]:

Yogatattvavaiśāradī on Yogasūtra.I.48

[35]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[36]:

"tatjñānamanumānameva", Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[37]:

Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[38]:

Jayamaṅgalā on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[39]:

Gauḍapādabhāṣya on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[40]:

"tasmānnānumānātpramāṇāntaramarthāpattiriti siddham|" Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[41]:

evamabhāvopi pratyakṣameva| na hi bhūtalasya pariṇāmaviśeṣāt kaivalyalakṣaṇādanyo ghaṭābhāvo nāma|
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[42]:

Clasical Sāṃkhya A critical Study, P.59

[43]:

Jayamaṅgalā on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[44]:

Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[45]:

Gauḍapāda bhāṣya on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[46]:

sambhavastu, yathā-khāryāṃ droṇāḍhakaprasthādyavagamaḥ| sa cānumānameva| khārītvaṃ hi droṇādyavinābhūtaṃ pratītaṃ khāryāṃ droṇādisatvamavagamayati||
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[47]:

Jayamaṅgalā and Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[48]:

Gauḍapāda bhāṣya on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[49]:

yaccānirdiṣṭapravaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyamātraṃ’ iti hocurvṛddhāḥ,-ityaitihyam, yathā’ iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ prativasati’ iti, na tat pramāṇāntaram, anirdiṣṭapravaktṛkatvena sāṃśayikatvāt| āptavaktṛkatvaniścaye tvāgama eva| ityupapannam "trividhampramāṇam" iti||
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5

[50]:

Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5