Introductory—Benediction

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation:

प्रशस्तपादभाष्यम् ।
प्रणम्य हेतुम् ईश्वरम् मुनिम् कणादम् अन्वतः ।
पदार्थधर्मसंग्रहः प्रवक्ष्यते महोदयः ॥

praśastapādabhāṣyam |
praṇamya hetum īśvaram munim kaṇādam anvataḥ |
padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ ||

Having bowed to Īśvara, the Cause, and then to the sage Kaṇāda, I am going to describe the nature of things (or, compose the work called ‘Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.’) leading to the best of results.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

I take my refuge; in God, the beginningless, endless, effulgent, cause of the world, whose will ever comes true, and whose body consists of eternal consciousness.

Salutation to the blessed Puruṣottama, whose essence is pure knowledge, and who has shaken off all bondage,—to Him, stainless and without a second, whom only those see who have their minds centred in deep meditation and whose wanderings (in the cycle of metempsychosis) have come to an end!

At the commencement of the work, the Author offers a salutation to his Deity, as also to the original founder of the system of philosophy, by means of the first half of the śloka—‘Praṇamya &c.’ It is a usage common among people that before beginning any action due obeisance is offered to the Deity and to one’s Teachers. The effect of such obeisance lies in the removal of obstacles in the way of the due accomplishment of the desired work. It could not be absolutely fruitless; as in that case, no intelligent person could ever have recourse to it. Nor could it have any other result save the due accomplishment of the contemplated work; as iu that case it would not necessarily be used at the commencement of that work. Then too, in as much as what is uppermost in the person’s mind at the time that he takes up a work is the due accomplishment of that work there is no other result approximate enough to be accepted as following from the salutation in question..

Objection:—“Does the removal of obstacles result from salutation only, or from something else also? There is no such necessary rule as that it follows from salutation only; because, even in the absence of such salutation, we find two such Bhāṣyas, as that on the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃā sūtras “in their complete forms. Then again, if it resulted from other "things also, then there would be no reasonable ground for a "necessary recourse to this particular course only.”

To the above we make the following reply:—The cessation of obstacles results from salutation only; as we find all good men having recourse to it, at the commencement of all actions. Nor is it a fact that the authors of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣyas did not offer any salutation; because they too must have done it.

Question:—“How do you know that?”

Answer:—We infer it from the fact of the authors being good and wise persons. Let the case of the wise rest; even among the Mlecchas we find that they do not engage themselves in any action unless they have saluted their own divinities. Under the circumstances, it cannot be for a moment believed. that two such extremely good and godly persons, as Pakṣila Svāmi (the author of the Nyāyabhāṣya) and Śabara Svāmi (the author of the Mīmāṃsābhāṣya), should not have offered due salutation.

We now proceed to explain the words of the text: “Praṇamya”—the prefix ‘pra’ denoting intensity, the word ‘praṇamya.’ denotes such salutation as is accompanied by intense devotion and confidence; as it is such a salutation alone which, creating a merit, destroys the very seed (possibility) of obstacles. It is for this reason that in the case of such works as Kādambarī and the like, we find that they were left incomplete, even though salutation had been offered at the beginning; and the reason for this lay in the fact of the salutation in these cases not having been offered with due faith and devotion,—the absence whereof is inferred from this very fact of the works being left incomplete.

In the present case, the salutation, though being done at the present time, is yet, in reality, meant to precede the composition of the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha; and_it is for this reason that we have the sequential affix ‘ktvā’ (in ‘pranamya’); but this affix is used only with a view to establish a syntactical relationship between the two (the salutation and the composition), and not merely for the purpose of indicating the said sequence; as there would be no useful purpose served by such indication.

‘Hetu [Hetum]’—by means of this word ' hetu’ without any qualifications, the author points to the fact of God being the cause of all created things.

‘Īśvara [Īśvaram]’—this word denotes a particular deity; as it is only in this sense that the word is used in ordinary parlance; and this system of philosophy is meant to be a mere compilation of things ordinarily known to men.

‘Muni [Munim]’—denotes a particular person of austere pennance, who has had the darkness of ignorance destroyed by the pure knowledge of Self, and who is possessed of a complete knowledge of the whole truth regarding all things; as it is only in this sense that this word is generally found to be used.

‘Kaṇāda [Kaṇādam]’—this name was given to the sage, on accouut of his subsisting, like a pigeon, upon grains fallen on the road (the word being explained as kaṇān atti iti) Consequently, there can be no room fur the taunt—“may you eat mere grains &c.” The revered Praśastadeva has used this word, simply because it formed the name of the sage; and not as a reason for the excellence of the system as composed by such a person (as lived on mere grains picked up from the road); because such excellence is directly cognisable by the fact of the acceptance of the system by great men, just as is the case with the declarations of Manu and other sages. Nor is any useful purpose to be served by making the system known as ‘kaṇāda-śāstra.’ It might be urged that, “by this means would be indicated the excellence of the author’s own work, as based upon the work of Kaṇāda.” But it is not so; for it is true that the precedence of such ap ṅkhority adds to the excellence of the author’s own work; but it is quite possible for such a work being open to the suspicion of being a statement of false doctrines; this suspicion being based upon certain well known discrepancies in the character of the [hor][?] of the work. It might be argued that, “no human frailties could ever be suspected in the revered Praśastapāda whose veracity is universally acknowledged.” But, in that case, just as in the case of Kaṇāda’s own work, people who saw him, as also the direct disciples of these, accept it, only through their confidence in the author, and the other persons follow in the same path through finding the declarations compatible with those of other persons,—so, in the same manner, in the case of Praśastapāda’s work also, his disciples and other persons would accept it; and as such there would be no use of declaring the fact of the latter work being based upon the former.

As for the question.—“why should there be a salutation of the sage?”—we have already said that such salutations are meant to remove obstacles, just like the salutation to God. Nor can the salutation of God also be taken as indicating the fact of the work being based upon the work of God; because this would not be in keeping with facts. A person is found to begin all actions after having saluted his own particular deity; and he does not thereby mean that the actions are such as have been previously performed by that deity; specially as salutation is wholly the outcome of devotion and faith. As for instance, we find that the author of the Mīmāṃsā-vārtika has saluted the moon-bearing God, and certainly the Mīmāṃsā philosophy has not been composed by that God.

‘Anu’—this particle indicates the fact of the salutation to Kaṇāda coming after that to Īśvara, the meaning being—‘having in the beginning saluted Īśvara, and then saluting Kaṇāda &c. &c.’

Until the connection and the purpose of a particular work are fully understood the student does not pay any attention to it; as the activity of all intelligent persons is always preceded by a full recognition of the purpose to be fulfilled by that act; and if a work do not give rise to such activity it would be as good as non-existent; consequently, the author, at the very beginning of bis work, lays down, by means of the second half of the verse, the connection and the purpose, both of which are necessary factors in the activity cd the intelligent pupil.

‘Padārthadharma &c.’—‘Padārthas’ are the six categories, Substance and the rest; the ‘dharmas’ are the common and specific properties of these; and that work which collects, or brings together, or explains these is the ‘Padārthadkarmasaṅgraha.’

‘Pravakṣyate’—the promise of the author is that he will propound an excellent work which will briefly explain the properties of the categories. The excellence of the work lies in this, that the properties of things which in other works, are explained very extensively and at random, are, here, explained briefly and in one place; this is the motive that has led the author to the composing of the work, while there already existed other works treating of the same subject.

Obj. “A collected treatment of the properties of things is the cause of the due knowledge of these properties; but such knowledge cannot be the desired end of man; as the sole end of man lies either in the obtaining of pleasure or in the avoiding of pain. Consequently the work not accomplishing any desire of man, cannot be a fit object for acquiring”.

In reply to this we have the word ‘mahodaya [mahodayaḥ]’ which indicates the fact of the work effecting the desired end of man. The word means—that work from which results the highest result, in the shape of Deliverance. This also implies that the work bears to the Properties, the relationship of the Denoter and the Denoted, and to the Highest Result, that of the Cause and Effect.

Question: “Well, what is this highest result?”

In answer to this, (1) some people (the Bauddhas) declare it to be the cessation of all knowledge along with all impressions, tendencies and longings. But this is not correct; because no intelligent person could ever act towards the total destruction of the self which is the nearest of all things; also because the word ‘mukti, (Deliverance), which is synonymous with the destruction of bondage, does not mean the said cessation or destruction.

(2) Others (the Vedāntis) explain it as the appearance of pure knowledge free from all objective taint, following on the destruction of all impressions &c. This too is not right; as this could not be possible in the absence of an efficient cause. The cause of such knowledge consists in an augmentation of Retentiveness; and the nature of this is such that, in the absence of a permanent substratum, it cannot produce any particular effect; and if at every moment, it were to appear as something new, then, in as much as it would be undergoing a total destruction at every moment, like the practice of leaping, it could not have gained in power; and as such it could not be able to produce any clear cognition; and hence there would be no possibility of such a cognition; specially as of the conditions of the mind as tainted (by objectivity), the inborn capability of producing homogenous, or like, effects and the incapability of producing unlike ones, could never be sec aside. Then again, in as much as all the previous states of the mind are naturally evanescent, the state that is herein spoken of would be something quite different from these. Nor is there any such single ‘series’ wherein both of these could exist; and yet Bondage and Deliverance both belong to one and the same substratum; and these two, according to you, would refer to two distinct objects, while, as a matter of fact, that state of mind which ceases is the same that has been functioning before.

(3) Others (the Sāṅkhyas) bold that after the difference between Matter and Spirit has been duly perceived, the functioning of Matter ceases, and the Spirit rests in Its own nature; and it is this that is Deliverance. This also is not correct; because Matter, being by its very nature active, could never rest idle (indifferent, without functioning). It might be argued that—“the functioning of Matter is caused by the purpose of the Spirit; and this purpose being none other than the perception of the said difference, as soon as this perception appears, Matter, having accomplished its purpose, would cease to function.” But this could not be; as Matter being un-intelligent, could not function with any such discrimination (as would be necessary in accordance with the Sāṅkhya theory). In fact, we find that even when it has duly brought about a certain perception,—of sound, for instance—, it still goes on functioning towards the same perception; and in the same way, even after it will have brought about discriminative knowledge, it would go on with its functioning towards the same end; as its active nature will not have been set aside (by the said knowledge.)

(4) Others (the Yogis) again hold Deliverance to consist in an experience of ever-lasting and unsurpassed pleasure. But this view also has nothing to recommend itself; as we shall show later on.

(5) For these reasons, we conclude that the “highest result” consists in the absolute cessation of pain.

Question: “What is the proof of the existence of this cessation of pain?”

In reply to this, the Naiyāyikas put forward the following syllogism: ‘The series of pain, being something qualified, is destroyed absolutely, because it is a series,—just like the series of light rays emitted by the lamp. But this is not satisfactory; as the argument is directly contradicted by the case of the series of the colour &c. of the atom of earth and other substances (which are never destroyed). Therefore we maintain that the proof of the said cessation lies in such Upaniṣad texts as ‘Him without a body, pleasure and pain do not touch.’

Objection:—“All these Upaniṣad passages refering merely to the natural state of things cannot have any evidential authority.”

Reply.—Not so; as the same might be said against the authority of Sense-perception (which also pertains to the natural state of things).

Objection: “What we mean is that sentences describing the natural state of things would be merely descriptive, and as such devoid of evidential authority; because these would depend upon the authority of something else; as such a description in itself could never be the efficient means of any correct cognition.”

Reply:—A passage cannot be regarded as descriptive simply because it speaks of things in their fully accomplished states; as in that case even Sense-perception would have to be regarded as merely descriptive. In fact it is only when it speaks of something that is already known, that a passage is regarded as descriptive. And as a matter of fact we find that the matter dealt with by the Upaniṣad passages in question is such as is never cognised by Sense-perception or the other means of knowledge; and under the circumstances, how could these passages be regarded as merely descriptive? How too could they ever stand in need of the coroboration of any other means of knowledge? Specially as in the case of these passages, the cognition produced by them is not found to be necessarily preceded by any other cognition of the same object, as we have in the case of Remembrance (which for this reason is not regarded as an independent means of knowledge). In fact it is on this ground that human assertions arc regarded as authoritative. These human assertions too do not bring about the cognition of things, through an indication of the trustworthiness of the speaker; but they do so independently of the speaker, depending upon the speaker only for their own appearance (and not for their faculty of producing cognitions), as the capability of expressing things is inherent in the word, and inherent also, in these expressed things, is the capability of being related to one another, either by mutual requirement, or by proximity, or by capability. Consequently, just as in the case of the Veda, the word is accepted as producing the cognitions of things, independently of any other means of knowledge,—so in the case of ordinary human assertions; as, according to the maxim—‘ye laukikā vaidikāsta eva,’ (‘the words of the ordinary human assertion are the same as those in the Veda’), the potency of the word must be the same in both cases. As for the inquiry into the trustworthiness of the speaker, it is simply meant to set aside the possibility of error with regard to facts; just as in the case of Sense-perception also, we look out for the purity and soundness of the sense-organ, simply for the sake of setting aside all doubts as to the erroneous character of the cognition.

We have briefly dealt with this here; for a detailed treatment of the subject, we refer the reader to the Advayasiddhi.

Objection:—“The authority of words is restricted to something that has to be accomplished, and not to the mere nature of things as they exist; specially as in the case of all usages of old experienced people, we find that words have their expressive potency only when there is something to be accomplished, and not otherwise. Consequently the Upaniṣad passages cannot be taken as referring to the natural, state of things.”

Reply:—This is not admissible; as in ordinary parlance we often find a sentence applying to the natural state of things,—e.g. the assertion, ‘the mango produces good effects, and the jack fruit brings undesirable ones.’

Objection:—“In the case of this sentence also, what it does is to lay down the eating of the mango, and the avoiding of the jack fruit, the meaning of the sentence being—‘eat the mango which produces desirable effects, and avoid the jack fruit which leads to evil consequences’ (hence in this sentence also “there is no mere description of the natural state of things)”

Reply:—It is not so; as any such laying dozen would be useless; because the man is naturally attached to the eating of the mango; by the mere cognition of the fact of its producing good effects; similarly is he repulsed from the eating of the jack fruit by the cognition of the fact of its leading to evil consequences. And as such, what would be the necessity of any injunction in this case, where the necessary attraction and repulsion are acomplished by the nature of the things themselves? specially as an injunction has its use only in a case where its object has not been accomplished by some other means.

Objection:—“The sentence must be regarded as used for the purpose of laying down the said attraction and repulsion, as it is with the purpose of such attraction and repulsion that it is always found to be used.”

Reply:—True; the sentence does serve the purpose of attraction and repulsion; but it does this only as the originator of these, and not as their (verbal) denoter; and the evidential authority of words rests only with accomplished things. If, from the mere fact of the sentence being used for the purpose of the said attraction and repulsion we were to infer the fact of these two being verbally denoted by the sentence,—even though they are not cognised as directly expressed by the words,—then, in that case, even such things as the feeling of satisfaction following on the eating of the mango, and its digestion, would also have to be regarded as expressed by the sentence; and in the case of Sense-perception also, when its object would be such as is desired for the sake of the fulfilment of a certain purpose, it would be this fulfilment that would have to be regarded as the object of. that sensuous cognition. As for the fact of the sentence being the originator of activity, even the Upaniṣad texts inquestion are such originators; as when one has recognised the true nature of a thing by means of these, he has recourse to the practice of meditation &c., which brings about a pure knowledge of the Self, free from all doubts and uncertainties; from which knowledge proceeds final Deliverance. Nor is it necessary that the operation of all means of knowledge should always end in activity or cessation from activity; as these being dependent upon the wish of the agent, even when they are not brought about, we have a distinct perception resting in the thing itself.

Nor is the denotative potency of words restricted to only such objects as are related to some action; as we often find words applying to things not so related; e. g. in the sentence “iha prabhinnakamalodaremadhūni madhukaraḥ pibati (within this full blown lotus, the bee is drinking the honey)”, which describes an occurence at the present moment, we find that one who knows the meaning of the other words, but does not know that of the word ‘madhūkara [madhūkaraḥ]’, comprehends this word as denoting that insect which he finds drinking the honey (and in this case, the word does not denote anything that is related to an action.)

Objection:—“In this case also, there is an indirect relation-“ship with an action; as the person who utters the sentence has “known the meaning of the word ‘madhukara [madhukaraḥ]’ only by notic-“ing the actions of older people”.

Reply:—Not so; as there can be no certainty with regard to this; that is to say, there is no certainty as to whether the man who utters the sentence had obtained the knowledge of the meaning of the word, with reference to the object as related to a certain action of older people, or from its co-extensivness with other words known to him, or from the direct teaching (of an older person) with regard to the thing by itself (independently of any action); specially as there is no knowing which of these factors enters first into the comprehension of the meaning of a word. Then, in accordance with what you hold, the speaker of the sentence would have his comprehension with reference to the object as related to the action, while the hearer would have it with reference to it as not so related; and as one person does not comprehend the meaning of a word by means of the comprehension of another person, the word ‘madhukara [madhukaraḥ]’ would have the two mutually inconsistent characters of having its denotation related, as well as not related, to an action, as with reference to the two persons.

Objection:—“The mutual relationship among the meanings of words in a sentence is based upon the requirements of the verb denoting an action; and hence there could be no such relationship in the case of the quoted Upaniṣad text which is devoid of verbs.”

Reply:—All Upaniṣad texts are not devoid of verbs; and even in the case of those that have no verb, there is a distinct relationship among the things that are denoted by the words as connected with one another, and are qualified by capability and proximity (to other words).—such relationship being based upon the mutual requirement of these denotations. For instance, in the sentence—‘kāñcyāmidānīm tribhuvanatilako rājā’—we are fully cognisant of a connected meaning of the sentence, though there is no Verb. Or, in such cases the relationship may be said to be based upon such verbs as ‘asti’ or ‘bhavati’ which may be either distinctly mentioned or only inferred indirectly.

This by the way; to return to the original subject: A collection of the categories is obtained only by means of a due knowledge of the properties of the categories; as there could be no collection of the properties by themselves alone.