Chapter 2c - Jayanta’s interpretation of ‘avyapadeśyam’ term

[Full title: Jayanta’s interpretation of ‘avyapadeśya [avyapadeśyam]’ term occurring in the definition of pratyakṣa given by Gautama:]

(i) Jayanta presents a number of interpretations of the term ‘avyapadeśya’ to clarify the intention of Gautama. To present the first interpretation he says that when the words interpenetrate our cognition it is called vyapadeśya. In order to exclude such cognition from pratyakṣa the word avyapadeśya [avyapadeśyam] has been given. But the old logicians^[1] hold that what finds expression in words is called vyapadeśyam. Therefore, an expressible cognition is designated as vyapadeśyam. The awareness which arises from the sense-object contact and is named after its object such as the awareness of colour, taste etc. is called as vyapadeśyam. The term ‘avyapadeśyam’ uses in the sūtra to suggest that no such expressible awareness is the resulting form of pratyakṣa.^[2] Therefore, such an interpretation is untenable.

The mere association of an apprehension with a word cannot discredit it as untrue. It the awareness of colour, taste etc. is represented by words but it rightly refers to its object then how can it be called as false awareness? If it contains a wrong reference then the term ‘avyabhicāri’ given in the sūtra is competent enough to exclude it from the domain of pratyakṣa. In that case, is not the term in question superfluous? The awareness interpenetrated by a word owes its existence to the source of valid cognition. Will it be excluded from the state of being the resulting pratyakṣa by the mere term ‘avyapadeśyam’ contained in the sūtra in spite of the fact that it is produced by the source of valid cognition? It is not also produced by the source of an inferential cognition (anumāna). There is also no provision in Gautama’s logic of the fifth source of valid cognition. Thus, the four types of valid cognition (pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, and śabda) would be too narrow to include it within itself.

Hence, it is a riddle which defies the finding of our intelligence. Therefore, the above interpretation is really a misinterpretation.^[3]

(ii) Some other Naiyāyika^[4] said that the term ‘avyapadeśya’ excludes some other form of cognition from the domain of pratyakṣa. We know from the joint method of agreement and difference that the sense-organ is one of its conditions yet words play the part of an instrumental cause in its production. For this reason, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has not framed the definition of verbal cognition (śabda jñāna) in such a way as to exclude the dependence of verbal cognition upon a sense-organ as its condition. The definition of verbal cognition as given by Gautama is this that the cognition which is derived from the words of a trustworthy person is verbal. It shows that the room of verbal cognition is spacious. Gautama also approves the entry of a sensuous element into the body of verbal cognition. But he has narrowed down the scope of pratyakṣa as he shuts his door against an element of verbal cognition, by qualifying pratyakṣa by the term ‘avyapadeśya’. Hence, experience interpenetrated by words cannot be the resulting form of pratyakṣa. Therefore, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra used the term ‘avyapadeśya’ in his sūtra to exclude the above experience from the pratyakṣa.^[5]

But the subsequent interpreters do not assent to the above conclusion. If such apprehension as is produced by the joint causality of the two distinct factors is excluded from pratyakṣa then it turns out to be a piece of false direct cognition but the definition of false cognition does not apply to it. On the other hand, if it is valid then it should be decided with which kind of valid cognition it is to be identified. Word-interpenetrated experience is verbal since it is causally connected with words as its causal relation is detected by the joint method of agreement and difference. It is also sensuous since it is causally connected with the senseorgans and its causal relation is also similarly detected.

It is also incompatible to hold that word-interpenetrated experience is verbal since it is produced by the two distinct sources of cognition. On the other hand, if it is held that it is a class by itself then such a hypothesis meets with the dilemma which has been shown before.

Jayanta says, Gautama cautiously defines pratyakṣa and adequately qualifies it with the purpose of excluding any element of verbal cognition from it. But he does not qualify the definition of verbal cognition so as to exclude it from the partly sensuous one. From this attitude of his mind, we come to the conclusion that piece of cognition which is produced not by words alone but by words accompanied by some other factors required for the appearance of some other form is of cognition surely verbal.^[6]

On an adequate examination of the nature of such object we find that this piece of cognition is perceptual since it is causally determined by the sense-organ and this causal connection is based upon the joint method of agreement and difference. When its sensuous origin will be negated it is wise to hold that it belongs to another kind of valid cognition.

Again, the word ‘avyapadeśya [avyapadeśyam]’ given in the sūtra is to guard against the possible defect of the definition of pratyakṣa in being impossible.^[7] A critical logician discusses this point as thus: If an object to be defined is existent then its definition is given. But pratyakṣa which arises from the sense-object contact does not really exist if pratyakṣa refers to the object as qualified by a word which denotes it. Therefore, the so called pratyakṣa referring to a qualified object as indicated above is essentially verbal. The distinction-perceptions cannot be established if their reference to their corresponding different objects is not admitted. So, the function of consciousness is simply to reveal an object.

No one has ever experienced that a perceptual judgment is the joint effect of the two different sense-organs.^[8] But an objector may urge that a word interpenetrated experience owes its existence to the inner organ just like the judgment that the bandhūka flower is scented. From this context we should remember that when a word or a mark or a similar source of cognition fails to discharge its function as an instrumental cause and an effect in the shape of a judgment arises in our mind we entertain a hypothesis that the inner organ plays the part of an instrumental cause to generate it. But if the possibility of a source of cognition as an instrumental cause is not ruled out then the causality of the inner organ should not be relied upon. If we deny this rule then the inner organ should be the only source of valid cognition. So, the word is the instrumental cause of the judgment in question. It reveals itself and the object meant by itself like thousand-rayed sun. Therefore, though the judgment that this is a cow refers to a cow which is a perceptible object yet it is not perceptual but mediate, i.e. it is derived from a word. But a question arises in our mind with regard to this hypothesis. We have heard the word ‘cow’, etc. when we have been initiated into its signification. The word has ceased to exist. Then, how is it that the judgment in question is due to the instrumentality of the past word? Though the word is not heard at the time of the formation of the judgment yet it being recalled in our memory, generates it.

Another question arises that, when the particular word consisting of many letters is heard do we really perceive all the letters at a time? Is there any distinction between the communications of sense by the two different words? Jayanta replies, a word expresses its meaning when all its constituent letters are supplied by memory and another word carries its sense when its last letter is only audible and the rest are supplied by memory.

So, it is proved that the judgment in question is due to the instrumentality of words which are not directly given to us but are recalled in our memory. As a word reveals itself along with a supersensible object so it does with a perceptible object. Thus it should be admitted that judgment of this type refers to an object which is qualified by a word which denotes it.^[9]

(iii) An experienced teacher^[10] holds that the word ‘saṃjñitva’ is a classical example of an object having a word as its predicate. The noun ‘saṃjñā’ is the base. The nominal suffix in ‘having the sense of ‘matup’ suffix has been attached to it. The resultant form is ‘saṃjñin’. On the other hand, the nominal suffix ‘tva’ denoting the sense of an abstract quality has been attached to the word saṃjñin. But the nominal suffix ‘tva’ denotes a relation when it is attached to a word which is derived from a basic word with a nominal suffix implying the sense of the ‘matup’ suffix added to it. Therefore, the word saṃjñitva denotes the relation obtaining between ‘saṃjñā’ and ‘saṃjñin’. Jayanta says if we recall the ruling of the learned Grammarians^[11] on this point in our mind then we see that the ‘tva’ suffix after a word derived

from a root with a verbal suffix attached to it or that derived from a base a nominal suffix attached to it or a compound word signifies a relation. Here, the term ‘saṃjñā’ stands for a word. Thus the import of the word ‘saṃjñitva’ is that an object which is denoted by a word is presented to our consciousness along with its denotative word as its predicate. We are aware of no awareness which is not associated with words. When definite words are not presented to our consciousness there is possibility of some general words being associated with our consciousness. Therefore, we get a result that if words are not associated with consciousness then consciousness lacks its power of illumination.^[12] In order to meet the charge of absurdity which may be leveled against the definition of pratyakṣa the term ‘avyapadeśyam’ has been given in the sūtra.^[13]

But some Naiyāyikas disapprove of this solution.^[14] They believe that the judgment that this is a cow owes its existence to the sense-object contact, and it cannot be a piece of verbal cognition. Again, they hold that this judgment does not refer to an object which is qualified by a word since an instrumental cause of such a judgment is not possible. And words are the source of such judgment as has the subject supplied by them. But let us now find out the instrumental cause of a judgment in which the word plays the part of a mere predicate. Our auditory organ is not the instrumental cause in question since it cannot produce its result by fits. If we closely examine the process of associating the synthetic judgment that this is a cow with words then we at once abandon the idea of entertaining the argument that the auditory organ is the instrumental cause of it. The first step towards the association of the judgment with words is our cognition of the relation between a word and its meaning. Then the word which is recalled in our memory is associated with the objective consciousness. Here arises a question, how does the auditory organ come in to produce the judgment in question? The inner organ unaided by an external sense-organ is not competent to produce a judgment which refers to an external object; otherwise, no one should be blind, etc. The objector may urge that the words alone play, here, the part of an instrumental cause and may suggest that one should not search for another instrumental cause. Thus, such a contention is not tenable. The object of a verb cannot be its instrument. Again, the objector says in support of his view that sun light is both the object and the instrument of the verb to see. But this illustration arises from the wrong identification of one act of seeing with that of another. There are two acts of seeing. When sun’s light is an instrumental case it is not an objective case and vice versa. We see an object, e.g. a jar by means of sun’s light; light is merely the instrumental cause but is not the objective case. When we see light it is merely an object but not an instrumental cause. In this case, we see light only with our eyes, and so, the eyes are the only instrumental cause. On the other hand, we see an object such as a jar with the aid of light. But when we see light we require no such aid. Sun’s light is, at first, seen independently of any other light with our eyes. It endures long and serves the purpose of an instrumental cause when the other objects are beheld with the same organ. This conclusion seems to be reasonable.^[15]

Sound endures only two time-atoms. It is audible. If it plays the part of an instrument when the consciousness of an object which is grasped by a source of cognition other than the auditory organ is produced then how can it be an object of such awareness? A word is a means of cognition like smoke but is never an object of such cognition. In other words, a word itself is not referred to by a judgment which owes its existence to its instrumentality. When a word, being recalled in our mind, leads to the cognition of an object, i.e. its meaning let us pay attention to the following steps. At the outset we remember a word. Then we know the object denoted by the word. Thus, when we know the object it is in no way possible for us to cognize the word itself. Therefore, no judgment refers to an object which is qualified by its denotative word. Moreover, the judgment that this is a cow is causally connected with the sense-object contact since its causal connection is determined by the joint method of agreement and difference. How can you per force, i.e., violating the law of logic, hold that the above judgment is a piece of verbal cognition? Though it is due to the function of a senseorgan in co-operation with the impressions of the cognition of words yet it is asserted by you to be a piece of verbal cognition. Then we see that you are a great logician indeed. It has been pointed out by you that neither the visual organ nor the auditory organ is instrumental to the production of such a judgment as refers to an object as qualified by its denotative word. But, Sir, why do you not hold that such an object is perceived with our eyes alone? Then very well, you may contend that our eyes do not apprehend an object which is not visible. Hence, the judgment which refers to an object which is qualified by its denotative word is not visual. But this contention is not tenable. How do you hold that your illusion is optical when you mistake the rays of the sun for water? The eyes are not in contact with water. Therefore, your statement is baseless. We beg to mention in this connection that water which is at first recalled in our mind is perceived with our eyes. Similarly here too, why is not the word which is at first remembered perceived with our eyes. Again, you may contend that a word which is essentially a sound ever remains beyond the reach of our eyes. In reply we also put this question to you, viz., ‘Is water which is not in touch with our eyes, ever seen with our eyes?’

It has often been pointed out that if sound is at all visualized then only one kind of sense-organ, viz., the eyes, should be admitted. Here, Jayanta replies with a counter argument as thus: If an object which is not in contact with our eyes is visualized then all the objects of the universe should be perceived with eyes. In other words, every one having normal eyes should have seen each and every object of the universe.^[16]

Then, very well, now, why do you illustrate an illusion by which the rays of the sun are mistaken for water? What is it that makes an illusion? Is it so since the sense-organ does not produce it? Or, is it so because it does not correspond to the object referred to by it? Now, if it is held that it is illusion because of its non-sensuous origin then the term ‘not produced by the sense-object contact’ being sufficient to exclude an illusion from pratyakṣa the term ‘avyabhicāri’ should be abandoned as superfluous. The latter term finds a place in the sūtra which defines pratyakṣa so it is admitted that the essential character of an illusion lies in its non-correspondence. Thus it should be surely assumed that the illusory judgment which refers to water not united with the sense-organ is produced by the sense-organ. As the optical illusion of water refers to water lying beyond the reach of our eyes so why do you not subscribe to the hypothesis that the perceptual judgment refers to an object which is qualified by its denotative term? As you hold that the colourless objects such as time, etc. are visualized, why do you not maintain that an object which is characterized by its name is also visualized? Moreover, the causal relation obtaining between the perceptual judgment which refers to an object as qualified by its name and the sense-organ will not be contradicted. An objector to the view may contend that he cannot support the above view that sound is visualized as long as he is alive.^[17] He advises his rival thinkers to give us his tenacious attempt at bringing home the point that an object qualified by its name is visualized. Moreover, if the above judgment is said to be a piece of verbal cognition as it has been suggested by objector then he should explain how he does acquire the cognition of signification. Jayanta advocates that a word cannot communicate its meaning if the signification of a word remains unknown. The signification of a word is not grasped if one has only the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa of the object denoted by it. The objector stands committed to the view that all savikalpaka pratyakṣa is a piece of verbal cognition. Therefore the objector cannot hold that the cognition of the signification of a word is due to the savikalpaka pratyakṣa. The cognition of the signification of a word is not acquired if it does not come through a distinct source of valid cognition other then a verbal one. If it is held that the signification of a word is learnt from the verbal testimony (śabda) then it is an instance of circular reasoning (itaretarāśraya doṣa). No one understands that the object which is signified by a word is qualified by the word itself. If it had been so then the meaning of the word ‘cow’ would have been grasped as the word ‘cow’ itself. But if the word ‘cow’ denotes a cow as qualified by the word ‘cow’ then it will also be an element of its meaning. In other words, if a term signifies its denotation as qualified by itself then the cognition of a mark should also lead to the cognition of the object marked as qualified by the mark itself. But fire is never inferred as qualified by smoke. Similarly, cow and such other objects are never known as qualified by their denotative terms. The state of being signified is never a property of an object. If it had been so then it would have been grasped by the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

The Buddhist logicians hold^[18] that the words cannot signify the real objects. For this reason, they reject the savikalpaka pratyakṣa. But the objector holds that the so-called savikalpaka pratyakṣa is a piece of verbal cognition then how can you win victory over the Buddhist logicians? How do you hold that a word relates itself with an object which is perceived? A word should be at first related to its object and also it should be known independently of the word itself. If it is held that a word at all stages associates itself with its meaning then the cognition of an object would be piece of verbal cognition. But this argument is not sufficient to overcome the Buddhist view.

In assumption, the diversity of objects alone accounts for the difference in the character of an awareness. Owing to the obstinate inclination to cling to this wrong assumption you have had to imagine that the object of a savikalpaka pratyakṣa, being qualified by a word, is distinct from that of a nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Proceeding in this path do not you realize that you mistake pratyakṣa for verbal cognition? What a perversion of intellect! Doing so you have become an object of the following censures viz. ‘Oh fool man! You only see honey but do you not see the pit under your feet -the pit where you will drop’.

Therefore, the judgment that this is a cow is perceptual since it is produced by the eyes in cooperation with the recollection of a word.

Further, it is reasonable to hold that it has not been the creation of the internal organ alone. It is due to the function of the external organ since it is causally connected with it and the causal relation is determined by the joint method of agreement and difference.

(iv) Some stalwart followers of the line of the objector come forward with a new objection and hold that it has been proved to the hilt that the judgment that this is a cow and such other judgments do not refer to objects, qualified by their denotative terms. Now, how shall we distinguish a savikalpaka pratyakṣa from a nirvikalpaka one? Because an apprehension is not distinct from another if the latter does not refer to a distinct object. Actually, the difference in the nature of an object explains only the difference in the corresponding awareness. The acts of consciousness corresponding to the words ‘remote, near, slow, quick etc.’ refer to an object which is either qualified by space or time. Otherwise, the distinction in their meanings would not have been grasped.

Jayanta says if you put a question to me whether time or space is directly known then I simply ask you to put this question to your experience but not to me. It is a fact that an object qualified by time or space is presented to our direct awareness but on the contrary, it is also strange that they themselves (time or space) are never perceived. This admission also points to the acceptance of the argument that the relation of inherence is perceived under certain circumstances. The judgment that the cloth rests upon this (the collection of interlaced threads) reveals that the cloth inherent in the threads, is perceived. The judgment that this is a piece of cloth is distinct from the judgment that this piece of cloth inheres in the threads. If the relation of inherence which subsists between this piece of cloth and the threads, is not perceived, then the distinction between the above two judgments will not arise since the apprehension of the cloth alone cannot account for the distinction. Now, a second alternative suggestion on this point is as follows: The difference in the two awarenesses focused upon the same object is explained by the distinction in the nature of conditions. The following illustrations will bring home our point. The same post is differently presented to our consciousness when it stands close at hand or is far away from us. The same thing is differently perceived when it is seen with normal eyes or with diseased eyes. The difference in the nature of awareness due to the diversity of conditions is hard to establish. The condition brings about some special feature in the effect viz., an act of awareness reveals but cannot alter an object in the least. But the Naiyāyikas hold that when one is aware of an object he is not aware of the awareness of an object. The act of awareness which is marked by some distinction is not intuited. The object which is presented to our consciousness has no distinction. But it is a fact that a distinction is presented to our consciousness. Thus, the line of the argument is dangerous. The awareness of a near object does not differ from that of the same object, being distant though their conditions are distinct but they differ since the objects are not the same.

When we look at an object from a distance we perceive it as outlined by its general features only. But when we see it from a close quarter we behold it as qualified by its vivid distinctive features. Thus, the difference in the act of awareness is absolutely due to the diversity of objects.^[19]

But some Naiyāyikas hold that the distinction of awareness is not only due to the diversity of objects but also is due to the difference of means. The objector has pointed out that when an object is presented to our consciousness we are not aware of the awareness of an object and if it is held that an act of awareness acquires a distinction without a reference to its object then the argument is beset with enormous difficulty. But such type of criticism is not correct. The appearance of apprehension amounts to the pratyakṣa of an object accordingly to our system. But we are not self-conscious of this act of pratyakṣa. When we have the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa of a person, the object of such pratyakṣa is only presented to our consciousness but the awareness of this pratyakṣa remains absent. Though the awareness of an awareness does not take place yet the object is cognized. On the other hand, when the savikalpaka pratyakṣa of the same object takes place it acquires distinction as it is conditioned by the awareness of its predicate. Thus, the argument in question does not meet with disaster though it acquires a distinction without referring to a distinct object. Again, the objector may contend that the cognition should not be expressed in the proposition that has been pointed out by the critic since the relation of the qualifying to the qualified determines the form of cognition. But the contention of the objector is untenable.

Hence, the judgment that this is a cow does not refer to an object as qualified by its name. Therefore, it is not a piece of verbal cognition. But it is a clear case of perceptual judgment. Such type of judgment comes within the province of pratyakṣa, so the assertion of the futility of the definition of pratyakṣa becomes baseless. Thus, the term ‘avyapadeśya [avyapadeśyam]’ has not been given in the sūtra to meet the charge that it is impossible to define pratyakṣa.^[20]

Then, a question arises that what is the function of this term? According to the Naiyāyikas, it has been given to exclude such cognition as arises from the two distinct sources of cognition within the field of pratyakṣa.^[21]

(v) Again some others hold that the term ‘avyapadeśya’ excludes only such cognition as arises from the two distinct types of sources of cognition and that this cognition appears only when the signification of a word is learnt from a sentence employed for instructing the name of an object. If this is their view then the judgment that this is a cow, meant for communicating the acquired signification, should be necessarily generated by the two distinct types of sources of cognition since the judgment is produced by the sense-organ together with the memory of a sentence learnt by us. We remember that we have correctly learnt that this word signifies the object in question since we have been taught by a reliable person. Then, why do not you exclude such a judgment from the field of pratyakṣa by the term in question? Now, they may claim that words do not directly condition the above judgment but their memory. So, such a contention is untenable. They may further claimed that when the cognition of signification is communicated by a judgment the judgment is produced by the sense-organ together with the memory of the word denoting an object as an accessory condition. Further, they may contend that the sentence of an expert, expressing a significant word, directly condition the cognition of the signification of a word. But this contention is not also sound. When the signification of a word is communicated by a judgment the sentence of an expert, pointing out the significant word, is remembered. If it were not recalled in mind then we could not know that such an object is denoted by such a word. When it is recollected that a reliable person has instructed that the word ‘cow’ denotes this object a person expresses his judgment in the proposition that this is a cow. Thus, the judgment in question is due to the revival of the memory of the above sentence.

Therefore, the judgment in question is a piece of verbal cognition since the sentence instructing the denotative word conditions it. If the Naiyāyikas subscribe to this opinion then the savikalpaka pratyakṣa of those logicians will be absolutely precluded from the field of pratyakṣa. Even, if the cognition of the signification of a word is ascertained by some other means of cognition like, inference, then the statement that this cognition of signification is a piece of verbal cognition cannot be controverted.^[22]

The validity of savikalpaka pratyakṣa is the life blood of the Nyāya Epistemology. So, the cognition which owes its existence to the two distinct types of sources of cognition should not be designated as a piece of cognition derived from the verbal testimony.^[23] The relation of signification subsisting between a word and the object signified is grasped by means of various proofs and each of them plays its own independent part. The verbal testimony alone should not be saddled with the burden of revealing the said relation. The sense-organ constitutes the very canvas of this judgment whereas the verbal testimony supplies us with the mere embroidery. Thus, the tentative argument that the term ‘avyapadeśya’ has been used to exclude such cognition as is the joint product of the two distinct sources of cognition is not without its defects. The import of this argument is that the judgment in question is perceptual. The ancient logicians intend to mean that word-interpenetrated perception may be analyzed into two elements, viz., (i) its knowledge-element and, (ii) its word-element. The former represents pratyakṣa and it is generated by the sense-organ. Shortly, if it illuminates its object aright then it is a piece of valid perceptual cognition. Therefore, there is no possibility of its being called a fifth type of valid cognition i.e., a new species of valid cognition.

(vi) Another logician holds that the term ‘avyapadeśya’ has been used by Gautama to remove a possible wrong impression that savikalpaka pratyakṣa is derived from the verbal testimony (śabda). But the object which is one of the conditions of this pratyakṣa is associated with a name and that it also allows itself to be word-interpenetrated. This piece of cognition is senseperception since it is causally connected with the sense-organ and its causal connection is determined by the joint method of agreement and difference. Therefore, it is not derived from the verbal testimony (śabda).

Jayanta says that this piece of cognition is sense-perception since it is vivid, that it is not word-interpenetrated at the time of its appearance, is causally connected with the senseorgan and gets the sanction of the popular view. Though, in some cases, the recollection of the name of an object is one of the conditions of savikalpaka pratyakṣa yet it is not derived only from the cognition of the word since the sense-organ plays the important role of a cause but the remembrance of the name plays the subordinate part of an accessory condition like a lamp to the eye. But, if the argument that savikalpaka pratyakṣa is sense-perception is thus proved then a new problem is to be faced viz., nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa does not come within the province of pratyakṣa.

On the other hand, some critics hold that the so-called savikalpaka pratyakṣa is derived from the verbal testimony since it is a piece of verbalized knowledge. Jayanta replies that, if even some word-interpenetrated knowledge is proved to be sense-perception then there is no doubt that apprehension which is absolutely free from the association with words is sense-perception. Therefore, Gautama includes both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa within sense-perception by the term ‘avyapadeśya’.^[24]

Thus, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives the various explanations about the term ‘avyapadeśyam’ and intended to say that the competent reader is to select for himself any one of them, that makes an appeal to his mind to be true.^[25]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

“tatra bṛddha naiyāyikāstāvadācakṣate, vyapadiśyata iti vyapadeśyaṃ śabdakarmatāmāpannaṃ jñānamucyate”.—-Nyāyamañjarī, Jayantabhaṭṭa, prathama āhnika o dvitīya āhniker pratyakṣa aṃṣa, edt. by Dr. Amit Bhattacharyya, p. 380.

[2]:

“yadindriyārthasannikarṣādutpannaṃ sadviṣayanāmadheyena vyapadiśyate rūpajñānaṃ rasajñānamiti tadvyapadeśyaṃ jñānaṃ tatpratyakṣaphalaṃ mā bhūdityavyapadeśyagrahanam”.—-Ibid. p. 380.

[3]:

“tadidamanupapannam. na hi nāmadheyavyapadeśyatvamaprāmānyakāraṇaṃ bhavati. yadi hi tadrūpajñānaṃ rasajñānañca viṣayāvyabhicāri niḥsaṃśayañca tatkathamapramāṇaphalamucyate? vyavicārādi-doṣayoge vā padāntareṇa tatpratikṣepāt kimavyapadeśyapadena? pramāṇaphalañca tadvijñānamidānīṃ kiṃ pramāṇaprabhavaṃ bhavanna pratyakṣaphalam, etatpadaprakṣiptatvāt? nānumānādijanyaṃ tadvailakṣaṇyāt. nāsti kiñcita pañcamaṃ pramāṇamasaṃgrahohasya lakṣyasya lakṣaṇeneti prajñāpramādaḥ. tasmādapavyākhyānametaditi”.—-Ibid. p. 380.

[4]:

“vyavacchedyāntaramavyapadeśyapadasya varṇayāñcakrurācāryāḥ”.—-Ibid. p.

[5]:

“tasmādevaṃvidhavyapadeśyavijñānavyavacchedārthamavyapadeśyapadamiti”. —- Ibid. p. 381.

[6]:

“sa paśyati karaṇāntarānupraveśehapi śābdametajjñānamiti”.—-Ibid. p. 383.

[7]:

“asambhavadoṣavyavacchedārthamavyapadeśyapadopādānam. hi paro manyate, sati lakṣye lakṣaṇavarṇanamucitam, iha tu lakṣyamānaṃ pratyakṣamindriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṃ nāma na kiñcidasti”.—-Ibid. p. 384.

[8]:

“na ca yugapadindriyadvayadvārakamekamutpadyamānaṃ jñānaṃ kvacid dṛṣṭam, tatraitat syāt”.—-Ibid. p. 385.

[9]:

“tadevaṃ smṛtiviṣayīkṛtaśabdajanita eṣa pratyaya ityabhyupetavyaḥ. yathā parokṣehapi śabda uccārita ātmānaṃ prakāśayatyarthañca, tathā pratyakṣe viṣaye sa eva smaryamāṇa ātmānamarthañca prakāśayatīti vācakāvacchinna vācyapratibhāsaścaivaṃvidhāsu buddhiṣu nūnameṣitavyaḥ”.—-Ibid. p. 386.

[10]:

“yathāha vṛddhaḥ—-‘saṃjñitvaṃ kevalaṃ parami’ti”.—-Ibid. p. 387.

[11]:

Here Bhartṛhari says “na sohasti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena gṛjyate”. It means that there is no such consciousness in this universe as is not associated with words. We are aware of all awareness as qualified by words.—-Ibid. p. 387.

[12]:

“na ca śabdānusandhānarahitaḥ kaścit pratyayo dṛśyate. anullikhitaśabdakeṣvapi pratyayeṣu antataḥ sāmānyaśabdasamunmeṣasambhavāt”.—-Ibid. p. 387.

[13]:

“asambhavadoṣanirākaraṇārthamavyapadeśyapadamiti”.—-Ibid. p. 388.

[14]:

“tadetadācāryā na kṣamante”.—-Ibid. p. 389.

[15]:

“ghaṭādigrahaṇe cakṣuruddyotamapekṣate, noddyotagrahaṇa iti kamanuyuñjmahe. sohayaṃ suryaprakāśaḥ prakāśāntaranirapekṣacakṣurindriyaprathamagṛhītaściramavatiṣṭhamānastadindriyagrāhya ekaviṣaye gṛhyamāṇe karaṇatāmupayātīti yuktam”.—-Ibid. p. 389.

[16]:

“nanvekeindriyavādaḥ syāccakṣuṣā śabdavedane. atrāpi sarvavodhaḥ syāda sannihitavedane”.—-Ibid. p. 391.

[17]:

“nanu cākṣuṣatāṃ śabde na jivan vaktumutsahe. tyajainaṃ vācakopetavācyāva gamadurgraham”.—-Ibid. p. 393.

[18]:

“arthāsaṃsparśinaḥ śabdān kathayan duṣṭasaugataḥ”.—-Ibid. p. 395.

[19]:

“kriyāntarāṇāṃ vaicitrye yadvā tadvāhastu kāraṇam. bhedo jñānakriyāyāstu karmabhedanivandhanaḥ”.—-Ibid. p. 397.

[20]:

“taśmiṃśca lakṣite sati lakṣaṇavaiyarthyaśaṅkākaraṇābhāvānnāsambhavadoṣanirākaraṇārthamavyapadeśyapadam”.—-Ibid. p. 401.

[21]:

“kimarthaṃ tarhīdamastu? uktamācāryairubhayajajñānavyavacchedārthamiti”.—- Ibid. p. 402.

[22]:

“yatra mārgāntareṇāpi saṅketajñānasambhavaḥ. tatrāpyanena nyāyena śābdatā na nivartate”.—-Ibid. p. 404.

[23]:

“naiyāyikānāñca savikalpakapratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇāḥ, tasmānnobhayajasya śābdatvaṃ jñānasya vaktavyam”.—-Ibid. p. 405.

[24]:

“nirvikalpakavat tasmāt pratyakṣaṃ savikalpakam. samagrahīcca tadidaṃ padenānena sūtrakṛt”.—-Ibid. p. 408.

[25]:

“ityācāryamatānīha darśitāni yathāgamam. yadebhyaḥ satyamābhāti sabhyāstadavalamvyatām”.—-Ibid. p. 408.