4. Language and Knowledge

In chapter two I have brought out the various definitions of the different points of view of linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and so on (see §2.3). In this section, an attempt has been made to deal with and critically study the language and knowledge as reflected in the Five Nikāyas. It, however, firstly needs further to examine and discuss the philosophy of language; that is, the language of thought in particular, and the knowledge of language in general.

Language is known as a unique faculty of man’s knowledge coordinated to the senses and the intellect. It is a form of rational communication, of communication of thought. Philosophers have provided many different accounts of what languages might be. Some think of languages as structured by formal logical relations; others prefer accounts based on the idea of speech acts. Davidson, however, has denied the existence of languages if these are understood as governed by conventions that determine the connections between words and what they might mean. Several philosophers have made claims about what kind of features language must have for it to be learnable by creatures, like us, with finite abilities. According to Tenesini (2007: 87), “Fodor has used these considerations to argue for a language of thought, Dummett to argue against semantic realism, and Davidson to argue for a recursive theory of meaning. Chomsky (1968) proposes that linguistic theory should explain the mental processes that underlie the use of language. He is the pioneer who placed linguistics at the core of studies of the mind in affirming that language is a code that represents our hidden inner thoughts, a ‘mirror of mind’. Dialectically, Stcherbatsky (1999: 458) suggests that “language is not a separate source of knowledge” but “an indirect cognition of reality.” It is something what to be used to convey our knowledge or logically our indirect knowledge through inference. Thus, as being viewed above, “language mirrors human mental processes or shapes the flow and character of thought” (Chomsky 1968: 1). In fact, as Descartes himself quite correctly observed, “language is a species-specific human possession, and even at low levels of intelligence, at pathological levels, we find a command of language that is totally unattainable by an ape that may, in other respects, surpass a human imbecile in problem-solving ability and other adaptive behavior” (Chomsky 1968: 9).

Before embarking to study the knowledge and the knowledge of language, it is necessary to present briefly the Truth-table which provides all the possible combinations of the truth-values taken by complex truth functional sentences given the values assigned to their atomic sentential constituents. A truth-table, for instance, shows that the conjunction of the sentences ‘it is raining’ and ‘it is windy’ is true when it is both raining and windy, and false in all other cases. Thus, the truth-table is illustrated below:

Table 1: Truth-Table

It is raining	It is windy	It is raining and it is windy
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

As the table shown, the truth-tables are used to illustrate the meaning of truth-functional sentential connectives. They also offer an effective method for testing the validity of arguments in propositional logic.

Based on Huarte’s distinguishing three levels of intelligence; that is, (i) “docile wit”: the lowest level; (ii) the normal human intelligence: the next higher level; and (iii) normal human minds: the highest level that “assisted by the subject alone, without the help of any body, they will produce a thousand of conceits they never heard spoke of … inventing and saying such things as they never heard from their masters, nor any mouth” (Chomsky 1968: 8), Chomsky goes to conclude that “normal human intelligence is capable of acquiring knowledge through its own internal resources, perhaps making use of the data of sense but going on to construct a cognitive system in terms of concepts and principles that are developed on independent grounds; and it is capable of generating new thoughts and of finding appropriate and novel ways of expressing them, in ways that entirely transcend any training or experience” (Chomsky 1968: 8). A person’s knowledge of language, according to Chomsky, “is representable as a stored set of patterns, overlearned through constant repetition and detailed training, with innovation being at most a matter of ‘analogy’ … [and] the normal use of language is not only innovative and potentially infinite in scope, but also free from the control of detectable stimuli, either external or internal. It is because of this freedom from stimulus control that language can serve as instrument of thought and self-expression, as it does not only for exceptionally gifted and talented, but also, in fact, for every normal human” (Chomsky 1968: 10-11). Chomsky (1968) continues to argue that “a phrase corresponds to a complex idea and a sentence is subdivided into consecutive phrases, which are further subdivided into phrases, and so on, until the level of word is reached.” And he takes an example to illustrate this: the sentence “Invisible God created the visible world” contains the subject “invisible God” and the predicate “created the visible world,” the latter contains a complex idea “the visible world” and the verb “created,” and so on. In the example just given, “Invisible God created the visible world,” the deep structure consists of a system of three propositions, “that God is invisible,” “that he created the world,” “that the world is visible.” Thus, “the deep structure is related to the surface structure by certain mental oprations -in modern terminology, by grammatical transformations. Each language can be regarded as a particular relation between sound and meaning. … The grammar of a language must contain a system of rules that characterizes deep and surface structures and the transformational relation between them, and that does so over an infinite domain of paired deep and surface structures” (Chomsky 1968: 15).

A language, as Chomsky (1968: 23) observed, is a “habit structure” or “a network of associative connections” or “that knowledge of language is merely a matter of “knowing how,” a skill expressible as a system of disposetions to respond. Accordingly, knowledge of language must develop slowly through repetition and training, its apparent complexity resulting from the proliferation of very simple elements rather than from deeper principles of mental organization that may be as inaccessible to intro-spection as the mechanism of digestion or coordinated movement.”

In order to achieve progress in the study of language and human cognitive faculties in general it is necessary first to establish “psychic distance” from the “mental facts,” and then to explore the possibilities for developing explanatory theories, whatever they may suggest with regard to the complexity and abstractness of the underlying mechanism. For Chomsky, “the person who has acquired knowledge of a language has internalized a system of rules that relate sound and meaning in a particular way” (Chomsky 1968: 23). It is evidently that knowledge of language–the internalized system of rules–according to Chomsky is “only one of the many factors that determine how an utterance will be used or understood in a particular situation.”

Drawing upon a fast growing body of research, it can be argued that there in fact exist two types of knowledge; that is, direct and indirect. It means that knowledge originates either from the senses, perception, or the intellect, conception. The knowledge derived from language is known as indirect knowledge because it does not belong to the domain of sensation. Language, though, somewhat belongs to intellectual, inferential, conceptual, and dialectical domains whereas the real knowledge or direct knowledge as the ultimate truth is pure, unintelligible, unutterable and non-dialectical. With a varied and the most extensive appraisal of the Five Nikāyas, specially the Samyutta Nikāya, the reality or the ultimate truth itself is vivid and pure but without the language, the man cannot touch it. As Varshney (17^th ed. 2009: 1) asserts “without language man would have remain only a dumb animal.”

Philosophical discussions describe clearly and succinctly that language in its intermediary function has aspects of epistemology (theory of knowing) and ontology (theory of being). As a sharp tool of knowledge, it is regarded to operate in a characteristically dialectical process of veiling and revealing truths and is in the process sometimes identified even with the reality that it seeks to represent. It fulfills an interpretative function in the process of effectively apprehending as well as comprehending the applied experience.

The relationship of language to the real knowledge albeit happens to be indirect and distant rather than close. In general, it is pointed out that language is not only an interpretative knowledge of the world and a conferral or comparison of meaning to life but also a means of access to the ultimately reality thus leading to the final liberated goal. For this purpose, the Buddha with the immeasurable wisdom aims to utilize various ways and manners to enable the people understand the truth and through which they can reach to the right and highest knowledge.

Knowledge thus can be viewed in a sense as basically an understanding of or information about a subject which is either represented in a person’s mind or possessed by people on a whole. It also means awareness, a discovery of something. Thus, as points out by Sasaki (1992) “knowledge refers to the analysis of an object, and such knowledge called objective knowledge. This kind of knowledge can be accumulated. It cannot, however, be termed Buddhist knowledge as far as it concerns objective analysis.” This can easily be recognized if we pay attention to the fine distinction between the scientific knowledge, that can be accumulated and obtained by experience or study, and the religious knowledge, that is wisdom or insight rising from awareness and enlightenment, a discriminating knowledge or intuitive apprehension. One possessing the scientific knowledge is the improbable one who has wisdom. Since Buddhism attaches an importance to wisdom based on the faculty, which apprehends the truth of the Buddha’s teaching more than just the accumulated scientific knowledge. Wisdom in Buddhism sense, according to Sasaki (1992), is divided into two concepts: transcendental knowledge (ñāṇa) and knowledge-to-exercised (paññā).^[1]

ñāṇa ‘transcendental knowledge’ is particularly used in the context of the understanding of doctrines. In terms of the Buddhist epistemology, tradition (anussava) is neither by itself a valid form of knowledge, nor are sense-perception or reason the reliable means of knowledge until the distorting influence of unwholesome mental factors, which are rooted in greed (rāga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), have been eliminated. Once this has been achieved, one who reflects with right and wise attention (yoniso manasikāra) will perceive with the proper mode of cognitive awareness and see things ‘as they really are’ (yathābhūta) (Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta number 149.9). In such sense, ñāṇa often occurs in intensive couple-compounds with terms of sight as cakkhu ‘eye’, for example: ‘cakkhu-karaṇa ñāṇa-karaṇa’, ‘opening our eyes and thus producing knowledge’ (that is, giving us the eye of knowledge (a mental eye)), or with dassana (sight, view) as in ñāṇadassana, ‘knowledge and vision’, ‘full vision’, insight given by knowledge that is for ‘one who knows and sees’^[2] (Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta number 2). This is one of the features of Arahantship.^[3] Generally speaking, ñāṇa is relative to common experience and perception (saññā) is necessary for the formation of ñāṇa, as it precedes ñāṇa.

Paññā ‘knowledge-to-exercised’, which will be discussed in great detail on the next section, is an important concept in Buddhist epistemology. It is often translated as ‘wisdom’ but closer in meaning to insight, discriminating knowledge, or intuitive apprehension, comprising all the higher faculties of cognition. It is the faculty which apprehends the truth of Buddhist teachings not as a mere understanding of doctrines but as ‘coming-to-know’ and ‘coming-to-be’. In other words, paññā is not dialectic but an exercise of thought on matter of practice. It is not mere insight or intuition, but conduct accompanied by insight; it is a term of practical import (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: 265). Although all beings possess paññā, it is usually the underdeveloped that needs to be cultivated through the practice of insight meditation (vipassanā). In the three standard stages^[4] which lead to arahanship, it occupies the highest and last stage; that is, the third division paññā-kkhandha ‘code of intellectual duties or practice of the attainment of highest knowledge’. Obviously, this can found in the Mahāvedalla Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta number 43) at which paññā is regarded as the practiced knowledge (bhāvetabbā), a wisely understanding about the Four Noble Truths. In the Abhidhamma, paññā is classified as one of the mental functions (cetasika), and is defined as the analytical discrimination of phenomena (dhamma-pavicaya).

The distinction between ñāṇa and paññā is very multi-polar. In the Early Buddhism, this distinction was not very clear as sometimes they were used as synonymous. However, the Abhidhamma period onwards it became evident clear. In Pāli Abhidhamma, paññā came to mean the subject’s knowing (pajāna). In contract, ñāna came to mean the object to be known (ñāta) . Thus, ñāna is the object, while paññā belongs to the subject. The endeavour to attain ñāna thus presupposes paññā (Sasaki 1992: 92). Thus, paññā obviously has a broader sense than ñāṇa. This distinction becomes clearer during the period of commentaries. In an attempt to bring out the dynamics of paññā more persuasively, the Atthasālinī presents two characteristics of paññā’ s: (i) illuminating (obhāsana) and (ii) knowing or understanding (pajānana) as follows:

Hence, the Elder has said: Just as when a man, your majesty, introduces an oil-lamp into a dark house, the lamp so introduced disperses the darkness, produces light, sheds lustre, makes objects visible, so, your majesty, paññā as it arises dispels the darkness of ignorance, produces the light of understanding (vijjā), sheds the lustre of ñāṇa, makes plain the Ariyan Facts. Thus, your majesty, paññā has illuminating as its characteristic.

And this was said by the Dhammasenāpati (Sāriputta): ‘It knows; thus, brother, it is in consequence called paññā. And what does it know? This is ill’, and so on. Thus it should be expanded. And thus knowing should be regarded as the characteristic of paññā.

(Sasaki 1992: 97)

Thus, paññā’ s characteristic is quite illuminating, its function is to break up the darkness, and its manifestation is to shed the sheen of ñāṇa or to produce the light of understanding (vijjā). Ñāṇa as a whole is considered as a consequence of paññā. In addition, the commentator also gave two further etymological interpretations of paññā that are: (i) paññāpana ‘to make known or to indicate’; and (ii) pakārena jānāti ‘to know the object from the viewpoint of impermanence (aniccatā), suffering (dukkhatā) and non-self (anattā)’. These two meanings are closely related to each other and turn to the same fact that due to paññā the nature of existing things would be made explicitly known. Paññā, thus, signifies the spiritual wisdom which embraces the fundamental truths of the essence of human existence (Sasaki 1992:92-3).

The distinction between the static and dynamic states of ñāṇa and paññā becomes more pure in Sammohavinodanī. According to this commentary, paññā operates by virtue of function (kicca) and object (ārammaṇa) while ñāṇa has for its object (dhamma) . It means that in order to operate paññā must firstly have an action on the subjective side and the object on the objective side. With the object alone, paññā is considered not to work at all. Ñaṇa is included in the object to be known and practised by paññā. And thus, ñāṇa is regarded as the static product and ideal to be obtained, while paññā is subjective, dynamic and functional. In terms of spiritual exercise, the important thing is not merely the ideal or result, but rather the way to approach the ideal. Whether the achievement of the ideal is realized or not rest on the ability of the practitioner. Ñāṇa, therefore, will be of significance only when it is considered in relation to the functional paññā. In other words, the ideal must be achieved by the practical: ñāṇa must be achieved by paññā, it is assimilated in paññā. In order to elucidate this distinction, the venerable Buddhaghosa compared paññā with saññā ‘perception’ and viññāṇa ‘consciousness’. This comparison showed that saññā refers to the perception of a colourful object, whereas viññāṇa means the perception of a multitude of appearances. These two terms concern the analytical perception of the object. Paññā, on the other hand, means to distinctively know (pajānana) ‘the religious significance’ of the object.

The view that ñāṇa as a consequence, and paññā as a means of the Early Buddhism and the Theravāda school are also found in the Abhidharmakośa and its commentary of the Sarvāstivāda school. This school believes that paññā is imminent and refers to the way to be cultivated, while ñāṇa is transcendental and a consequence or a result to be attained. Apart from the arguments for the distinction of the two concepts, the Sarvāstivāda school goes further into the details of their intertwined relationship.

The commentator Yaśomitra pointed out three types of functions of paññā (Skt, prajñā):

1. khānti (Skt, kṣānti),
2. ñāṇa (Skt, jñāna) and
3. diṭṭhi (Skt, dṛṣṭi).

Paññā performs its function as acceptance of the truth at the first stage, as the decision at the second stage, and as the investigation at the last one. These three kinds of functions have a connecting link between each other, representing the stepping-forward of paññā in function from acceptance to investigation. Thus, ñāṇa here is considered as one of the qualities of the dynamic and functional paññā, being therefore assimilated by and intertwined with paññā. The Sarvāstivādins, in addition, attempt a combination and formulate the philosophy of model form by which paññā and ñāṇa come into unity. They try to express how the knowledge-to-be-cultivated (that is, paññā) is combined and unified with its product (that is, ñāṇa). This unification is termed as ākāra. According to the Pāli, a concept of ākāra means a type of form (rūpa) which remains even after the disappearance of the object. Paññā denotes the essential nature of ākāra and the basis of ñāṇa. In other words, ākāra is a model form in which paññā and ñāṇa come into unity. It consists of these two counterparts. It is obvious that in the Sarvāstivāda school paññā includes both functions, psychological and philosophical. When paññā is taken as knowledge to determine the characteristics of dhamma, it is a psychological function. On the contrary, when paññā is taken as knowledge to be cultivated and exercised, it is a philosophical function. It is a means, by which one can remove defilements out of his mind and can reach the final goal.

The notion that paññā is as a means to remove defilements can also be seen in the Mahāsaṇghika school, preceding Mahāyāna Buddhism. Later, with the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism the concept of paññā has come to refer to light. Its original meaning ‘the knowledge to be exercised’ has come into focus on the basis of the Bodhisattva’s ideal, which emphasizes the human activities, encourages altruism and universal compassion.

A Bodhisattva must perfect the Ten Transcendental Perfections (Dasapāramitā):^[5]

1. generosity (dāna),
2. morality (sīla),
3. patience (khanti),
4. courage (viriya),
5. meditation (samādhi),
6. intuitive insight (paññā),
7. skilful means (Upāyakusala),
8. vow (Panidhāna)
9. power (bala), and
10. knowledge (ñāṇa).

The sixth Perfection, the perfection of insight (paññā), is the central element of the Mahāyāna Path. The Mahāyānist experience provided the basis for the identification of the Buddha with ultimate reality (Skt, prajñāpāramitā). Furthermore, the pursuit of the prajñāpāramitā experience is one and the same with the quest for Buddhahood. Here, Prajñāpāramitā represents the practitioner’s recognition of his own potential Buddhahood which is cultivated by himself. The cultivation of insight results in the direct realization of emptiness (suññattā) and is regarded by many Mahāyāna texts especially the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the foundation of the Mahāyāna. Accordingly, the Prajñāpāramitā literature was innovative in two principal ways. First, it advocates the Bodhisattva ideal as the highest form of the religious life, and second the ‘insight’ it teaches is into the emptiness and non-production of phenomena (dhammas), rather than into their substantial (albeit impermanent) mode of being as previously assumed.

There are some distinctions between the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda school on the basis of the prajñāpārami (Skt, prajñāpāramitā, ‘Perfection of Wisdom’) idea. The Mādhyamika school developed the intellectual self-training through knowledge, emphasizing thereby the theoretical structure built round paññā. The Vijñānavāda School, on the other hand, developed the inner experience through yoga accruing upon the treading of ñāṇa. For Vijñānavāda school, ñāṇa represents the pure knowledge realized by the enlightenment where discriminative knowledge is converted into non-discriminative knowledge. Enlightenment consequently means a conversion from the experimental world based upon discriminative knowledge into non-discriminative knowledge. Thus, the term ñāṇa in this context concerns the transcendental and consequential knowledge while paññā concerns the immanent and existential knowledge related to the exercise of the practitioner. It is for this reason that the knowledge of the Buddha is always represented as ‘Buddhañāṇa’ and not as ‘Buddhapaññā’. In short, this distinction between the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda is after all an expression merely of different emphasis of two sides to Buddhist experience, the theoretical and the inner experiential. This means that Buddhist experience involves not only seeing that the reality is ‘emptiness’ but also seeing this in inner experience.^[6]

We have seen two types of knowledge above. It should be recalled here that direct and indirect knowledge. That knowledge originates either from the senses, perception, or the intellect, conception is called direct knowledge. That knowledge derived from language is known as indirect knowledge because it does not belong to the domain of sensation. In Sutta Nidānassaṃyatta ‘Connected Discourses on Causation’ (Samyutta Nikāya, Sutta number 12) in order to make bhikkhus become the noble disciples the Buddha brings out two kinds of knowledge–knowledge of the principle and knowledge of entailment. That “he is called a noble discipline who is accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, who has arrived at this true Dhamma, who sees this true Dhamma, who possesses a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s true knowledge, who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom, one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless” (Samyutta Nikāya, Sutta number 12.33).

And the Blessed One also teaches cases of knowledge as follows:

“Bhikkhus, I will teach you forty-four cases of knowledge. Bhikkhus, what are the forty-four cases of knowledge? Knowledge of aging-anddeath, knowledge of its origin, knowledge of its cessation, knowledge of the way leading to its cessation. Knowledge of birth... Knowledge of existence... Knowledge of clinging... Knowledge of craving... Knowledge of feeling... Knowledge of contact... Knowledge of the six sense bases... Knowledge of name-and-form... Knowledge of consciousness... Knowledge of volitional formations, knowledge of their origin, knowledge of their cessation, knowledge of the way leading to their cessation. These, bhikkhus, are the forty-four cases of knowledge.

“And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death?... (definition as above)... Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death. With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging-and-death. With the cessation of birth there is the cessation of aging-and-death. This Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of aging-anddeath; that is, right view... right concentration. (Samyutta Nikāya, Sutta number 12.33)

And, further, the Buddha goes on teachings the cases of knowledge:

“Bhikkhus, I will teach you seventy-seven cases of knowledge. Bhikkhus, what are seventy-seven cases of knowledge? The knowledge: ‘Aging-and-death has birth as its condition: The knowledge: ‘When there is no birth, there is no aging-and-death: The knowledge: ‘In the past too aging-and-death had birth as its condition: The knowledge: ‘In the past too, had there been no birth, there would have been no aging-and-death: The knowledge: ‘In the future too aging-anddeath will have birth as its condition: The knowledge: ‘In the future too, should there be no birth, there will be no aging-and-death: The knowledge: ‘That knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma is also subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation.

“The knowledge: ‘Birth has existence as its condition:... The knowledge: ‘Volitional formations have ignorance as their condition: The knowledge: ‘When there is no ignorance, there are no volitional formations: The knowledge: ‘In the past too volitional formations had ignorance as their condition: The knowledge: ‘In the past too, had there been no ignorance, there would have been no volitional formations: The knowledge: ‘In the future too volitional formations will have ignorance as their condition: The knowledge: ‘In the future too, should there be no ignorance, there will be no volitional formations: The knowledge: ‘That knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma is also subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation’.

“These, bhikkhus, are called the seventy-seven cases of knowledge.”

(Samyutta Nikāya, Sutta number 12.34)

Thus, a noble disciple has purified and cleansed the two kinds of knowledge–knowledge of the principle and knowledge of entailment–he is then called a noble disciple who is accomplished in view … one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

This analysis of two terms ñāṇa and paññā is based on definitions and explanations of PED, 287 & 390 and DB, 127 & 218.

[2]:

BÑ & BB translate Ñāṇadassana as ‘knowledge and vision’. And this term can easily be found in AN, SNo. 4.143; and MN, SNo. 2.3; 24.2, 9; 26.18; 29.5; 30.11; 32.7; 77.12; 128.32; and 149.9. According to MA, ñāṇadassana also refers to the ‘divine eye’, the ability to see the subtle forms which are invisible to normal vision.

[3]:

The ‘reviewing knowledge’ or ‘retrospective knowledge’ (paccavekkhanañāṇa) is one of an Arahanta’s characteristics. It is usually shown as the confirmation of his liberation by the phrase “there comes the knowledge: ‘It is liberated’. He understands: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being’” (see MN, SNo. 22.29; MLDB, n. 265).

[4]:

In PED, TRD explains the three standard stages which lead to arahanship or final emancipation as follows: (i) sīla-kkhandha ‘code of moral duties’, (ii) samādhi-kkhandha ‘code of practice of concentration and meditation’, and (iii) paññā-kkhandha ‘code of intellectual duties or practice of the attainment of highest knowledge’ (see PED, 390).

[5]:

Literally, the term pāramitā means ‘crossed over’. It denotes a ‘completeness’, ‘perfection’ or ‘highest state’. Early it consists of the original list of six perfections, later it was eventually increased to ten to complement the ten stages (bhūmi) of a Bodhisattva’s career. It appears these ten Mahāyāna Perfections is risen from the ten pāramīs of Early Buddhism. In the later Theravāda literature such as Jātakas, Buddhavaṃsa or Cariyāpiṭaka, the word pāramī comes to signify the perfect virtues that a Bodhisatta must fulfill over many lives to attain Buddhahood. It is for this sense that corresponds to the Sanskrit ‘pāramitā’ of the Mahāyāna literature, even though the numerical lists of virtues overlap only in part (see MLDB, n. 763; and DB, 212).

[6]:

This section is most consulted from the section “The Three Modes of Knowledge” in G.H. Sasaki (1992), Linguistics approach to Buddhist Thought, pp. 90-105.