Text 120

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 120:

विशेषदर्शनजम् अवधारणज्ञानं संशयविरोधी निर्णयः । एतद् एव प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानं वा । यद् विशेषदर्शनात् संशयविरोध्युत्पद्यते स प्रत्यक्षनिर्णयः । यथा स्थाणुपुरुषयोरूर्ध्वतामात्रसादृश्यालोचनाद् विशेषेष्वप्रत्यक्षेषूभयविशेषानुस्मरणात् किम् अयं स्थाणुपुरुषो वेति संशयोत्पत्तौ शिरह्पाण्यादिदर्शनात् पुरुष एवायम् इत्यवधारणज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षनिर्णयः । विषाणमात्रदर्शनाद् गौर्गवयो वेति संशयोत्पत्तौ सास्नामात्रदर्शनाद् गौरु एवायम् इत्यवधारणज्ञानम् अनुमाननिर्णय इति ॥ १२० ॥

viśeṣadarśanajam avadhāraṇajñānaṃ saṃśayavirodhī nirṇayaḥ | etad eva pratyakṣam anumānaṃ vā | yad viśeṣadarśanāt saṃśayavirodhyutpadyate sa pratyakṣanirṇayaḥ | yathā sthāṇupuruṣayorūrdhvatāmātrasādṛśyālocanād viśeṣeṣvapratyakṣeṣūbhayaviśeṣānusmaraṇāt kim ayaṃ sthāṇupuruṣo veti saṃśayotpattau śirahpāṇyādidarśanāt puruṣa evāyam ityavadhāraṇajñānaṃ pratyakṣanirṇayaḥ | viṣāṇamātradarśanād gaurgavayo veti saṃśayotpattau sāsnāmātradarśanād gauru evāyam ityavadhāraṇajñānam anumānanirṇaya iti || 121 ||

Text (120): A definite cognition brought about by the due perception of the special features, is called ‘Nirṇaya;’ and this is opposed to Doubtful Cognition. It is only this definite cognition that can be either ‘perceptive’ of ‘inferential.’ That which is produced by a sensuous perception of the special features, and sets aside all doubts, is the ‘perceptive judgment;’ e.g when we see a certain object standing before us, we may perceive only the tallness, which is a property common between the pole and the man, and not perceive any of the features belonging specifically to either; and then recalling to our mind the (other) features common to both, we have the doubtful cognition, as to whether the object before us is a pole of a. nan; after a time, perceiving that the object has a head and hands &c., we come to the definite cognition that it is a ‘man,’ and this is a case of the ‘perceptive Definite Cognition. Then again, seeing only a pair of horns in a thicket (and not any other parts of the animal’s body), we have the doubtful cognition that it is a cow or a Gavaya; and then noticing the presence of the dewlap, we have the Definite Cognition that it is a ‘cow and this is a case of the ‘inferential Definite Cognition.’—(IX-ii-12; X-i-3.)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Some people regard Definite Cognition to be a distinct means of knowledge; and in regard to this view the author says: ‘A definite cognition &c.’ That is to say, in a case where the non-perception of specific features has given rise to a doubtfull cognition, the subsequent perception of such features brings about a definite cognition, which is called ‘Nirṇaya.’ ‘Definite Cognition’. It is called the ‘opposite of Doubtful Cognition,’ because as soon as it appears, it removes the previous ‘doubtful cognition’. As Maṇḍana Miśra has declared in his Vibhramaviveka,—‘Asi soon as the pole has been definitely cognised’ there is no longer any doubtful cognition based upon mere ‘tallness.’ Though every definite cognition may be called ‘Nirṇaya,’ (no matter whether it does or does not set aside a previous doubt), yet in as much as a certainty is generally known to follow after an uncertainty) the author has called it ‘opposed to Doubtful Cognition.’

With a view to explain his own general statement, the author next shows that Nirṇaya is included in Sense-perception and Inference. The definite cognition with regard to objects perceived by the senses is ‘Perceptive Nirṇaya,’ and that with regard to inferable objects is ‘inferential’ Āvrṇaya.

Notes.

(a) When we perceive the horn, the doubtful cognition is due to the following inferential reasoning: ‘The animal before us is either a cow or a Gavaya. as it has horns.’ And then the perception of the dewlap leads us to the following Inference. ‘It must be cow, because it has dewlap.’ This is called ‘inferential definite cognition,’ as the entire animal is not actually seen.

(b) It is not quite clear who regard ‘Nirṇaya’ as a distinct means of knowledge.