Text 99

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 99:

तत्राक्षम् अक्षम् प्रतीत्योत्पद्यते प्रतक्षम् | अक्षाणीन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्छ्रोत्रमनांसि षट् | तद् धि द्रव्यादिषु पदार्थेषूत्पद्यते | द्रव्ये तावद् द्विविधे महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वोद्भूतरूपप्रकाशचतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद् धर्मादिसामग्र्ये च स्वरूपालोचनमात्रम् | सामान्यविशेषद्रव्यगुणकर्मविशेषणापेक्षाद् आत्ममनः सन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षम् उत्पद्यते सद् द्रव्यम् पृथिवी विषाणी शुक्लो गौर्गच्छतीति | रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शेष्वनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् स्वगतविशेषात् स्वाश्रयसन्निकर्षान् नियतेन्द्रियनिमित्तम् उत्पद्यते | तेनैवोपलब्धिः | संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागपरत्वापरत्वस्नेहद्रवत्ववेगकर्मणाम् प्रत्यक्षद्रव्यसमवायाच्चक्षुः स्पर्शनाभ्याम् ग्रहणम्  | बुद्धिसुखदुह्खेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नानाम् द्वयोरात्ममनसोः सम्योगाद् उपलब्धिः | भावद्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनाम् उपलभ्याधारसमवेतानाम् आश्रयग्राहकैरिन्द्रियैर्ग्रहणम् इत्येतद् अस्मदादीनाम् प्रत्यक्षम्  | अस्मद्विशिष्टानाम् तु योगिनाम् युक्तानाम् योगजधर्मानुगृहीतेन मनसा स्वात्मान्तराकाशदिक्कालपरमणुवायुमनसस्सु तत्समवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषेषु समवाये चावितथम् स्वरूपदर्शनम् उत्पद्यते  | वियुक्तानाम् पुनश्चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद् योगजधर्मानुग्रहसामर्थयात् सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेषु प्रत्यक्षम् उत्पद्यते | तत्र सामान्यविशेषेषु स्वरूपालोचनमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षम् प्रमाणम् प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः प्रमानात्मा प्रमितिर्द्रव्यादिविषयम् ज्ञानम् | सामान्यविशेषज्ञानोत्पत्तावविभक्तम् आलोचनमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षम् प्रमाणम् अस्मिन् नान्यत्प्रमाणान्तरम् अस्ति अफलरूपत्वात् | अथवा सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद् अवितथम् अव्यपदेश्यम् यज्ज्ञानम् उत्पद्यते तत्प्रत्यक्षम् प्रमाणम् प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः प्रमातात्मा प्रमितिर्गुणदोषमाध्यस्थ्यदर्शनम् इति ॥ ९९ ॥

tatrākṣam akṣam pratītyotpadyate pratakṣam | akṣāṇīndriyāṇi ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakchrotramanāṃsi ṣaṭ | tad dhi dravyādiṣu padārtheṣūtpadyate | dravye tāvad dvividhe mahatyanekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātram | sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanaḥ sannikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate sad dravyam pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaurgacchatīti | rūparasagandhasparśeṣvanekadravyasamavāyāt svagataviśeṣāt svāśrayasannikarṣān niyatendriyanimittam utpadyate | tenaivopalabdhiḥ | saṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasnehadravatvavegakarmaṇām pratyakṣadravyasamavāyāccakṣuḥ sparśanābhyām grahaṇam | buddhisukhaduhkhecchādveṣaprayatnānām dvayorātmamanasoḥ samyogād upalabdhiḥ | bhāvadravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādīnām upalabhyādhārasamavetānām āśrayagrāhakairindriyairgrahaṇam ityetad asmadādīnām pratyakṣam | asmadviśiṣṭānām tu yoginām yuktānām yogajadharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmāntarākāśadikkālaparamaṇuvāyumanasassu tatsamavetaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitatham svarūpadarśanam utpadyate | viyuktānām punaścatuṣṭayasannikarṣād yogajadharmānugrahasāmarthayāt sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate | tatra sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpālocanamātram pratyakṣam pramāṇam prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ pramānātmā pramitirdravyādiviṣayam jñānam | sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattāvavibhaktam ālocanamātram pratyakṣam pramāṇam asmin nānyatpramāṇāntaram asti aphalarūpatvāt | athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭayasannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyam yajjñānam utpadyate tatpratyakṣam pramāṇam prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ pramātātmā pramitirguṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanam iti || 99 ||

Text (99):—Of these, that which proceeds from the senseorgans is ‘directly sensuous.’ The sense-organs are six—the nose, the tongue, the eye, the skin, the ear and the mind.

This knowledge appears with regard to substance and the other categories. As regards substance, it appears with reference to three forms of it, in the gross form; and proceeds from such causes as the existence of many parts, the appearance of manifested colour, and the presence of the contact of four things, aided by such auxiliaries as dharma and the like; in this the knowledge is in the character of ‘mere perception of form.’ From the contact of the mind as qualified by (1) generalities, (2) specialities, (3) substances, (4) qualities and (5) action,—there proceeds a ‘directly sensuous’ knowledge,—f.i., in the form, ‘the (1) existing, (2) substance, (3) earthy cow, (4) white and with horns, (5) is moving.’

With regard to colour, taste, odour, and touch the sensuous knowledge is brought about by means particular sense-organs, and proceeds from such causes as—their inherence in composite substances, peculiarities in the qualities themselves and the contact with the substrates of these qualities. The knowledge of sound proceeds from threefold contact; and inhering in the ear, it is known by the ear alone. Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Viscidity, Fluidity, Velocity and Action are perceived by the eye and the skin, through their inherence in perceptible substances. Intellect, Pleasure, Vain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are perceived by the contact of both mind and self. Bhāvatva (the character of ‘being’), guṇatva (the character ‘quality’) karma (the character of ‘action’) and others—when inhering in cognisable substrates—are perceived by means of those sense-organs that perceive their substrates. This is the case with our ordinary ‘sensuous’ knowledge.

As for persons unlike ourselves—e.g. yogis in the estatic condition—there appear precisely true cognitions of the real forms of such things as their awn self as well as the selves of ākāśa, space, time, atoms, wind, mind,—the qualities, actions, generalities and individualities inhering in these,—and inherence; and the cognition of these is brought about by the mind as aided; by properties or faculties born of yoga. In the case of Yogis out of the ecstastic coṇḍition, direct sensuous knowledge appears with regard io subtile, hidden and distant objects, by means of the mind through fourfold contact, by the force of faculties born of Yoga.

With regard io generalities and individualities, the only means of- direct sensuous knowledge is the perception or cognition of the mere form; the cognisable are substance and other categories; the cogniser is the self; and the cognition is the knowledge of substance, etc.

In the appearance of the cognition of generalities and individualities, the means of direct sensuous cognition consists in mere ‘ālocana’ (contact of the sense-organ and the object); for this there is no other means of knowledge; as it is not in the form of resultant cognition.

Or, the means of direct sensuous cognition may be defined as any and every true and undefinable cognition of all objects, following from fourfold contact; substance and other categories are the cognisables: the self is the cogniser; and the recognition of the good pleasant), bad (unpleasant) and indifferent character (of the things perceived) is the cognition.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to explain the definition of ‘sensuous perception’—The meaning of the definition is that, that which is produced after reaching the sense-organs is ‘sensuous perception’; the peculiar character of its cause also serves to differentiate a thing from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and as such serves as its definition. For instance, the fact of being produced out of the barley-seed serves as a definition of the barley-sprout; by which reason too this latter name is given to it.

Objection: “In as much as pleasure, pain and impressions are also produced by the sense-organs, this also would be ‘sensuous perception’ (according to the definition given).”

Reply: Not so; because the definition occurs in the section on ‘Buddhi’; and is thereby so qualified as not to extend to pleasure, &c. That is to say, the sense of the definition is that that ‘cognition’ which appears after contact with sense-organs is ‘sensuous perception.’ And it is a well-known fact that pleasure &c., have not the nature of ‘cognition’; and as such, bow could the definition apply to these?

Objection: “If such be the cue, then there could be no prāmāṇya, ‘evidential authority,’ or ‘character of means of knowledge,’ in the contact (of the sense-organs).

Reply: True; such a character is not shown by the sentence under consideration; but as a matter of fact such character of the contact is really meant; as the word ‘pramāṇa’ is interpreted as pramiti-karaṇa, ‘the instrument or means of true knowledge,’ and certainly the contact is such a means.

As for Doubt and Misconception, these are excluded by the very fact of the section being one of ‘Vidyā’ (while Doubt and Misconception are forms of Avidyā).

The declaration, ‘that that which is born of the contact with the sense-organs is sensuous perception,’ might lead some people to think that it is only the cognition born of the external organs that is such a perception; as it is only these organs that are ordinarily known as ‘sense-organs;’ and with a view to guard against this the author has repeated the word ‘akṣa [akṣam]’ which is thus made to include all sense-organs, internal as well as external.

The compound in the word ‘pratyakṣa’ is in accordance with the sūtra ‘kugatiprādayaḥ’ (Pāṇini II-ii-18); and the word literaly meaning ‘pratigatam akṣam’ (‘that which has approached the sense-organs’) the word becomes an adjective, and as such its gender is regulated by the gender of the noun it qualifies,—and we have such expressions as ‘pratyakṣam jñānam’ (neuter), ‘pratyakṣā buddhiḥ’ (feminine), and ‘pratyakṣaḥ pratyayaḥ’ (masculine).

In as much as the word ‘akṣa’ is known to have many meanings, the author proceeds to specify the meaning desired to be conveyed in the present context. The word ‘akṣa’ here it used in the sense of Indriya, ‘sense-organs.’

The Sāṅkhyas speak of eleven sense-organs; and with a view to deny this, the author names six only—Nose, Tongue, Eye, Skin, Ear and Mind’—by which they mean to exclude the other five mentioned by the Sāṅkhyas.

The assertion that, ‘cognition born of the sense-organs is sensuous’—would bring Remembrance also under the category of ‘sensuous knowledge’; hence with a view to show that this latter has no real object extant at the time, the author points out the object of ‘sensuous knowledge.’ It is only with regard to substance, &c., that we have sensuous knowledge; that is to say, it appears only with regard to substances, qualities, actionsand generalities, and never with regard to Individualities and Inherences. Among these too, inasmuch as Substance is the most important, be proceeds to describe the process by which sensuous knowledge is produced with regard to it—In regard to substance &c. The word ‘tāvat’ is meant to denote sequence. He explains the reasons whereby sensuous knowledge is produced with regard to gross substances, in the forms of Earth, Water and Fire: (1) ‘anekadravyavattva which means the fact being a composite of many particle, (2) the appearance or manifestation of colour—such appearance being a property of colour, the absence of which makes the fire or light in the water imperceptible; (3) the presence of contact of four things—viz:(a) that of the self with the mind, (b) of the mind with the sense-organ, and (c) that of the organ with the object perceived. When all these causes are present; and there is present also the proper auxiliary in the form of dharma, adharma and particular points of time and space, then alone sensuous knowledge is possible. Inasmuch as there is no perceptibility in the atom and the diad, we have the qualification ‘gross.’ The ‘fact of being a composite of many parts’ is a cause of perceptibility, because the presence of large number of component particles, as also the excellence or otherwise of these particles, serve, to bring about distinctness or indistinctness and largeness or smallness of the composite whole Even when there is grossness and the presence of many component particles, in Air, yet this is not perceptible; and this is due to the absence of manifested colour in it, whereby the presence of manifested colour is also regarded as a cause of perceptibility.

Inasmuch as all cognition is the cause of some sort of pleasure or pain, and is found to appear at definite places and times, it is regarded as brought about by peculiarities of dharma, adharma, time and space. In the absence of the contact of the self with the mind, of that of the mind, with the sense-organ, and of that of the sense-organ with the object, we have no sensuous perception; hence the contact of these four is regarded as the cause of such perception.

Objection: “If the contact of the sense-organ with the object be the cause of perception, then, like Generalities, Inindivdualities also would have to be perceptible, and that would make Doubt and Misconception impossible.”

Reply: Not so; as it is not absolutely necessary. That is to say, the Generality consisting of many Individual objects, is perceived merely by the contact of its substratum with the eye; as for the Individuality on the other hand, inasmuch as its extent is very small, it stands in need of the contact of its substrate and its many parts, with the eye as a whole and the several parts of the Eye; hence it is not absolutely necessary for the perception of Generality to be accompanied by the perception of Individuality; specially as the accessories vary in the two cases. It is for this same reason that there is only an indistinct perception of objects at a distance,—the reason for this being the fact that the parts of the outgoing rays of light from the eye get diffused in the intervening space, and hence fail to get at the object in the proper manner.

In connection with sensuous knowledge, some people hold the following view: “The savikalpaka or ‘determinate’ is the only sensuous knowlege; because a thing is capable of being used only when it is in the character of action (and this can pertain only to objects of determinate cognition); and even animals who are devoid any comprehension of the meanings of words, turn to action only after they have a distinct determinate cognition.”

Against this view, the author says—The perception of the mere form etc., That is to say, there is simple perception, devoid of qualifications, of the form of the thing. If the indeterminate cognition of the form of the thing be not admitted, then, inasmuch as in that case there would be no remembrance of the word denoting it, there could not be a determinate cognition either. Hence one who would wish for determinate cognition must admit of indeterminate cognition also.

This indeterminate cognition does not pertain to the Generality only; because the factor of distinctness or difference or peculiarity, also eaters into that cognition. Nor does it pertain to the mere ‘specific individuality’ of the thing (as held by the Bauddha); as the factor of generality is also present in it; and also because it is distinctly recalled on the subsequent perception of another individual of the same class. As a matter of fact, it pertains to the Generality as well as to the Individuality; though it is true that there are no distinct notions such as ‘this is the Generality and that the Individuality’, yet this is due to the absence, at the time of the perception, of another object of the same class. It is only when one thing is cognised as having the same general character as another that we have an idea of ‘Generality’ as distinct from the Individuals; and when one thing is cognised as having a character different from that of another that there is a distinct cognition of the ‘Individuality.’ At the indeterminate stage of the cognition of an object, as there is no cognition of another object, there is no cognition either of inclusiveness—the property belonging to Generality,—or of exclusiveness—the property belonging to Individuality; and as these properties are not cognition, there are no distinct notions of Generality and Individuality. As for the cognition of the form of the thing however, this is present; as the cognition of mere form is not dependent on any other property, etc. It is for this reason that an indeterminate cognition is not cognisant of the qualificatory relationship among the Generality, the Individuality and the specific individuality of an object; as the cognition of this relationship is always preceded by the cognition of distinction among these three factors, which is absent in Indeterminate cognition. It is after this cognition that there appears the determinate congnition which is cognisant of the generic and individual character of objects; because when a man, at the time of cognising an object, recalls another object, he has distinct cognitions of the fact of the former being in certain respects inclusive (agreeing with and similar to), and in others exclusive of (dissimilar to) the said latter object; and it is only then that there appear the notions of Generality and Individuality.

The Bauddhas put forward the following argument: “It is only the indeterminate cognition which is unmistaken with regard to its object, having its cognizance invariably in keeping with the ‘specific individuality’ of things. And for this reason that alone, and nob determinate cognition, can be regarded as ‘sensuous knowledge’; because determinate cognition has its appearance dependent upon dispositions and tendencies (of the observer); and having its cognizance not always in keeping with the objects, is mistaken with regard to its object; as in the case of ‘tufts of hair’ (seen when the eye is closed).”

With a view to refute this view of the Bauddhas, the author lays down the fact of the character of ‘sensuous knowledge’ belonging to ‘determinate cognition’ also—sāmānyas etc. It proceeds from that contact of the self and the mind which is dependent upon, and conditioned, by such qualifications as those of Generality, Individuality, Substance, Quality and Action. The cognition that ‘the substance is,’ is qualified by generality; that ‘it is earth,’ is also qualified by the generality ‘earth;’ that ‘it has horns’ is qualified by substance; that ‘it is a white cow’ is qualified by Quality; that ‘it is moving’ is qualified by Action,—and every one of these is a ‘sensuous cognition. The ‘contact of the self and the mind’ being already included in the ‘contact of four,’ the repetition of it is with a view to show that what is spoken of now (i.e., determinate cognition) is something different from indeterminate cognition. How can yon assert that determinate cognition is not a right form of knowing an object, in face of the fact that what is cognised by the cognition, ‘this is a jar’ is a distinctly definite object with a peculiar neck and so forth?

Objection: “Vikalpa, ‘definiteness’ or ‘qualification,’ is cognition or ideation, born of nothing; and hence the definite or determinate cognition of an object cannot but be mistaken as has been well said—‘definiteness consists of the manifestation of nothing, and as such not keeping with the real state of things it is only a case of misconception.”

Reply: It is not so; because in actual action, the cognition is found to be quite in keeping with the real state of things.

Objection: “What really happens is that the definiteness is born of observation (and not directly of the object); and imposing its semblance in the form of the object, it hides from view the difference between the ‘specific individuality’ of the object and its mere semblance; tends to make the man turn towards the point of space occupied by the ‘specific individuality;’—and also brings about an agreement (between the cognition and the real state of things); just as the brightness of the gem does with regard to the gem; and the real object is got at by reason of the indirect relationship or concomitance (between the semblance and the object, through the specific individuality).

Reply: If definiteness did not touch (pertain to) the real object, then how could it ever impose its own semblance in the form of the object? As until the rays of the sun emanating from sandy surface is seen we do not cognise the resemblance of water imposed upon it.”

Objection: “The definiteness follows upon the wake of sensuous cognition, and taking up the function of the instrument tends to make manifest, or cognised, the object capable of some effective action; if it were not so, one desiring some effective action could not be brought to act by definite cognition; as has been declared—‘from the definiteness too the action is towards the object’.”

Reply: If such be the case then definiteness becomes a right form of cognising the object; as it is found to give rise, with regard to the object, a cognition in keeping with the real state of things.

Objection: “That point of time which is perceived by means of sensuous cognition is not cognised by the definite cognition; and that which is perceived by the definite cognition is not got at by the subsequent activity (of the observer); and thus there is no agreement in regard to the point of time; as all the factors concerned have only momentary existence (like all things). So what We mean is that the point of time that all perceived by the definite cognition is similar to that perceived by means of sensuous cognition; and that which is got at by means of subsequent activity is similar to that cognised by definite cognition; and thus the agreement is merely with regard to the exclusion of contraries, without any regard to the differences of points of time. And in this, as the definite cognition would only be cognising what has already been previously cognised by sensuous cognition,—it cannot be regarded as a right form of cognition; as for the definite cognition born of an inferential mark, however, it is regarded as a right form of cognition, because of the fact that it cognise or comprehends, the specific individuality of a fresh object not already cognised by any other means of cognition.”

Reply: There is not much in all this argumentation As what is cognised by means of sensuous cognition is neither the exclusion of the contrary of the moment of time, nor its negative form in general imposed with regard to the exclusion of other things, which exclusion too is of a negative character; what is actually cognised is something having the character of the cause (towards effective action); and that which is a mere negative entity is wholly devoid of all effective action. As for the point of time itself, it is the object of sensuous cognition, as it is a real entity; being quite capable of effective action; and it has been said that this point of time does not fall in with the time of the definite cognition. Under the circumstances, how can the Sensuous Cognition and the Definite Cognition be regarded as having one and the same object? (and hence the latter cannot be said to have an object that has been already cognised). Or, we may grant (for the sake of argument) that both these cognitions have one and the same object, in the form of something without any definite form, which is capable of being in keeping with the subsequent activity of the cogniser. Even then the Definite Cognition cannot lose its character of being a right form of cognition; because like a serial cognition it is independent of previous cognitions, in the matter of its own objective; and also because It is capable of leading the cogniser to what is cognised by itself. The character of the right form of cognition being thus assured to Definite Cognition, it could be none other than ‘Sensuous’ in its character; because there are no such factors as that of the inferential mark and so forth; and also because it is found to follow always upon the contact of the sense-organ and the object. It is true that though born directly of the object, it does not, like indeterminate cognition, follow immediately after the contact of the sense-organ with it; but that is due to the fact of the observer not remembering, at that moment, the expressive word (denoting the object), which is a necessary aid to the object and the sense-organ (in the bringing about of definite cognitions).

Objection: “The definite cognition, follow ng as it does upon the remembrance (of the expressive word), cannot but be regarded as born of the remembrance, and not of the object and the sense-organ; as between these two and the cognition there is the intervening factor of the remembrance.”

Reply: Well sir, does an auxiliary hide away the potentiality of an object? If it does so, then what have you to say to the case of the seed being productive of the sprout, when the seed will have its potentiality hidden away by the

Objection: “In what way does the remembrance of the word help the object and the sense-organ, that it could be regarded as their aid or auxiliary?”

Reply: Just as the definite cognition needs, for its production, the contact of the object and the sense-organ, so also does it need the said remembrance; and hence the help that is given by this remembrance to the object and the sense-organ is only this that while these tatter are not by themselves capable of bringing about the effect (in the shape of Definite Cognition), they become so capable, when they obtain the aid of the remembrance. The view, that those things that do not add something to the form of the thing cannot be regarded as ‘auxiliaries,’ we have refuted while refuting the theory of the momentary character of all tilings (see above).

Objection: “Sensuous cognition is devoid of kalpanā, (‘definiteness’ or ‘determinateness,’ verbal or objective); and the cognition of definiteness is determinate; and as such this cannot be a right form of knowing things.”

Question: What is this ‘kalpanā’?

“There are two kinds of kalpanā cognising the qualified object: (I) Verbal, consisting of the connecting of the object with a word, and (II) objective, consisting of the connecting of the object with (other) objects.”

Reply: This is not right; as the theory does not stand the test of an examination of its alternative forms. For instance, as for the cognition connecting with words, (a) does this connect the word with the object? (b) or does it itself become connected with the object? If the former, then too, we ask—(1) does it reduce the object to the character of the word? (2) or does it cognise the object as tainted by the form of the word? (3) or does it call the object by name of the word?

The first of these is not possible; because in Determinate cognition also the object appears exactly in the same form as in Indeterminate cognition; and also because it is found to accomplish an effective action (which could not be done—by a mere word). If it were not so, then there could not be a simultaneous activity, with regard to it, of the person knowing the meaning of the word and another who does not know it.

In the case of (2) it is not right to assert that the Determinate cognition cognises the object as tainted by the form of the word; because such is not found to be the case; as what actually happens is that when the object has been comprehended by means of the Indeterminate Cognition, the previously known word denoting that object is remembered at the sight of its counterpart (in the form of the object); and the well-known word being remembered qualifies the object with regard to its own denotation; and it is not that the object is cognised as tainted by the form of the word, in the same manner as the rock-crystal is tainted with the blue colour (of the object placed near it); because the word is not visible; and it is the object only that is cognised as ‘such and such a thing’ (by name); just as in the case of Indeterminate Cognition. Nor is it that when the expressive word is remembered, there is any harm done to the form of the thing denoted by it; and hence the contact of the object and the sense-organ being present, the mere remembrance of the name cannot deprive the cognition of its ‘sensuous’ character; as has been well said: ‘the name, even though remembered, does not set aside the sensuousness of the object to which the name belongs; because the name is absolutely indifferent, and not capable of concealing the form or character of an object.’

(3) Nor can we believe that the cognition names or mentions the object as connected with the word. Because it is the intelligent Self which, through its power of recalling impressions, remembers the expressive word he had come to know at the time of the convention determining its meaning and then names or speaks of the object by means of that word—e.g., ‘this is a jar;’ this cannot be done by the Cognition which, being unintelligent, is devoid of the faculty of recalling impressions. Hence it is proved that the Cognition cannot connect the object with the word.

(b) Nor does the object by itself become connected with the word; because the Cognition as well as the form that is inseparable from it, being momentary, is each independent by itself; and hence no word being capable of belonging to a number of these in common, they are incapable of any convention; and hence they cannot become connected with words; and also because the word which denotes the object cannot be used to speak of either the object or the cognition of that object which is something wholly different from the object.

Objection: “ Determinate cognition has its object such as is connected with words. And the object becoming connected with the word comes to be spoken of by means of that word and it is with reference to this that we have the conventional denotation of the word. This convention too pertains to that which is non-momentary in its character, and is common among many things; and neither the ‘specific individuality,’ nor the cognition of the specific individuality, nor the form of the cognition, is either common or non-momentary. As for the externality of the form of cognition, that too is something distinct from the form of the cognition, and is something wholly uncommon or specific. Then as for Generality, there is no such real entity; as that has been shown to be incapable of standing the test of examination. Consequently, there being no comprehension of difference among the particular forms of the cognition, each of which in its external character is imposed upon it by the determinate cognitions, and singleness also being imposed upon it through the exclusion of all that is other than that cognition,—there follows the convention with regard to the word. This being proved by proper evidence cannot be denied. Thus then, the determinate cognition, functioning towards rhe unreal object connected with the word, brings about the cognizance of an object shat has no existence; and this is what is meant by ‘kalpanā’ or ‘jñāna,’ ‘cognition.’ As has been well said: “In any kalpanā the form, that appears as one, coming as it were from elsewhere, and being something excluded from other things,—has no real essence (or existence): because it does not form a factor in actual (sensuous) cognition.”

Reply—If the nature of kalpanā lies in the comprehending of something qualified by the generality, there being no such real entity as generality by itself,—then it would consist in something having for its object that which has no existence; and not in the comprehending of something connected with word. Under the circumstances, if we succeed in proving the existence of generality, then, even though Determinate Cognition might be comprehensive of objects connected with words, it could not but be regarded as ‘Sensuous,’ inasmuch as it is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ; specially as that which contains a direct and distinct manifestation is ‘Sensuous,’—as we find in, the case of Indeterminate Cognition; and Determinate Cognition is one that contains a direct and distinct manifestation. Cognitions are indirect whenever they are not produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organs; as we find in the case of inferential cognition; and the fact of being produced by such contact of the object with the sense-organ, which is the contradictory of the fact of not being produced by such contact, is distinctly cognisable in Indeterminate Cognition; and hence your theory would involve the ‘contradiction -of the vyāpaka’ (i.e., in determinate cognition we find the character of being produced by sense-contact, and this character is contradictory to the character of not being produced by sense-contact; this latter is always accompanied by indirectness; hence the attributing of indirectness, which would necessarily imply the presence of the character of not being born of sense-contact, to Determinate Cognition would involve a contradiction).

Objection: “We can bring forward a similar argument in support of the opposite view: That cognition which is pre-ceded by remembrance is non-sensuous,—as inferential cognition; Determinate cognition is preceded by remembrance; (hence it is non-sensuous).”

Reply: If sensuousness is ever perceived, it is only in determinate Cognitions; and hence it cannot be denied; as all denial is preceded by the previous presence of (that which is denied).

Objection: “Sensuousness is cognised in Indeterminate cognitions by an inference based upon the fact of the appearance of Indeterminate Cognitions being invariably concomitant with the contact of the object with the sense-organs.”

Reply: If you once admit the truth of the inference of sensuousness from invariable concomitance (of sense-contact), then (as this concomitance would be present in the case of Determinate Cognitions also; the Inference whereby you seek to negative the sensuousness of these cognitions would be operaing [operating?] against that former inference; and as such would be negatived by that same inference, just like the proposition “sound is not perceived by the ear.”

Thus then kalpanā cannot be a cognition consisting in the connecting of word.

II—Nor can kalpanā be the cognition of a qualified object, and consist in the connection of objects; as the qualification, the qualified, and the relationship between these two of the differentium and the differentiated,—are all real (and as such cannot he called ‘Kalpanā’ which by its very nature, must be unreal).

Objection: “A Cognition consists in the comprehension of an object; and it appears from sense-contact, exactly in accordance with the character of the object as it presents itself at first sight; and it does not operate after any deliberation. A determinate cognition however is deliberate in its character, involving many such deliberations,—‘this is the qualification,—that the qualified,—such and such is the relationship between them,—the ways of men are such that they speak of the man with, the stick, and not of the stick with the man’ and so forth; and the observer having considered all these facts collates them and then arrives at the determinate cognition that ‘this is the man with a stick.' If the qualified character of the object were real, then at the very first sight it would be cognised as such. And as it is not so cognised at first sight, its qualified character cannot be regarded as real; it must be unreal and adventitious. Hence we conclude that the cognition of the qualified character of an object is Kalpanā.”

Reply: Ill argued has this been by you, my good Sir! It is the intelligent self who, having comprehended each one of the qualification etc., and thought over them, comes to cognise, by his sense-organs, the qualified character of the object; and this is not done by the Cognition, which is unintelligent and as such incapable of thinking over the qualifications; specially as it does not operate intermittently. As for the object, it is always qualified, on account of its connection with qualifications; and the fact of its not being perceived as qualified by the sense-organ is due to the absence of the necessary aids in the form of the comprehension of the qualifications; and as soon as these equalifications are comprehended, it at once becomes cognised as qualified. Thus then, even in presence of the indubitable fact of the qualified cognition being born of sense-contact, if sensuous character be denied to it, merely for the fault of being qualified,—then such a reasoning is too clever to be refuted! So we close this discussion here.

The author proceeds to describe the causes of the sensuous cognition of Colour &c.—Rūparasa etc., etc. The word ‘anekadravya [anekadravyam]’ means that substance which inheres in, is made up of, many component parts. The ‘svagata viśeṣa’ is the character of taste in Taste, the character of odour in Odour, the character of touch in Touch, and so forth. From the contact of their substrates with the cognitive senseorgans, appears a distinctive cognition brought about by each one; of the sense-organs—viz: the cognition of colour is brought about by the Eye, that of taste by the Tongue, that of odour by the Nose, and that of touch by the Skin. As the specific character of each is also a cause of perception, there is a restriction as to the operation of the sense-organs; otherwise, if there were no difference, there would be a confusion in the sense-operations. As for sound, which inheres in the Ear, its perception is brought about by the ‘contact of three’—viz. of the self, the mind and the sense-organ; as for the contact of the object! (sound) with the organ, this is implied in the qualification ‘which inheres in the Ear’ (sound inhering in the ear, there is no need of contact); it is perceived by that same organ’—i.e. by the Ear.

Number etc. down to Action, when inhering in perceptible substances, are perceived by the Eye and the organ of Touch

Objection: “We cannot allow that Action is perceptible as when a substance moves, we do not perceive anything else except certain conjunctions and disjunctions (and these are only Qualities, while Action is a distinct category). As for the notion ‘it moves,’ it pertains to an act inferred from the said conjunctions and disjunctions.”

Reply: In this argument there is nothing to recommend itself. If Action were imperceptible, and only to be inferred from conjunctions and disjunctions, then, inasmuch as these conjunctions and disjunctions always belong to two substrates (f.i. the moving object and the ground it moves upon), the action (of moving) could be inferred (and believed) to exsit in the other substrate (ground) also. As a matter of fact, however, we find that when the monkey moves from the top of the tree to its root, and again from the root to the top, we have no such notion as that ‘the tree moves,’ though the tree also is the substrate of the conjunctions and disjunctions (of the monkey).

Objection: “The non-inference of Action in the tree is due to the fact that in the case in question the monkey has certain other conjunctions also, as for instance those with the points of space and the like, and these other conjunctions are not known to be bought about by any action of the tree.”

Reply: If such be the case then, for the sake of these other conjunctions of the monkey with the points in space, we might assume another action of the monkey; in any case the assumption of action in the tree would not be set aside. There is a general law to the effect that the substratum, of the cause (action) is the same as the substratum of the effect (conjunction and disjunction) and if this law were rejected in one instance, how could we believe in it in other instances?

Objection: “When we have assumed the action of the monkey (on the strength of inference from conjunctions and disjunctions), that is found enough to explain all such conjunctions of the monkey as those with the tree and with the points in space; and as such there is no ground for assuming the action of both (the monkey and the tree).”

Reply: It is not so, as all that is needed for inference is that whenever the pervaded (or less extensive) mark is perceived, it points to the presence of its pervasive (more extensive) concomitant And in what way could such an inference be disturbed, as Apparent Inconsistency is, by other explanations (of the premisses)? Nor is the Inference an intelligent being like man, that it should operate with due regard to certain purposes in view. If you seek to assume the conjunctions and disjunctions of any one point in space as the cause of the inference of action,—then we say that such an assumption cannot be made; because of the imperceptibility of the conjunctions and disjunctions of space which is beyond the reach of the senses. If, then, the action be sought to be inferred from the series of conjunctions and disjunctions of a certain portion of the Earth-globe, then the action of the flying bird would be absolutely inexplicable and incomprehensible. If the inferential mark in this case were sought to be found in the conjunctions and disjunctions of the light overspreading the atmosphere,—then there could be no basis or explanation for such notions as ‘my arm is throbbing,’ ‘my eyebrow is moving’;—notions born of the sense of touch as controlled by the invisible internal organ,—actions which appear, in dense darkness, by reason of the action of disordered wind in the body; how too could you explain the notion of moving that we have, in an intensely dark and cloudy night, with regard to the lightning flash which lasts for a moment (and is not perceived as having any conjunctions or disjunctions)?

The perception of buddhi and other qualities belonging to the self is due to its inherence in something in conjunction with the sense-organ. As for sattā, ‘being,’ dravyatva and other such (abstract) qualities, these are perceived by the same sense-organ by which their substrates are perceived.

(1) The perception of Substance is due to Conjunction (direct contact of the sense-organ); (2) that of Quality &c., is due to their inherence in something in direct contact with the sense-organs; (3) that of ‘guṇatva,’ ‘the character of quality’ is due to their inherence in something inhering in that which is in direct contact with the sense-organs; (4) that of sound is due to inherence (in the sense-organ); (5) that of ‘śabdatva’ is due to its inherence in that which inheres in the senseorgan; (6) and that of negation is due to its qualifying that which is related to the sense-organs; these are the six kinds of ‘sense-contact’. There are certain perceptions of negation,—such for instance as (a) the perception of the absence of taste &c., in colour, which is due to its qualifying that which inheres in a thing in contact with the sense-organ; (b) that of the negation of ‘rasatva’ &c., in ‘rūpatva,’ which is due to its qualifying the qualification existing in something inhering in that which is in contact; (c) that of the absence of the letter ‘kha’ in the letter ‘ka,’ which is due to its qualifying that which inheres in the sense-organ; and (d) that of the absence of ‘khatva’ in ‘katva’ which is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something inhering in the sense-organs. All these sources of perception however are included in the ‘qualifying of that which is related to the sense-organ’ (which has been mentioned as the cause of the perception of negation in general).

Some people regard either Conjunction only or Inherence only as the cause of perception; and they deny the intervening relationships mentioned above.

The nature of things is such that they are perceived only through contact with something else (the sense-organs); as for the possibility of confusion and uncertainty of perception, it is obviated by the restriction or limitation due to the proximity of their substratum.

Recapitulation: Such is the perception of us, who are not Yogis. The author proceeds to describe the ‘sensuous cognition’ of the Yogis: As for those that differ from, us &c., by ‘yoga’ here we mean ‘ecstacy;’ and it is of two kinds the Conscious or Concrete and the Unconscious or Abstract. The ‘concrete ecstacy’ consists in the contact of the mind, which has been controlled and concentrated upon a, portion of the self, with the self in whom there is a desire for knowledge; and the ‘Abstract ecstacy’ consist. in the contact without any end in view, of the controlled mind with a part of the self arising from ‘non-rising’ or undisturbed state of the mind.

Of these two, the latter belongs to the seeker after deliverance, and serving the purpose of dissipating ignorance, comes to be fully developed in the last life of the jīva upon earth; it does not add any dharma, because of the absence of the necessary accessory cause in the shape of a longing or desire (for either acquiring dharma or avoiding adharma); nor does it tend forwards any external object, being centered in the self alone; the former (concrete) ecstacy on the other hand, is always aided by a certain desire, and as such brings about dharma; and it always illuminates that external object with regard to which there is in the mind a desire to know the truth. These are the two kinds of ecstacy or yoga; and those who have once experienced this ecstacy, are called ‘yogis’ even when they have fallen of from - that condition; because of the capability in them (of returning to the same condition).

Inasmuch as the yogis have no perception of supersensuous objects, until the covering of impurities have been re moved from their minds, the author adds that while in the state of ecstacy, by means of their minds helped by dharma born of yoga, they obtain perfectly true conceptions with regard to. their own selves as well as bo those of Others, and also with regard to Ākāśa (space), time, air, atoms, minds, the qualities belonging to the last two, and inherence. By ourselves the self is always cognised in the character of the doer and the possessor as expressed in the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’; both these characters however are due to the connection of the self with such limitations as those of the body &c., and they are not natural to the self; whereby both these notions are called ‘false perception,’ in all systems of philosophy; simply because they contain conceptions contrary to the true state of things. The natural form of the self is perceived by the yogis alone. When the yogi makes up his mind to know the true character of the self as taught in the Vedāntas (Upaniṣads), he withdraws his mind from the external sense-organs, and fixing it upon a definite part of the self he continues one-pointedly to practise meditation upon the self; and then there coming into manifestation such of his dharma as tends to the accomplishment of his true knowledge, there clearly appears before his mind the real self free from all impositions of the ‘I’ or the ‘mine.’ When however he practises meditation with a view to learn the truth with regard to other selves or with the regard to space, time &c. then there comes about a dharma of considerable force helping his acquisition of true knowledge with regard to those things; and by the force of this, his internal organ shooting out of his external body, comes into contact with those other selves &c., and then brings about the due cognition of these through contact, of their qualities through the inherence of these in something in contact with the internal organ, of the guṇatva of the qualities through inherence in something inhering in that which is in direct contact, and of the absence of Inherence through the qualification of that which is related to the internal organ. Even in the case of the sciences and the arts we find that even when there is no proper knowledge of these, when due attention is paid and the mind fixed in constant meditation upon those subjects, the knowledge comes in due course.

These arguments have elsewhere been put in the form of the following inferential reasonings:—(1) The collective force of constant contemplation of the self, ākāśa and such things, is the cause of the true knowledge of these,—because it is a particular kind of practice,—like the practice of learning the sciences and arts; and (2) the varying grades of the intellect (involved in the practice) have a certain limit beyond which it does not go,—because they are varying grades,—like the varying grades of dimension. [And the true knowledge of self &c. would be those limits].

Objection: “In the case of water that is being heated we find that there are varying grades of heat; and yet we never find it ever reaching the highest limit of heat by being turned into fire itself (and from this it is clear that the mere presence of varying grades does not necessitate the reaching of the highest limit); nor do we ever perceive any limit upon the practice of jumping; as there is no man that can jump over all the three worlds (and until this limit is reached there would always be varying grades of jumping).”

Reply: When a property that has a permanent substratum produces a peculiarity in its substratum, a practice or repetition which would be of the nature of such a property would, gradually, reach the highest limit of excellence; as for instance when gold is repeatedly heated and treated by the method of ‘puṭapaka’ its purity gradually reaches the highest limit in acquiring the character of the raktasāra (?). As for the heating of water, it has got no permanent substratum, wherein repetition could bring it up to the highest limit; this absence of the permanent substratum is proved by the fact of the water entirely disappearing on the application of great heat. Then as for the practice of jumping. it is not productive of any peculiarity in its substratum; because the first jumping having been totally destroyed, leaving no traces behind, the second and subsequent jumpings might be the effects of other forces and efforts, like an altogether new jumping and hence any susequent excellence of jumping need not necessarily be attributed to the previous jumping). It is for this reason that we find that when the man is tired by three or four jumps, his limit of jumping begins to decline, on account of the decrease of strength (and this could not be if practice brought about gradual improvement). As for buddhi on the other hand, it has a permanent substratum, and brings about peculiar characters in its substratum; as we find that though something may not be comprehended at first, it becomes duly comprehended, when the buddhi is repeatedly applied to it. And thus the previous repetition always producing a higher peculiarity in it at each step of the practice, when the practice is kept up continuously and with great care for a long time, the buddhi, having obtained fresh force due to dharma born of yoga, must reach its highest limit; and there is nothing unreasonable or improbable in this.

Then again it has been argued that, ‘yogis cannot perceive supersensuous things,—because they are living beings—like ourselves’; and if this has been argued with regard to all men, then it becomes superfluous (as we too do not admit it of all men); and as for any particular kind of men, our opponent does not admit of any such (as they do not admit of men acquiring any powers by yoga); if be should know of any such man, then his argument would become contrary to the means of knowledge whereby such a person (who would form the subject of his conclusion) would be known (as the argument is meant to deny the existence of any such person with peculiar powers &c.).

Objection: “Your argument is an instance of ‘prasaṅgasādhana’ (the proving of an undesirable contingency); and such an argument is rightly brought forward, never for the establishing of one’s own position, but for the showing of an undesirable element in the opponent’s view of the case. But this undesirable element also can be rightly brought home to the opponent only when proved by means of such dharma &c. as are admitted by him; and it is not necessary that the person putting forward those should know and believe them to be true himself. For the opponent can never come forward with the assertion—‘these dharma &c. are not admitted by you; and I cannot understand them even though they are admitted by me’.”

Reply: Is this ‘prasaṅgasādhana’ an Inference or something else? If it is something other than Inference, then it should be shown to which ‘means of knowledge’ above described it belongs; or a distinct definition of it should be given. If, however, it is only an Inference, then it can operate only as based upon a previous cognition of the person bringing it forward; as a ‘parārtha anumāna’ (inference for the sake of others) is always put forward with a view to produce in the mind of the other person a firm conviction similar to that in the mind of the speaker himself. If it were not so, then it would be possible to admit the evidential authority of such inferential arguments as—‘the sky-lotus is sweet-smelling, because it is a lotus, like the lotus in the tank—even though it has a subject whose existence is not admitted by the propounder of the argument.^[1]

Then as for the fact of yogis being ‘living beings’ (which has been brought forward by the opponent as a reason for denying their supersensuous vision), and such other facts, these are cases of doubtful concomitance. If the great man under consideration were to have the character of a ‘living being’ he might also have omniscience,—what inherent inprobability could there be in this? Certainly no inconsistency has ever been found between ‘omniscience’ and the character of ‘living being.’ But omniscience being cognisable by other means of knowledge, its concomitance with the character of ‘living being’ would always be doubtful; as it cannot be definitely ascertained whether our want of omniscience is due to our character of living beings, or to the absence of the dharma born of yoga, which is recognised as the cause of the knowledge of all things. Consequently the ‘character of living beings’, having its concomitance doubtful, cannot prove the inferential conclusion (that the yogi can have no supersensuous cognition).

Objection: “It is not yet proved that dharma born of yoga is the cause of superseusuous cognition; and under the circumstances, how can our want of omniscience be suspected of being due to the absence of that dharma?”

Reply; To us the fact is well-known and fully established; hence it is that we suspect it. Thus then, the invariable concomitance (of ‘the character of living beings’ and ‘want of supersensuous knowledge’ is not one that is accepted by both parties; how then could there be any right inference based upon it?

Having described the sensuous perception of yogis in ecstacy, the author proceeds to describe that of those out of the ecstatic condition. Persons who have accumulated a store of dharma by yoga, even when not in the state of samādhi or ecstacy, do perceive things beyond the ordinary range of the senses; and it is these persons in this state that are called ‘viyukta’, ‘non-ecstatic.’ When these persons, having before them all the best of objects, and having none of the effective causes dulled in any way, coṃe to have the contact of the four things,—self, mind, sense-organ and the object,—and this contact is aided by the dharma born of their yogic practices,—then, through the said contact thus helped, they come to have direct sensuous perception of subtle things, like the mind, the atom &c., of things hidden from ordinary view (though close to us) like the nether region of serpents, and of distant things like! the region of Brahmā and the like.

Sensuous perception has been fully described; and the author next proceeds to distinguish the ‘result’ of this^- means of knowledge. In regard to Generalities, like ‘sattā’, ‘dravyatva’, ‘guṇatva’, ‘karmatva’ &c.,—and also with regard to Individualities, the ‘means of knowledge’ is in the form of the mere ‘ālocana of form’, free from all qualifying definiteness, ‘vikalpa’; as it is this ‘cognition’ that forms the most efficient means of the right knowledge of the thing; this exceptional ‘efficiency’ being inferred from the fact of its having the peculiarity that when this is present the person desiring knowledge is sure to have it. The character of the cogniser and the cognised is such that when these are present, knowledge is possible, and not that it must appear; but the nature of the ‘means of cognition’ is such that when it is present, in the form, of the abstract cognition of the qualification &c., it is absolutely certain that the cognition or knowledge, of the qualified object will duly appear.

The prameyas, ‘knowables,’ are the four categories substance &c.. That is to say, when cognition has appeared, it is with regard to these that the action of rejection or acceptance follows. The pramātā, ‘knower’, is the self, as it is in this that the knowledge inhered. Pramiti, ‘Knowledge’ is the knowledge of substance &c. That is to say, when the abstract cognition of Generalities and Individualities is the pramāṇas ‘means of knowledge,’ then the qualified cognition of the substance &c. is the pramiti, ‘knowledge’; when, however, the abstract cognition of Generalities and Individualities also has the form of ‘knowledge’, being as it is of the nature of ‘cognition of objects’, then with reference to that the ‘means of sensuous knowledge’ is in the form of the mere indistinct ālocana. The word ‘ālocana’ means that whereby a thing is perceived, which is the contact of the object with the sense-organ; and it is this mere sense-contact independently of any actual cognition, that forms the ‘means’ of the knowledge of Generalities and Individualities. Even for the cognition of the qualified, object, this sense-contact is the ‘means’, because of its inherent character of being the ‘means’ of cognition; but with this difference that, in this latter it acts as the ‘means’ only as helping the cognition of the qualification, and not independently by itself; while in the case of the abstract cognition of Generalities and Individualities it operates by itself, independently of actual cognition.

The author proceeds to show how mere ‘contact’ is the ‘means of knowledge’ in this case, and not actual cognition. For the cognition of Generalities and Individualities there is no other ‘means’, in the form of cognition,—because the cognition of Generalities and Individualities has not the character of a ‘result’, and as such it cannot be the result of; any cognition; the ‘cognition of the qualified’ is the result of the ‘cognition of the qualification and this latter cannot be; the result of another cognition; as, if it were, then there: would be no end of such cognition upon cognition. Hence it; must be admitted that for the ‘cognition of qualification’ the only ‘means’ that there can be is the contact of the sense-organ with the object.

Thus then, it has been shown that when the abstract cognition of Generalities and Individualities is the ‘result’ then the contact of the object with the sense-organ is the ‘means and when the concrete cognition of the qualified is the ‘result’ then the mere abstract cognition of the Generalities and Individualities is the ‘means’; and the author next points out that when the idea of ‘acceptance’ or ‘rejection’ is the ‘result’, then the cognition of the qualified is the ‘means’. With regard to all things the ‘pratyakṣa means of knowledge’ is that cognition born of the contact of four, three or two factors, which is ‘not false’—i.e. free from doubts and mistakes—and which is avyapadeśya, ‘not produced by words’.

Doubt, while showing an object as having two fleeting characters, lands the observer upon it as if it had a single fixed character; and hence bringing about a contrary conviction it is regarded as vitatha ‘false’; and as such is precluded by the word ‘avitatha.’ When a man, who does not know the meaning of the word ‘cow,’ has his eyes turned towards an object near him, and when he hears the word ‘cow’ uttered in its connection, he has the cognition of the ‘cow’; and for this cognition the sense-organ of the Eye is also a means; as otherwise he could not have any cognition of each line (on the cow’s body). But even then it is not ‘sensuous,’ because the most effective means of its appearance has been the word uttered between the sight of the animal and the cognition in question; and the sense-organ has acted merely as an aid. Hence it is that when asked, the man says—‘this animal has been spoken of by means of the word cow,’ and not that ‘I have perceived by means of the senses that it is a cow.’ And it is with a view to preclude this verbal element in the cognition that the author has added the word ‘avyapadeśya.’

Cognition consists in the perception of the goodness, badness or indifferent character of the object. The perception of goodness constitutes the cognition of the thing as something to be acquired; the perception of badness constitutes the cognition of it as something to be rejected or avoided; and the perception of the indifferent character constitutes the cognition that the thing is neither to be acquired nor to be avoided. Whenever the form of an object has been duly cognised, we remember the. help or otherwise accorded to us by it in the past; then we: come to form definite notions as to whether it is a source of pleasure or pain: and then we have the cognition as to its acquirability or otherwise; and this last cognition can not but; be the result of the ‘cognition of the form of the object’; the remembrance of pleasure &c, only being intervening agencies; as has been well said—“that which occurs in the interim is the action of the original cause.”

Others hold the following view: “The cognition of the thing as a source of pleasure, is the same as the cognition of its goodness, and also the same as the cognition of its being an object fit to be acquired; and similarly the cognition of it as a source of pain is. the same as. the cognition of its badness, as also the cognition of it as something to be avoided.^[2] And all this appearing as it does as ‘direct cognition,’ is the ‘result’ of ‘sensuous cognition’ which is aided by practice, which perceiving the mere form of the object, is free from any notion of distinguishing marks, and which is independent of all idea of invariable concomitance.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The reading ‘bhyupagatasiddhā’ does not give good sense, hence the translation has adopted the reading given in the footnote.

[2]:

Four lines have been wrongly inserted here as rightly noted in the footnote on page 260.