Perception (pratyakṣa) [in Charaka philosophy]

Sense perception is the natural and direct way of cognizing external things. 1t leads to immediate cognition. In common with other living creatures, man has the capacity for sensory experience. It is the principal means of one's knowledge of the physical world.^[1] When a thing is directly perceived, there is no desire for further cognition. For instance, when an ordinary person hears from a reliable that there is fire in a certain place, then he has the verbal knowledge of fire from his words. If he desires for further definite cognition, he proceeds to the spot. There, on seeing the smoke, he infers that there is the fire. If he again proceeds to have a determinate cognition, he apprehends it when fire is presented before his eyes. The cognition of fire attained by this direct sense-object contact is perception. It is final and there ends his desire for further cognition of that fire. So perception is placed as the first in the hierarchy of pramāṇas in all other systems.

The Buddhist logician Dinnāga defines perception as a kind of knowledge which is devoid of determination.^[2] Dharmakīrti, who improves upon the definition, says that perception is a cognition that is generated by the objects not associated with names, and which is not erroneous.^[3] Here, the absence of association of names is denoted by the expression kalpanāpoḍha.^[4] According to Dharmottara the cognition which is associated with a name is determinate (savikalpaka).^[5] Thus, perception is nonerroneous indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka).^[6]

According to Akṣapāda if a perceptual judgment generated by the contact of sense with the object is to be true it must satisfy three conditions, namely:

1. it must not be associated with verbal cognition (avyapadeśyaṃ),
2. it must not be erroneous (avyabhicāri),
3. it must be determinate (vyavasāyātmakaṃ).^[7]

Of them the first condition implies that when the perception of an object takes place, it must not be associated with a word or a name heard from a person uttering it just at the time the object is perceived. For instance, when one sees a pot and another says that “here is a pot” the knowledge derived from the articulation is not to be taken as perception but as verbal. The second condition is that it must not be erroneous. Erroneous cognition is the cognition of a thing as what it is not. Sometimes there may be erroneous cognitions from the contact of sense with the object. For example, when the flickering at a distance comes into contact with the eye, it is often recognised as water. This misapprehension is erroneous and hence it is not counted as perception.^[8] As defined by Gangeśa Upādhyāya perceptual cognition is the knowledge in which no other knowledge is instrumental.^[9] Kaṇāda does not give a direct and independent definition of perception. But it is implied by certain sūtras^[10] which indicate that the contact of self, mind, sense, and object is the source of perceptual knowledge. Praśastapāda, who classifies valid knowledge into four (perceptive knowledge, inferential knowledge, recollection, and knowledge of sages)^[11] , defines perception as the knowledge that which proceeds from the contacts of each sense-organ with its objects^[12] . Further he makes it clear that the immediate cause is the sense object contact though the contact of the four namely self, mind, sense, and object is essential for perception, the immediate cause is sense-object contact. So it is taken into consideration for the definition. The contact of the mind and self is a general condition for all cognitions. Kaṇāda says that merits and demerits of the perceiver, as well as time and space are also causal factors. Perception of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are caused by the contact between the self and the internal sense organ, mind.^[13]

Jaimini, in his Mīmāṃsa-sūtra defines perception as cognition that is produced when there is the contact of human sense organs.^[14] The Bhāṭṭas define it as valid knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with their objects.^[15] The Prābhākaras say that perception is immediate cognition.^[16] In Advaita Vedānta, mind is not an instrument of internal perception as an organ. So they do not accept the definition given by the Naiyāyikas, which does not include internal perception, unless mind (antakaraṇa) is considered as its instrument (indriya.).^[17] On the contrary, they accept the definition given by the Prābhākaras.^[18] The Vedāntins say that the immediacy of knowledge, referred to here, does not rest on its being caused by the sense organs, but it rests on the intrinsic characteristic of immediate presence of the consciousness.^[19]

Perception, according to classical Sāṃkhya, is the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya) of each individual object^[20] by means of sense organs. Though it is conceived as the function of buddhi,^[21] ahaṃkāra, and manas are also involved in it.

Caraka defines perception as the manifestation of the intellectual faculty (buddhi) as a result of the contact of the soul, mind, sense organ, and the object.^[22] As far as the perception of the external world is concerned, the contact of external sense organs with the object is the immediate cause. The contact of the self with the mind is, after all, a common condition for all cognitions as has been stated in the case of the Naiyāyikās. But it is included in the definition of perception to bring the cognition of pleasure, pain, desire, and aversion with in the purview of perception.^[23] The perception of these qualities by the contact of the self and mind is called ātmapratyakṣa^[24] and by the external sense organs is called sense perception (indriya pratyakṣa).

Cakrapāṇi speaks of five kinds of sense-object relation based on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, which are not mentioned in Carakasaṃhitā.

The five relations thus stated are:

(1) saṃyoga, the relation of sense organ with the substances like pot,

(2) saṃyukta-samavāya, the relation with the quality (guṇa) like colour of the pot through the thing in which they inhere,

(3) saṃyuktasamaveta-samavāya, the relation with the universals of the those qualities like colourness (rūpatva) of the pot which inheres in the colour by samavāya

(4) samavāya, the relation of the auditory sense with the sound generating sound perception,

(5) samavetasamavāya, the relation of the auditory sense with the universal of sound (śabdatva) creating its perception.^[25]

Cakrapāṇi omits the sixth relation (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva) which is construed as the cause of the perception of non-existence. This explanation of perception given by Caraka is something peculiar when compared to that of the other systems particularly Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is a fact that all of them agree to the point that sense-object proximity is the immediate cause of perceptive knowledge. Still there exists a great difference between the cognising processes among them.

The Sāṃkhyas describe the knowing process in terms of consciousness, “I consciousness”, mind, and sense organs with out the involvement of puruṣa which is unaffected, immutable pure consciousness. The untainted and pure buddhi reaches out to the object and assumes the form of the object as a pot or a cloth.^[26] When the sense-organs come into contact with the object, the inertia (tamas) of the buddhi is overcome, and the essence (sattva) springs forth from it, in consequence of which a definite and determinate cognition of the object is produced.^[27] The process of perception is further illustrated in the following way. Just like the head man of a village collects taxes from the villagers and hands them over to the governor of the province; the governor to the minister, and minister to the King, the external sense organs^[28] communicate the immediate discrete impressions to the mind. The mind ratiocinates them and gives them to the “I consciousness” (ahaṃkāra) which appropriates them by its unity of apperception and gives these self appropriated apperceived impressions to the buddhi for the experience of the self (puruṣa).^[29] One of the important points to be noted in this connection is the following. The Sāṃkhyās consider that puruṣa is distinct from the buddhi. At the same time they argue that the manifestation of ahaṃkāra in the form of “I know” is due to the non-apprehension of the distinctness of puruṣa (pure consciousness) from the cognition present in the buddhi and so it is called abhimāna.^[30] The NyāyaVaiśeṣikas do not admit this.^[31] For them buddhi is a specific quality of the self. Contradicting the Sāṃkhya thesis, Udyotakāra says that if consciousness and soul were separate entities then the soul could not apprehend thing presented in the buddhi, for the reason that apprehensions of one conscious entity can never be cognized by another conscious entity.^[32] Supporting the view, Śankaramiśra says that properties like cognition can exist only as the properties of an agent. Manifestation of ahaṃkāra in the form of “I know”, “I cognize” and “I intuit” takes place only in communion with the Self which is the substratum.^[33]

Even though the Naiyāyikas overcome the constraints of dualism of buddhi and puruṣa by regarding the former as quality of the self and lay down the general condition of mind-self contact and special condition of sense-object contact, they do not explain the specific functions of the different factors involved in perception. Nor do they explain relations between the self and the object and the correspondence between knowledge forms and object forms.^[34]

It is in this context that the Caraka’s thesis of perception reveals its uniqueness. Caraka describes the knowing process in terms of self, intellect, “I consciousness”, mind, and sense organs. The perceptual faculty or buddhi assumes the various forms as it enters the channels of different sense organs. Thus, seeing becomes the colour seen; hearing assumes or becomes the sound heard and so forth in accordance with the contact. Similarly, the consciousness that enters the channels of mental faculty manifests itself into the forms of anxiety, sorrow, and so forth.^[35] This prima-facie evidence may lead to the conclusion that the perceptual process construed by Caraka is the very same process described in classical Sāṃkhyas^[36] who consider sense faculties as egoistic (āhaṃkārikas) giving room for the above mentioned contradiction.

But Caraka obviates this contradiction of dualism. In Caraka's thesis, puruṣa is the ultimate substantial cause and at the same time the agent of cognition, which is against the basic concept of classical Sāṃkhya who hold that puruṣa is an untainted indifferent spectator and has no involvement in cognition. As far as Caraka is concerned, puruṣa is not an indifferent spectator, but he is the real knower (jñaḥ). The manifestation of ahaṃkāra in the form of “I cognize” is not because of the non-apprehension of the distinctness of puruṣa by cognition present in the buddhi but because of the truth that the self becomes the owner of cognition. With out admitting such a fact, it is not possible to recognize puruṣa as the agent (karta) of all actions and enjoyer (bhokta) of the fruit of all his actions. Another thing is that just like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, Caraka, on the one hand, construes buddhi as a quality. On the other side, quite similar to that of the Sāṃkhyas, buddhi is conceived as the first evolute and determinate cognition as its modification. That is, determinate cognition is the modification of the evolute buddhi which is actually the material medium radiated by the quality consciousness of the self. So naturally, when objects are presented to the buddhi it becomes the cognition of the self. So there does not arise the problem of cognising the cognitions of conscious entity by another conscious entity as in the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Thus, by accepting the involvement of self in the process of cognition and by conceiving consciousness as the quality of the self, he has successfully solved the basic constrain that the dualistic Sāṃkhya faced with. It is something unique of Caraka that it is not by confrontation with the other systems but by accepting what is found reasonable in the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṃkhya systems that he has formulated his thesis.

Caraka conceives the perceptual process as psychophysical from a realistic point of view. But he does not maintain that the object perceived is directly apprehended by one's sense capacities or mind. In cognizing an object all that is directly known by the senses is its qualities. Caraka says that the contact of the sense organs with the object is made possible by the identical nature (tat svabhāvāt) of the proto-physical element in the sense organ and the object, and also the pervasive nature (vibhutva) which is typical of the sense organs.^[37] The conditions namely the identical nature of the predominating element of the sense-organ and the object, and the pervasive nature of the sense organ, which are described as the pre-requisites for perception are some thing peculiar to Caraka. The objects are immediately presented to the senses. They form the “sense-data”. Sensations mean the awareness of sense-data.

Apprehension of truth or the fact arises when all the necessary conditions are fulfilled. Otherwise, invalid cognition in the form of an error, doubt or disbelief results.^[38] For correct sense perception the sense organs must be free from obstructions. It may be significant to note that the Carakasaṃhitā, quite similar to that of the Sāṃkhyas, refers to certain obstacles to perception. They are over proximity, over distance, barrier, inadequate functioning of sense organs, lack of attention, confusion with other similar objects, overcome by stronger luminaries, and subtleness.^[39]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

MK, p. 36.

[2]:

Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dinnaga, ed., Rangaswami lyengar, University Publication, Govt. Oriental Library, Mysore, 1930, p. 8.

[3]:

tatra kalpanāpoḍhambhrāntaṃ pratyakṣaṃ. Nyāya Bindu of Dharmakīrti., 1. 4. p. 8.

[4]:

The term kalpanā is described as the association of name with the apprehension: “abhilāpasaṃsargayogyātāpratītiḥ kalpanā” Ibid., 1. 5. p. 10.

[5]:

abhilāpasaṃsṛṣṭārthaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ, Dharmottara on Ibid., I. 5, Nyāya Bindu of Dharmakīrti., p. 11.

[6]:

na cendriyavijñānamarthena niyamitapratibhāsatvādabhilāpasaṃsargayogyatāpratibhāsaṃ bhavatīti nirvikalpakṃ, Ibid. “According to the Buddhists, perception is always indeterminate (nirvikalpaka);there is no determinate (savikalpaka) perception; the so-called determinate perception is not perceptual in character. Indeterminate perception apprehends the specific individuality of an object (svalakṣaṇas) devoid of its generic character and other qualifications”. IP, pp. 31-32.

[7]:

indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānamavyapadeśyaṃ avyabhicārī vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ. Nyāyasūtra., I. i. 4.

[8]:

see Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana., on Ibid pp. 20-22.

[9]:

jñānakaraṇakaṃ jñānaṃ (pratyakṣaṃ) iti tu vayaṃ, Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya., Vol. I, p. 552.

[10]:

Vaiśeṣikadarśana., III. i. 18; III. ii. 1.

[11]:

vidyāpi caturvidhā pratyakṣalaingikasmṛtyārṣalakṣaṇā, Praśastapādabhāṣya., p. 441.

[12]:

tatrākṣamkṣaṃ pratītyotpadyata iti pratyakṣaṃ. Ibid., p. 442.

[13]:

CSP, p. 140; “sākṣātkāre sukhādīnāṃ karaṇaṃ mana ucyate”. NSMK, pp. 360.

[14]:

Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I. i. 5.

[15]:

indriyārthasannikarṣajaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ, Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa., p. 9.

[16]:

sakṣatpratītiḥ pratyakṣaṃ, Ibid., p. 24.

[17]:

MK. p. 37.

[18]:

Ibid., 36.

[19]:

tatra pratyakṣapramāyāḥ karaṇaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇaṃ.
pratyakṣapramā cātra caitanyameva, “yat sakṣādaparokṣād braḥma” iti śruteḥ. Vedāntaparibhāṣa of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra., p. 8. see also. MK, p. 36.

[20]:

“pratviṣyādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṃ”, Sāṃkhyakārikā. 5.

[21]:

ātmendriyamanorthānāṃ sannikarṣāt pravartate.
vyakta tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣaṃ sa nirucyate, CS, Su, XI, 20.

[22]:

pratyakṣaṃ tu khalu tadyat svayamindriyairmanasā copalabhyate. CS, Vimāna - sthāna, IV. 4.

[23]:

etena sukhādiviṣayamapi pratyakṣaṃ gṛhītaṃ bhavati, Cakrapāṇi on CS,Su, XI, 20, p. 71.

[24]:

pratyakṣaṃ nāma tadyadātmanā cendriyaiśca svayamupalabhyate; tatrātmapratyakṣaḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣādayaḥ, śabdādayastvindriyapratyakṣāḥ. Ibid., Vimāna - sthāna, VIII. 39.

[25]:

See Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI, 20.

[26]:

Śankara Miśra presents the Sāṃkhya view thus: “sā ca buddhirdarpaṇavannirmalā, tasyāśca bahirindriyapraṇāḍikayā viṣyākāro yaḥ pariṇatibhedo ghaṭa iti paṭa ityādyākārastajñānaṃ vṛttiriti ca ākhyāyate.....”, Vaiśeṣikopaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra., pp. 448- 449.

[27]:

upāttaviṣayāṇāmindriyāṇāṃ vṛttau satyāṃ, buddhestamo'bhibhāve sati yaḥ sattvasamudrekaḥ so'dhyavsāya iti vṛttiriti jñānamiti cākhyāyate, Vācaspatimiśra on Sāṃkhyakārikā, 5, Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra., p. 46.

[28]:

The buddhīndriyas are not the same as their physiological sites or end organs (adhiṣṭānās). For the Sāṃkhyās they mean the psychophysical impulses which go out to the external objects and receive impressions from them. IP, pp, 4-5.

[29]:

Vācaspatimiśra on Sāṃkhyakārikā, 36. Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra., pp. 214-15.

[30]:

“svacchāyāṃ buddhau vartamānena jñānena caitanyasya puruṣasya bhedāgrahādahaṃ jānāmīti yo'bhimānaviśeṣaḥ saivopalbdhiḥ”. Vaiśeṣikopaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra., p. 449.

[31]:

See Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana., p. 34

[32]:

Nyāya-Vārttika of Udyotakāra., p. 82.

[33]:

Śaṅkaramiśra on Vaiśeṣikadarśana., VIII, i. 1, Vaiśeṣikopaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra., p. 449.

[34]:

IP, p. 114.

[35]:

yā yadindriyamāśritya jantorbuddhiḥ pravartate yāti sā tena nirdeśaṃ manasā ca manobhavā. bhedāt kāryendriyārthānāṃ bahvayo vai buddhayaḥ smṛtāḥ. ātmendriyamanorthānāmekaikā sannikarṣajā, CS, Śārīra - sthāna, I. 32-33; See also Cakrapāṇi on ibid., pp. 290-91.

[36]:

saṃbaddhaṃ bhavat saṃbadhavastvākāradhāri bhavati yadvijñānaṃ buddhivṛttistat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇamityarthaḥ, Vijñānabhikṣu on Sāṃkhya-sūtra,, 1. 89, Sāṃkhyadarśana (with Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya of Sri Vijñana Bhikṣu).. p. 57.

[37]:

tatrānumānagamayānāṃ pañcamahābhūtavikārasamudāyātmakānāmapi satāmindryāṇāṃ tejaścakṣuṣi, khaṃ srotre, ghraṇe kṣitiḥ, āpo rasane sparśane'nilo viśeṣeṇopapadyate. tatra yadyadātmakamindriyaṃ viśeṣāttatadātmakamevarthaṃ anugṛhṇāti, tatsvabhāvāt vibhutvācca, CS, Su, VIII. 14.

[38]:

MK, p. 115.

[39]:

satāṃ ca rūpāṇāmatisannikarṣādativiprakarṣādāvaraṇāt, karaṇadaurbalyānmanovasthānāt samānābhihārādatisaukṣmyācca pratyakṣānupalabdhiḥ. CS, Su, XI. 8; According to the Sāṃkhyas, perception is not possible if the object is too far away or too close. Inability of sense organs, lack of presence of mind, intervention of other objects between the sense organ and the object to be perceived, concealment and intermixing with similar object also obstructs perception. Sāṃkhyakārikā, 7.