Text 121: On Smṛti (Remembrance)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 121:

लिङ्गदर्शनेच्छानुस्मरणाद्यपेक्षाद् आत्ममनसोः सम्योगविशेषात् पट्वाभ्यासादरप्रत्ययजनिताच्च संस्काराद् दृष्टश्रुतानुभूतेष्वर्थेषु शेषानुव्यवसायेच्छानुस्मरणद्वेषहेतुरतीतविषया स्मृतिरिति ॥ १२१ ॥

liṅgadarśanecchānusmaraṇādyapekṣād ātmamanasoḥ samyogaviśeṣāt paṭvābhyāsādarapratyayajanitācca saṃskārād dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣvartheṣu śeṣānuvyavasāyecchānusmaraṇadveṣaheturatītaviṣayā smṛtiriti || 121 ||

Text (121): From the contact of the soul and the mind as aided by such causes as the perception of an ‘Indicative,’ ‘desire’ (for remembering) and ‘associated ideas,’ and the like, and from a faculty produced by distinct cognition, by repetition and by an impressive regard (for the object concerned),—there arises a remembrance of objects seen, heard or experienced (inferred) in the past, which becomes the cause of the recalling of what remains (of a previous cognition), of desire, of associated or secondary remembrance, and of aversion.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author now proceeds to describe knowledge in the form of Remembrance: The expression ‘and. the like’ has been added with a view to include Praṇidhāna, ‘Close Attention’ and others enunciated iu the Nyāyasūtra (Adh. III Āhnika II, Sūtra 43). The ‘contact of the soul and the mind’ aided by these constitutes the cause or source of Remembrance. For this ‘Contact’ the peculiarity that makes it a cause of Remembrance consists in the ‘perception of the Indicative’ &c.; as a mere contact of the soul and the mind cannot bring about any Remembrance.

The author next points out that like the ‘perception of the Indicative,’ ‘Faculty’ also is an instrumental cause of Remembrance. Remembrance follows from a peculiar faculty of the mind; and this faculty is produced—(1) by distinct cognition as from the cognition of the touch of blades of grass in motion (2) sometimes it happens that even a distinct cognition does not produce any perceptible impression on the mind, as We find in the case of a chapter of the Veda read for the first time; hut in this case when there is a repetition of what has been cognised once, a distinct impression is produced on the mind, which fixes the chapter in the memory (3) sometimes when we see a strange object, the cognition produced is so impressive that even though the object is seen but once, it is remembered for all times to come.

With regard to objects seen &c.’ This points out the objects of Remembrance. ‘Seen’ = cognised directly by the senses; ‘heard’ = cognised only through hearing from other, ‘experienced’ = Inferred.

Becomes the means &c.’ This serves to point out the effects of Remembrance. Śeṣa is that which remains behind. ‘Anuvyavasāya’ is functioning afterwards and by the compound Śeṣānuvyavasāya’ (where Śeṣa qualifies anuvyavasāya which literally means the ‘recalling of what remains behind,’ is meant the cognition of the ‘object of the Inference, which is not included in the first cognition of the inferential Indicative and the meaning of this is the ‘remembrance’ of the invariable concomitance (of that object with that Indicative). The ‘remembrance’ of a certain object having afforded pleasure in the past becomes the mean, of a ‘desire’ for that object. The ‘remembrance’ of the first word of a sentence becomes the means of the ‘associated remembrance’ of the second word. And the ‘remembrance’ of an object having produced pain in the past becomes the cause of an ‘aversion’ to it.

And remembrance also appears in the form of that? (‘That thing which I had seen &c.’). And inasmuch as in all Remembrance the object is recognised as having been known in the past, Remembrance is called ‘atītaviṣayā,’ ‘pertaining to past objects.’

It is for this same reason of its pertaining to past objects, that Remembrance is not regarded as a ‘means of knowledge,; as all that it does is to point out an object as known in the past and as such it depends, in the matter of making its objective known, upon previous cognitions (and as such only making known an object that is already known, it cannot be regarded as a means of knowledge which is a name given only to such means as afford knowledge of things not otherwise known). As for Inferential Cognition, though that also depends upon another cognition for its accomplishment, yet in the matter of bringing about a knowledge of its own objective it is wholly independent i.e though the Inference is based upon the previous knowledge of concomitance &c., yet it always leads to a conclusion the matter of which is wholly unknown until pointed out by that same Inference, which thus, with regard to this latter, does not merely recall a previous cognition as is done by Remembrance. This has been thus declared in the Tantravārtika by the superhumanly intelligent Teacher: It is only the cognition of some previous cognition that is called Smṛti, Remembrance, and hence we can never accept it as true in the absence of such previous cognition’ [I-iii-1, Translation Page 105]. This same idea has been also expressed in the following Kārikā (Ślokavārtika): ‘There (in the case of Remembrance) to the previous cognition (which is the origin of the Remembrance) belongs the character of the correct means of knowledge; and the purpose of Remembrance lies in the mere recalling of that previous cognition’ [Anumāna Verse 158, Translation. Page 204]. Some people hold the non-evidential character of Remembrance to be due to the fact of its not being directly produced by a real object: but for such people there would be no evidential authority for Inferences with regard to past and future objects (which cannot be regarded as real at the time of the inference) and they cannot escape from this objection.

Notes:—(1) The Nayāsūtras referred to in the commentary are—smaraṇaṃ tu ātmanaḥ jñasvābhāvyāt | 42 || praṇidhāna-nibandhābhyāsa-liṅga-lakṣaṇa-sādṛśya-parigrahāśrayāśrita sambandhānantarya-viyogaikakārya-virodhātiśaya-prāpti-vyavadhāna-sukha-duḥkhecchā dveṣa-bhayārthitva-kriyārāga-dharmādharmanimittebhyaḥ || 43 ||

[Note: see source file for original Sanskrit]

The first of these Sūtras simply states the fact that Remembrance belongs to the self; as it is the self alone that is endowed with consciousness; and in the next Sūtra Gautama declares that Remembrance follows from such causes as ‘Prāṇidhana’. and the rest; and here we find stated in detail the various grounds of association leading to Remembrance. Each of these is thus explained by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra; (1) ‘Praṇidhāna’ is rhe steady ng or concntrating of the mind with view to recall something to the mind; that is to say, when we wish to remember something, we withdraw the mind from all other objects and concentrate it on the various distinguishing features of the one object intended to be recalled; and this concentration is called ‘Praṇidhāna’ (2) ‘Nibandha’— When a number of things are treated of in the same work (‘composition’), the association thus established among them makes each one of them bring the other to the mind. (3) Abhyāsa—is the name given to that peculiar character of the Self, which in the form of a faculty or Impression is produced by a constant repetition or repeated pcnderiug over the same idea. Thia faculty thus becomes a means whereby the idea and its object is remembered easily. This Abhyāsa includes ‘Ādara’ (great regard and ‘Pratyaya’ Impressive cognition) also; as these also tend to create in the self a faculty that becomes the means of remembering; when we have a great regard for a certain thing, or when the cognition that we have of it is of a character that leaves a lasting impression on the mind, there appears a certain faculty that fixes those objects in our memory. (4) ‘Liṅga’—An indicative or distinguishing mark; everything has certain features whereby it is more easily remembered. This Indicative mark is generally of four kinds: (a) A thing is often remembered by the help of something where with it may have been found to have been in contact,—f.i., having seen a cart with a particular horse, on a former occasion, seeing that horse, we remember the carriage; (b) it is remembered by means of something wherein it has been found to inhere; for instance, having seen the yarn along with the piece of cloth, whenever afterwards we see the yarn, we at once remember the cloth. (c) When two things have been found to in here together in the same object, the perception of one calls the other to the mind; f.i., having found whiteness and coolness together in a piece of ice, whenever we see whiteness it brings an idea of coolness to the mind; or having seen the hands and feet of a man, when we see his hands we remember his feet also. (d) One thing is often found to bring about the idea of its contradictory; for instance, on experiencing extreme heat, we are at once put to mind of extreme cold. (5) A certain distinguishing feature fixed by convention often serves to bring to the mind the name of the family to which one belongs, f.i. having found by experience that the animals belonging to a certain family are marked, by a particular kind of mark on the forehead, whenever we see an animal hearing that mark, we are led to remember the family. (6) Of two similar things, one reminds us of the other; for instance, the picture of a man reminds us of the man himself. (7) By ownership a thing is remembered; for instance on seeing the servant we remember the master, or vice versa (8) Of two things related to one another one reminds us of the other; as the sight of the son reminds us of the father. We often remember a thing through immediate Sequence; f.i., finding that the railway train leaves immediately after the whistling, as soon as we hear the whistling we are reminded of the leaving of the train; or being accustomed to take our food immediately after bath, the bath reminds ua of the food (10) The Separation from a man reminds us of him. (11) The identity of function is another cause of action; f.i. finding that a certain set of eleven men forms a football team, on seeing any one of them we remember the rest. (12) Of two persons opposed to each other, the sight of one reminds us of the other opponent. (13) An excellence of some sort becomes a means of rememberance; f.i,. a student wishing to learn a certain subject remembers the teacher famous in that branch of learning (14) The likelihood of gain from a certain person puts us in mind of that person. (15) The covering of a thing reminds us of that thing, /. the sight of the scabbard leads us to remember the sword. Similarly pleasure and pain, affection and aversion, fear and want put us in mind of their respective objects, the action of a man reminds us of the man, as the moving of the chariot reminds us of the driver; and Virtue and Vice also remind us of their effects. These are a few of the special instances of the general law of association, which is enunciated as—[... See source for Sanskrit text].

(2) (a) Patanjali in his Yogasūtra has defined it as the non-abandonment by the mind of the object that has been once cognised (I-ii). This definition puts us in mind of the declaration of Bishop Hall, that, “memory is the great keeper of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had nut been.”

The Vedantis hold that Remembrance does not depend upon our will; it is in this that it differs from Reflection. Their opinion is that no sooner the necessary conditions present themselves than the Remembrance appears, whether we wish it or no (Vivaraṇa prameyasaṃgraha, p 151).

Remembrance is not regarded as one of the ‘valid means of knowledge,’ Pramāṇa. And on this point the Nyāyamañjarī says—‘The invalidity of Remembrance is due, not to the fact of its pertaining to an object that has already been cognised before, but to the fact of the object whereof it affords the knowledge not having a real existence at the time that we have the Remembrance. Soon this point we find a difference of opinion between our commentator and the Nyāyamañjarī. Remembrance enters as a necessary factor in all Inferential and Verbal cognitions; and as such we cannot regard it as absolutely invalid, all that is meant is that it is not an independent Pramāṇa.

Some writers hold that the direct cause of remembrance does not consist in the saṃskāra, which thus stands in the same relation to Remembrance as sense-contact does to Sense-perception, Śaṅkara Miśra in the Upaskāra (on Sūtra IX-ii-6) says that a particular kind of conjunction is the non-material cause, saṃskāra the instrumental cause and the Self the material cause, of Remembrance.

(3) It will be of interest to notice what some of the western philosophers have got to say in this connection.

Professor Fleming says—“Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with the knowledge that it has formerly been present; when this takes place we are said to remember, and the faculty of which remembrance is the act is memory.” [It is for this reason that ‘smṛti’ cannot be rightly translated as ‘memory’ ].

“This faculty (of memory) implies two things: a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use” (Stewart, Elements VI-i).

[This is opposed to the Vedantic conception that Remembrance is wholly independent of our effort].

“The nest faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge is that which I call retention. This is done in two ways: first by keeping the idea which is called contemplation [the ‘praṇidhāna’ of the Nyāyasūtra explained above]. The other way of retention 18 the power to revive again or our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared” (Locke Essay II-x-i).

In connection with the ‘invalidity’ of Remembrance, on which so much stress has been laid above, we may note the opinion of Hobbes who holds that memory is a decaying sense. Professor Bain regards it as a wholly independent faculty of the mind; as the phenomena thereof cannot be included under tin so of any other power; or as the Sanskrit writers would put it, the cognition produced by that faculty cannot be classed under the cognition due to any other ‘means of knowledge.’

Western psychologist lay down Vividness, Attention and Repetition as the conditions facilitating remembrance. These three, are the same as Ādara, Praṇidhāna and Abhyāsa of Vātsyāyana (see above). In relation to the mention of ‘sukha’ and ‘duḥkha’ &c. in the Nyāyasūtra, we may note the following from Herbert.

“The things which are best preserved by the memory are the things which please or terrify, which are great or new its., &c.”

On the question of Remembrance being independent of our will, strongly put forward in the Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, the following statement of Professor Fleming’s helps to ciear the difficulty: “In its first manifestations, memory operates spontaneously, and thoughts are allowed to come ami go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will, some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible excluded. Spontaneous memory is remembrance, Intentional memory is recollection or reminiscence. Sully calls the former passive and the latter active memory.