Prameyas in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama

by Sri Panu Podder | 2014 | 41,257 words

This essay studies the theory of Prameya as discussed in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama and commentaries. The Nyayasutras belong to a separate branch of Indian Philosophy (darshana) and can be dated to at least the 6th century B.C. They primarily deal with logic and knowledge such as the topics of Pramana (instruments of valid Knowledge) and Prameya (o...

Chapter 5 - Suffering and Liberation

In this chapter we shall discuss the last two prameyas. In a sense they are very important for any system of philosophy. One of them is suffering. At least in the Indian tradition suffering may be said to be the starting point for philosophy. The ultimate aim of every system is freedom from suffering forever Suffering is a fact. It is proved by universal experience. Nobody can deny its existence. Nobody can escape suffering. Everybody is anxious to keep away from suffering. No body willingly submits oneself to suffering. All the systems say that it is also possible to overcome suffering. Suffering is not something which cannot be destroyed. Suffering may temporarily be removed by ordinary means. If one gets a disease one gets cured by taking medicines. Different kinds of suffering may be thus removed by various means. But there is no guarantee that a certain form of pain will be removed definitely by a particular means or that even if it is removed it will never occur again. Freedom from suffering means total freedom, freedom forever from sufferings. Philosophy alone can perform this function. Every system claims that if one follows the advice given by the system one will be free from sufferings definitely and for all time to come. In the other end, we have liberation, the last prameya. Here also all the systems agree generally that when a person attains liberation he reaches the final goal and he has to strive for nothing else. So these two prameyas represent the first and the last steps of human life and the importance of philosophy in general.

Following his general practice Gautama first briefly mentions suffering in the first chapter and then in the fourth chapter Gautama discusses its nature in detail. In the brief sūtra in the first chapter Gautama says only that suffering is of the nature of pain (bādhanā)[1]. Vātsyāyana’s comments here are also brief. He says that the word bādhanā is a synonym for pīḍā and tāpa. Moreover, he points out that the nine prameyas from body to result also are to be viewed as nothing but suffering, because they are invariably attended with suffering. As we have already noted many times, the self experiences suffering only when it is connected with the body etc. They are the things which invariably produce different kinds of suffering. A person finds that every thing is pervaded by suffering. If he has to get rid of suffering he has to get rid of the body etc. also. So in a sense they are also a kind of suffering. He finally attains a state of indifference then he becomes non-attached and become liberated.

In the fourth chapter while critically examining the nature of suffering, Gautama and following him Vātsyāyana mainly discuss two questions. First, suffering is mentioned in the list of prameya, but there is no mention of pleasure. Does this mean that Gautama does not admit the reality of pleasure?[2] Secondly, why should the body etc. also be looked upon as suffering only? Vātsyāyana already hints at these two questions, but in the fourth chapter Gautama himself refers to them.

In the first chapter it has only been generally remarked that the body etc are suffering. But in the fourth chapter it is pointed out that this is meant for a particular kind of persons only. Thus Vātsyāyana says that a person who has been subject to continuous stream of births and deaths, has experienced a lot of sufferings and has attained a state of complete indifference and is fervently desirous to drive away suffering for good should meditate upon the body etc. as suffering. If he does so he attains final deliverance from suffering on the strength of such meditation. The ground for such meditation as given by Gautama himself is that they are invariably attended with different kinds of pain.[3]

Vātsyāyana divides pain into three kinds-mild (hīna), moderate (madhyama) and severe (utkṛṣṭa).[4] The first is experienced by those who are condemned to hell, the second by animals and the third by human beings. The pain experienced by gods as well as those free from attachment is milder. Thus, finding that all the regions in which a living being is born are inseparably connected with different kinds of pain, a person determines that even pleasure and the means for obtaining it, namely, the body, the senses and the mind, are to be looked upon as suffering only. Next, because of such determination he has the conviction with regard to pleasure etc. attainable in all the different worlds that they do not constitute his desirable ends. When he again and again meditates upon this conviction he becomes free from the craving for the enjoyment of pleasure in all the different worlds and due to a total annihilation of cravings from the enjoyment of pleasure he is delivered from all forms of suffering. Vātsyāyana gives an example. A person is fond of drinking milk. He finds a pot of milk, but does not try to drink it if he knows that the milk is contaminated by poison. Generally he finds great pleasure in drinking milk. Milk is a much desirable thing for him. Even then he considers it very much undesirable because the poisoned milk will lead him to death. So also a person when he becomes convinced that pleasure will ultimate lead him to great harm he considers pleasure also as suffering, as a thing which is to be avoided at all cost.[5]

In the list of prameya Gautama has mentioned suffering, but there is no mention of pleasure. Thus a doubt arises. Is Gautama rejecting the reality of pleasure? The answer is in the negative. Though it has been again and again pointed out that pleasure is not to be desired, it is not the intention of Gautama to claim that there is nothing called pleasure. In fact, Gautama himself declares this. He says that the reality of pleasure cannot be denied, because pleasure also is produced in the intermediate periods. Suffering is a quality which is perceived by the mind. Similar is the case with pleasure. We have mental experiences of pleasure also which also not contradicted. So it cannot be said that pleasure does not exist. A person who is in bondage has the experience of not only suffering but also pleasure. The experiences of the two are mixed up.[6]

It is true that Gautama does not mention pleasure explicitly and does not lay stress upon it. He discusses about suffering in detail. This has a special purpose. The suffering of a living being does not come to an end until liberation due to his longing for the objects of pleasure. The ultimate goal of life is liberation, complete freedom from suffering. That is why suffering becomes a much more important topic. When a man is not liberated he continuously runs after pleasure. Thus, he determines an object as conducive to pleasure, strives for obtaining it. But he may not at all obtain it. Even if he obtains it, it may soon be destroyed or what he obtains may fall short of what is actually expected. It may also happen that he obtains the desirable thing only after hard labour and removing many difficult obstacles. He longs for the objects of pleasure and is also tormented by various kinds of mental sufferings. But the sufferings have to be avoided and liberation is to be obtained. So it is prescribed that pleasure also is to be looked upon as suffering. If a person meditates in this way it becomes easier for him to get rid of suffering. It is never meant that there is a total absence of pleasure.[7]

Moreover, it is observed that there is no end to the longing for pleasure. One desires an object of pleasure, obtains it and enjoys pleasure from it. But one is not satisfied. One again hankers after another object of pleasure and goes on putting efforts for obtaining it. This process goes on without an end. A person acquires one hundred cows, but still he tries to acquire more and more cows. So actually there is no happiness in continuously running after pleasure. If a person has to have mental peace and real happiness one must desist from running after pleasure. This can be done only if one is convinced that pleasure is not pleasure only, it is actually a lot of suffering also. So even without denying the reality of pleasure one may meditate upon every thing as suffering only. This is the point that is stressed by Gautama.[8]

The body etc are also described as nothing but suffering because ordinary people wrongly consider the different forms of suffering as pleasure. A person has to be freed from this kind of misconception. An ordinary person is bent upon the enjoyment of pleasure only. He thinks that there is no ultimate good except pleasure. When he obtains pleasure he considers that the mission of his life is fulfilled and he has accomplished what a human being ought to achieve in this life. Due to such false notion he gets firmly attached to pleasure and the means for obtaining it. He strives for attaining pleasure only and ultimately there are produced many kinds of suffering due to birth, old age, desire, death, not obtaining the desirable, separation from what is desirable etc. Suffering is indeed an inseparable part of pleasure, because it is impossible to attain pleasure without being afflicted by suffering. So to remove this wrong notion of identifying suffering with pleasure, it is again and again emphasised that suffering is a much more important fact than pleasure. Pleasure is not really denied.[9]

The last of the twelve prameyas admitted by Gautama is liberation (apavarga). We have already noted that in a sense this is the most important object of knowledge. The aim of all the systems of philosophy is to free a person from suffering forever. Human life is full of suffering. But one should try to make oneself free from them. Ordinary means cannot provide freedom forever and also cannot prevent recurrence. The method prescribed by a system of philosophy only can do so. But the conception of liberation varies from system to system according to the special metaphysical and epistemological position admitted by each. Therefore, the Nyāya also has its own view on the nature of liberation.

Following the general practice, Gautama briefly describes the state of liberation in a single sūtra in the first chapter.[10] The definition is quite simple, though a negative one: liberation means absolute freedom from suffering. The adjective ‘absolute’ is significant. Suffering can be removed by ordinary means also. But there are two difficulties. First, sufferings may be removed only for the time being, there is no guarantee that they will not occur again. Secondly, there is also no certainty that a particular suffering will be removed by a particular means. For example, to get cured of a disease a person takes medicines prescribed by a doctor. He may by cured by the medicines but he may be afflicted once again later. Sometime it also happens that the person is not cured even after taking a lot of medicines. So the removal of suffering by ordinary means is temporary and unsure. But if a person follows the directions given by a system of philosophy and succeeds in removing the basic cause of suffering he becomes free forever. This removal of suffering is permanent and sure.

In the commentary on this sūtra, Vātsyāyana first briefly describes the nature of liberation.[11] Next, he elaborately examines and criticises a particular view that in the state of liberation a person enjoys eternal bliss, though generally such analysis is made at the time of critical examination of a category. As we shall see there is a section in the Nyāyasūtra in the fourth chapter where Gautama makes a critical examination of liberation. But this question of bliss in liberation which was perhaps a much debated question has not been discussed there by Gautama.

Describing the state of liberation Vātsyāyana says that liberation means absolute cessation of suffering, which actually means terminating forever the series of births. It means giving up the birth which has already taken place and not being subject to another birth. It is a state of fearlessness, without decay and death and identical with brahman. It is the attainment of the highest good. The state of cosmic dissolution (pralaya) is also without any suffering. But it is so only temporally. It is followed by cosmic creation again and all the sufferings are there again. Thus it is different from the state of liberation. Liberation is said to be a state of fearlessness and without decay and death. That is why Vātsyāyana points to its close similarity with brahman, for these characteristics hold good for both liberation brahman. Vācaspati explains that a liberated person does not suffer from the fear of worldly existence and hence, it is a state of fearlessness. Brahman also is again and again said to be without fear by the scriptures. Some philosophers think that the world is only a modification of brahman. But Nyāya does not admit such a view. So Vātsyāyana says that liberation is without modification or decay. The eternal and unchanging brahman suffers no modifications and so is liberation which is a changeless state. Some conceive liberation as the final destruction of the mind (citta), just like blowing off of a lamp. This is also not acceptable. So Vātsyāyana says that liberation is not an abode of death. Liberation is not an annihilation of the self. It is eternal like brahman.[12]

This brief description is followed by an examination of the question whether liberation is a state of bliss or not. Vātsyāyana says: “According to some, in the state of liberation is manifested eternal bliss of the self, just like its all-pervasive magnitude, and by this manifested bliss the absolutely liberated self becomes full of bliss”. The idea is as follows. The self is all-pervasive. But this property of the self is not manifested so long as it remains in the state of worldly existence. When liberated, the self is not subject to such existence and this property becomes manifest. Similar is the case with eternal bliss. It abides in the self but remains unmanifested when the self is under bondage. But in liberation it becomes manifested and from liberation onwards the self goes on enjoying the bliss. In that, it is argued fact there are many scriptural statements supporting this view.[13]

It is not clear who were the advocates of such a view. Generally it is held that according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika liberation means only the absence of suffering, but not also the presence of pleasure. In the state of liberation there is neither any body nor a sense organ. So then pleasure cannot be enjoyed by the self because it can do so only through the medium of the body etc. But in some works the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika views are described differently. According to Mādhāvācārya, Śaṅkara was once asked to distinguish between the concepts of liberation as accepted by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. Śaṅkara replied that in kaṇāda’s view in the sate of liberation all the specific qualities of the self are destroyed and the self remains as pure as the sky, but in Gautama’s view in liberation there is awareness of pleasure also. On this evidence some think that at least a section of the older Naiyāyikas accepted such a position. But it was later rejected. That is why Vātsyāyana elaborately refutes it. Another well-known advocate of Nyāya, Bhāsarvajña, admits this position and speaks against the view of Kaṇāda. In some Nyāya works this view is referred to as the Bhāṭṭa view, although it is not clear whether it refers to the great Mīmāṃsaka Kumarila. Udayana says that such a view is held by the Tautātita. Here also it is not definitely known who was Tutāta.[14]

Let us now see how Vātsyāyana analyses and refutes the view that in liberation eternal bliss of the self is manifested. Manifestation of bliss is nothing but its awareness. This awareness must have a particular cause. What can be the cause? It may be answered that the awareness also is eternal like the bliss itself, and there is no necessity of a cause. But it will lead to an absurd position. There will be no difference between a self in bondage and a self liberated. Both bliss and awareness are always present and there should be enjoyment of pleasure for all the selves. There should also occur the enjoyments of both pleasure and pain at the same time. But it is never possible.[15]

If may be said that the awareness is non-eternal and its cause is a special conjunction of the self with mind assisted by dharma. This argument also is not logical, because dharma is exhausted after producing its result. At that time, there will be no awareness of bliss. So it cannot be decided, whether bliss is not enjoyed because it does not exist or because the cause is not present.[16]

It may be argued that even if the awareness is considered eternal there may be distinction between a liberated self and a self in bondage. The body etc. which are present in the latter case prevent the experience of bliss. They act as obstructions. But this claim also is not acceptable. The body etc are actually the means of enjoyment for the self. A self without any body etc. can never enjoy pleasure etc. To consider them as obstructions is quite absurd.[17]

It cannot also be argued that a person is always motivated to an action for attaining the desirable. If there is no pleasure in liberation no body will be motivated to act for the attainment of liberation. But the fact is that people try to attain liberation. So it must be admitted that there is pleasure in liberation. But this argument also is rejected. People are also motivated to action because of a desire for the avoidance of the undesirable. A person suffering from a painful disease takes medicines not because he will get some pleasure, but because he will become free from the pain.[18]

The opponent may also argue that there are many scriptural statements which clearly show that in liberation pleasure is enjoyed. Thus the view of Vātsyāyana will become contradicted by the scripture. Vātsyāyana apprehends this objection and also answers it. He says that the term bliss is used there not in its primary sense but in a secondary sense. It actually means an absolute nonexistence of any kind of suffering. Sometimes the primary meaning of a term cannot be accepted. In such a case a secondary meaning is to be accepted. It is proved by independent arguments that there can be no awareness of bliss in liberation. Therefore even if the term bliss is used by the scripture in the context of liberation it cannot be taken in a literal sense. If it is taken in a literal sense there will be contradiction and the statement of the scripture will become meaningless. Therefore, the statement is to be explained with the help of a secondary meaning.

Finally Vātsyāyana says that there can be no liberation unless a person is totally free from all kinds of attachment. If a person is motivated for liberation because of bliss he will not be liberated at all. For liberation it is necessary to give up all desires even the desire for enjoying bliss. Vātsyāyana’s a view has been generally accepted by later advocates.[19]

In the fourth chapter Gautama notes some objections against the concept of liberation. Liberation is said to be the ultimate goal of human existence. But the opponent says that liberation or complete freedom is never possible. The reason is that every living being is inseparably related with debts, afflictions and activities. It has been stated in the scripture that as soon as a person is born he is under three kinds of debts, to the seers, to the gods and to the forefathers. A person has to repay these debts to the seers by observing celibacy, to the gods by performing sacrifices and to the forefathers by producing off springs. For this purpose a person has got to be always performing different actions during his whole lifetime. For example, one has to perform Agnihotra as long as one is not rendered incapable by old age or death. Thus a person will be too busy to perform any action which may lead him to liberation, such as studying the Sāstras etc. Secondly, a person is never found to be free form afflictions, i.e. attachment, aversion and ignorance. A person always performs actions under the influence of them. Even for a single moment he does not remain without being guided by them. So the question of liberation does not arise. Thirdly, not even for a single moment person is found without some kind of activity. From the moment he is born he is found performing actions always, exerting himself through speech, body and mind. So he cannot be liberated. Thus the process of liberation given in the second sūtra by Gautama is meaningless.[20]

Gautama answers the three objections one by one. First, he says that the opponent has not correctly understood the meaning of the term ‘debt’. In the scripture the term has not been used in its primary sense, because that is not possible in the actual context. The primary meaning of the term is something like money etc. which is borrowed from somebody else with the promise that it will be repaid later. But when it is said that a person has a debt to the seers such a meaning does not apply. It is not that the person takes some-thing from the seers and promises to give it back later. It is only meant that when a person is born he is under the obligation of performing certain actions which are similar to the repayment of debts. Such usage in the scripture is not uncommon. A boy who is newly initiated into celibacy is called fire. There is also a special purpose for using terms in a secondary sense. If a statement is made in such a sense it expresses the additional sense of censure or praise. Similarly, the expression a person as soon as he is born also cannot be taken in a literal sense, because a baby can never perform the duties prescribed by the scripture. Actually the expression means a householder. When a person is old enough to become a householder and enter that state he has to perform certain duties. Moreover the implication is also not that they are to be performed always. If a person does not desire to acquire liberation, but wishes to lead an ideal life as a householder only one should follow the prescription of the script. In fact, if a person conquers all worldly desires he will not be under the obligation of performing sacrificial rites during the whole of his life and will remain free to work for his own liberation. Vātsyāyana quotes a passage of Upaniṣad which clearly states that before taking up the vow of a religious mendicant a person must perform a sacrifice called the prājāpatya and give away as the sacrificial fee all his wealth etc. keeping absolutely nothing for himself. This can be done only by a person who is totally free from any desire for ordinary wealth and hence, it is proved that the performance of the rites like the Agnihotra etc which produce results in the form of heaven etc. is binding upon only a person who is full of desire. So it cannot said that there is no liberation because of the debt to seers.[21]

To the objection that there can be no liberation because it is not possible to sever the connection with affliction, Gautama says that liberation as a state free from all sufferings is proved, because there is no affliction for a person under a dreamless, deep sleep. Gautama refutes the opponent by giving an example of a person becoming totally free from suffering. A person who is under deep sleep and does not experience any dream, has no connection with attachment etc. and pleasure and pain. Thus such a state is possible. The state of liberation is compared with dreamless sleep. But the two are not identical, there is a fundamental difference between the two. In sleep the afflictions are absent only for that particular time. The seeds of affliction are not destroyed, they only remain inactive. As soon as the person wakes up the afflictions also appear. But in liberation the seeds of future affliction are totally destroyed. If a person is liberated he does not have to suffer in future.[22]

As to the objection that there can be no liberation due to an inseparable connection with activity Gautama answers that the activities of a person who has attained freedom from affliction do not lead to rebirth. The implication is that there can be no liberation without right knowledge. When right knowledge is produced false knowledge or ignorance disappears and as a result there is no attachment or aversion. Thus a person who has acquired right knowledge and attained liberation becomes totally free from the three afflictions and his actions good or bad do not lead to any future rebirth. An objection may be raised against the above. If a liberated person is not reborn how will he enjoy the fruits of his previous actions which have not yet produced there fruits? It will lead to the illogical position that a liberated person does not need to enjoy the fruits of his own actions. Thus one may sometime escape the consequence of one’s own actions. Vātsyāyana notes the objection and answers that the fruits of all previous actions are experienced by a liberated person in the final birth.[23]

Even after this the opponent may object in a different way. There can be no absolute destruction of affliction, because the stream of affliction is some thing natural. The idea is that a person may be free from afflictions temporarily but not absolutely, because the continuous production of three afflictions-attachment, aversion and ignorance-represent a process which is beginning-less, going on from time immemorial, without any permanent break. It can never come to an end must go on forever. Thus a person can never be liberated. The implication may be understood in a different manner also. An absolute destruction of the natural attribute of an object means also an absolute destruction of the object itself. The natural property of water is coldness. If coldness of water is somehow destroyed it will be also the destruction of water. The afflictions are the natural attributes of the self. If it is admitted that there may be an absolute destruction of afflictions it will have to be admitted also the self is absolutely destroyed. Thus it will have to be admitted that in liberation either the self also is destroyed or that the self is still characterised by afflictions. But both these positions are untenable.[24]

Before giving his own answer Gautama refers to the answers to the above which are offered by others. Thus, it is said that the stream of afflictions, though natural can be destroyed just like the non-existence of an effect before its production. It cannot be said that whatever is beginning less cannot come to an end. A effect is non-existent before its production. This nonexistence is without any beginning, because it cannot be specifically determined at which particular point of time the non-existence begins. But it cannot be denied that such non-existences comes to an end the moment the effect is produced. The flow of affliction continues as long as there is no right knowledge. As soon as right knowledge is produced and a person becomes liberated the flow stops. So liberation is possible. Others answer the objection with a different example. The atoms of earth are naturally black in colour. So a pot made of then is black in colour. But when such a pot is put into the fire the black colour is destroyed and red colour is produced due to conjunction with fire. Just like the natural black colour of a pot the natural flow of affliction also may be destroyed.[25]

These answers are not accepted by Gautama. Vātsyāyana explains the reason why it is so with reference to the first answer. Vātsyāyana says that prior nonexistence is not a proper instance because it is said to be non-eternal only in a secondary sense. The term non-eternal is primarily applied to only positive entities which have booth origin and destruction. Prior non-existence has destruction only and no origin. So, it is not eternal in the primary sense. Referring to the second answer Vātsyāyana says that there is no ground to prove that the black colour of an earthly atom is without any beginning and hence it cannot be a proper instance. It is said to be without a beginning because it is not brought into existence by the effort of an ordinary person as it is found in the case of the red colour which is produced because of being put into the fire.

Gautama gives his own answer very briefly. He simply says that the three afflictions like attachment etc. have for their cause deliberation also. The idea is that in the absence of the cause the effect also is absent. Afflictions have causes. So, if the causes are removed they cannot exist. When right knowledge is produced their causes are destroyed. So, they also do not exist. Therefore the objection that there can be no end of the stream of afflictions is not logical.[26]

Vātsyāyana has explained in detail the argument of Gautama. He also says that through only one argument is mentioned explicitly in the sūtra, two more argument is implied. First, due to wrong deliberations which make one attached to, averse to and ignorance about an object, there are produced the three afflictions of attachment, aversion and ignorance. Secondly, also the action of a person which is an efficient cause for his birth is to be admitted in producing specific forms of attachment etc. Thirdly, attachments etc. are produced also by one another themselves. Thus, one under ignorance becomes attached, one under ignorance is characterised by aversion, one who gets attached becomes ignorant and one who gets averse becomes ignorant. But none of the wrong deliberations is produced when right knowledge is produced. If the cause does not appear the effect also cannot be produced. Thus, in the state of liberation the production of attachment etc. is not possible. In short, when a person is liberated the afflictions finally stop because of the absence of the cause.[27]

It is also not logical to claim that the stream of afflictions only is without beginning, because all positive entities like the body etc. which are related to the self are created one after another in a beginning-less stream. Thus, even the beginning-less entities like the body etc. are observed to be destroyed, it cannot be claimed that their can be no destruction of afflictions because it is without beginning. In the state of liberation a person’s action which is an efficient cause for the birth of a living being does not act as a cause for the production of attachment etc. because of the removal of wrong deliberation by right knowledge. However, for sometime the result of some particular actions which have already started to produce their results are enjoyed in the from of pleasure or pain. But, such experiences also come to an end when those actions are exhausted through enjoyment. Thus, finally one becomes totally free.

In the first sūtra Gautama has said that the right knowledge of sixteen categories leads to liberation. It has been explained that this is only a general statement. The actual implication is that the right knowledge of the second category only, i.e. prameya is the most important. The knowledge of the second category is the direct cause if liberation. The right knowledge of the other categories is a cause only in an indirect way, because their right knowledge helps in producing and protecting the right knowledge of prameya.

An objection may be raised against the above. What is exactly meant by saying that the right knowledge of prameyas like the body etc and the self is the cause of liberation? Should a person desiring liberation acquire the right knowledge of every one of the twelve prameyas or will it be sufficient to acquire the right knowledge of only a specific one of them? The first alternative cannot be accepted, because then liberation will be impossible. A person can never acquire the right knowledge of all the bodies and selves. The second alternative cannot be accepted for the same reason. Even if a person acquires the right knowledge of some specific body and self, he will naturally remain ignorant about all the other bodies and selves. How can such a person become liberated when he is under so much ignorance? In short, it cannot be claimed that right knowledge of prameya is the cause of liberation. In answer, Vātsyāyana says that ignorance does not simply mean an absence of right knowledge, it mean false knowledge which is the cause of bondage. A person may not have right knowledge about some particular bodies or selves, but it does not mean that he is ignorant about them. A person should have the right knowledge of only that particular object the ignorance in respect of which makes him suffer and put is him in bondage. The fact is that every living being remains in bondage due to the ignorance about his own self and body etc. Therefore to attain liberation he has to acquire the right knowledge of these alone and there is no necessity of his rightly knowing all the other bodies and selves. Thus it will possible to attain liberation, because it is possible understand rightly the nature of one’s own self and body etc. and remove the false knowledge about them through the means prescribed in the scripture, such as śravaṇa, manana etc.[28]

Gautama devotes a section for the critical examination of liberation. He mainly discusses the question whether liberation is at all possible or not. But he does not refer to any ground for admitting liberation. Vātsyāyana also says nothing in this regard. But a later follower of Nyāya raises the question and answers it. For example, Udayana gives an inference for proving liberation, namely, the continuous stream of suffering is absolutely destroyed because it is a continuous stream, as is the case with the stream of flames of a lamp. The flame of a lamp my appear to be one or the same. But actually it cannot be so. Every moment a new flame is produced by the different drops of oil, parts of the wick etc. Every moment the causes are different and hence the effects also should be different. But the flames are produced one after another very quickly and the minute interval of time is not known. So, it appears that only one flame lasts for a long time though actually we have only a continuous stream of flames. But it is also a fact that the stream of flames does not go on forever, but comes to an end at a certain point of time when the cause are no longer present. From this we can have a rule that whatever is a continuous stream comes to an end at a point of time. The sufferings also are produced in a continuous stream, it also must come to an end. The state when it comes to an end is called liberation.[29]

Another question also is much debated by later authors. It is generally said that liberation means an absence of suffering. But the question is what kind of absence is to be considered as liberation? If it is said that liberation means an absolute absence (atyantabhāva) of suffering it will be impossible to attain liberation. Such an absence is eternal and it cannot be produced by any means. So no body will try to attain liberation. Moreover all the prescriptions in the scripture regarding the means of liberation become useless. So, finally liberation is said to be an absence of suffering in the form of destruction which does not co-exist with suffering. Even when a person is not liberated there may be destruction of suffering in his self. Sufferings are continuously produced and destroyed. But it is not identical with liberation, because even if some particular suffering is destroyed there are produced again and again other new sufferings. In the case of ordinary person destruction of suffering co-exists with suffering. But when a person is liberated there is no further production of suffering in his self. Thus the final destruction of his suffering does not co-exist with suffering. So he is liberated.[30]

After the critical examination of liberation Gautama adds a small section on the production of right knowledge which is naturally very relevant and proper. Gautama says that the cessation of false idea regarding the self results from the acquisition of right knowledge about the causes of evil.[31] Vātsyāyana explains that the prameyas starting with body and ending with suffering are the indirect causes of evil, because the false knowledge which is actually the direct cause of evil has these prameyas as its objects. There fore, when produced, right knowledge which has for its object the said prameyas removes the false idea regarding the self which also has for its object the same prameyas, because right knowledge and false knowledge are opposed to each other only when they relate to the same object. Vātsyāyana also claims that in this way the conclusion stated in the second sūtra earlier is also justified.[32]

According to Vātsyāyana, by causes of evil in the sūtra Gautama means the ten prameyas excluding the first and the last one, namely, self and liberation, because a living being is afflicted by the three evils so long as he is in possession of the body, senses and others and one evil may be the cause of another evil. The self and liberation cannot be considered to be so, because a liberated person is not observed to be tormented by any of the three evils. False knowledge is the direct cause of evils and so Gautama places evil just before false knowledge in the second sūtra. It may be asked, how then the body and others are to be looked upon as causes of evil? Vātsyāyana answers that the body and the other nine prameyas generally constitute the object of false knowledge which is the direct cause of evils.

Vātsyāyana further points out that the present sūtra does not state a new conclusion but only notes something already stated. In the second sūtra Gautama only says that if false knowledge is removed, then all sufferings also are removed and liberation is attained. But he does not say anything about the forms of false knowledge or the particular form of right knowledge that will remove it. In the present sūtra by mentioning what has already been stated Gautama now clearly states that in the second sūtra false knowledge means not only the false knowledge about the self, but also the false knowledge about the other prameyas like the body etc. because both forms of false knowledge are the causes of bondage and secondly, such false knowledge is removed only by the right knowledge of the same group of prameyas.

Gautama further says that when the objects like colour and others become the subject of wrong deliberation they become causes of evils.[33] Actually Gautama here points to the order in which the right knowledge of the different prameyas are to be acquired. Vātsyāyana explains the implication. The object of senses such as smell, taste colour, touch and sound are objects of desire. When they are wrongly deliberated upon as desirable, they produce attachment, aversion and ignorance. They should be rightly ascertained, first. When one rightly ascertains one’s wrong deliberations regarding them are all removed. Again, after such wrong deliberations have all been removed one should rightly distinguish the body etc. from the self and from such right knowledge there follows the removal all wrong notions regarding the nature of the self. Thus a person who is free from all wrong motions concerning the nature of the self and lives on with a mind free from any attachment is said to be liberated.

Finally, Gautama refers to some examples of wrong notions. Gautama’s sūtra is very brief and cryptic. But Vātsyāyana clearly mentions a number of false notions. For example, in the case of a man a false notion is ‘this woman is beautiful’, or in the case of women ‘this man is handsome’. There are also notions based upon a mark or resemblance. A person striving for liberation should discard all such notions so that he can be free from evils.[34]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.21.

[2]:

Bhāṣya on 4.1.54.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Ibid.

[6]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.55.

[7]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.56.

[8]:

Ibid.

[9]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.57.

[10]:

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.22.

[11]:

Bhāṣya on ibid.

[12]:

Ibid.

[13]:

Ibid.

[14]:

A very good discussion is made by Phanibhusana Trakabagish, Nyāyadarśana, Vols. (i) and (iv).

[15]:

Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.22.

[16]:

Ibid.

[17]:

Ibid.

[18]:

Ibid.

[19]:

Ibid.

[20]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.58.

[21]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.59.

[22]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.62.

[23]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.63.

[24]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.64.

[25]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.65.-66.

[26]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.67.

[27]:

Bhāṣya on ibid.

[28]:

Bhāṣya on ibid.

[29]:

Kiranavali, commentary on the introductory verse of Prasastapada bhāṣya.

[30]:

In Navyanyāya the question has been discussed, e.g. Gadadharas Muktivada.

[31]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.2.1.

[32]:

Bhāṣya on ibid.

[33]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.2.2.

[34]:

Nyāyasūtra 4.2.3. and Bhāṣya.

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