A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 3

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1940 | 232,512 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of a general idea of nimbarka’s philosophy: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the second part in the series called the “the nimbarka school of philosophy”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Part 2 - A General Idea of Nimbārka’s Philosophy

According to Nimbārka, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman can take place only after one has studied the literature that deals with the Vedic duties leading to various kinds of beneficial results and discovered that they are all vitiated by enjoyment and cannot bring about a state of eternal bliss. After such a discovery, and after the seeker has learnt in a general manner from the various religious texts that the realization of Brahman leads to the unchangeable, eternal and ever-constant state of bliss, he becomes anxious to attain it through the grace of God and approaches his teacher with affection and reverence for instruction regarding the nature of Brahman.

The Brahman is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is omniscient, omnipotent, the ultimate cause, and the all-pervading Being. Such a Being can be realized only through a constant effort to permeate oneself with His nature by means of thought and devotion. The import of the first aphorism of the Brahma-sūtra consists in the imposition of such a duty on the devotee, namely, the constant effort at realizing the nature of Brahman[1]. The pupil listens to the instruction of his teacher who has a direct realization of the nature of Brahman and whose words are therefore pregnant with his concrete experience.

He tries to understand the import and meaning of the instruction of his teacher which is technically called śravaṇa. This is indeed different from the ordinary accepted meaning of the śravaṇa in the Śaṅkara literature where it is used in the sense of listening to the Upaniṣadic texts.

The next step is called manana — the process of organizing one’s thought so as to facilitate a favourable mental approach towards the truths communicated by the teacher in order to rouse a growing faith in it.

The third step is called nididhyāsana —the process of marshalling one’s inner psychical processes by constant meditation leading ultimately to a permanent conviction and experiences of the truths inspired and communicated by the teacher. It is the fruitful culmination of the last process that brings about the realization of the nature of Brahman.

The study of the nature of the Vedic duties, technically called dharma, and their inefficacy, rouses a desire for the knowledge of the nature of Brahman leading to eternal bliss. As a means to that end the pupil approaches the teacher who has a direct experience of the nature of Brahman. The revelation of the nature of the Brahman in the pupil is possible through a process of spiritual communication of w hich śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana are the three moments.

According to Nimbārka’s philosophy which is a type of Bhedā-bheda-vāda, that is, the theory of the Absolute as Unity-in-difference, Brahman or the Absolute has transformed itself into the world of matter and spirits. Just as the life-force or prāṇa manifests itself into the various conative and cognitive sense-functions, yet keeps its own independence, integrity and difference from them, so the Brahman also manifests itself through the numberless spirits and matter without losing itself in them. Just as the spider spins out of its own self its web and yet remains independent of it, so the Brahman also has split itself up into the numberless spirits and matter but remains in its fullness and purity. The very existence and movement of the spirits and indeed all their operations are said to depend upon Brahman (tad-āyatta-sthiti-pūrvikā) in the sense that the Brahman is both the material and the determining cause of them all[2].

In the scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts, and the only way in which the claims of both these types of texts can be reconciled is by coming to a position of compromise that the Brahman is at once different from and identical with the world of spirits and matter. The nature of Brahman is regarded as such that it is at once one with and different from the world of spirits and matter, not by any imposition or supposition, but as the specific peculiarity of its spiritual nature. It is on this account that this Bhedā-bheda doctrine is called the svābhāvika bhedā-bheda-vāda. In the pure dualistic interpretation of the Vedānta the Brahman is to be regarded only as the determining cause and as such the claims of all texts that speak of the Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits with the Brahman are to be disregarded. The monistic view of the Vedānta is also untenable, for a pure differenceless qualityless consciousness as the ultimate reality is not amenable to perception, since it is super-sensible, nor to inference, since it is devoid of any distinctive marks, nor also to scriptural testimony, as no words can signify it.

The supposition that, just as one’s attention to the moon may be drawn in an indirect manner by perceiving the branch of a tree with which the moon may be in a line, so the nature of Brahman also may be expressed by demonstrating other concepts which are more or less contiguous or associated with it, is untenable; for in the above illustration the moon and the branch of the tree are both sensible objects, whereas Brahman is absolutely super-sensible. Again, if it is supposed that Brahman is amenable to logical proofs, then also this supposition would be false; for all that is amenable to proofs or subject to any demonstration is false. Further, if it is not amenable to any proof, the Brahman would be chimerical as the hare’s horn. If it is held that, Brahman being self-luminous, no proofs are required for its demonstration, then all the scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahman would be superfluous. Moreover, the pure qualityless Brahman being absolutely unassociated with any kind of impurity has to be regarded as being eternally free from any bondage, and thus all scriptural texts giving instruction in the methods for the attainment of salvation would be meaningless.

The reply of the Śaṅkarites, that all duality though false has yet an appearance and serves practical purposes, is untenable ; for when the scriptures speak of the destruction of bondage they mean that it was a real bondage and its dissolution is also a real one. Again, an illusion is possible in a locus only when it has some specific as well as some general characters, and the illusion takes place only when the object is known in a general manner without any of its specific attributes. But if the Brahman is absolutely qualityless, it is impossible that it should be the locus of any illusion. Again, since it is difficult to explain how the ajñāna should have any support or object (āśraya or viṣaya), the illusion itself becomes inexplicable. The Brahman being of the nature of pure knowledge can hardly be supposed to be the support or object of ajñāna. The jīva also being itself a product of ajñāna cannot be regarded as its support. Moreover, since Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination and ajñāna is darkness, the former cannot legitimately be regarded as the support of the latter, just as the sun cannot be regarded as the supporter of darkness.

The operation that results in the formation of illusion cannot be regarded as being due to the agency of ajñāna, for ajñāna is devoid of consciousness and cannot, therefore, be regarded as an agent. The agency cannot also be attributed to Brahman because it is pure and static. Again, the false appearance of Brahman as diverse undesirable phenomena such as a sinner, an animal, and the like, is inexplicable; for if the Brahman is always conscious and independent it cannot be admitted to allow itself to suffer through the undesirable states which one has to experience in various animal lives through rebirth. If the Brahman has no knowledge of such experiences, then it is to be regarded as ignorant and its claim to self-luminosity fails. Again, if ajñāna is regarded as an existent entity, there is the change to dualism, and if it is regarded as nonexistent then it cannot hide the nature of Brahman.

Further, if Brahman is self-luminous, how can it be hidden and how can there be any illusion about it? If the conch-shell shines forth in its own nature, there cannot be any misperception of its nature as a piece of silver. Again, if the nature of Brahman is admitted to be hidden by ajñāna, the question that naturally arises is whether the ajñāna veils the nature of the Brahman as a whole or in part. The former supposition is impossible, for then the world would be absolutely blind and dark(jagad-āndhya-prasaṅgāt), and the latter is impossible, for the Brahman is a homogeneous entity and has no characters or parts. It is admitted by the monists to be absolutely qualityless and partless. If it is held that ordinarily only the “bliss” part of the Brahman is hidden by ajñāna whereas the “being” part remains unveiled, then that would mean that Brahman is divisible in parts and the falsity of the Brahman would be demonstrable by such inferences as: Brahman is false, because it has parts like the jug (brahma mithyā sāṃśatvāt, ghaṭādivat).

In reply to the above objections it may be argued that the objections against ajñāna are inadmissible, for the ajñāna is absolutely false knowledge. Just as an owl perceives utter darkness, even in bright sunlight, so the intuitive perception “I am ignorant” is manifest to all. Anantarāma, a follower of the Nimbārka school, raises further objections against such a supposition in his Vedānta-tattva-bodha. He says that this intuitively felt “I” in “I am ignorant” cannot be pure knowledge, for pure knowledge cannot be felt as ignorant. It cannot be mere egoism, for then the experience would be “the egoism is ignorant.” If by “ego” one means the pure self, then such a self cannot be experienced before emancipation. The ego-entity cannot be something different from both pure consciousness and ajñāna, for such an entity must doubtless be an effect of ajñāna which cannot exist before the association of the ajñāna with Brahman.

The reply of the Śaṅkarites that ajñāna, being merely false imagination, cannot affect the nature of the Brahman, the abiding substratum (adhiṣṭḥāna), is also inadmissible; for if the ajñāna be regarded as false imagination there must be someone who imagines it. But such an imagination cannot be attributed to either of the two possible entities, Brahman or the ajñāna ; for the former is pure qualityless which cannot therefore imagine and the latter is inert and unconscious and therefore devoid of all imagination. It is also wrong to suppose that Brahman as pure consciousness has no intrinsic opposition to ajñāna, for there can be no knowledge which is not opposed to ignorance. Therefore the Śaṅkarites are not in a position to demonstrate any entity which they mean by the intuition “I” in “I am ignorant.” The final conclusion from the Nimbārka point of view therefore is that it is inadmissible to accept any ajñāna as a world-principle producing the world-appearance by working in co-operation with the Brahman. The ajñāna or ignorance is a quality of individual beings or selves who are by nature different from Brahman but are under its complete domination. They are eternal parts of it, atomic in nature, and are of limited powers. Being associated with beginningless chains of karma they are naturally largely blinded in their outlook on knowledge[3].

The Śaṅkarites affirm that, through habitual failure in distinguishing between the real nature of the self and the not-self, mis-perceptions, misapprehensions and illusions occur. The objection of Anantarāma against such an explanation is that such a failure cannot be attributed either to Brahman or to ajñāna. And since all other entities are but later products of illusion, they cannot be responsible for producing the illusion[4].

In his commentary Śaṅkara had said that the pure consciousness was not absolutely undemonstrable, since it was constantly being referred to by our ego-intuitions. To this the objection that naturallv arises is that the entity referred to by our ego-intuitions cannot be pure consciousness; for then the pure consciousness would have the characteristic of an ego—a view w'hich is favourable to the Nimbārka but absolutely unacceptable to the Śaṅkarites. If it is held to be illusory, then it has to be admitted that the ego-intuition appears when there is an illusion. But by supposition the illusion can only occur when there is an ego-intuition[5]. Here is then a reasoning in a circle. The defence that reasoning in a circle can be avoided on the supposition that the illusory imposition is beginningless is also unavailing. For the supposition that illusions as such are beginningless is false, as it is well known that illusions are possible only through the operation of the subconscious impressions of previous valid cognitions[6]. Again, the reflection of the pure consciousness in the ajñāna is impossible, for reflections can take place only between two entities which have the same order of existence. From other considerations also the illusion has to be regarded as illegitimate. Illusions take place as the result of certain physical conditions such as contact, defect of the organs of perception, the operation of the subconscious impressions, etc. These conditions are all absent in the supposed case of the illusion involved in the ego-intuition.

The Śaṅkarites described māyā as indefinable. By “indefinable ’ ’ they mean something that appears in perception but is ultimately contradicted. The Śaṅkarites define falsehood or non-existence as that which is liable to contradiction. The phenomena of māyā appear in experience and are therefore regarded as existent. They are liable to contradiction and are therefore regarded as nonexistent. It is this unity of existence and non-existence in māyā that constitutes its indefinability. To this Anantarāma’s objection is that contradiction does not imply non-existence. As a particular object, say a jug, may be destroyed by the stroke of a club, so one knowledge can destroy another. The destruction of the jug by the stroke of the club does not involve the supposition that the jug was nonexistent. So the contradiction of the prior knowledge by a later one does not involve the non-existence or falsity of the former.

All cognitions are true in themselves, though some of them may destroy another. This is what the Nimbārkists mean by the sat-khyāti of knowledge. The theory of sat-khyāti with them means that all knowledge (khyāti) is produced by some existent objects, which are to be regarded as its cause (sad-dhetukā khyāti, sat-khyāti). According to such a view, therefore, the illusory knowledge must have its basic cause in some existent object. It is wrong also to suppose that false or non-existent objects can produce effects on the analogy that the illusory cobra may produce fear and even death. For here it is not the illusory cobra that produces fear but the memory of a true snake. It is wrong therefore to suppose that the illusory world-appearance may be the cause of our bondage.

Since illusions are not possible, it is idle to suppose that all our perceptual, inferential, and other kinds of cognitions are produced as associated with an ego through sheer illusion. Right knowledge is to be regarded as a characteristic quality of the self and the production of knowledge does not need the intervention of a vṛtti. The ajñāna which prevents the flashing in of knowledge is our karma which is in accumulation from beginningless time. Through the operation of the sense-organs our selves expand outside us and are filled with the cognition of the sense-objects. It is for this reason that when the sense-organs are not in operation the sense-objects do not appear in cognition, as in the state of sleep. The self is thus a real knower (jñātā) and a real agent (kartā), and its experiences as a knower and as an agent should on no account be regarded as the result of a process of illusion[7].

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness, but it should yet be regarded as the real knower. The objection that what is knowledge cannot behave in a different aspect as a knower, just as water cannot be mixed with water and yet remain distinct from it, is regarded by the Nimbārkists as invalid. As an illustration vindicating the Nimbārka position, Puruṣottama, in his Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā, refers to the case of the sun which is both light and that from which light emanates. Even when a drop of water is mixed with another drop the distinction of the drops, both quantitative and qualitative, remains, though it may not be so apprehended. The mere non-apprehension of difference is no proof that the two drops have merged into identity. On the other hand, since the second drop has its parts distinct from the first one it must be regarded as having a separate existence, even when the two drops are mixed. The character as knower must be attributed to the self; for the other scheme proposed by the Śaṅkarites, that the character as knower is due to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the vṛtti, is inefficacious. The sun that is reflected in water as an image cannot be regarded as a glowing orb by itself. Moreover, reflection can only take place between two visible objects; neither pure consciousness nor the antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti can be regarded as visible objects justifying the assumption of reflection.

The ego-intuition refers directly to the self and there is no illusion about it. The ego-intuition thus appears to be a continuous revelation of the nature of the self. After deep dreamless sleep one says “I slept so well that I did not know even myself.” But this should not be interpreted as the absence of the ego-intuition or the revelation of the self. The experience “I did not know myself” refers to the absence of the intuition of the body and the mental psychosis, but it does not indicate that the self-conscious self had ever ceased to shine by itself. The negation involved in the denial of the perception of one’s self during dreamless sleep refers to the negation of certain associations (say, of the body, etc.) with which the ego ordinarily links itself. Similar experience of negation can also be illustrated in such expressions as “I was not so long in the room,” “I did not live at that time,” etc., where negations refer to the associations of the ego and not to the ego. The self is not only to be regarded as expressed in the ego-intuition, but it is also to be regarded as distinct from the knowledge it has.

The perception of the self continues not only in the state of dreamless sleep but also in the state of emancipation, and even God in His absolute freedom is conscious of Himself in His super-ego intuition. He is also all-Merciful, the supreme Instructor, and the presiding deity of all our understanding. Like individual selves God is also the agent, the creator of the universe. If the Brahman were not an agent by nature, then He could not have been the creator of the universe, even with the association of the māyā conditions. Unlike Brahman the activity of the individual souls has to depend upon the operation of the conative organs for its manifestation. The self also really experiences the feelings of pleasure and pain. The existence and agency of the human souls, however, ultimately depend on the will of God. Yet there is no reason to suppose that God is partial or cruel because He makes some suffer and others enjoy ; for I Ie is like the grand master and Lord who directs different men differently and awards suffering and enjoyment according to their individual deserts.

The whole idea is that though God awards suffering and enjoyment to individuals and directs their actions according to their deserts, He is not ultimately bound by the law of karma, and may by His grace at any time free them from their bondage. The law of karma is a mechanical law and God as the superintendent decides each individual case. He is thus the dispenser of the laws of karma but is not bound by it[8]. The human souls are a part of thenature of God and as such are dependent on Him for their essence, existence, and activities (tad-āyatta-svarūpa-sthiti-pūrvikāḥ). God being the ultimate truth, both the human souls and inanimate nature attain their essence and existence by virtue of the fact that they are parts of Him and participate in His nature. They are therefore entirely dependent on Him for their existence and all their operations.

The individual souls are infinite in number and atomic in size. But though atomic in size they can at the same time cognize the various sensations in various parts of the body through all-pervading knowledge which exists in them as their attribute. Though atomic and partless in their nature, they are completely pervaded by God through His all-pervading nature. The atomic souls are associated with the beginningless girdle of karma which is the cause of the body, and are yet through the grace of God finally emancipated when their doubts are dissolved by listening to the instructions of the śāstras from the teachers, and by entering into a deep meditation regarding the true essence of God by which they are ultimately merged in Him.

God is absolutely free in extending His mercy and grace. But it so happens that He actually extends them to those who deserve them by their good deeds and devotion. God in His transcendence is beyond His three natures as souls, the world and even as God. In this His pure and transcendent nature He is absolutely unaffected by any changes, and He is the unity of pure being, bliss and consciousness. In His nature as God He realizes His own infinite joy through the infinite souls which are but constituent parts of Him. The experiences of individuals are therefore contained in Him as constituents of Him because it is by His own īkṣaṇa or self-perceiving activity that the experiences of the individual selves can be accounted for. The existence and the process of all human experience are therefore contained and controlled by Him.

The individual selves are thus in one sense different from Him and in another sense but constituent parts of Him. In Bhās-kara’s philosophy the emphasis was on the aspect of unity, since the differences were due to conditions (upādhi). But though Nimbārka’s system is to be counted as a type of Bhedā-bheda or Dvaitā-dvaita theory, the emphasis here is not merely on the part of the unity but on the difference as well. As a part cannot be different from the whole, so the individual souls can never be different from God. But, in the state of bondage the individuals are apt to forget their aspects of unity with God and feel themselves independent in all their actions and experiences. When by absolute self-abnegation springing from love the individual feels himself to be absolutely controlled and regulated by God and realizes himself to be a constituent of Him, he loses all his interests in his actions and is not affected by them. The ultimate ideal, therefore, is to realize the relation with God, to abnegate all actions, desires and motives, and to feel oneself as a constituent of Him.

Such a being never again comes within the grasp of mundane bondage and lives in eternal bliss in his devotional contemplation of God. The devotee in the state of his emancipation feels himself to be one with God and abides in Him as a part of His energy (tat-tādātmyā-nubha-va-pūrvakaṃ viśvarūpe bhagavati tac-chaktyā-tmanā avasthānam)[9].

Thus, even in the state of emancipation, there is a difference between the emancipated beings and God, though in this state they are filled with the utmost bliss. With the true realization of the nature of God and one’s relation with Him, all the three kinds of karma (saṅcita, kriyamāṇa and ārabdha) are destroyed[10]. Avidyā in this system means ignorance of one’s true nature and relationship with God which is the cause of his karma and his association with the body, senses and the subtle matter[11]. The prārabdha karma, or the karma which is in a state of fructification, may persist through the present life or through other lives if necessary, for until their fruits are reaped the bodiless emancipation cannot be attained[12].

Sainthood consists in the devotional state consisting of a continual and unflinching meditation on the nature of God (dhyāna-paripākena dhruva-smṛti-para-bhakty-ākhya-jñānā-dhigame). Such a saint becomes free from the tainting influence of all deeds committed and collected before and all good or bad actions that may be performed later on(tatra uttara-bhāvinaḥ kriyamāṇasya pāpasya āśleṣaḥ tat-prāg-bhūtasya saṅcitasya tasya nāśaḥ . Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, iv. 1. 13).

The regular caste duties and the duties of the various stages of life help the rise of wisdom and ought therefore always to be performed, even when the wisdom has arisen; for the flame of this light has always to be kept burning (tasmāt vidyo-dayāya svā-śrama-karmā-gnihotrā-di-rūpaṃ gṛhasthena, tapo-japā-dīni karmāṇi ūrdhva-retobhir anuṣṭheyāni iti siddham).

But the conglomeration of deeds which has started fructifying must fructify and the results of such deeds have to be reaped by the saint either in one life or in many lives as the case may be. The realization of Brahman consists in the unflinching meditation on the nature of God and the participation in Him as His constituent which is the same thing as the establishment of a continuous devotional relationship with Him. This is independent of the ontological fusion and return in Him which may happen as a result of the complete destruction of the fructifying deeds (prārabdha karma) through their experiences in the life of the saint (vidyā-yoni-śarīra) or in other lives that may follow.

A saint, after the exhaustion of his fructifying deeds, leaves his gross body through the suṣumnā nerve in his subtle body, and going beyond the material regions (prākṛta-maṇḍala) reaches the border region— the river virajā —between the material regions and the universe of Viṣṇu[13]. Here he leaves aside his subtle body in the supreme being and enters into the transcendent essence of God (Vedanta-kaustubha-prabhā, IV. 2. 15). The emancipated beings thus exist in God as His distinct energies and may again be employed by Him for His own purposes. Such emancipated beings, however, are never sent down by God for carrying on an earthly existence. Though the emancipated beings become one with God, they have no control over the affairs of the world, which are managed entirely by God Himself[14].

Though it is through the will of God that we enjoy the dream experiences and though He remains the controller and abides in us through all stages of our experiences, yet He is never tainted by the imperfections of our experiental existence (Vedānta-kaustubha and its commentary Prabha, HI. 2. 11). The objects of our experiences are not in themselves pleasurable or painful, but God makes them so to us in accordance with the reward and punishment due to us according to our good or bad deeds. In themselves the objects are but indifferent entities and are neither pleasurable nor painful (Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, iii. 2. 12). The relation of God and the world is like that of a snake and its coiled existence.

The coiled (kuṇḍala) condition of a snake is neither different from it nor absolutely identical with it. So God’s relation with the individuals also is like that of a lamp and its light (prabhā-tadvator iva) or like the sun and the illumination (prakāśa). God remains unchanged in Himself and only undergoes transformation through His energies as conscious (cic-chakti) and unconscious (acic-chakti)[15]. As the individuals cannot have any existence apart from Brahman, so the material world also cannot have any existence apart from him. It is in this sense that the material world is a part or constituent of God and is regarded as being one with God. But as the nature of the material world is different from the nature of God, it is regarded as different from Him[16].

The Vedic duties of caste and stages of life are to be performed for the production of the desire of wisdom (vividiṣā), but once the true wisdom is produced there is no further need of the performance of the duties (Ibid. in. 4. 9). The wise man is never affected by the deeds that he performs. But though ordinarily the performance of the duties is helpful to the attainment of wisdom, this is not indispensable, and there are many who achieve wisdom without going through the customary path of caste duties and the duties attached to stages of life.

Footnotes and references:


As the nature of this duty is revealed through the text of the Brahma-sūtra, namely, that the Brahma-hood can be attained only by such a process of nididhyāsana, it is called the apūrva-vidhi.


Srinivasa’s commentary on Nimbārka’s Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha on Brahma-sutm, I. i. 1-3.


paramā-tma-bhinno’lpa-śaktis tad-adḥīnaḥ scinātcinas tad-aṃśa-bḥūto’ nādi-karmā-tmikā-Tidyā-vṛta-dharma-bhūtā-jñāno jīva-kṣetrajñā-di-śabdā-bhi-dheyas tat-pratyayā-śraya iti.
p. 12.


Ibid. p. 13.


adḥyastattve tu adḥyāse sati bḥāsamānatvam, tasmin sati sa ity anyonyā-śraya-doṣaḥ.
Ibid. p. 14.


adhyāso nā’nādiḥ, pūrva-pramā-hita-saṃskñra-janyatvāt.
p. 14.


 Vedānta-tattva-bodha, p. 20.


na vayaṃ brahma-niyantṛtvasya karma-sāpekṣattvaṃ brūmaḥ, kintu punyā-di-karma-kārayitṛtve tat-phala-dātṛtve ca.
p. 14.


Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 591.


Ibid. p. 598.




viduṣo vidyā-māhātmyāt sañcita-kriyamāṇayor āśleṣa-rināśau, prārabdhasya tu karmaṇo bhogena vināśaḥ, tatra prārabdhasya etac charuena itara-śarīrair vā bhuktvā vināśān-mokṣa iti samkṣepaḥ.
p. 583.


para-loka-gamane dehād utsarpaṇa-samaye eva viduṣaḥ puṇya-pāpe nira-vaśeṣaṃ kṣīyate,. . . vidyā hi sva-sāmarthyād eva sva-phala-bhūta-brahma-prāpti-pratipādanāya. . . enaṃ deva-yānena pathā gamayituṃ sūkṣma-śarīraṃ sthāpayati.
, III. 3. 27.


muktasya tu para-brahma-sādharmye’pi nikhila-cetanā-cetana-patitva-tan-niyantrtva-tad-vidhārakatva-sarva-gatatvā-dy-asambhavāt jagad-vyāpāra-varjam aiśvaryam.
iv. 4. 20.


ananta-guṇa-śaktimato broḥmaṇaḥ pariṇāmi-svabhāvā-cic-chakteḥ sthulā-vasthāyāṃ satyāṃ tad-antarā-tmatvena tatrā’vasthāne'pi pariṇāmasya śakti-gatatvāt svarupe pariṇāmā-bhāvāt kuṇḍala-dṛṣṭānto na doṣā-zahaḥ apṛthak-siddhatvena abhede’pi bheda-jñāpanā-rthaḥ.
in. 2. 29.


jīvavat pṛthak-sthity-anarha-viśeṣaṇatvena acid-vastuno brahmā-ṃśatvaṃ viśiṣṭa-vastv-eka-deśatvena abheda-vyavahāro mukhyaḥ-viśeṣyayoḥ sva-rūpa-svabhāva-bhedena ca blieda-vyavaliāiro mukhyaḥ.
111. 2. 30.

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