Text 44: On Ātmā (Self)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 44:

आत्मत्वाभिसम्बन्धादात्मा । तस्य सौक्ष्म्यादप्रत्यक्षत्वे सति करणैः शब्दाद्युपलब्ध्यनुमितैः श्रोत्रादिभिः समधिगमः क्रियते । वास्यादीनां करणानां कर्तृप्रयोज्यत्वदर्शनात् शब्दादिषु प्रसिद्ध्या च प्रसाधकोऽनुमीयते । न शरीरेन्द्रियमनसामज्ञत्वात् । न शरीरस्य चैतन्यं घटादिवद्भूतकार्यत्वात् मृते चासम्भवात् । नेन्द्रियाणां करणत्वात् उपहतेषु विषयासान्निध्ये चानुस्मृतिदर्शनात् । नापि मनसः करणान्तरानपेक्षित्वे युगपदालोचनस्मृतिप्रसङ्गात् स्वयं करणभावाच्च । परिशेषादात्मकार्यत्वात् तेनात्मा समधिगम्यते शरीरसमवायिनीभ्यां च हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारयोग्याभ्यां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यां रथकर्मणा सारथिवत् प्रयत्नवान् विग्रहस्याधिष्ठातानुमीयते प्राणादिभिश् चेति । कथं शरीरपरिगृहीते वायौ विकृतकर्मदर्शनाद्भस्त्राध्मापयितेव निमेषोन्मेषकर्मणा नियतेन दारुयन्त्रप्रयोक्तेव देहस्य वृद्धिक्षतभग्नसंरोहणादिनिमित्तत्वात् गृहपतिरिव अभिमतविषयग्राहककरणसम्बन्धनिमित्तेन मनःकर्मणा गृहकोणेषु पेलकप्रेरक इव दारकः नयनविषयालोचनानन्तरं रसानुस्मृतिक्रमेण रसनविक्रियादर्शनादनेकगवाक्षान्तर्गतप्रेक्षकवदुभयदर्शी कश्चिदेको विज्ञायते । सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नैश्च गुणैर्गुण्यनुमीयते ते च न शरीरेन्द्रियगुणाः कस्मादहङ्कारेणैकवाक्यताभावात् प्रदेशवृत्तित्वादयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वाद्बाह्येन्द्रियाप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च तथाहंशब्देनापि पृथ्श्श्दिव्यादिशब्दव्यतिरेकादिति । तस्य गुणाः बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागाः । आत्मलिङ्गाधिकारे बुद्ध्यादयः प्रयत्नान्ताः सिद्धाः । धर्माधर्मावात्मान्तरगुणानामकारणत्ववचनात् संस्कारः स्मृत्युत्पत्तौ कारणवचनात् । व्यवस्थावचनात् संख्या पृथक्त्वमप्यत एव तथा चात्मेतिवचनात् परममहत् परिमाणम् । सन्निकर्षजत्वात् सुखादीनां सम्योगः । तद्विनाशकत्वाद्विभाग इति ॥ ४४ ॥

ātmatvābhisambandhādātmā | tasya saukṣmyādapratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādyupalabdhyanumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate | vāsyādīnāṃ karaṇānāṃ kartṛprayojyatvadarśanāt śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako'numīyate | na śarīrendriyamanasāmajñatvāt | na śarīrasya caitanyaṃ ghaṭādivadbhūtakāryatvāt mṛte cāsambhavāt | nendriyāṇāṃ karaṇatvāt upahateṣu viṣayāsānnidhye cānusmṛtidarśanāt | nāpi manasaḥ karaṇāntarānapekṣitve yugapadālocanasmṛtiprasaṅgāt svayaṃ karaṇabhāvācca | pariśeṣādātmakāryatvāt tenātmā samadhigamyate śarīrasamavāyinībhyāṃ ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyāṃ pravṛttinivṛttibhyāṃ rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate prāṇādibhiś ceti | kathaṃ śarīraparigṛhīte vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanādbhastrādhmāpayiteva nimeṣonmeṣakarmaṇā niyatena dāruyantraprayokteva dehasya vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇādinimittatvāt gṛhapatiriva abhimataviṣayagrāhakakaraṇasambandhanimittena manaḥkarmaṇā gṛhakoṇeṣu pelakapreraka iva dārakaḥ nayanaviṣayālocanānantaraṃ rasānusmṛtikrameṇa rasanavikriyādarśanādanekagavākṣāntargataprekṣakavadubhayadarśī kaścideko vijñāyate | sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiśca guṇairguṇyanumīyate te ca na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ kasmādahaṅkāreṇaikavākyatābhāvāt pradeśavṛttitvādayāvaddravyabhāvitvādbāhyendriyāpratyakṣatvācca tathāhaṃśabdenāpi pṛthśśdivyādiśabdavyatirekāditi | tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgāḥ | ātmaliṅgādhikāre buddhyādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ siddhāḥ | dharmādharmāvātmāntaraguṇānāmakāraṇatvavacanāt saṃskāraḥ smṛtyutpattau kāraṇavacanāt | vyavasthāvacanāt saṃkhyā pṛthaktvamapyata eva tathā cātmetivacanāt paramamahat parimāṇam | sannikarṣajatvāt sukhādīnāṃ samyogaḥ | tadvināśakatvādvibhāga iti || 44 ||

Text (44):—Ātmā, Self, is that which belong: to the class ‘Ātmā’;—(VIII-i-2. III-i-2).

In as much as it is extremely subtile in its character, and as such imperceptible, its cognition is brought about by means of the organs of hearing &c., as inferred from perception of Sound &c;—aided by the fact of such instruments as the axe and the like being always operated by a doer or agents.

In the cognitions of sound &c., also we infer a ‘cogniser.’ This character cannot belong to the Body, or to the Sense-organs, or to the Mind; because all these are unintelligent or unconscious. Consciousness cannot belong to the body; as it is a material product, line the jar; and also as no consciousness is found in dead bodies.

Nor can consciousness belong to the Sense-organs; because these are mere instruments, and. also because we have remembrances of objects even after the senseorgan has been destroyed, and even when, the object is not in contact with the organ.

Nor can it belong to the Mind; because if the mind be regarded as functioning independently of the other organs, then we would have perception and remembrance simultaneously presenting themselves (and if the mind be regarded as functioning through the other organs, then it would be the same as ‘Ātmā); and also because the mind itself is a mere instrument.

And thus the only way thing to which consciousness could belong is the Self, which thus is cognised by this consciousness.

from the motion of the chariot we infer the existence of an intelligent guiding agent in the shape of the charioteer, so also we infer an intelligent guiding agent for the body, from the activity and cessation from activity appearing in the body, which have the capacity of acquiring the desirable and avoiding the undesirable object.—(III-i-19).

The intelligent agent, is also inferred, from the actions of breathing &c. “How?” (1) When ice perceive a variegated functioning of the Air contained in the body, (we infer the existence of a guiding agent), who would act like the blower of the windpipe. (?) From the regular action of winking up and down., we infer the existence of the agent. who would be like the puller of a pulley. (3) From the fact of the wounds of the body being healed up, we infer the existence of the agent who would be like the master of a house repairing it. (4) From the action of the mind towards the contact of the sense-organs apprehending desirable objects, we infer the existence of the agent, who would be like the boy in a corner of the house throwing a ball (to another ball stuck in the ground). (5) When we see an object by the Eye, and then recalling the taste of that object, we find a certain modification appearing in the organ of taste; from this we in fer the existence of a single guiding agent for the two operations, like a person looking through two windows. (6) Then again, from the qualities of Pleasure. Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort, we infer the existence of one to whom these qualities belong. These qualities can not belong either to the Body, or to the Sense-organs; (a) because these are found to be coexistent with the notion of ‘I’ (b) because these qualities exist only in certain parts of the object to which they belong; (c) because they are not coeval with their substratum; (d) because they are not perceptible by the external organs of perception. (7) The existence of the Self (as a distinct substance) is also proved by the fact of its being spoken of by means of the word ‘I’ which is wholly distinct from the words ‘Earth,’ ‘Water’ &c.—(III-ii-4 to 13).

The qualities of the Self are, these: Intelligence, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Virtue, Vice, Faculty, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction. The Sūtra, dealing with the distinguishing features of the Self has mentioned the qualities, from Intelligence down to Effort. The presence of Virtue and Vice is indicated by the mention of the fact of the qualities of one Self not being the cause of the appearance of a quality in another Self. The existence of Faculty is indicated by the mention of this as being the cause in the bringing about of remembrance. The presence of Number is indicated by the mention of ‘Restriction’; and from that follows Separateness. The Greatest Dimention of the Self is mentioned in the Sūtra ‘so is the Self also.’ The fact of Pleasure &c. being due to contact proves the existence of Conjunction in the Self; and Disjunction is the destroyer of that Conjunction.—(III-ii-4, 20, 21; VI-i-5. IX-ii-6; VII-i-22).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author now proceeds to describe that, for whom the knowledge of truth brings the highest good, and false knowledge leads to birth and rebirth, and for whose purpose are all the things (in the world).

Ātmatvābhisambandhāt &c.—‘Ātmatva’ is the name of a generality or class; and the relationship or presence of this generality makes the substance known as ‘Ātmā;’ and it is the fact of belonging to this class that differentiates the Self from all other things.

Objection: “As a matter of fact we find that the existence of a perceptible object is always accompanied by a cognition of its shape or form; in the case of the Self we find there is no cognition of the shape of the Self; and hence not finding its invariable concomitant, we cannot but reject the existence of the Self; and under the circumstances why should any attempt have been made towards the ascertaining of its distinguishing features?”

Reply: There is no reason for setting aside the notion of the existence of Self; because the absence of the sense-perception of it is implied in its very nature. On the other hand, for its existence we have a proof in the shape of Inference. And the author proceeds to show this: Tasya &c., Subtility consists in the incapability of being perceived by the senses; and this subtile Self is cognised by means of the Inference based upon the Senses of audition and the rest whose existence, as belonging to the imperceptible Self, is proved by means of Inference; e.g. ‘The perception of sound &c., are brought about by means of certain instrumental organs,—because it is an action,—like the action of cutting (which cannot be brought about without an instrument in the shape of the axe)’ How these organs prove the existence of the Self is next shown: In the case of such instruments as the ace and the like, we find that they are always moved or worked by an intelligent agent. That is to stay, whatever Instrument there is in the world, it is found to be worked by an intelligent agent, as we find in the case of the axe which is worked or operated by the carpenter; and the organ of audition &c„ are all instruments; and as such they must be worked by something else; and that by which these are worked is the Self. Though the organ of audition, which is of the nature of the Ākāśa has no direct relationship with the Self, as Ākāśa is all-pervading, yet it has the capability of being worked or operated by the Self, through the substratum of the internal organ (mind); just as the hand is in contact with the red hot ball of iron, through the pincer.

The fact of the organs of audition &c., being instruments is proved by the fact of their illumining, or manifesting, or rendering perceptible, definite objects, like the lamp.

Though it is by the mind that we cognise the Self as ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ mixed up with the notions of the doer ami the master, brought about by the limitting conditions of the body and the organs acquired by it by reason of Its previous deeds,—yet it is spoken of as ‘imperceptible by the senses,’ on account of its being imperceptible by the external sense-organs.

Śabdādiṣu prasiddhyīā &c. In as much as there is a cognition of sound and other things, we infer from that the existence of the cogniser. For instance—‘Cognition must inhere in something, because it is an action, like the action of the axe; and that wherein it inheres is the Self.’

Objection: “The cognition cognises the object by itself and not as inhering in something else.”

Reply: Is this cognition eternal, or does it change with every moment? If it is eternal, then there is a mere difference of name (as what we call ‘Self’ is nothing more than an eternal cogniser); while if it be momentary, then there could be no remembrance of something perceived a long time before; as the cognition that remembers is something wholly different from that which had perceived it on the previous occasion.

Objection: “In as much as there is a causal relationship between the previous cognition and the subsequent remembrance, (.he former cognition would be remembered by the latter; the reason for the son not remembering that which was perceived by his father lies in the fact of there being no causal relationship between the cognition of the father and that of the son; though there is such a relationship between the bodies of the two persons (father and son), yet in as much as the bodies are unconscious things their relationship can have no bearing upon their cognitions.”

Reply: This is not right; because if there be no Self, there would be no idea formed of any causal relationship; as at the time that the cause would be cognised, there would be no cognition of the effect, which will not have come into existence at that time; while at the time that the effect would be perceived, the cause will have disappeared in the past, and hence there would be no cognition of it; and according to one who denies the Self, there would be no one perceiver of both; and as such who could ascertain the causal relationship between these two things appearing one after the other?

Objection: “ The previous cognition cognising itself also brings about the idea of its causal character, which is nothing apart from itself. The subsequent cognition cognising itself, also cognises its character as an effect, which is not distinct from its own nature. And the character of the cause and that of the effect, apprehended by each of these cognitions, come to be cognised by a simple idea brought about by the single Impression produced by the two cognitions conjointly.”

Reply: These are simply absurd assumptions. How could the two cognitions, which would be confined within themselves, have any such idea as that ‘I am the effect or the cause of that cognition as certainly they would be wholly ignorant of the conditions of each other. And that which they would not cognise could not be apprehended by them; as apprehension always fellows in the wake of cognition.

Objection: “We grant that cognition inheres in something else; and the substrate of cognition we would have in the Body, or in the sense-organ, or in the Mind.”

Reply: It does not belong to the Body, the Sense-organ or the Mind, What does not belong to these is ‘consciousness’, ‘caitanya’ mentioned in the next sentence. That is to say, consciousness does not belong to the Body, or to the Sense-organ, or to the Mind; because these are ‘unconscious’—i.e. they are not the material cause of cognition.

Objection: “This argument involves a begging of the question, the premiss being the same as the conclusion.”

With a view to this objection, the author adds ‘na śarīrasya &c.’ That is to say, Consciousness does not belong to the Body, because like the jar, the body, is a material product; as a matter of fact we find that whatever is a material product is not conscious, as the jar; and the body is a material product: therefore it cannot be conscious. He adds another argument:—Because it is not found in the dead body; the putting forward of the fact of there being no consciousness in the dead body, is with a view to show that the property of Consciousness is not [???] with its substratum; the argument thus comes to this: Consciousness is not a specific quality of the Body, because it is not coeval with (does not exist as long as) its substratum, like Conjunction. From this it follows that Consciousness does not belong to the material constituents of the Body; as if these constituents were conscious, their product would also be so; and there would be numerous cognisers (conscious beings) in one and the same body; and the conscious entity not being one, there could be no adjustment of the activities of the body, in accordance with the motive or purpose of any one of those numerous conscious beings (in the body).

Consciousness does not belong to the sense-organs, because they are of the nature of instruments. That is to say, the sense-organs are unconscious, because they are instruments, like a stick (in the making of the jar). He adds another argument:—When they are destroyed &c. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that even when a sense-organ has been destroyed we have distinct remembrances of things previously perceived by its means; and certainly no remembrance would be possible if the cogniser had been destroyed (in the shape of the sense-organ); hence Consciousness cannot be a quality of these sense-organs. Then again, we find that we have the remembrance of an object even when the object is not before us (and not in contact with the sense-organs); (which would not be possible if consciousness belonged to these organs); nor could the remembrance be attributed to to these organs); as these operate over objects only by going over to them (which would not be possible in the case of the absence of the object). Hence Remembrance cannot belong to the sense-organs; and the absence of Remembrance would also prove the absence of cognition in these: as remembrance cannot belong to any other thing say that to which the previous cognition belongs.

It is for this same reason that Consciousness cannot belong to the Objects; as if it were so then there could be no remembrance of the Object after it had been destroyed. For the following reason also Consciousness cannot belong to the object: Because we do not find the object having any idea either of its position or of the pleasure &c., brought about by it; and because we do not find it ever moving at all with any degree of intelligence. Then again, if consciousness belonged to the Senseorgan, or to the Object, then we could have no such notion as ‘I saw the colour, perceived the taste, and am feeling the touch.’ which unifies in itself the several cognitions of colour &c; Colour &c., and Eye &c., are distinct from one another (i.e. Colour is distinct from Taste, and the Eye from Tongue, and so on).

Objection: “Consciousness may be a quality of the Mind; as it applies to all objects, and is eternal; and as such the unification of cognitions just spoken of would be quite possible in this case.”

Reply. It cannot belong to the Mind. If the Mind be believed to cognise, by the help of some organ of perception other than the Eye &c., then your theory differs from me only in name (you applying the name ‘Mind’ to what we call ‘Self). As what this other organ would be is the Mind; and the Mind which you hold to be the substratum of consciousness would be what we call ‘Self.’ If the Mind does not need the help of any other organ save the Eye &c., then, in the case of an object with a colour, taste &c., being before us all these would be perceived simultaneously, as there would be a simultaneity of the causes of their perception. It is only when there is a need of some other organs that, this organ of the Mind being atomic in its nature cannot be in touch with all the ordinary sense-organs at one and the same time, and hence there is no possibility of any simultaneous cognition of Colour, Taste &c. And if there were no such organ (in the shape of an eternal organ, Mind), then there would be simultaneous remembrances; as there would be no want of any necessary element. Whereas if there be a need of such an organ, as there could be no simultaneous contact with this organ, the remembrances could only be gradual

It has been held by some people that the Mind, being a single eternal entity, cannot bring about any remembrances either simultaneously or successively (as in the latter case the remembrances would go on ad infinitum; and as such it could not be regarded as having any instrumentality in the bringing about of remembrances). But this is not right; because as regards the simultaneous bringing about of remembrances, this is’ not possible, then as regards the successive bringing about of them, when one has been brought about, there can be nothing left to; be brought about after that; but this does not mean that at] this latter Time, the Mind does not exist; as we do admit of an existence other than that which consists in effective activity.;

For the following reason also consciousness cannot belong to the Mind; Because the Mind is itself of the nature of an instrument. That is to say, ‘Mind’ is not conscious because it is an instrument of consciousness, like the jar.

Objection: “The fact of the Mind being an instrument has not been accepted (by both parties, as it is held to be the doer or agent.";

Reply: If the Mind were the doer, then for the perception of pleasure &c., we should find some other instrument, like the Eye for the perception of colour; as no action can ever be produced without an instrument. And if you agree to accept the existence of some such organ, then there would be a difference in name only; as you would also admit the existence of a doer (calling it ‘Mind’ while we call it ‘Self’), and a distinct instrument (calling it something else while we call it ‘Mind’)

Another reason, why the Mind cannot be regarded as conscious lies in the fact of its being a material substance, like a piece of stone.

Question: “If consciousness does not belong to the Body, or to the Sense-organ, or to the Mind, what does that prove with regard to the Self?”

Answer: Pariśeṣāt &c.—That is to say, Consciousness being an effect, must be the effect of some cause in which it would inhere; It has been proved that it cannot inhere in the Body, Sense-organs or the Mind; and will be shown later on, nothing else has the power to be the cause of consciousness; and hence the only thing that remains, to which Consciouness could be attributed, is the Self. In as much as it is a product of the Self, it is by means of Consciousness that the Self is cognised.

Objection: “All this is wholly irrelevant; as both the Self and the Consciousness having but momentary existence, there could be no such relationship between them as that of the substratum and the contained. Specially as ‘Sattva,’ ‘Existence,’ consists in the doing of some action towards a certain end; and this action could be either simultaneous of gradual; as there is no third method which is both gradual and simultaneous. What is gradual consists in the fact of several useful actions being done at different times; and simultaneity consists in these being done at one and the same time; and between two such mutually contradictory things (as gradual and simultaneous), the absence of one would necessarily imply the presence of another. If the actions and things had not a merely momentary existence, there would be no gradual succession; as succession would mean the cessation of one and the appearance of another; and if the previous thing had not a mere momentary but a continuous existence, then it would not be possible to set aside its existence (and as such both continuing to exist, there would be no gradual succession). On the other hand, if the existence (by which is meant the capability of doing a useful action) did not belong to the thing at any time, then it could never have that capability at any time.

“It might be argued that the gradual succession of the action would be due to the aid of gradually operating auxiliaries. But against this it is alleged that if the auxiliary does not add something to the thing itself, then it would not be required, being a useless accessory; and if it does add something, then we ask—is this ‘something’ distinct from the thing itself, or not distinct from it? In the former case, the effect in question may be regarded, through invariable concomitance, to have been produced by this something that comes afterwards; and so there could be no causal efficiency belonging to the thing which had been believed to have no momentary (but a continuous) existence. It might be argued that the causal efficiency belongs to this thing as accompanied by the additional something brought about by the auxiliary. But if this addition itself made any further addition on its own account, what form of aid would it give? On the other hand, if it were to make a further addition, we would have additions ad infinitum; and how would you avoid this? Then again, to assert that the addition is brought about by auxilliaries, and yet belongs to the momentary thing, affords an instance of rare intelligence! Nor would it be quite right to assert that the addition brought about by auxilliaries is non-different from mere existence,—there being no relationship between that which is not helped and that which does not help. Because the existence that has already been brought about once before cannot be brought about again. It must be admitted that the previous existence, not consisting of the addition, ceases, and another existence comes about, partaking of the addition. But this would be an admission of momentary existence.

“Question: ‘What do the auxilliaries do for the momentary thing?’

“Answer: Nothing at all.

“Question: ‘Then why does it stand in need of them?’

“Answer: Who says that they are in need of them? As a matter of fact, every one of the moments having an existence "only in its last throes, has the capability of producing its own peculiar effect; and as such why should they stand in need of themselves? That they approach one another is due to the necessity of there being some cause for the disappearance of "each of these, and to the existence of any combined causal " efficiency in them. And the necessity of the cause of disappearance too is due to the very nature of things.

“Objection: ‘All the causes being capable of bringing about the effect, each of these would briug about a single effect?’

“Reply: You must put this question to these causes themselves, which, as a matter of fact, appear to be unable, individually, to accomplish the effect. What we do is simply to "explain what we actually find to be the case; and for this we cannot be censured.

“Question: ‘Do the others produce the same effect that has been produced by one of these causes?’.

“Answer: It is not that each of them that produces what has been produced by another; bat they produce what is being produced by the other.

“Question: ‘When each of them is equally capable of producing the effect, what is the use of the others?’

“Answer: True; but they are not intelligent agents; and as such none of them could desist from activity seeing that the effect had been already produced by something else,

“Objection: ‘That many causes bring about a single effect is hard to prove; as a diversity of causes would always bring about a diversity of effects.’

“Reply: It is not so; as the difference in the effects is due to the difference in the attendant concomitants, and to that in the auxiliaries. Because it is the very feet of producing (conjointly) a single effect that constitutes the fact of a number of things being ‘auxiliaries.’

“Thus then it is only when Entities are momentary, and have a successive existence, one after the other, that they can produce any effect; and it is absolutely impossible to explain the gradual and successive causal operation of things having more than a merely momentary existence. Nor could there be any simultaneous operation of these latter; as the causal efficiency could not cease even at any subsequent time (and would continue to operate as long as the cause would exist).

“Objection: ‘There can be no production of what has already been produced; nor is there anything to be done by the cause, after the effect has been produced; as the whole mass of effect has been brought about all at once; and hence there would be no causal operation and no production of the effect at any Subsequent moment.’

“Reply: In that case this cause would be as good as non-existent; as there would be a total absence of useful actional (wherein lies the existence of things).

“Thus then there being no possibility of either simultaneity or succession which are both of an all-pervading character (i.e. exhaust between themselves all possible contingencies),—the existence becomes precluded from all that may have a more than momentary existence; and as such it becomes centered "in only momentary things. And such being the case, the inference of the momentary character of things becomes very easy: viz. That which exists is momentary, and the twelve Āyatanas (vide Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, Cowell and Gough:—‘The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the Common sensory and the Intellect are the twelve ‘Seats’ or ‘Āyatanas’) exist; (therefore these are momentary).”

To the above we make the following reply:—The momentary character of things cannot be proved by the mere fact of their existence; as in the case of such an inference we could form no idea of the absence of the Probans (‘existence’) in the contradictory of the Subject.

Objection: We have the notion that that which is devoid of simultaneity and succession is non-existent as for instance, the horns of the horse,’ and also that ‘that which has more than a momentary existence, is devoid of succession and simultaneity.’ And this contrary notion setting aside simultaneity and succession from ‘non-momentary’ entites,—we have the motion of their absence or negation of existence.”

Reply: Not so; the mere non-cognition of the non-momentary thing does not necessarily bring an idea of the preclusion of ‘existence’ from it; as it is only when we percieve the existence of water, that we have the idea of the non-existence of Fire and Smoke. In the same manner an idea of the absence of existence could follow from the absence of succession and simultaneity, only when there would be a perception of the non momentary thing. For you, however, there is no ‘non-monentary’ thing.

Objection: “In the case of the ghost, we find that though the ghost is not actually perceived, yet we have an idea of its preclusion from something else,—in the form that the post is not a ghost; and so we could also have in the case in question (even though we may not perceive the non-momentary object).”

Reply; That could not be; because preclusion is cognisable only by means of negation; and the Negation (of one thing) consists of the perception of something different from it; as it is not possible without the perception of its counter-entity. And if there were a total difference in the forms of the ghost and the post, the “ghost” could not be precluded from the ‘post.’

Question: “How then have we the idea that the post is not the ghost ì”

Answer: In this idea we have a negation, not of relationship, but of identity; and this could be possible only if we admitted the visibility of the ghost which was suspected to be identical with the post,—not otherwise. As has been declared: ‘all negation of identity is due to an admission of perceptibility.’ The idea of the post restricted to the one form of the post, serves as the basis of the preclusion of all things not identical with that post. If the post were the ghost, then it would certainly be cognised in that character; as a matter of fact however we find that the idea of the post does not include any idea of the ghost, as it does that of the ‘post’; and hence we have the idea that the post is not the ghost.

Objection: “There is nothing, either momentary or non-momentary, apart from such objects as the blue and the like. As a matter of fact when the ‘blue-moment’ perceived by a previous cognition is wrongly supposed to be identical with the ‘blue-moment’ perceived by a present cognition, then that ‘blue-moment’ is spoken of as ‘non-momentary;’ and when the two are recognised as distinct, then they are known as ‘momentary’; and the cognition of the absence or negation of existence is with reference to the ‘blue,’ this negation being brought about by the preclusion of simultaneity and succession. And if what is cognised is only the ‘moment’ perceived before, then it would either do the present useful action on the previous occasion, or the past useful action on the present occasion; and there would be no gradual performance of actions; as the contradictory natures of the ‘doer’ and the ‘non-doer’ could not belong to one and the same. Nor could it do all the actions on the previous occasion; as in that case having no useful actions on the present occasion, it would have no existence at the present time.”

Reply: But in this case too, has any real contradictory of the Probans, or of the existence, been shown? Or, has such contradictory been proved to be such as is only imposed by imagination? In fact there is no actual contradictory; as the ‘non-momentary’ Blue’ &c., have no real existence. Then one who wishes to obtain from Inference a real knowledge of things, should,—for the sake of the ascertaining of the threefold form of the middle term, as in the case of the Inference from ‘smoke,’—show that it has a such an existence in the Subject ‘Pakṣa) of the Inference, as is only cognised by the recognised means of knowledge, and not as a mere imaginary imposition. As a matter of fact, there is nothing non-momentary that has such a character, and hence there is an impossibility of the negation (of the middle term). And this not being established, there could not be an affirmation of it either, as an affirmation (or positive existence) is always preceded by a negation. And thus the Probans becomes open to the fallacy of Asādhāraṇa.

Then again, what has been proved by the contrary cognition is the absence of existence, from non-momentary things; but how do you establish the concomitance of nomentariness and existence? The mere preclusion of existence from the contrary of momentariness can not prove that concomitance; as in that case, even an asādhāraṇa Probans would prove the conclusion. The negative inference—i.e. the inference of mere negation—cannot be desirable for you.

Objection: “When it is proved that existence cannot belong to the non-momentary, it follows as a necessary corrollary from this that existence belongs to the momentary.”

Reply: Not so; as the mere assertion of its following as a corrollary does not contain a statement of the reason for existence (i.e. it does not constitute the necessary Minor premiss); and that of which the invariable concomitance with the Minor term (‘existence) has not been established can never serve as the right Probans.

Objection: “The contrary cognition itself will have the double function of proving either another proof or the invariable concomitance (necessary for it) and of proving the contrary); and it would prove this with regard to the ‘twelve Āyatanas’; as no invariable concomitance could be cognised, except with reference to a certain object; and there is no object apart from the twelve ‘Āyatanas;’ and when the concomitance of existence with these has been recognised, there is cognition, of momentariness also; as the cognition of relationship always accompanies the cognition of that which is related; and thus we have the purposelessness of existence in the subject (major term) of the inference; and this would constitute a cognition of invariable concomitance of existence in general, and would make the specific existence the middle term in the inference.”

Reply: Not so; because there can be no cognition of the generality devoid of individuals. And as for the generalities of ‘momentariness,’ and ‘existence’ inhering in specific individuals, that are cognised,—we find the momentariness of such things as ‘blue’ and the like duly cognised; (and these having existence), it is well said that there is a purposelessness of ‘existence’!

Objection: “From the aforesaid contrary cognition we have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of the preclusion of non-momentariness and the preclusion of existence, and from existence follows the cognition of the momentary character of all that has the character of a substance.”

Reply: Not so; because there can be no identity between two preclusions that have been assumed to be distinct from each other, on the ground of the difference of the objects precluded; and it has already been explained that it is identity that forms the basis of Inference.

Objection: “In as much as there is an identity between momentariness and existence, both of which form the integral parts of all things, there would be an identity between these preclusions (of non-momentariness and non-existence), that have been recognised as identical with those.”

Reply: Not so; as the identity between the two things has not been proved by any other argument. If such identity were already established, then there would be no need for the contrary cognition that has been brought forward. Nor can anything be proved (or deduced) from the cognition of a concomitance between mere preclusions; for the simple reason that the thing that is is wholly distinct from that which is not; and there can be relationship between these.

Dharmottara (a Bauddha writer the author of the Nyāyabindu) has declared thus: “Having, by means of the contrary cognition, established the necessary concomitance, (between Existence and Momentariness), in the case of the jar, we prove the momentariness of Sound, from its Existence; and thus there is a distinct use for both (the contrary cognition, and the concomitance); as both have distinct objectives (one refering to the Jar and the other to Sound).”

To this we make the following reply: As in the case of the jar, so in that of sound also, there could be no cessation of the operation of the contrary cognition also; and as such the employment of any other argument would be absolutely useless.

Nor is it impossible for a non-momentary thing to have a useful action; as the existence of a thing consists in its capability of action whenever there are auxilliary attendants, and not in being active independently by itself. And just as its auxiliaries, having their capabilities ascertained by negative and positive concomitance, fall in,—its action duly appears; and hence it is quite possible for a permanent (non-momentary,) thing to have an action appearing gradually; specially as from a single thing (existing at only one moment) no appearance is possible of such an action as depends upon a number of causes. Nor would it be right to assert that, if the thing were dependent upon auxiliaries, then the action would appear by reason of the peculiar capability of these auxiliaries, and hence the activity could not be said to belong to the thing itself. Because an action is found to be always accompanied, by the idea of the appearance of the form of a certain thing doing that action.

If the action did not belong to the thing, then the seed of barley could bring about the sprout of paddy; as the auxiliary attendants of soil and water, are common to both(the barely and the paddy); and there would be nothing to restrict (the appearance of the paddy-plant to the paddy-seed). Nor do the auxiliaries add any capability to the thing; all that they do is merely to help it in its action. The only addition to the capability of the thing consists in the proximity of the auxiliaries; and the absence of these would constitute its weakness (or incapability of action); as the action appears whenever there is a proximity of these, and not otherwise. As for the theory that certain moments are productive and others are not productive (of action), this is negatived by the direct perception of continued existence.

Objection: “This perception of continued existence is a mistaken one, being due to the fact of the non-perdeption of the difference among the successive moments, that are very much like one another."

Reply. You prove the mistaken character of the said perception, on the strength of the momentary character of things; and the momentary character of things you prove by the mistaken character of the said perception; and thus you fall into the vicious circle of mutual interdependence. Nor is it right to assume the production or destruction of a thing, when there is an absence of what have been recognised, by negative and positive concomitance, to be the causes of such appearance and destruction. And this would lead to the absurdity, of a destruction without cause, and also of the seed being the direct cause of the seed. As a matter of fact the seed producing the seed is not produced directly from the seed,—for the simple reason that it is a seed,—like the seed that is still upon the stalls oft the paddy plant.

It has been asserted that the thing being impartite, it could not possibly be both active and inactive.

But this is nothing; because a single thing in the shape of Fire is active towards burning; and at the same time inactive towards bathing; nor does this dual character make any difference in its form. In the same manner, a single thing could be active, when the necessary auxiliaries would be present; and inactive when they would be absent.

Question: “How can the proximity of one thing make something else active? and if such activity were possible, why should the activity brought about be of only a few things, and not of all things?”

Answer: You can not rightly take objection to the nature of things. As for ourselves, whenever we find an activity appearing at the presence of a few things, and disappearing when these things are not present, we infer that these things constitute the auxiliaries in the appearance of that activity; and certainly there can be nothing objectionable in this process of reasoning. According to you also, in as much as the. plant grows out of the seed and the damp soil, it is these and not anything else, that are regarded as the aids; and for you also in this what other reason have you except the nature of things as they are?

Objection: “Each of these things—the seed, the soil and the water—is capable of bringing about the action of sprouting; and they cannot be regarded as mere auxiliaries to one another.”

Reply How then is it that the farmer after having prepared the soil, sows the seeds, and waters it?

Objection: “He does it for the purpose of bringing about the moment of the production of the sprout, by each of these three (soil &c.), as guiding the action of the other."

Reply: If the seed alone were to appear from its cause as fully capable of bringing about the ‘moment of the production of the sprout’.—what would be the use of the Soil and the Water? And if the seed were absolutely incapable of bringing it about, then the proximity of these too would be of no avail; as this could not make it lose its nature (natural incapability).

Objection: “ What the soil and the water do is to stop the efficiency of the seed to produce another incapable ‘moment,’—such efficiency existing in the ‘moment-series’ of the seed itself."

Reply: There may be the non-production of the incapable moment’; but any production of the capable ‘moment’ would not be possible, on account of there being no cause for this production. As a matter of fact however, there can be no stopping of the efficiency that constitutes the very nature of the thing. As in that case there would be a cessation of the thing itself; and destruction comes to be brought about by a cause (and not uncaused as the Bauddha holds all momentary destructions to be).

Then again, it is not possible that there should be produced in the seed, an efficiency or capability of bringing about a particular kind of ‘moment;’ because it is momentary. And if the efficiency thus produced were not something apart from the very nature of the thing,—then that would come to the producing of what has already been produced.

For these reasons, there can be only two alternatives: (1) If what is produced is inefficient, then there can be no action, and (2) if it is efficient, then it must act immediately after its production; and the action cannot ba attributed to the proximitiy of any other thing; as this other thing could not be of any use in this matter (as shown above).

It might be argued that, “in as much as the effect is not found to be produced from a single cause, while it is found to be produced from a number of causes combined together,—we must attribute causal efficiency to all these combined, and as such why should you wander away from us who hold this view?”

But in that case your premiss becomes inconclusive, in as much as it is quite possible for a non-momentary thing to operate towards a useful end.

Objections “Of all such things as are produced, or brought about by some cause, destruction is absolutely certain; and from this we can infer their momentary character. For instance, in all things we find that that which is sure to be does not stand in need of any cause to bring about that; e.g., the fact of the arrow and the sword being made of iron does not stand in need of any other cause; and the destruction of all things is sure to be; and from this we can infer that the destruction of things does not stand in need of any other cause (save their very being); specially as those circumstances that are found to be due to other causes are not such as are sure to be,—such for instance as the colouring of clothes; so also if things were, for their destruction, to stand in need of causes other than those that bring, them into existence,—then, in as much as there might be certain discrepancies in those Other causes or some obstacle in their operation, it might so happen that some produced thing might not be destroyed at all. Whereas things being produced by their causes as amenable to destruction, they become destroyed as soon as they are produced; and thia establishes the momentary character of all things. Then again, if a thing were not destructible by its very nature, then its destruction could never be brought about; it would be as impossible as the cooling of fire: and if it be destructible by its nature, there would be no need for any causes for its destruction. Nor can destruction, which, is non-different from the thing itself, be ever regarded as brought about by another cause; as a difference in causes would make a difference in the effects (and hence destruction would not be identical with the thing). If the Destruction were something different from the thing, and were brought about by a different cause, then we would have the absurd possibility of a negation being perceived; and in as much as the appearances of one thing (Destruction) could not do away with the form of another thing (the thing believed to be destroyed), we could have no such declaration as ‘the jar is destroyed,’ with a positive thing for its Nominative; instead of that we should have the assertion, ‘Negation is produced.’ And then if a question of fact be put to us, as to what became of the ‘jar,’—though we would really have its cessation, yet in what way could we assert it? For these reasons we conclude that things are destructible by their very nature.”

To the above we make the following reply: when a thing is produced, does it stay for a single moment, or does it stay for any other moment also? In the latter case, its momentary character disappears, as it would stay for more than one moment And in the former case, it would have no existence at any other moment save the one at which it is produced; and hence there would be no identity between its existence and non-existence, as they would exist at different points of time.

It might be urged that what is meant is not that a thing is its own destruction, but that the second moment is the destruction or non-existence of the preceding moment.

But there is not much in this theory either; because even though one moment differs from another moment, as an individual unit of time, yet there is no actual contradiction or opposition in their nature. Just as one jar exists along with another jar,—i.e., in your phraseology, the jar of one “series” exists side by side with the jar of another “series”—so might it also exist along with another jar of the same “series.” Specially as the means of cognition pertaining to the second moment having served its purpose with regard to the positive form of that moment, it could not have any efficiency towards the negation of the previous moment. As for ‘Negation,’ it only consists in the negation of a certain positive thing, as it is always comprehended in the form, ‘the jar is not.’ Hence its appearance means the cessation of that thing; its continuance or existence means the discontinuance of the thing; as the two—the jar and its negation—are mutual contradictories. Such being the case, momentary character cannot belong to any thing; specially as its negation or absence, which always appears after sometime, and is dependent upon some other cause, is always found to come after the thing itself. As for existence we find that when the jar has been produced, it is long before it is destroyed by the stroke of the stick. Nor does it stand to reason to assert that, “the destruction of the jar is of a positive character, and what the stroke of the stick docs is to produce the ‘series’ of broken pieces of earthenware (into which the jar is reduced).” Because the thing (jar) having bound together within its own series, the potency of producing like things of the same series,—as long as this potency is not destroyed, there can be no production of a heterogeneous series; and if you admit of the destruction of that potency by the same stroke of the stick, why should you object to the destruction of the thing itself?

Even though a negation be brought about by a cause, that fact alone would not make it an entity; as it is directly perceived by the senses to have the character of a negation of entity. Its very nature is such that even though caused, it is not destroyed, like a positive entity; as that which has been destroyed is never again perceived (and it would be this perception that would constitute the destruction of that destruc-tion). And if the nature of things, cognised by the right means of knowledge, were to be set aside, simply on the ground of its similarity with something else,—then the diversity of the universe would also have to be set aside.

The argument—“how can the production of one thing make another thing lose its character?”—would not be a proper one to bring forward; as the statement, ‘the jar has been destroyed,’ is due to the production of its negation, through the action of its constituent parts; hence it is a negation of the jar alone, and not of all things; For this negation there is no material cause; and for this reason it has no non-material cause either. As to the question—“where have you seen any effect without a substratum?”—we see such an effect in this very case; as the negation cannot inhere in the jar, which has been destroyed; nor does it inhere in the Earth; as being a property of something else it could not inhere in it.

Question: “How then is it that it is found to be perceived in a definite place?”

Answer: That is due to the definite place being occupied by its counter-entity. It is its nature that on the negation of something connected with it, it appears as this latter thing; and that on the negation of something inhering in it, it appears in the form of the latter; its qualification also is such; and it has no conjunction or inherent relationship; as these two latter belong to positive entities.

Thus has been proved the existence of Negation. There is no such thing cognisable by the intellect as is contrary in its nature to Bhāva (positive existence), and which could bring, about a contradiction between Ice and Fire. As a matter of fact, the only contradiction that exists between Ice and Fire consists in the absence of Fire in Ice, and vice versa; and there is no contradiction between their forms; as a positive entity can never have another positive entity for its contradictory.

It has been urged that negation being sure to come about it could not stand in need of any other cause. But we find this argument failing in the case of the rising and setting of the Sun: and if these did not depend on any causes, then there would be no diversity of Time. The same objections would also apply if we were to make the negation concomitant with the appearance of any one accessory detail; in the case of the cloth we find that there is a definite cause of colouring, which also appears at a definite time; and in this case the mere non-proximity or absence of that time would necessarily- mean the non-production of colour. In the case of negation however we find that there are endless causes for bringing it about, and all are timed to appear at particular points of time; and it being impossible for every one of these causes and points of time to be absent, and one or the other of these is sure to appear; and appearing at any other time, it at once, in a moment destroys the positive Entity; and thus negation comes to be produced. And even though the destruction is caused, yet it is permanent.

Then again, all the above arguments brought forward to prove the momentary destruction of all things, are open to the fallacy of “Kalātyayāpadiṣṭa”; as we find that what has been once seen is again cognised, in the same form, by the recognitive perception.

Objection.: “This cognition cannot prove the fact of the positive entity having an existence before and after—i.e. a continuous existence; because the cognition of the object (now, and that after sometime) cannot be regarded as one and the same cognition; as there is no cause for any such continuous cognition; because the sense-organ operating upon objects that are near us, could not be said to belong to the past time; and as for the impression produced by a previous cognition, it is restricted to that particular cognition, and does not apply to any other time; and apart from these two there is nothing pertaining to both times, which could produce the cognition in question. Then again, for the following reason too, the cognition cannot be one and the same; because they are of totally different natures; the object perceived by the senses is known as “this,” while that which is not so cognised is spoken of as “that”; and the character of sense-perceptibility is directly opposed to that of imperceptibility; and as such they could never be regarded as one and the same cognition; hence we must accept the two cognitions—being as they are of the nature of direct perception and remembrance—to have wholly distinct objectives.”

To the above we make the following reply:—We distinctly recognise the fact of there existing a certain positive entity extending over the present as well as the past and the future; and then, to deny that that object is not the objective of the two cognitions would be a contradiction of direct cognition; as in that case the object of remembrance would not be the same as that which had been previously perceived. For these reasons the whole must be regarded as a single cognition, which, on the strength of our distinct cognition, should be accepted as having both (the past and the present) for its object. For a distinctly cognised effect learned people always assume adequate causes, even though these latter be not distinctly cognisable; and they never conceal or set aside the slightest or the most undesirable effect, on the ground of the non-perception of its cause; as if they were to do so, then there would be a setting aside of the whole worldly phenomenon, (the cause whereof we are never able to directly perceive). Hence, though the Sense-organ, or the Impression, each by itself, is incapable of; bringing about the said combined cognition, yet when combined, the two together would bring about the single effect in the shape of recognition. And on account of the capabilities of the two causes, this recognition would have both (the past) and the present) for its object; and it would attain the character? of ‘sensuous’ cognition, because of its following upon the) efficiency of the sense-organ and the capability of the object.)

The mere fact of each of the two causes being separately incapable of bringing about a particular effect cannot be a ground for denying the capability of these also when combined; as for instance, though we find each of the three causes, the soil, water and the seed singly incapable of bringing about the sprout, yet they do bring it about when put in touch with one another. It is a well-recognised fact that in a case where we have peculiar auxiliaries to the cause, the effect produced is also of a peculiar character.

Consequently there would be nothing incompatible in one and the same object being both perceptible and imperceptible, according as it happens to be or not to be, in proximity to the person perceiving. It is for this reason that even when there is no actual contact with the sense-organs, the cognition of something in the past is always ‘sensuous’ cognition, as it has for its object a cognition brought by the sense-organs (on the previous occasion); and because ‘sensuousness’ lies only in that (being produced by the sense-organs). The sense-organ cognising that which is not before us, cognises the fact of its having occurred at some time past, and that which is to appear in the future; as in the case of this latter, the Sense-organ is without the aid of the accompanying Impression (which is present in the case of the cognition of the past). Nor is there any incompatibility in the same cognition applying to both points of time (the present and the past); and as such there can be no reason for attributing to such a cognition the character of ‘Kalpanā’ (assumption or imagination). Because we have often seen a single thing having many qualifications; e.g. in the case of a person, Caitra, being qualified by (possessing) an umbrella and a book. Nor would there be any difference between the two cases, on the ground of the relationship of the umbrella and the book appearing at one and the same time, and that of the two points of time being gradual, appearing one after the other; as the fact of one thing being cognised as having two qualifications would be common to the two cases.

Thus then, we find that Recognition comprehends an object extending over diverse points of space and time; and as such it does away with the idea that all things are undergoing momentary productions and destructions. Nor can this recognition be regarded as mistaken; as we cannot find it being set aside by subsequent cognition to the contrary. It might be urged that it is set aside by all those arguments that have been brought forward to prove the momentary destruction of things. But all these arguments being inferential in their character could have a footing only when the contrary sensuous cognition would be set aside; and you seek to set aside this sensuous cognition by means of those same arguments; and certainly this affords an example of a curious mutual interdependence. This is not the case with Sense-cognition, which is independent of other forms of knowledge. In the case of such things as the Flame and the. like, the sense-cognition that we have has for its object the generality ‘Flame’; while the Inferential knowledge is that of an individual fire; and as such there being no contradiction between the two, in such cases the sensuous cognition is not an obstacle in the appearance of the] Inferential cognition.

Some people with extreme boldness have declared that the fact of all things undergoing momentary destruction is directly] perceptible by the senses. And against these people we bring forward the very fact of there being no such cognition at all. That is to say, the cognition that we have is in the form of ‘this: is blue,’ and not as ‘this is momentary.’

Objection: “The momentariness of the blue object is cocomitant with its blueness; and it has got no separate functioning (and existence); consequently when blueness would be perceived, momentariness would also be cognised along with it and the reason why it is not always recognised as such is that we do not always perceive the differences between the successive moments of the thing’s existence (and hence we regard the thing itself as having a continual existence).”

Reply: What a wonderful stretch of philosophic insight! You are explaining a fact of actual cognition, and yet you say it is not perceived! The hope that that which is not perceived is cognised is as false as a mirage; and no one admits of any other necessary condition in the sense-perceptibility of an object, save the cognition brought about by the force of sense-perception. And when of two things we find that the cognition of one does not mean the cognition of another, the assertion of an identity between these is a misnomer.

Objection: “The Sensuous cognition is momentary; and as such it could apply to only such existence of the object as would be coeval with itself; it would also set aside the fact of that object being not related to that point of time; as also the relationship of that object, which is concomitant with that point of time, with any other point of time; and thus that “momentary cognition must be accepted as apprehending the fact of that object having existence only for that time,—which means that it is momentary.”

Reply: In putting forward this argument you show yourself to be in a sorry plight similar to the drowning man catching at a straw. How could the cognition apprehend the fact of the object being coeval with itself, when it does not apprehend itself? Or, even granting that it does not apprehend it, then too no sensecognition would apply to the notion that the object did not exist before, and will not exist after, the moment at which it is perceived; because Sense-cognition is never found to operate towards either the past or the future; applying as it does to the present time, it could not preclude all time that is not present; as there is a distinct contradiction between the present and the non-present; but the fact of cognising an object as present does not necessarily preclude its relationship to any other point of time; as there is no incompatibility in a single object being related to various points of time, in the same manner as a single thread is connected with a number of beads.

This has been explained by us in detail in the Tattvaprabodha. and the Tattvasaṃvādinī; and hence we do not repeat here what we have already explained there.

Then again, if all entities were momentary, to whom would birth and rebirth belong?

Objection: “They would belong to the ‘series of cognitions’.”

Reply: This cannot be; because the ‘series’ can have no existence apart from that of which the series is formed.

Objection: “Birth-and-rebirth does not consist in any one thing (Soul) becoming connected with many bodies; what is meant by it is the non-cessation of the series of cognitions; and this would be quite compatible with the momentary character of things.”

Reply: There is not much to recommend in this explanation either; because there is no proof for accepting the cognitions of the child in the embryo as having their cause in the cognitions of the previous birth; as it is not necessary that the effect must proceed from a cause which is of the same kind as itself; as we find smoke arising from fire, which is not of the same kind as the smoke.

Objection: “When of two things we find that the existence or non-existence of the one depends upon the existence or non-existence and other peculiarities of the other, then we regard this latter to be of the same kind (homogeneous) with, and the material cause of, the other. And as a matter of fact, we find that cognition has the peculiar characteristic of being of the nature of consciousness; this characteristic we find absent in the material substances, Earth &c; hence the homogeneous cause of cognition must be something possessed of this characteristic nature; and from this we infer that the cognition of the child in the embryo must be due to another preceding cognition; otherwise if the effect were not necessarily concomitant with its cause, then it would appear in a hap-hazard manner.”

Reply: There is not much in thia either; as we find the burning characteristic of fire appearing out of the rubbing of two pieces of stick, which are not possessed of that characteristic; and from the unconscious Eye we find appearing cognitions having the character of consciousness; and hence we have no ground for necessarily postulating such a cause for cognition as would have the characteristic of consciousness; and hence the existence of a previous birth could not be established if all things were regarded as momentary.

Nor would it be possible to prove the existence of future birth: as there would be no ground for believing that the last cognition of the body would bring about, or transmit, any further cognition.

Objection: “That which necessarily brings about the effect is the cause in its fully developed condition; as we find in the case of the seed which always produces the sprout, when its causal efficiency is complete; and in the same manner, in as much as the last cognition of the body would have its full efficiency of producing further cognitions, it would surely bring about further cognitions;—in this we have got very good grounds for admitting of a continuous series of cognitions.”

Reply: Not so; because we do not find any such efficiency in the final flickering of the flame, (which is not found capable of bringing about any further bickerings).

Objection: “In the case of the flame the absence of the efficiency is due to the destruction or expansion of the oil and the wick (which circumstances are not present in the case of the Cognition).”

Reply: In the case of the last cognition also, its causal efficiency would be destroyed by the pangs of death. And hence no birth or rebirth would be explicable in accordance with the momentary character of things.

The author brings forward other arguments to prove the existence of the Self:—Śarīrasamavāyinībhyām &c. That is to say, from the activity and cessation from activity of the body, we infer the existence of an intelligent Guider or Master of the Body, who makes the necessary effort. In order to preclude the activity of the Creeper &c., the author has added—‘inhering in the body’; and for the purpose precluding the moving and not-moving of the dead body in a current of water, he has added—‘Capable of acquiring and avoiding the desirable and the undesirable respectively’; the ‘desirable’ is Pleasure; and the ‘undesirable’ is Pain; and the acquiring of Pleasure and the avoiding of pain indicate such activity as is prompted by intelligence.

The author cites an instance—“Just as we infer the guiding charioteer from the motion of the chariot.” That is to say, (1) the activity, capable of acquiring and avoiding the desirable and undesirable, through the accepting and rejecting of the means leading to those experiences, must be regarded as due to a preceding effort,—because it is a particular kind of activity,—like the activity of the chariot; (2) or, the Body is controlled by an intelligent agent,—because it has a peculiar action,—like the chariot.

‘Prāṇadibhiśca’—The connection is that from the actions of Breathing &c., also we infer the existence of the intelligent controller. This refers to all such actions as, Breathing up, Breathing down, the closing and the opening of Eyes, living, mental activity, and the modifications undergone by the sense-organs; as also Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort,—all of these being indicative of the existence of the Self.

With a view to show in what way these are indicative of the Self, the author proceeds to show, first how Breathing up and down is indicative of it: Śarīraparigṛhītaḥ &c.—Air has the character of blowing horizontally; but in the case of the Air, enclosed in the body, however, we find it moving up and down vertically,—in a manner contrary to its ordinary nature; and from this we infer the existence of a controller of the Body, who makes the Air move in that manner; as otherwise we could not account for such an action of the air, contrary to its natural modes of motion. The instance cited is that of the blower of the bagpipe. The argument may be simply stated thus: The Body is controlled by an intelligent agent,—because it is the receptacle of such air as has its action modified by the desire of some one,—just like the bagpipe. The qualification ‘Śarīraparigṛhītaḥ’ indicates the precedence of intelligent desire; and hence the argument is not invalidated by such instances as those of the ‘Dvivāyuka’ and the like. (‘Divāyuka’ is the name given to the phenomenon of the rising up of the whirlwind caused by the collision of two contrary winds).

The closing and opening of the Eyes indicates a controlling agency, of the same kind as the propeller of the pulley. That is to say, the action bringing about the conjunction of the upper lid with the lower is called ‘nimeṣa’; and that which brings about their separation is called ‘unmeṣa’; and from this action we infer a controlling intelligent agent for the Body who would act like the propeller of the pulley. In as much as the propelling up and down of the pulley could be brought about by the action of the wind also (as in the case of the wind-mill).—in order to preclude this, the author has added ‘niyatena’ in a fixed manner, which implies dependence upon same one’s desire. The argument may be thus stated: The body is controlled by an intelligent agent,—because it has as its constituents such parts as are moved up and down by desire—like the pulley.

The author next puts forward an argument that proves the existence of Life: Dehasya &c. ‘Vṛddhi’ is growth; this and the filling up of wounds being due to some intelligent controller, we infer the existence of such an intelligent controller or mender for the Body, who would be similar to the master repairing his house. That is to say, the growth of the body and the filling up of its wounds must be regarded as being brought about by an intelligent agent,—because they have the character of growth and filling up of wounds,—like the growing or increase and repairing of the house. Nor would the growing of trees &c., invalidate this argument; as the growth of these also is brought about by God.

Such things as the tree and the like have no souls; as in the case of these we do not find any connection with souls with the qualification of producing the various functionings of the Intellect &c.

The author now puts forward the inferential argument based upon mental activity—Abhimata &c. That is to say, the existence of the Self in the body is indicated by the action of the mind that brings about its connection with the eyes and the other organs of perception, which apprehend objects desired to be perceived. The urger or propeller of the Mind is inferred to be like the boy propelling one ball against another fixed in a corner of the room, (the fixed ball resembling the Eye, the propelled ball the Mind, and the Boy the Self). That is to say, the Mind is propelled by an intelligent agent,—because it is the substratum of an action bringing about the connection with a desired object,—like the ball in the boy’s hand. That which would be propelled by non-intelligent agencies of the wind and the like, would bring about connection with undesirable things also’.

“Nayanaviṣaya &c,—as a matter of fact we often find that after the perception of colour, the object of vision, we find certain modifications in the organ of taste, following upon the remembrance of the taste of the object seen; and from this we infer that there is a single agent who cognises both Colour and Taste, by means of the two organs, resembling a person looking through two openings in the window. That is to say, when we see the colour of a nice fruit which we like, we have a remembrance of its taste perceived on some previous occasion; this remembrance produces in us a desire to eat the fruit; this is followed by an effort towards obtaining it; and this effort, through the contact of the seif and the mind, produces a modification in the organ of taste, in the form of making saliva flow from the roots of the teeth; this flow of saliva could not be due to any intelligence in the sense-organ itself; as each of the two organs concerned perceives only the colour and the taste respectively; and hence the seeing of Colour could not bring any remembrance of the Taste; as a matter of fact however we do find this modification appearing in the organ of Taste; and hence there must be some one apart from the organs, who cognises both, and who on seeing the Colour, remembers the Taste (perceived by himself on a previous occasion). Nor could the body itself be taken as the cogniser of both; because the young body being universally recognised to be different from the old body, on account of the difference in size, any thing perceived in boyhood could not be remembered in old age.

Not for the above reasons alone, but also because of the properties of the Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort, which lead to the inference of something to which these properties belong,—all these qualities are cognised as co-extensive with the notion of ‘I’—being always cognised as ‘I am pleased,’ ‘I am pained’ and the like, where we find that it is the object ‘I’ which is characterised by Pleasure. The notion of ‘I’ could not refer to the body; because it is not found to apply to the body of another person. Nor could it be said to apply to one’s own body alone. Because one body, as a body, does not differ from another body. If the notion of ‘I’ referred to the Body, then just as another’s man’s body being as perceptible as our own body,—the notion of fatness appearing equally with reference to both,—the other man’s body would also be capable of being spoken of as ‘I’; specially as in both, the shape is the same. If it be held that there is a difference between the two on account of the characters of things related to them,—then the notion of ‘I’ would come to apply to these things, and not to the Body. Then again, if the notion of ‘I’ referred to the Body, it could not appear in our consciousness as something internal.

For the same reasons the notion of ‘I’ could not refer to the Sense-organs; as these organs are themselves beyond senseperception; while the notion of ‘I’ is of the nature of Sense-cognition,—being independent of inferential marks as well as of verbal expression.

For the same reason, Pleasure &c., also could not belong either to the Body or to the Sense-organs. Then again, it is a fact known by all men that to him alone who is the experiencer or cogniser, belong Remembrance, Desire, Aquiring of the means of pleasure, Feeling of Pleasure, Avoidance of Pain, and so forth; and it has already been proved that Cognition and Remembrance do not belong either to the Body or to the Sense-organs; and hence it follows that Pleasure &c., also cannot belong to them.

The author brings forward another reason: Pradeśa-vṛttitvāt. That is to say, we actually see that the qualities of Pleasure &c., exist only over a part of their substratum,—for instance, we have such ideas as ‘I feel pleasure in my feet,’ ‘I feel a pain in my head;’ and from this it follows that they cannot be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs; as it differs essentially from the specific properties of these latter, which are found to pervade over the whole of their substrates. The argument may be thus simplified in the form of a negative Inference: Pleasure &c., are not the specific properties of the Body or the Sense-organs,—because they exist only in parts of their substrates, while the specific properties of the body and the sense-organs have always been found to pervade the whole of their substrates,—e.g.. Colour and the rest;—Pleasure &c., however do not thus pervade over the whole of their substrates,—and hence they cannot be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs. Nor could the case of Sound be an exception invalidating the above premiss; as though Sound is a property of Ākāśa (over the whole of which it could not pervade), yet it appears as the property of that portion of Ākāśa which is enclosed within the cavity of the Ear, over the whole of which it certainly pervades.

For the following reason also Pleasure &c., could not be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs:—Because they do not last as along as their substrates. The case of Colour may be cited as an instance to the contrary. In fact this argument could not apply to the case of the sense-organs; because the premiss would be invalidated by the case of the organ of hearing, which has its property, sound, such as does not exist as long as the organ itself.

Another reason, why Pleasure &c., could not be properties of the Body or the Sense-organs, is that they are not perceptible by any of the external Sense-organs. The qualities of the Body and Sense-organs are of two kinds—(1) some, like gravity and the like, are imperceptible, and (2) some, like Colour &c., are perceptible by the external sense-organs. In the case of pleasure &c., however we find that they do not come within any of the two categories (being perceptible, but not by any of the external Sense-organs); and hence these cannot be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs.

And thus it being proved that Pleasure &c., cannot belong to the Body and the Sense-organs, the Self is the only substance left to which they could belong.

Objection: “Pleasure and Pain are modifications; and as such could not belong to the Self which is eternal (and hence unmodifiable). And even if they could belong to it, then that Self (being modifiable) would become non-eternal, like the skin.”

Reply: Not so; because the production and destruction (appearance and disappearance) of these could not cause any disturbance in the form of the Self. In the case of all eternal things, we do not admit of any destruction or change of its form; and as for the disappearance of one quality (Pleasure) and the appearance of another (Pain) in connection with it,—there would be no incongruity in this.

Question: “What do Pleasure and Pain do to the eternal Self?”

Answer: They afford to it an experience with regard to themselves.

Question: “What good could this experience do to one that is free from all addition or substraction (i.e., want and its supply)?”

Answer: The good done consists ia this that it is on the strength of such experience that it becomes an enjoyer or experiéncer of Pleasure and Pain.

Tathāhaṃśabdenāpi.—That is to say, just as the Self is inferred from Pleasure &c., so also is it inferred from the notion of ‘I’. We find the word ‘I’ used in the Veda as well as in ordinary parlance, by learned persons; and this word could not be without something that it would denote. Its own form could not form its denotation, as that would involve the incongruity of its operation bearing upon itself; as has been well declared—“no word ever denotes itself.” And hence that something which is denoted by the word ‘I’ would be the Self.

Objection: “The word ‘I’ may be regarded as denoting the earth etc.”

In reply to this our author says—Pṛthivyādiśabdavyatirekāt. That is to say, that which denotes one thing is always found to be co-extensive with other words denoting the same thing, as we find in the case of the words ‘Substance’ (‘Dravya’) ‘Earth’ (‘Pṛthivī’) and the like.

In the case of the word ‘I’ however we find that it is not co-extensive with the other words denoting the Earth &c.; as we never come across such expressions as ‘aham pṛthivī’ (‘I am Earth’), ‘aham udakam’ (‘I am water’) &c.; hence the word ‘I’ could not be taken as applying to the Earth &c.

Objection: “The word ‘I’ is found to be applied to the Body; in such expressions as ‘Sthūloham,’ ‘I am fat.’

Reply: Not so; because we find it used in such expressions as ‘Aham jānāmi’ (‘I know’), ‘aham smarāmi’ (‘I remember’); and it has been shown that knowledge and remembrance do not belong to the Body. Hence its use with regard to the Body must be regarded as secondary or figurative, based upon the fact of the Body being a useful instrument for the Self; in the same way as the master says of his useful servant—’ he is my very self;’

The existence of the Self having been thus established, the author next proceeds to point out its qualities—Tasya ca guṇāh &c. He then points out the authority of the Sūtras on the point of Intellect &c, belonging to the Self; Ātmaliṅgādhikāre &c., which refers to the Sūtras—Prāṇāpāna *c.

Dharmādharmau &c.—That is to say, the existence of Dharma and Adharma in the Self is indicated by the declaration in the Sūtra—‘Dharmādharmau ātmāntaraguṇānāmakāraṇatvāt.’ The sense of this is this: Some people hold that the Dharma of giving, inhering in the given thing, produces a Dharma in the receiver of the gift; and this view the author of the Sūtra has repudiated in the Sūtra—‘Ātmāntaraguṇānāmātmāntaraguṇeṣvakāraṇatvāt.’ That is to say, in the case of pleasure we find that the pleasure of one Self does not produce such qualities in another Self; and hence the Dharma and Adharma of one Self could not be the cause of the like qualities in another Self; and this distinctly indicates the fact of Dharma and Adharma, being the properties of the Self; as otherwise the said non-productiveness of these could not be asserted on the ground of their similarity to Pleasure and other qualities of the Seif.

Saṃskāraḥ smṛtyutpattau. This refers to the Sūtra dealing with Remembrance—‘Ātmamanasoḥ saṃskārat’. That is to say, what is remembered is something cognised before; but the cause of this remembrance could not be that previous cognition, which will have been long destroyed; nor could the absence of that cognition be the cause of remembrance; as ‘absence’ being equally present everywhere, there would be no such diversity as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ in the cause of remembrance; and there would be no need for repetition (as the means of bringing about Remembrances). Hence it must be admitted that the previous cognition produces a certain faculty in the Self, which gives rise to the Remembrance; and hence the postulating of this Faculty or Saṃskāra.

Some people bold the cognition itself, even though it has ben destroyed, to be the cause of Remembrance; and in the opinion of these people, the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like also would bring about the results in the shape of Heaven, without any intervening agency, in the shape of Adṛṣṭa, of which thus there would be no need at all.

Vyavasthāvacanācca Saṅkhyā—We have the Sūtra ‘Nānatmāno vyavyasthātaḥ’: this Sūtra points out the multiplicity of Selves; and that shows that multiplicity of number is one of its properties.

Now what is meant by this ‘Vyavasthā’? It means the non-recognition of the cognitions and pleasure &c. belonging to several persons. That is to say, in the case of our own pleasure &c. we have the recognition, in old age, of our experiences of the past, as our own; as we often have the idea—‘I enjoyed such and such a pleasure’ and the like; and if the experience were one and the same in all bodies, then we could have a similar idea with reference to the experiences of other persons: as a matter of fact however we have no such recognition; and from this we infer that there is a distinct Self in each body.

Objection: “Just as in the case of Ākāśa we find that though it is one only, yet on account of the diversity of the limitations in the shape of the Ear-cavities, we have a diversity in the sound-experiences—so, in the case of the one Self also we may explain the diversity of experiences as being due to the diversity in the limitations of the body &c.”

Reply: The instance is not quite analogous; the diversity of sound-experience might well be explained as due to the diversity of sound-comprehending agencies of the Ear-cavity and the rest which have been brought about by the Dharma and A dharma, which again are restricted to each individual person. In the case of the One Self on the other hand, there would be no diversity in the Adharma and Dharma (since all these would belong to one and the same Self); and as such there being no diversity in the bodies (which are brought about by the Dharma and Adharma of the Self ensouling the body),—what would be the cause of the diversity of the pleasure and pain experienced by different persons? specially as the Self being one, the contact of the Mind also would be common to all persons. For one however, who admits of many Selves, even though all Selves, being omnipresent, would be present in all bodies, yet his experiences would not be common to all of them; as each of them would experience only such pleasures &c., as would appear in connection with the particular body that will have been brought about by the previous Karma of that Self,—and not those belonging to the other bodies. And the Karma also belongs to that Self by whose body it has been done. Hence the restriction of body is due to the restriction of Karma and vice versa,—the mutual interdependence going on endlessly (and hence not objectionable.)

It might be held that though the Supreme Self is one only, the human Selves being many and different from one another, that would account for the diversity in question.

But this would not be right, as if the human Selves would be different from the Supreme Self, then that would mean an abandonment of the Monistic Vedānta theory; and also because such a theory would go against the identity of the human Selves with the Supreme Self, as laid down in the Śruti passage—‘may I differentiate names and forms by entering with this Jīva which is my own self.’

It might be argued that, “the difference between the Supreme and the human Selves may be explained as being due to Ignorance; and the differentiations of Ignorance with regard to the human Selves are beginningless,”

But whose ‘Ignorance’ is this? Is it of Brahma, or of the human Selves? It could not belong to Brahma; as That is by Its very nature pure and intelligent. And if it belonged to the human Selves, then there would be an interdependence,—differentiation of human selves being due to Ignorance, and this latter belonging to the differentiated human selves.

Objection: “The differentiations of Ignorance and human Selves would be endless, like the differentiation of the seed and the tree; and as such the said interdependence or reciprocity would not be objectionable.”

Reply: There is a real difference between the seed and the tree; whereas the difference between Ignorance and the human Self is not real; so the cases are not quite analogous. And the reciprocal causability also in the case of the seed and the tree is due to the real difference among the several seeds and trees, (one seed being the cause of one tree, which brings forth another seed, and so forth); the human Self however is one and the same through all the states that it passes through in its course of metempsychosis—viz: the states of the bird, the quadruped and the man; as in each of these we find that no sooner is the infant born than it evinces a desire for the kind of food suited to the species in which it happens to be born; and such desire could only be due to the series of experiences of its previous births; this shows that its Self has had a beginningless connection with bodies; and in this case, it would not be quite reasonable to hold the differentiation of Selves to be due to Ignorance, and this Ignorance to belong to the human Self.

Objection: “The human Self also, like Brahma, is beginningless and endless, being a mere reflection of Brahma; and hence on the strength of the text—‘all things shine after that shines, and all this shines by Its light’ &c., we hold that it is the endless and beginningless essence of Brahma that appears in all bodies.”

Reply: That is not right; as if such were the case, then the diversity in question would be absolutely inexplicable. Hence it was quite right for the author of the Sūtra to declare—‘Nānātmāno vyavasthātaḥ.’; and as for the texts laying down the non-difference of Selves, they must be taken as figurative.

According to the theory of the multiplicity of Selves there would be no such absurd contingency as the cessation of the worldly process, on the emancipation of all human selves.. As the number of such selves being endless, there would be no end of them; nor any decrease or increase of their number. As has been declared by the revered author of the Vārtika:—“Thus then the knowing ones being continuously emancipated, there does not become a void (of selves), in as much as the number of these in the universe is endless; if there were an end, or an increase and decrease in their number, then alone could such a void be possible,—as in the case of things of limited dimensions; when however the thing is illimitable, there is no possibility of these (end &c.)”

Pṛthaktvamapyata eva. That is to say, the assertion ‘nānātmāno &c.’ also indicates the ‘separateness’ of Selves; since Separateness always follows from Number.

The assertion in the Sūtra ‘Tathā cātmā’ indicates the Greatest Dimension as belonging to Selves. That is to say, having said that Ākāśa is all-pervading, the Sūtra adds ‘so is the Self also;’ and this clearly indicates that the Self like Ākāśa, is all-pervading; and hence its dimension must be the greatest possible. The all-pervading character of the Self is inferred from the upward flaming of fire, and the horizontal blowing of Air; since both of these must be due to certain unseen forces; nor could this unseen force be wholly unconnected with the receptacle of these (Fire and Air); as in that case there would be no restriction in such actions (i.e. anything or everything would flame upward and blow horizontally). Nor is it possible for the unseen force inhering in the Self to be directly connected with any other substance; hence it comes to this that the Fire and Air are connected with that (body) which is connected with the substratum of the unseen force; and this establishes the fact of the Self being connected with all material substances; this constitutes its all-pervading character.

Objection: “The upward flaming of the Fire, is due to its nature; and not to any unseen forces.”

Reply: What do you mean by this ‘nature of the Fire’? Is it ‘bahnitva’ (fireness), or ‘dāhakatva’ (‘burning character’) or ‘a particular colour’? If it were any of these, then we would have this nature in the red hot iron also (and this would also, be flaming upwards). If the ‘nature’ be said to consist in ‘being produced out of a particular kind of fuel,’ then we would have no upward flaming in the case of lightning, and such other fires, which are not produced by any kind of fuel. If the ‘nature’ be regarded to be something imperceptible, existing in certain fires whom we see flaming upward,—then why object to this peculiar nature being a property of the Self? Any action that is not caused by gravity, fluidity or speed, must be regarded as produced from some specific quality of the Self; as we find in the case of the action of the hand which is produced by the effort of the Self; and the said upward flaming and horizontal blowing we do not find to be brought about by gravity &c; as none of these properties exist in Fire and Air, and also because the actions in question are incompatible with these properties, (of gravity &c.); hence the two actions must also be regarded as produced by some specific quality of the Self; the argument being put in this form: Upward flaming and horizontal blowing are due to a specific quality of the Self,—because being actions, they are not produced by such causes as Gravity and the like,—like the actions of the hand caused by the man’s effort.

In as much as such properties of the Self as Pleasure &c., are produced by the contact of the Mind with the Self,—this clearly indicates that Conjunction is a property of the Self; as if Conjunction did not belong to the Self, then it could not be the immaterial cause of the properties of that Self; but this also proves that Disjunction, which is destructive of the said Conjunction, also belongs to the Self; specially as both the Mind and the Self being eternal, the destruction of Pleasure &c., could not be due to the destruction of any of the two substrates of the Conjunction.

Objection: “The Self being eternal, there would be no Emancipation for one who perceives or recognises this eternal Self; as being always affected by a longing for pleasure he would have an attachment to the means of pleasure, and aversion to those of pain; and these two, attachment and aversion, would give rise to constant activities and cessations from activity; and these in their turn would give rise to Dharma and Adharma (and these would lead to a further birth) and so on. Whereas if one did not believe in the existence of the Self, he would be imbued with the idea—‘I myself am not, to whom could any pain belong?’; and thus he would become indifferent to all pleasures and pains; and thereby becoming freed from attachment as well as aversion, he would have no activity or cessation from activity; and this would lead to Emancipation.”

Reply: Not so; because for one who recognises the eternal Self also, there would come about due dispassion, produced from a recognition of the evils inseparable from the objects of enjoyment; and this dispassion would, in due course, bring about Emancipation.