The Advaita Vedanta (Introduction)

Śaṅkara uses the term Advaita to denote his philosophy. The Sanskrit word ‘Advaita’ means non-dual. That is one without a second.^[1] The fundamental idea of non-dualism is that the Jīvātma or individual soul is non-different from Paramātman or the universal soul. In the light of upanishadic thought Advaita of Śaṅkara places the Brahman as the ultimate reality. The word of multiplicity is only an illusory appearance of the Brahman.^[2] According to him, the attributeless Brahman appears in the universal form, due to Avidyā (ignorance).

In Bhagavatpādābhyudaya we can see the hint of the basic principles of Advaita Vedanta. These are represented as part of philosophical discourses with other scholars, for example:

jīvabhedo jagajjīvabhedo jīveśayorbhidā |
jagadīśvarabhedaśca mitho bhedo jagatyapi || 21 || 
iti pañcavidhaṃ bhedaṃ vāstavaṃ prāha sa dvijaḥ |
ekavijñānataḥ sarvavijñānaniyamaśruteḥ || 22 ||
tadanyādhikaraṇaparyālocanāyā bhidā |
mithyā na vāstavī vācārambhāṇaśrutiśāsanāt || 23 ||
ityadyuktyā pūrvapakṣaṃ nirācaṣṭe sma deśikaḥ |
ākṣepān kṛtavān bhūyo'pyātmānamadhikṛtya saḥ || 24 ||
visphuliṅgaśrute sāṃśo jaḍaḥ suptāvabhānataḥ |
duḥkhitvadarśanādbaddho bālāgratvaśruteraṇuḥ || 25 || 
bālyādyavasthakāluṣyājjīvātmā hi vikāravān |
anityaścaiva na pretya saṃjñeti śrutiśāsanāt || 26 || 
iti dvaitāvalambena pūrvapakṣayati dvije |
samādhatte sma siddhāntī niraṃśo niṣkalatvataḥ || 27 ||
sāṃśatve tu vikāritvānityatvādi prasajyate |
avikāryatvanityatvabādhanāttadasaṃgatam || 28 ||
nāsyāvasthakṛto doṣo'pyananvāgatatāśruteḥ |
na pretyanyaparaṃ vākyamavināśitvaśāsanāt || 29 || 
vyāpako'sau vibhutvokteraṇutvaṃ syādhadupādhitaḥ |
utthite pratyabhijñānāccotano'sau na vai jaḍaḥ || 30 || ^[3]

In the Upaniṣads, the teachings of the great sages like Uddalaka and others to worthy disciples like Svetaketu are recorded. In Bhagavatpādābhyudaya we can see it was the debate between Pūrvamīmāṃsakas and Advaitins or the debate between Vyāsa and Śaṅkarācārya. The former holds that the only purpose of the Veda is to prompt man to actions or rituals of vedic sanction, by the performance of which man attains heavenly felicity to long duration. At the end of heavenly life he returns to the earth, again to acquire more merits by performing karmas. In that manner the real Veda is of the nature of commandments to action of a ritualistic nature. According to Purvamīmāṃsa theory irrespective of whether there is God or not one’s Karma as ordained by the Vedas should be performed without fail. If one performs his duty correctly that Karma itself will yield fruit. They believed that Karma is more important than anything else. Refraining from doing one’s Karma is wrong and becoming a saṃnyāsin is also wrong. Inorder to change this view of Maṇḍana Miśra and make him realise the importance of eternal bliss and to relieve him of the cycle of the birth and death. Śaṅkara decided to meet Maṇḍana Miśra.

Contrary to the view of Pūrvamīmāṃsakās is the contention of Uttaramīmāṃsakās or Vedantins that the above is only half truth. The Uttaramīmāṃsakās content that the Veda has two sections-the Karmakānda or ritualistic section and the Jñānakānda or the philosophical section. What the Pūrvamīmāṃsakās said is true only of the Karmakānda and not of Veda as a whole^[4]. The Jñānakanda of the Vedas is also known as Vedanta, or the crown of the Vedanta. They believed that the statements of the Upaniṣads are not commandments to action, but revelation of the nature of the Ultimate Reality and man’s relation to it. They are an end in themselves, and not aids to the perfomance of any ritual. The understanding conveyed by them releases man from the false sense of duality and establishes him in the experience of the unity of all existence. In this manner releasing him for ever from the repeatative process of birth and death or saṃsāra by rousing in him the sense of oneness with eternal bliss.

Once Śaṅkara seated on the banks of the Gaṅga, teaching his commentaries to his disciples. At that time he was confronted by an old Brahmana with the question ‘what are you teaching sir? And may I know who are you?’ His disciples said ‘this is our teacher, great Ācārya Śaṅkara, the master of all Upaniṣads. He has established the doctrine of non-dualism through his commentaries on Śarīrika-Sūtrās or Brahmasūtrās’ . That time the old man remarked that ‘this was unbelievable. This people says that you have commented on the Sūtras of Vyāsa. If you are as learned as that, let me hear you expounded any one Sūtra of Vyāsa. He quoted the first Sūtra (tadantara pratipattau raṃhati samparisvaktah praśnanirūpaṇābhyām)^[5] from the third chapter of Brahmasūtras, and asked Śaṅkara to explain it. To this Śaṅkara replied, in the light of the conversation between Gautama and Jabāli in the Thandila sṛuti, the Sūtra means that at the time of the death the jīva departs clothed in the subtle essence of the Bhutās or elements. The Brahmana then raised numerous objections to this interpretation to the utter astonishment of all the scholars assembled there. And then Śaṅkara answered the criticism and attacked the thesis of the Brahmana in several ways. In this manner the conversation turned in a learned disputation extending over eight days between these two, who resembled Ādiśeṣa and Bṛhaspati in learning. When the two were thus engaged in this prolonged debate. Padmapāda, who got an inkling of the identity of the new comer, at last said ‘This Brahmana is none other than that very Vyāsa. He was the knower of the essence of all Vedantas and the author of these Sūtras. He is an incarnation of Mahāviṣṇu.

The discussion of Vyāsa and Śaṅkara was long. Lakṣmaṇa Sūrin gives a summary of it as quoted above. The former argued that there are five types of Bhedas in Jīva. They are Jīvabhedham, Jagath Jīvabhedham, Jīva-Īśabhedham, Jagat-Īśabhedham, Jīva-Jagatbedham etc, says Vyāsa.^[6]

According to Upaniṣad vākya, Śaṅkara says that:

‘Ekam sad Viprah bahudha vadanti, neha nanāsti kiñcana’, vācārambho vikāro nāmadheyam^[7]

Which means, there is only one truth, not many. The clay is only truth, not the names and forms. Similarly Brahma alone is real. According to the Upaniṣad vākya there is only one truth, but we feel it as many. Śaṅkara stressly says that there is only one truth that is Brahman. At that time Vyāsa asked about Soul or Ātma. He said with the help of ‘Visphuliṅga śṛuti’^[8]. From fire there are so many spark. Thus the essence of Brahma could be seen in Jīvātma. Mind is an Indriya. Indriyanigraha is manonigraha says Śaṅkara. He added that Jīvatma is like ‘anitya and avicāra’. That is not true. He added that if Jagat is true, according to sruti, there is a doṣa. The relation of Jagat and Brahman are ‘Vyāpya-vyāpaka’. Former is ‘Nyūnadeśavṛtti’ and latter is Adhikadeśavrtti^[9]. Brahma is Adhikadeśavṛtti and Jagat is Nyūnadeśavṛtti.

Vyāsa says that the similarity assertes only of their both being eternally conscious entities, while in respect of qualities like ‘Being the soul of all’ etc. In that manner it is covered by Avidyā or ignorance and only look as if they are absent. By accepting this meaning, the basic oneness remains, at that time for all practical purposes the difference also is asserted. Why cant we get over the difficulty suggested by you this way. Śaṅkara says, if you are prepared to go so far, why do you hesitate to say openly that they are one? When you admit that the difference perceived is not real but only apparent, that is caused by avidya. Vyāsa says that the doctrine of Brahman and Jīva contradicts the evidence of perception. The sentences like ‘Aham Brahmasmi’,^[10] ‘Tat tvam asi’^[11] are meaningless sentences used for Japa by Yogis’. They have not got the force of Vedic sentences. Śaṅkara answered it has to be established, and not merely presumed, as you do, that perception of the difference between Īśvara and Jīva is actually experiences by the eye. Then only is the non-perception of the unity between Īśvara and Jīva of any significance, and the situation of identity passages in the Upaniṣads contradicted by perception arises. But actually perception cannot reveal the difference between Īśvara and Jīva, no kind of relation can be established between the organ eye and the kind of difference you speak of. The mere contact of organ an object is necessary for perception and function. Here there is no contact between the eye and this difference.

Pūrvamīmāṃsakās says that we have actually got a feeling that we are different from Īśvara. Leaving the question of actual contact we take this feeling of difference as an attribute of the Jīva and interpret it was revealing the difference between the Jīva and the Īśvara. Śaṅkara answered that an attribute like difference alone is perceived and not the object it qualifies, is an irrelevant and senseless proposition. When you say the non existence of a pot on a table is perceived, the table, which the non existence is supposed to qualify should also be seen. In this manner the Ātman, which is the object supposed to be qualified by difference is not seen. If they say this like then content that ‘difference’, which is one of its attribute alone is seen? Pūrvamīmāṃsakās says that both the Ātman and Mind are Dravyas or substances. One substance can contact another substance and rest on it. So your contention that the mind does not and cannot contact the Ātman is not correct. The Advaita Vedantins says that in your way of thought the Ātman must be either anu or atomic or Vibhu or all pervasive. In either case it is partless entity. In this manner we can see that only entities with parts can have mutual relation. If you content that mind contacts the Ātman, you will have to admit the Ātman has parts, which will destroy the very nature of the Ātman as a partless and indestructible whole. The opponent is wildly saying that by accepting this meaning, all these arguments are vitiated, by the presumption that mind is a sense organ which directly contacts objects. But this is not a fact. It is only an aid to the senses for perceiving their respective objects just as light is. It is not a sense organ. At that time the Pūrvamīmāṃsakās says that it was the sense of difference between Jīva and īśvara that is born of perception be given up. What is the difference of this inborn intuitive feeling in us? Cant one could say that this intuitive feeling contradicts, the Vedic sentences propounding the unity of the Jīva and Īśvara^[12].

Śaṅkara says that the intuitive feeling certifies of the difference between the Jīva as qualified by Avidya or ignorance and Īśvara as qualififed by Māya or creative power. The unity which the Vedic sentences says that is the inherent unity realised on the elimination of the above qualifying adjuncts of both. The feeling of intuitive in Vedic sentences here being different, the question of conflict between them does not arise. Besides even in case a conflict is seen, it is resolved by the law that in two successive experiences or statements, the succeeding one is the stronger one and can cancel the earlier according to the doctrine of Apaccheda. Vyāsa says the evidence of presumption in any form be given up the position of inference contradicts the doctrine of unity of the Jīva and Īśvara. The Jīva is an entity with little knowledge. Īśvara is a all knowing entity. In this manner Jīva is different from Īśvara, just as a pot is different from Him. This conclusion contradicts Vedic passages declaring the unity of this two. Śaṅkara asks that the difference between the Īśvara and the Jīva is actual or merely apparent. If you say it is actual your example is inappropriate and invalid. The instance shown must be one having knowledge or sentiency inorder to have resemblance with the entities, namely the Jīva and the Īśvara. In this manner you must show another conscious entity to illustrate your point. The pot is an insentient object. So your argument falls to insufficiency of illustrations. In this manner debate continued.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

idamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam | taddhaika āhuḥ - ‘asadevedamagra asīdekamevādvitīyam, tasmādasataḥ sañjāyata |’ Śaṅkarācārya, Chandogyopaniṣadbhāṣyam, Madras: Samata Books,1910, 6.2.1

[2]:

brahmasatyaṃ jagatmithyā jīvobrahmaiva na'parā |,
  Śaṇkarācārya, Brahmajñā navalīmāla, Madras: Samata Books,1981 śloka, 20

[3]:

Lakṣmaṇa Sūrin, Bhagavatpādābhyudaya, V. 21-30.

[4]:

yāvatā ‘āmnāyasya’, kriyārthatvādānarthakyamatadarthānām ||
  Achyuthananda Jha, Jaiminisūtram, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Saṃskrta Series, 2008, 1.2.1

[5]:

tadantarapratipattau raṃhati saṃpariṣvaktaḥ praśnanirūpaṇābhyam,
  Śaṇkarācārya, Brahmasūtrabhāsyam, Madras: Samata Books,1980, 3.1.1

[6]:

Lakṣmaṇa Sūrin, Bhagavatpādābhyudaya, V. 21-22.

[7]:

ekena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñānataḥ vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyaṃ, Śaṇkarācārya, Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam, Madras: Samata Books,1910, 6.1.4

[8]:

Lakṣmaṇa Sūrin, Bhagavatpādābhyudaya, V. 25.

[9]:

Ibid, V. 26

[10]:

Śaṇkarācārya, Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam, 1.4.10

[11]:

sa ya eṣo'ṇimā aitadātmyamidaṃ sarvam, tatsatyaṃ sa ātmā, tatvamasi, Śaṇkarācārya, Chandogyopaniṣadbhāṣyam, Madras: Samata Books,1910, 6.87

[12]:

sarva hyetadbrahmāyamātmābrahma so'yamātmācatuṣpāt - Śaṇkarācārya, īśādi Dasopaniṣad (Vol.I), Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 2015, 2