Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhaka-pramāṇa and Trairūpya

[Full title: Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna by Masamichi Sakai]

I am very grateful to Mr. Tyler Neill (PhD candidate, Leipzig University) for correcting and improving my English. Through the conversation with him, I could also improve this essay as a whole. With my deepest gratitude, I dedicate this article to my beloved Teacher Dr. Helmut Krasser, who privileged me to be a member of his project of editing the codex unicus of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā.

Introduction

It goes without saying that Dharmakīrti’s new approach of inferring momentariness (kṣa-nikatvānumāna)–i.e., the sattvānumāna, the inference of momentariness based on the inferential reason property “existence” (sattva)–had a decisive impact on the later de-velopment of this kind of Buddhist inference. At the same time, it is also true that the sattvānumāna generated a number of interpretative tasks for Dharmakīrti’s successors.

The problem is that the sattvānumāna seems to contain many aspects that threaten to shake the foundation of the traditional Buddhist logic in place since Dignāga.^[1] Prof. Katsumi Mimaki gives a clear synopsis of the problems confronting later Buddhist logicians, basing himself mainly on the works of Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, Ratnākaraśānti, and Mokṣākaragupta, who constitute the last phase of Buddhist philosophers.^[2] I agree with Prof. Mimaki’s contention that the problems they dealt with did not arise suddenly at that time, but rather had been developing gradually over the course of history.^[3] I have shown for example that one of the most crucial problems of the sattvānumāna–namely that the “example” (henceforth: dṛṣṭānta) is of no use, which seemingly forces the Buddhist to discard the second trairūpya condition (sapakṣa eva sattvam; henceforth T2)–was argued by Arcaṭa with a keen awareness.^[4]

Arcaṭa’s pupil, Dharmottara, shares his teacher’s awareness of the problem. In line with Arcaṭa’s argument, he also asks whether or not the dṛṣṭānta in the sattvānumāna is necessary. However, Dharmottara goes even further, contesting the necessity of the inferential reason property “existence” itself, thereby deepening the problem and developing the argument.

The aim of this article is to introduce and clarify Dharmottara’s arguments for solving the problematic nature of the sattvānumāna,^[5] by shedding light on what the exact problem is that Dharmottara inherits from his teacher, and how he addresses and develops it. In doing so, I attempt to properly locate Dharmottara’s contribution within the larger interpretative history of the sattvānumāna.

1. Arcaṭa and Dharmottara

[Sharing the problem of the dṛṣṭānta and the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa]

1.1 Arcaṭa’s argument: the dṛṣṭānta is useless and redundant

Arcaṭa’s greatest concern, as well as his pupil’s, is the relation between the threefold characteristic of a good reason property, i.e., trairūpya, and the so-called viparyaye bādha-kapramāṇa in the sattvānumāna.

In Dharmakīrtian logic, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in the sattvānumāna plays the critical role of demonstrating the essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha) or the pervasion (vyāpti) between the inferential reason property (henceforth: hetu) “existence” and the target property (henceforth: sādhyadharma) “momentariness.”^[6]

In the Hetubinduṭīkā (HBṬ), Arcaṭa argues^[7] that, in the case of kṣaṇikatvānumāna, since its sādhyadharma “momentariness” is imperceptible by nature, it is therefore impossible to find and show a dṛṣṭānta via perception (pratyakṣa). Generally speaking, in Dignāgean inference, in order to say that a hetu satisfies T2, one must exhibit at least one thing that possesses the hetu as well as the sādhyadharma and that is ontologically different from the site of inference (sādhyadharmin; henceforth: pakṣa). However, in the kṣaṇikatvānumāna, it is in fact impossible to find any momentary thing at all via perception. How then can one find a momentary thing to serve as dṛṣṭānta? Concerning this problem, Arcaṭa is of the opinion that, since the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can prove the essential connection, it can also prove that whatever possesses the hetu has the sādhyadharma. Thus, if one applies the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to something possessing the hetu and ontologically different from the pakṣa, one can show that the hetu satisfies T2. In the final analysis, however, Arcaṭa sees this activity of finding a dṛṣṭānta as nonsensical, given the natural objection in favor of directly applying the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to the pakṣa. That is, the logical method used to find something momentary as a dṛṣṭānta can also be used to prove that the pakṣa is momentary. With this in mind, Arcaṭa views the dṛṣṭānta as being redundant and of no use in the case of the sattvānumāna.^[8] He asserts that T2 in the case of the sattvānumāna should be understood to be fictitious (kālpanika).

1.2 Dharmottara’s treatment of the dṛṣṭānta

Dharmottara takes the same position as Arcaṭa, namely that what proves the momentariness of a dṛṣṭānta is the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and not any other source of knowledge, and that the same viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can also be used to prove that the pakṣa is momentary.^[9] Given this position, the dṛṣṭānta seems to be of no use, according to Arcaṭa. However, in the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (PVinṬ), Dharmottara elucidates a positive significance of, and role for, the dṛṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna.^[10]

The following series of arguments in the PVinṬ is strongly influenced by Arcaṭa’s position, and it seems here that Dharmottara, in an attempt to preserve some kind of raison d’être for the trairūpya, tries to overturn Arcaṭa’s conclusion.

1.2.1 dṛṣṭānta’s role and significance

In the PVinṬ, Dharmottara states:

If impermanence [i.e., momentariness,] is to be proved, what is a dṛṣṭānta, where the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which pervades [it] should be demonstrated? And he [i.e., Dharmakīrti] will declare [later, in PVin 3 128,1–131,5] that, “One should not take up a hetu, relying on scriptural doctrine (samaya/gzhung PVinṬt).” And, when an opponent who does not adhere to [any] settled doctrine (siddhānta) objects to momentariness, in that case, he should be forced to provisionally accept the momentariness of a certain thing even by receiving bribes (utkoca). This is because, otherwise, owing to the lack of a dṛṣṭānta, there would be no hetu. Therefore, there is no [dṛṣṭānta] at all whose sādhyadharma has already been well established [for such an opponent].^[11]

First, in asking himself what to make of the dṛṣṭānta in the inference of momentariness, Dharmottara refers to Dharmakīrti’s discourse on the antinomic reasons (viruddhāvya-bhicārihetu) in the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. There Dharmakīrti argues that his three kinds of hetu –essential feature (svabhāva), effect (kārya), and non-perception (anupalabdhi)–can never be antinomic. This is because they are all based on real things (vastu). According to him, any hetus based on scriptures (āgama) are antinomic, since they do not issue from the force of seeing real things (avastudarśanabalapravṛtta).^[12] With respect to this position of Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara sees a role for a dṛṣṭānta. Namely, Dharmottara regards a dṛṣṭānta as a place where it is guaranteed that a relevant hetu is based on a real thing and not on scripture.^[13]

Then, Dharmottara imagines a certain situation in which a dṛṣṭānta is needed: Suppose there is an opponent who is open-minded, i.e., free from any dogmas, but who never accepts momentariness. In that case, an advocate of momentariness must force that opponent into provisionally accepting (abhi-upa-√gam) the momentariness of a certain thing–this ‘certain thing’ is a dṛṣṭānta. Otherwise, not only could he not present the sādhyadharma to him, but he could not present even the hetu. That is, for such an opponent a certain thing serving as dṛṣṭānta would be the first place where both the sādhyadharma and the hetu coexist. Therefore, with this dṛṣṭānta the proponent can first establish both for that opponent. So, the proponent must employ the following procedure: first, force the opponent into provisionally accepting the momentariness of a certain thing, and second, make it known to him that the hetu is also there. After that, he can eventually move on to a proof of the momentariness of the pakṣa. However, at this point, the sādhyadharma of that dṛṣṭānta has not yet been proved.

1.2.2 Definition of the dṛṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna

In this line of argumentation, Dharmottara defines the dṛṣṭānta in the inference of momen-tariness as follows:

Moreover, with regard to this “grasping/holding of a dṛṣṭānta [in a proof],” mentioned here and there, the following is the meaning: It is by depending on the fact that the hetu exists in a thing that is different from the pakṣa that one can make the defeating source of knowledge function, not in a different manner. Therefore, the dṛṣṭānta is an object 1) which is a sphere (viṣaya) where hetu is established and 2) which is a place where the defeating source of knowledge is shown. For an opponent in turn, however, [dṛṣṭānta] is not [yet] proved as being caused to be bound to the sādhyadharma, [i.e., momentariness], [until the defeating source of knowledge is made to function there].^[14]

One aspect of this is that Dharmottara confirms that the hetu should be established on the basis of reality and that it is in the dṛṣṭānta that this takes place. Another aspect is that the dṛṣṭānta is a place where the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa should be shown, since otherwise, the proponent cannot prove the dṛṣtānta’s momentariness, which has been only forcibly and provisionally accepted by the opponent.^[15]

2. The crucial problem of the hetu sattva:

[Sharing the problem of the dṛṣṭānta and the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa]

However, the position that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa establishes as proved the provi-sionally accepted momentariness of a dṛṣṭānta evokes the very crucial problem, which, to the best of my knowledge, was first propounded by Arcaṭa, and which equally confronted later Buddhist logicians.

Dharmottara introduces the following, seemingly rhetorical pūrvapakṣa:

[Objection 1:] If the defeating source of knowledge does not require [a dṛṣṭā-nta] of which the sādhyadharma is already admitted, then, in this manner, when the defeating source of knowledge shows the pervasion of [a property] “being produced” by [a property] “being impermanent” in a property posses-sor as dṛṣṭānta, this very same defeating source of knowledge will prove the impermanence in the pakṣa too. Thus, it is in every case the defeating source of knowledge that is capable of proving the sādhya[dharma]. For this reason, there is the undesirable consequence that the hetu, which is of the essential feature type, is not a real hetu (ahetutvaprasaṅga). [Objection 2:] Moreover, even if the following is the case: “Defeating (bādhaka) itself does not occur without depending upon [the hetus] ‘being existent’ and ‘being produced,’ therefore, [the hetu] ‘being existent’ should be needed,” it is nevertheless only on the basis of pakṣadharmatva [i.e., the fact that the hetu is a property of the pakṣa], which is accompanied by the defeating source of knowledge, that the sādhyadharma is proved. Thus, there is the undesirable consequence that there is not a threefold condition [as a whole, namely because only the first condition is needed].^[16]

The points of this objection are:

1) Given that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can in fact prove the dṛṣṭānta’s momen-tariness, it can prove the pakṣa’s momentariness too. It follows then that the hetu sattva in the sattvānumāna is not a real hetu that can in fact prove sādhyadharma –the real hetu, i.e., reasoning, is the very viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa instead.

2) It may be the case that defeating does not occur without this hetu –since what is defeated by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa is this sattva in the case where non-momentariness is supposed^[17] –and so, in this sense, the hetu seems to be needed.^[18] Nevertheless, it should actually be the case that only the pakṣadharmatva –the fact that the hetu is a property of the pakṣa –is needed. This is because the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can function in the pakṣa if and only if that pakṣa possesses sattva, so that its possession of the sādhyadharma can be proved by it. In this case, what is needed for a sound inference is only the first trairūpya condition (henceforth: T1). Thus, the trairūpya condition considered as a whole would be useless.

It is this same second point of this objection on the basis of which Arcaṭa discards the necessity of T2.

2.1 Counterexample and the second trairūpya condition

To respond to these undesired consequences on behalf of the trairūpya theory, Dharmottara appeals to the concept of a ‘counterexample’ in a possible debate with opponents:

[Answer:] [To this objection,] we say (ucyate): What has been said, namely that, “[It is sufficient that] there is pervasion only in the pakṣa, and so what can be gained by grasping other property possessors [other than the pakṣa]?” is not tenable. This is because it is not possible to show the defeating source of knowledge in a single locus [i.e., in the pakṣa], after setting aside visible objects that are different from the pakṣa. Suppose the defeating source of knowledge should be shown in the following manner: “If there were not the momentariness of a sound, there would not be even [its] existence.” If an opponent were to say, “Just as a visible thing, such as a pot etc., though not momentary, achieves purpose fulfillment, this sound too must be so,” [then] those visible [things], such as pots, should also in the same manner [i.e., like in the case of a sound] be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. And, with regards to those [visible things such as a pot and the like] that have [already] been brought into the scope [of the defeating source of knowledge], he [i.e., the opponent] may respond: “A certain invisible thing, though it achieves purpose [fulfillment], should be (bhaviṣyati) non-momentary, and these visible [things, the pot and so on] are like this.” Therefore, [this] invisible thing that has in turn been put forth as a [counter]example by the opponent should be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. Therefore, why is it the case that the defeating source of knowledge is shown only in the specific and single pakṣa?^[19]

Dharmottara’s point is this: Even though the proponent applies the viparyaye bādhaka-pramāṇa directly to the pakṣa and thereby completes the proof of its momentariness, his opponent might bring other existing things as ‘counterexamples’ which are thought to be non-momentary but capable of purpose fulfillment. Theoretically speaking, for any existent things including even invisible things (adṛśya), it is not until the viparyaye bādhakapra-māṇa functions that their momentariness is proved, since only it is capable of proving momentariness. In this sense, the opponent has the right to present counterexamples to which the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa has not yet been applied, so as to invalidate the pakṣa’s momentariness. Dharmottara insists that, in order to rebut such counterexamples, the proponent must show the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in counterexamples. This activity amounts to the fact that the opponent needs to hold T2, in that such counterexamples will be ontologically different things from the pakṣa. In this regard, it is not the case that the trairūpya condition in its totality is useless. Rather, it is an indispensable condition for a sound inference of the pakṣa’s momentariness. In this way, Dharmottara, although basically inheriting Arcaṭa’s view, asserts the significance of T2.

2.1.1 Omni-applicability of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa

In theory, the opponent can pose an infinite number of counterexamples including even invisible things. Therefore, the proponent must apply the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to each and every case according to the situation.

In other words, the viparyaye bādha-kapramāṇa must be such a source of knowledge as should and in fact can be applied to all counterexamples brought forth by the opponent. In this regard, Dharmottara calls Dharmakīrti’s viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa “that whose scope is a collection of all things” (sarvapadārthopasaṃhāraviṣayam).

And for this very reason, for the Teacher [i.e., Dharmakīrti], that which demon-strates the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which per-vades [it, i.e., the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa,] is intended to have the scope of a collection of all things, as [he] has said [in the PVin 2 76,3–4]: “whatsoever is produced is impermanent.” And he does not accept the pervasion which is subject to distinctions among the pakṣa and the like. Therefore, the logical mark, whose scope is in fact all things, is ascertained to be pervaded by its own target [property], which is proved by the defeating source of knowledge.^[20]

As the reason for the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa’s omni-applicability, Dharmottara refers to an essential feature of the hetu “existence” (sattva), which is a part of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa: namely, that it pertains to all things.^[21] Thus, the pervasion ascertained by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa functioning with this special property is not subject to distinctions between pakṣa and non-pakṣa. In short, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa proves that all things are momentary.

3. Problem of the first trairūpya condition

However, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa’s omni-applicability prompts a further crucial problem for the advocate of trairūpya, namely that T1 (= pakṣadharmatā) is useless. Given that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa proves that all things are momentary, then, since the pakṣa is already included in the sphere of everything, its momentariness is proved solely by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Thus, it is useless to particularly point out, in an inference, the pakṣa’s possession of the hetu “existence.” Arcaṭa does not discuss any problem of this kind in his HBṬ.^[22]

The relevant objection in the PVinṬ reads:

[Objection:] But, given that the pervasion is shown [by the defeating source of knowledge] as encompassing all things, a sound [as the pakṣa] too, which is included in all [things], is proved to be momentary. Thus, there is no benefit to including a property of the pakṣa [in the arguments].^[23]

Dharmottara rebuts this by strictly distinguishing the ascertainment of pervasion from that of whether or not the relevant pakṣa actually exists, i.e., in reality. That is, the ascertainment of pervasion by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa that everything, including the pakṣa, is momentary belongs to a theoretical level; on the other hand, the ascertainment of whether the pakṣa actually exists belongs to an actual, epistemological level.

He says:

[Dharmottara:] Well then, is it the case that a hare’s horn is known to be existent to a person who has already ascertained that “Whatever is existent is momentary?” [Objector:] Since a hare’s horn does not exist, it is not known [to him]. But a sound does exist. [Dharmottara:] Then, this [i.e., the existence of a sound] should be known by means of another source of knowledge, [since], if this is known, it can be understood that a sound is not like a hare’s horn. Therefore, though a sound is generally [i.e., without its individuality,] included in [all things] when pervasion is [demonstrated by the defeating source of knowledge], its [i.e., a sound’s] existence should be individually known by means of another source of knowledge in order to ascertain [its own] momentariness.^[24]

The ascertainment of pervasion and that of the pakṣa’s actual existence are totally different and independent issues. Knowledge of the former does not imply the latter. Otherwise, once pervasion is demonstrated, it would be proved that not only a sound, but also a hare’s horn is momentary. But this is not the case, since a hare’s horn does not exist in reality. According to Dharmottara, the pakṣa’s actual existence must be ascertained by another source of knowledge other than the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Showing T1 in an inference amounts to the fact that the actual existence of the pakṣa is epistemologically ascertained by another source of the knowledge.^[25] In this way, Dharmottara insists on the indispensability of T1.

4. Concluding remarks

In short, while absolutely relying on the logical universality of the viparyaye bādhakapra-māṇa, Dharmottara strives not for a formal, but rather for a substantial raison d’être of trairūpya. Furthermore, this reliance is well founded, given that he is basing himself on Dharmakīrti’s position as expressed in his Hetubindu and Vādanyāya.^[26] For the discussions of the kṣaṇikatvānumāna in these works, Dharmakīrti depends exclusively on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. At the same time, however, his formulation includes T1 and T2.^[27] It appears that under this logically ambiguous circumstance, Arcaṭa steers his course of interpretation toward stressing the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, judging Dharmakīrti’s retention of the trairūpya to be a mere formality, and Dharmottara, in turn, makes efforts toward harmonizing the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa with trairūpya.

To the best of my knowledge, in the larger interpretative history of the sattvānumāna, Dharmottara’s argument examined above is the first systematic defense of the significance of trairūpya taken as a whole, which well represents the Buddhist logical standpoint of being neither antarvyāpti nor bahirvyāpti.^[28] What’s more, this seems to remain the only way for traditional Buddhists to maintain their argumentative identity until the innovation by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti of proving the momentariness of a dṛṣṭānta via the combination of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya,^[29] itself a strategy that avoids exclusive reliance on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa.^[30]

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Steinkellner 1967 E. Steinkellner, Dharmakīrti’s Hetubinduḥ: Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien 1967.

Steinkellner 2004 E. Steinkellner, The Early Dharmakīrti on the Purpose of Examples. In: The Role of the Example (dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic, ed. Sh. Katsura and E. Steinkellner. Wien 2004, 225–250.

Tani 1997 T. Tani, Problems of Interpretation on Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (1)–(3). Kōchikōgyōkōtōsenmongakkō Gakujyutsukiyō 41 (1997) 19–37(1); 39–57(2); 59–77(3) (in Japanese).

Tani 2000 T. Tani, Study of Momentariness. Tokyo 2000 (in Japanese).

TBh Tarkabhāṣā (Mokṣākaragupta), ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore 1944.

TSam Tattvasamīkṣā (Vācaspatimiśra), ed. D. Acharya. Stuttgart 2006.

VN Vādanyāya (Dharmakīrti), ed. M. T. Much. Wien 1991.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

It is interesting that Dharmakīrti himself presents the sattvānumāna as if there were no conflict between the logic underlying the sattvānumāna and the traditional Buddhist logic in place since Dignāga. For now I cannot make any judgments about whether Dharmakīrti himself thinks that the logic of the sattvānumāna does not deviate from the traditional Dignāgean logic, but his followers’ activities make me think this is unlikely.

[2]:

Cf. Mimaki 1976 and Mimaki 1984.

[3]:

Cf. Mimaki 1984: 238.

[4]:

I read a paper on this topic at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vienna 2014; see Sakai 2015. In Arcaṭa’s argument, we can see a direct link with the antarvyāpti theory advocated by Ratnākaraśānti and reported by Mokṣākaragupta in comparison with the bahirvyāpti theory (cf. TBh 47,1–6).

[5]:

Perceiving the importance of Dharmottara’s arguments, Prof. Tadashi Tani was early in exploring them as they appear both in Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (KBhS) and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, second chapter (PVinṬ 2). See Tani 1997 and Tani 2000. At that time, however, the Sanskrit manuscript of the latter was unavailable. But now, the situation has changed, and I am luckily in a position to consult the codex unicus of the PVinṬ 2 (for the project of editing the codex unicus of the PVinṬ, see https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/buddhismuskunde-sinologie/schwerpunkte/pramanaviniscayatika/), which covers the entirety of the important portion in which Dharmottara discusses the problem of the sattvānumāna most intensively. The Sanskrit original surely enables us to grasp Dharmottara’s arguments with more clarity.

[6]:

Dharmakīrti’s first use of this defeating source of knowledge (bādhakapramāṇa) for the sattvānumāna is in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, second chapter (cf. PVin 2 80,1–8), and also in his later works, the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya (cf. HB 4,9–12, VN 2,1–4, respectively). He puts forward the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa as the method of proving the essential connection for the sattvānumāna. Its basic and simple form can be demonstrated as follows: “Given that there is non-momentariness, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfillmenta, the being-real which is characterized as that [i.e., purpose fulfillment,] is abandoned” (HB 4,11-12: akṣaṇikatve’rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ hīyata iti.). For a German translation, cf. Steinkellner 1967: 37. aMy understanding of the word arthakriyā is based on Dharmottara’s elucidation in his PVinṬ and the Nyāyabinduṭīkā. Cf. PVinṬ 2 Ms 89a2–3 (PVinṬS 17,11): arthaḥ prayojanam, tasya kriyā niṣpattiḥ; NBṬ 76,3–4: arthasya prayojanasya kriyā niṣpattiḥ.

[7]:

This paragraph is a summary of Sakai 2015: 284–289 (sections 3.1.–3.2.).

[8]:

In other words, the dṛṣṭānta never contributes in any way to a proof that the pakṣa has the sādhyadharma. This is so in the sense that the dṛṣṭānta cannot play even the Dharmakīrtian role of conveying the essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha) to those who do not remember or do not know it, since without the functioning of the viparyaye bādhakapramāna, one can never know that the dṛṣṭānta possesses the sādhyadharma “momentariness.” Given that momentariness itself can never be perceived, there is no difference between the dṛṣṭānta and the pakṣa. For the difference between the Dharmakīrtian and the Dignāgean role of dṛṣṭānta, see Steinkellner 2004.

[9]:

In the KBhS, Dharmottara asserts that even if there can be dṛṣṭāntas, namely things whose momentariness is accepted, it cannot thereby be proved that the pakṣa too is of that nature, and this is because a mere similarity with such dṛṣṭāntas cannot conclusively prove that the other thing is also momentary. Thus, Dharmottara requires, in order to prove the momentariness of the pakṣa, the viparyaye bādhaka-pramāṇa to be applied to the pakṣa. Cf. KBhSF 223,15–17, 21–23: ’di la dpe ni yod kyang chos mthun pa tsam’ba’ zhig gis (’ba’ zhig gis KBhSF: ’ba’ zhig gi KBhSP) dngos po gzhan dag de’i rang bzhin du’gyur ba rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no // … gal te yang dpe la skad cig mar’jig pa yod na (’jig pa yod na KBhSF: ’jig pa KBhSP) / de lta na yang khyab pa rab tu sgrub pa’i (rab tu sgrub pa’i KBhSF: rab tu bsgrubs pa’i KBhSP) tshad mar rab tu bstan pa ñid las skad cig mar’jig par grub bo // “In this case [i.e., when momentariness is to be proved], even if there are dṛṣṭāntas, it is not tenable that other things are [also] of that nature [i.e., = of the nature of momentariness] due to a mere similarity [with dṛṣṭāntas]. …even if there can be perishing within a moment in dṛṣṭāntas, nevertheless it is only on the basis of showing the source of knowledge which in fact demonstrates pervasion (i.e., the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa) that perishing within a moment is proved.” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241.

[10]:

In both the KBhS and the PVinṬ, Dharmottara discusses various logical problems with the sattvānumāna, and although many of these discussions are common to both works, it is only in the PVinṬ that Dharmottara cares about the positive aspect of the dṛṣṭānta.

[11]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a3–6: athānityatve sādhye ko dṛṣṭāntaḥ, yatra vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ sidhyeta. ^ana ca samayam āśritya hetur upādeya^a iti vakṣyati. anāśritasiddhāntakaś ca paro yadā kṣaṇikatvaṃ (kṣaṇikatvaṃ emended [cf. skad cig ma nyid PVinṬt]: kṣaṇikaṃ Ms) prati pratyavatiṣṭhate, tadāsāv utkocādānenāpi kasyacit padārthasya kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamaṃ (padārthasya kṣaṇikatvā° emended: padārthakṣaṇikatvā° Ms) kārayitavyaḥ. bitarathā hi dṛṣṭāntābhāvād dhetur na syāt. tasmān na prasi-ddhasādhyadharmaḥ kaścitb. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000:167. a–a To my understanding, the bold part is Dharmottara’s short summary of PVin 3 128,1–131,5, where Dharmakīrti details antinomic reasons (viruddhāvyabhicāra). I have not yet been able to find an exact passage in the PVin. For the Tibetan translation corresponding to PVin 3 128,1–131,5, which has been translated into Japanese with a clear analysis, see Ono 2010: 136–139. b–b For this part, the Tibetan version reads as follows: PVinṬt P305b3;D253a3: de lta ma yin na dpe med pas gtan tshigs ma yin par’gyur ro // de’i phyir bsgrub par bya ba’i chos ma grub pa la ni dpe’ga’ yang med do // “Otherwise, because there is no dṛṣṭānta, [a relevant reason property] would not indeed be a reason property. Therefore, with regard to [a reason property] whose sādhyadharma is not well established (*aprasiddhasādhyadharme/*asiddhasādhyadharme), there is no dṛṣṭānta at all (*na kaścid dṛṣṭāntaḥ).” For me, the content of this Tibetan translation is difficult.

[12]:

Cf. PVin 3 128,2–5: na hi sambhavo’sti kāryasvabhāvayor uktalakṣaṇayor anupalambhasya vā viru-ddhāvyabhicāritāyām. na cānyo’vyabhicārī . tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam a-numānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ, śāstrakārāṇām artheṣu bhrāntyā viparītasvabhāvopasaṃhārasambhavāt. na hy asti sambhavo yathāvasthitavastusthitiṣv ātma-kāryānupalambheṣu.

[13]:

In the sattvānumāna, the hetu as “existence” refers to “purpose fulfillment,” and this is of course established on the basis of seeing real things–for example, in the case of a pot as the dṛṣṭānta, its purpose fulfillment, holding water etc., is established by observation.

[14]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a6–7: yaḥ punas tatra tatra dṛṣṭāntaparigraha uktaḥ, tatrāyam abhiprāyaḥ (abhiprāyaḥ emended [cf. dgongs pa PVinṬt]: a{pra}y{ā}ayaḥ Ms)–sādhyadharmivyatirikte vastuni hetoḥ sattvam āśritya bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyāpārayituṃ śakyam, nānyathā. tasmād dhetor vidhiviṣayo bādhaka-pramāṇapradarśanagocaro (°pradarśana° emended [cf. rab tu ston pa’i PVinṬt]: °darśana°) ’rtho dṛṣṭāntaḥ. na tu prativādinaḥ sādhyadharmasambandhitaḥ siddhaḥ. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168.

[15]:

It should be noted here that in the KBhS Dharmottara does not mention the role and significance of dṛṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna that he discusses in the PVinṬ (cf. the text portions of the PVinṬ 2 cited in nn. 11 and 14 above).

[16]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a7–99b3: ayadi badhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ na siddhasādhyadharmāpekṣam, evaṃ tarhi yenaiva bādhakena pramāṇena dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi kṛtakatvasyānityatvena vyāptir upadarśyate, tenaiva pramāṇena sādhyadharmiṇy apy anityatvaṃ setsyatīti sarvatra bādhakam eva pramāṇaṃ sādhya-sādhanasamartham. ataḥ svabhāvahetor ahetutvaprasaṅgaḥ.a athāpi sattvaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ cānāśritya bādhakam eva na pravartata iti sattvam āśrayaṇīyaṃ, evam api pakṣadharmatvād eva bādhakapra-māṇasahāyāt sādhyasiddhir iti trairūpyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168–169. a–a For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhSF 223,23–25: gal te de ltar na bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can nyid la khyab pa (khyab pa KBhSF: khyab pa’i KBhSP) sgrub pa’i tshad mas skad cig ma nyid du sgrub na yod pa zhes bya ba’i gtan tshigs nye bar blangs pa don med par’gyur ro zhe na / “[Objection:] If, in this way [i.e., as it is in the dṛṣṭānta], the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion proves momentariness just in the pakṣa itself, it should be useless to take/employ the hetu called sattva [in an inference].” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241–242.

[17]:

Cf. n. 6 above.

[18]:

In other words, this position refers to the view that the hetu sattva and the property “being existent” defeated by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa are the same.

[19]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 99b3–7: ucyate–yad uktam–sādhyadharmiṇy eva vyāptiḥ, tat kiṃ dharmyantaraparigra-heṇeti, tad ayuktam, yasmād dṛṣṭān sādhyadharmivyatiriktān bhāvān parityajya naikasmin dharmiṇi bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ śakyaṃ darśayitum. yadi kṣanikatvaṃ na syāc chabdasya, sattvam eva na syād ity evaṃ bādhake pramāṇe darśayitavye yadi paro brūyāt–yathā ghaṭādir dṛṣṭo bhāvo’kṣaṇikatve’py arthakriyākārī , tadvad ayaṃ śabdo’pi syāt iti, evaṃ te’pi dṛṣṭā ghaṭādayo bādhakapramāṇaviṣayīka-rtavyāḥ. teṣu ca viṣayīkṛteṣu punarbrūyāt (punarbrūyāt emended: punabrūyāt Ms) –adṛṣṭo bhāvaḥ kaścid arthakāry apy akṣaṇiko bhaviṣyati, tadvac cāmī dṛṣṭā iti punaḥ pareṇa dṛṣṭāntīkṛto’dṛṣto bhāvo bādhakapramāṇaviṣayīkartavya iti (°kartavya iti emended [bya dgos pa’i phyir PVinṬt]: °kartta iti Ms) katham ekasminn eva sādhyadharmiṇi bādhakapramāṇapradarśanam. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 169–170. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS (the exact literal parallel is the part a–a). Cf. KBhSF 223,25–224,17: achos can nyid la khyab pa sgrub par byed pa’i (khyab pa sgrub par byed pa’i KBhSF: khyab par sgrub par byed pa’i KBhSP) tshad mar rab tu bstan par ni nus pa ma yin te / ’di ltar khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma ni’di ltar bstan par bya ste / gal te sgra rtag par gyur na rim dang cig car dag gis don bya ba la nye bar sbyor bar mi’gyur ro zhes so // ’di la ni pha rol pos kyang ji ltar bum pa skad cig ma ma yin yang rim dang cig car dag gis mngon par’dod pa’i’bras bu bsgrub par nus pa de bzhin du sgra yang’gyur ro zhes brjod par nus so // ’di la yang lan / bum pa yang ngas gnod par byed pa’i tshad ma’i yul du byas pa nyid do zhes brjod dgos so // des na rnam grangs’dis pha rol gyi nye bar bkod pa mthong ba’i dngos po mtha’ dag rgol bas (rgol bas KBhSF: gol bas KBhSP) gnod par byed pa’i tshad ma’i yul du bya ba yin no // gal te pha rol po dngos po’ga’ zhig skad cig ma ma yin par rim dang cig car gyis (rim dang cig car gyis KBhSF: rim dang cig car gyi KBhSP) don byed par nus pa de bzhin sgra yang yin no zhes ma mthong ba yang dogs par byed na (dogs par byed na KBhSF: dags par byed na KBhSP) de la yang gal te’ga’ zhig der gyur na skad cig ma ma yin pa des kyang rim dang cig car dag gis don byed par mi nus so zhes spyir brjod par bya’o // des na srid par byas pa’i ma mthong ba de yang gnod par byed pa’i tshad ma’i yul nyid du khas blang bar bya ba nyid do //a de lta yin pa dang mthong ba dang ma mthong ba’i dngos po mtha’ dag la (dngos po mtha’ dag la KBhSF: dngos po mtha’ dag KBhSP) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma bstan par rnam par gnas pa na (rnam par gnas pa na KBhSF: rnam par gnas pa dang KBhSP) / gang dag bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can las (bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can las KBhSF: bsgrub sgrub par bya ba’i chos can las KBhSP) tha dad pa’i dngos po de dag dpe’i dngos la brten pa’i phyir bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can las tha dad pa gang dag la (gang dag la KBhSF: gang la KBhSP) gtan tshigs yod pa de dag ni dpe yin te / bsgrub par bya ba’i dngos po nges pa ni (nges pa ni KBhSF: nges pa na KBhSP) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma la rag las pa’i phyir ro // “a[Answer:] It is not possible to show the source of knowledge proving pervasion only in the pakṣa alone. This is because the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion should be shown in the following manner–‘If a sound [i.e., the pakṣa] were permanent, it would be employed in fulfilling a purpose neither in a gradual nor in a simultaneous manner.’ [A proponent says] so. Against this, [his] opponent in turn can retort–‘Just as a pot, though being non-momentary, can bring about an expected effect in a gradual or simultaneous manner, so too must a sound be.’ Against this too, the reply should be stated [as follows]–‘A pot too is by all means brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by me [i.e., the proponent].’ Thus, every visible thing proposed (*upanyasta) by the opponent through such an enumeration is brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by the disputant [i.e., the proponent]. If the opponent doubts even an invisible [thing], saying that, ‘A certain thing, being non-momentary, can fulfill a purpose in a gradual or simultaneous manner, and a sound is so too,’ [then], against this too, it should be generally stated–‘If there were to exist a certain [thing, and if it were] not momentary, it also would be incapable of fulfilling a purpose, whether in a gradual or in a simultaneous manner.’ Therefore, this invisible [thing] too, which has been hypothetically assumed [by the opponent], is necessarily provisionally accepted as the object of the defeating source of knowledge.a And when in this manner it is established that the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is shown in [both] all visible and invisible things–since [in this case] those things that are different from the pakṣa belong to a subset of example objects–[all] those things which are different from the pakṣa and in which the hetu exists are [all] examples. This is because the ascertainment of [whether] the target [property] exists (*bhāva) [or does not exist] depends on the source of knowledge that demonstrates pervasion.” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 242.

[20]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 99b1–100a1: ata eva ca sarvapadārthopasaṃhāraviṣayaṃ vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasādhakam iṣṭam ācāryasya, yad āha–yat kiñcit kṛtakam, tat sarvam anityam iti (cf. PVin 2 76,3–4: yat kiñcit kṛtakaṃ tat sarvam anityam…). pakṣādipravibhāgāpekṣāṃ ca vyāptiṃ necchati. tasmāt sarvapadā-rthaviṣayam eva liṅgaṃ bādhakena pramāṇena sādhitasvasādhyavyāptikam avasātavyam. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 172.

[21]:

In the PVinṬ, Dharmottara differentiates the logical scope of the inferential reason property “being existent” (sattva) from that of the inferential reason property “being produced” (kṛtakatva). For the Buddhists, their ontological scopes are the same, but it might be the case that there are some opponents for whom this is not the case. According to Dharmottara’s explanation, Dharmakīrti is taking such a possibility into account when he introduces this hetu. The scope of the former includes something that has a cause, i.e., is produced, but which is beyond the category of the five aggregates (pañcaskandha), i.e., invisible, incognizable. Cf. Sakai 2010: 143–144.

[22]:

Cf. Sakai 2015: 291–292 (section 4.2.). Durvekamiśra elucidates where Arcaṭa sees the significance of T1 in the sattvānumāna. He reports (HBṬĀ 261,23–262,2) that Arcaṭa’s way of recognizing the necessity of T1 is rejected by Dharmottara and the like who have a different view on the same issue. According to Durvekamiśra, Arcaṭa requires T1, so that one can indicate the object to which the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa is applied in a relevant inference. On the other hand, Dharmottara’s reason for needing T1 is so that one can ascertain the pakṣa’s being real (tattva). For this interesting controversy, cf. Sakai 2019.

[23]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 100a1–2: nanu ca sarvapadārthopasaṃhāravati vyāptipradarśane śabdo’pi sarvāntarbhūtaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ siddha iti na pakṣadharmopasaṃhārasya phalam. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhSF 224,18–22: gal te dngos po mtha’ dag gi yul la (yul la KBhSF: yul can la KBhSP) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma srid na / ’o na ni des na ji ltar dpe dag la bsgrub bya nges pa khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma dang’brel pa de bzhin du bsgrub bya’i chos can la yang rjes su’gro ldog rab tu grub pa dag las mngon par’dod pa grub pas phyogs kyi chos nye bar bstan pas ci bya zhe na / “[Objection:] If the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is applicable to the sphere of all things, then, on the basis of this [fact], with regard to examples, ascertainment of the target [property] is subject to the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion. In the same manner, with regard to the site too, the desired [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved due to the positive and negative concomitances that are in fact established [by the source of knowledge that demonstrates pervasion]. Thus, what can be gained by pointing out a property of the site?” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 242–243.

[24]:

PVinṬ 2 Ms 100a2–4: tat kim idānīṃ yat sat, tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam iti niścitavato’pi puṃsaḥ śaśaviṣāṇaṃ sad iti jñātam. śaśaviṣāṇasyāsattvād ajñātam. śabdasya tu sattvam. tat tarhi pramāṇāntarāj jñātavyam, yasmiṃ jñāte na śaśaviṣāṇavac chabda ity avagamyeta. tasmāt sāmānyenāntarbhūtasyāpi śabdasya vyāptikāle kṣaṇikatvaniścayārthaṃ viśeṣeṇa sattvaṃ pramāṇāntareṇa jñātavyam. For this part too we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhSF 224,22–225,2: bden mod kyi’on kyang dngos po’i tshogs ni mtha’ yas la khyab pa bsgrub pa (khyab pa bsgrub pa KBhSF: khyab pa sgrub pa KBhSP) yang dngos po mtha’ dag gi yul can yin pa des na sgra med kyang bsgrub bya sgrub byed dag gi (sgrub byed dag gi KBhSF: sgrub byed dag gis KBhSP) khyab pa ni dngos po gzhan nyid las rab tu grub pa kho na’o (rab tu grub pa kho na’o KBhSF: rab tu grub tu grub pa kho na’o KBhSP) // des na ji ltar ri bong gi rwa med par khyab pa grub pa de bzhin du sgra med par rab tu’grub pa nyid do // de las khyab pa mi’grub pa’i phyir na sgra’i yod pa ni ji ltar yang phan’dogs par byed pa nyid ma yin no // de lta yin dang khyab pa’grub pa la khas ma blangs pa’i byed pa can sgra’i yod pa nyid ni tshad ma gzhan kho na las rtogs par bya ba yin no // des na nges pa tshad ma gzhan la rag las pa sgra’i yod pa nyid ni sgra mi rtag par bsgrub par nus pa’i phyir phyogs kyi chos nye bar bsdu bar bya ba (nye bar bsdu bar bya ba KBhSF: nye bar bsu bar bya ba KBhSP) kho na’o // “[Answer:] This is right. But, a collection of things is infinite, and [the source of knowledge] demonstrating pervasion can be applied to all things (*sakalapadārthaviṣayam). Therefore, even if a sound were not to exist, pervasion between the target property and the reason property would surely be realized on the basis of other things [other than a sound]. Thus, just as pervasion is established without the existence of a hare’s horn, so [pervasion] is surely established without the existence of a sound. Since pervasion is not established on the basis of that [i.e., a sound], the existence of a sound in no way brings benefits [to the establishment of pervasion]. And it is on the basis of another source of knowledge that the existence of a sound, whose functioning is not accepted in this way when pervasion is proved, has to be understood. Thus, since the existence of a sound, whose ascertainment requires another source of knowledge, is in a position to prove the impermanence of that sound, a property of the site must by all means be included [in the arguments of a proof].” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 243.

[25]:

Namely, perception (pratyakṣa). In the previous part of the PVinṬ (= PVinṬ 2 Ms 98b1–99a3) Dharmo-ttara already discussed how and by which source of knowledge the inferential reason property “existence” is established (siddha). There is also a parallel argument in the KBhS (= KBhSF 221,7–16 [pūrvapakṣa], 231,7–232,13 [uttarapakṣa]). For a detail of the arguments, see Sakai 2013, where I have translated these texts and analyzed their contents.

[26]:

For now I am uncertain whether Dharmakīrti, in PVin 2, absolutely relies on the viparyaye bādhaka-pramāṇa for establishing the pervasion of the reason property “being produced” (kṛtakatva) by the target property “being impermanent” (anityatva), though in this work he introduces the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in its complete form. This is because Dharmakīrti also introduces other arguments for establishing pervasion other than the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Cf. Sakai 2014.

[27]:

Cf. HB 6,9-10: yat sat, tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, saṃś ca śabda iti…, VN 1,13–14: yat sat kṛtakaṃ vā, tat sarvaṃ anityam, yathā ghaṭādiḥ, san kṛtako vā śabda iti.

[28]:

Cf. Ono 2004: 481–488.

[29]:

Cf. Mimaki 1984: 239.

[30]:

See, for example, Vācaspatimiśra, one of the most renowned representatives of the Brahmanical side, who probably flourished before the time of Jñānaśrīmitra (for the date of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Acharya 2006: xviii–xxii. Dr. Yasutaka Muroya recently suggested a new chronological relationship between Vācaspatimiśra and Jñānaśrīmitra in Muroya 2011). In his Nyāyakaṇikā and Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, he summarizes and then introduces as pūrvapakṣa Dharmottara’s argument defending the Buddhist trairūpya theory considered as a whole in the case of the sattvānumāna. Cf. NKaṇ 509,7–511,9 (=NVTṬ 515,3–13): anākṣaṇikasyārthakriyāvirodhād (nākṣaṇika° conjecture; na kṣaṇika° NKaṇ; na ca kṣa-ṇika° NVTṬ) asādhāraṇatā hetoḥ. na ca sādhyadharmiṇi dṛśyamāne śabdādau vyāptiprasādhanād (°prasādhanād NKaṇ: °sādhanād NVTṬ) eva sādhyasiddher asādhanāṅgaṃ hetuvacanam. na khalu sarvopasaṃhāravatī vyāptir dṛśyamātraviṣayā bhavitum arhati. śakyaṃ hi śaṅkituṃ pareṇādṛśya-mānānāṃ sattvam akṣaṇikān na vyāvartitaṃ tvayeti sattvam anaikāntikaṃ kṣaṇikatvasādhana iti. tasmād yad dṛśyam adṛśyaṃ vā, tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam iti darśanīyā vyāptiḥ.a bnanv evam api śabdāder vivādāspadībhūtasya vyāptidarśanabalād eva siddhā kṣaṇikateti tadavastham evāsādhanāṅgatvaṃ hetuvacanasya. maivam. asaty api śaśaviṣāṇādau yat sad dṛśyam adṛśyaṃ vā, tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam iti, yathā sarvopasaṃhāravatī vyāptiḥ sidhyati (vyāptiḥ sidhyati NKaṇ: vyāptiḥ NVTṬ). na ca śaśaviṣā-ṇādayo’pi bhavanti kṣaṇikāḥ. evaṃ saty api vivādāspadīkṛte (°kṛte NKaṇ: °bhūte NVTṬ) śabdādau vyāptisiddhāv api na sidhyati kṣaṇikatety avaśyaṃ darśayitavyam eva teṣāṃ (darśayitavyam eva teṣāṃ NKaṇ: darśayitavyam eteṣāṃ NVTṬ) kṣaṇikatvasādhanāya sattvam iti nāsādhanāṅgatā hetuvacanasya (°vacanasya NKaṇ: °vacanasyeti NVTṬ).b “aIt is not the case that, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfilment for a non-momentary [thing], the inferential reason property [of being existent] is unique/specific. Nor is it the case that, since the target [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved solely on the basis of the fact that the pervasion is well established with regard to the pakṣa, i.e., a sound and the like, which is seen, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof. It is indeed impossible for the pervasion that encompasses all [things] to have as its object seen [things] only. This is because the opponent has the right to doubt [this] in the following manner: ‘By you [i.e., the proponent] the property of being existent belonging to unseen [things] is not excluded from a non-momentary [thing]. Thus, the [inferential reason] property of being existent is indeterminate in the proof of momentariness.’ Therefore, [in order to rebut such doubt,] the pervasion should be shown in the following way: ‘Whatever a thing is, i.e., whether seen or unseen, it is exclusively momentary.’ a b[If one says:] even if this is so, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof, [something that] is the case when a sound and the like about which there is a dispute is proved to be momentary only by virtue of showing the pervasion, [then, we answer:] it should not be like that [for the logical reason sattva]. The pervasion that encompasses all [things] is established in such a way that, even if a hare’s horn and the like does not exist, that which exists, whether seen or unseen, is all/exclusively momentary. And it is not the case that a hare’s horn and the like too are momentary. In this way, even if a sound and the like which becomes the subject of dispute exists, [its] momentariness is not proved, even when the pervasion is established. Therefore, in order to prove their momentariness [i.e., that of a sound and the like], their existence must necessarily be shown in full. Thus, it is not the case that the statement of inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof.b” The part a–a, in terms of content, corresponds to Dharmottara’s defense of T2 examined above (cf. section 2.1.), the part b–b to the discussion examined in section 3. The part b–b has a parallel in the Tattvasamīkṣā by the same author. Cf. TSam 36,29–35: na ca sarvopasaṃhāravadvyāptisādhanād eva pramāṇāt sarvamadhyapātināṃ vivādāspadānāṃ śabdādīnām api kṣaṇikatvasiddhe(r asādhanāṅgaṃ hetuvacanam iti) sāṃpratam. yathaiva hi gagananalinādīnām asatām asaty api kṣaṇikatve na sarvopasaṃhāravatīṃ vyāptiṃ prasādhyataḥ pramāṇasya vi[ro](dhaḥ, tathaiva vivādāspadeṣu śabdādiṣu kas tasya virodhaḥ, sattvasiddhau tu syād iti tatsādhanāya hetur upanetavyo vacanena, saṃś ca vivādāspadībhūtaḥ śabdādi)[r i](ti svabhāvahetuḥ).