Verse 1.24-26

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 1.24-26:

अपोद्धारपदार्था ये ये चार्थाः स्थितलक्षणाः ।
अन्वाख्येयाश्च ये शब्दा ये चापि प्रतिपादकाः ॥ २४ ॥
कार्यकारणभावेन योग्यभावेन च स्थिताः ।
धर्मे ये प्रत्यये चाङ्गं संबन्धाः साध्वसाधुषु ॥ २५ ॥
ते लिङ्गैश्च स्वशब्दैश्च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्नुपवर्णिताः ।
स्मृत्यर्थमनुगम्यन्ते केचिदेव यथागमम् ॥ २६ ॥

apoddhārapadārthā ye ye cārthāḥ sthitalakṣaṇāḥ |
anvākhyeyāśca ye śabdā ye cāpi pratipādakāḥ || 24 ||
kāryakāraṇabhāvena yogyabhāvena ca sthitāḥ |
dharme ye pratyaye cāṅgaṃ saṃbandhāḥ sādhvasādhuṣu || 25 ||
te liṅgaiśca svaśabdaiśca śāstre'sminnupavarṇitāḥ |
smṛtyarthamanugamyante kecideva yathāgamam || 26 ||

24.-26. The meanings which have been obtained by abstraction, those which are of a fixed character, the forms which have to be grammatically analysed and those which are used as means for this purpose, the relations consisting in causality and fitness which lead to merit and understanding of meaning in the case of correct forms and to the understanding of meaning only in the case of incorrect ones, these have been described in this śāstra through indications and direct statements. These are only some which have been dealt with here according to tradition, in order that they may be fixed in memory.

Commentary

These three verses give the whole of the subject-matter to be dealt with. The abstracted word-meaning is that which was closely connected, but being freed from that connection by an inferred postulated form, it is now abstracted. The form of that separated thing is beyond the range of usage. It is generally established on the basis of postulation, by following tradition, according to one’s understanding and through repeated practice. Similarly, the essence of the word being indivisible, in order that the work of Grammar may proceed, by adopting the method of positive and negative reasoning and postulating their recurrence, the words are separated from the whole and the separated word-meaning is looked upon as what is expressed by them. This separated word-meaning serves the usage of the science of Grammar and also worldly usage based on difference and is similar to usage in Grammar. When this separated meaning rests on one single word, it cannot be determined as true or false. When the mere word tree (vṛkṣa) or fig-tree (plakṣa) is uttered and it is not completed by the addition of a verb, the meanings conveyed by the words cannot be clearly defined. As long as specific actions which keep out others do not set aside the act of mere existence which is the cause of the very use of a word,¹ the verb ‘it is’ (asti), in the third person, denoting existence, though not used, is brought to the mind by the words tree etc., and is understood. These words, looking like single words, when completed by some word or other, are called sentences. Similarly, such divisions as the meaning of the first word (of a compound) the meaning of the second word, the meaning of an outside word, the meaning of the stem, the meaning of the root, the meaning of the suffix etc., are abstracted somehow in many ways from a single word by some scholars without any clear line of demarcation.² The meaning with a fixed character is that which is conveyed by the sentence, it has fictitious divisions, it is specific, one, of the nature of action. It is conveyed by means of the cognitions of the separated word-meanings. Even though the separated elements are cognised, the meanings understood from namasyati, (he pays homage) saṅgrāmayate (he offers battle) muṇḍayati (he shaves the head) kuṭṭayati (he powders) carvayati (he masticates) etc., at the time of the comprehension of the whole, is not complex.³ That is why it has been said:—

“Or it is not necessary, because it is the (complete) word which is used to convey the meaning.”⁴

‘Word’ here stands for that in which an action is merged. Or one might say that it is only the apparent persistence of the cognition (sampratyaya) (of the separated elements) which is referred to here. Accepting the use of the indivisible) word to convey the (indivisible meaning, the Bhāṣyakāra) again says:—

“It is the word which ends in a primary or secondary suffix which has a meaning and not the bare primary and secondary suffixes.”⁵

What is meant by ‘forms to be grammatically analysed’ is this: According to some, it is the individual word which is the limit of grammatical analysis, while according to others, it is the sentence which is the limit.⁶ According to the view that it is the word which is so, when, because of the identity of sounds, the same form of the word is taken, words which have acquired their correct form on the basis of the universal, even when the particulars come on the scene because of connection with other words, would continue to have the form based on the universal, which is an inner factor. The result would be that a word like śukla (white), in the singular number and neuter gender, would be connected with other words expressive of the substratum, having some other gender and number. In order that this may not happen, the rule,

“Of the adjectives also, except the universal”.⁷ lays down that when words expressive of the substrata which are external factors are to follow, words expressive of quality, should take the gender and number of the words expressive of the substrata. According to the view that grammatical analysis has the sentence as the limit, considering that a quality always exists in something, it is not possible to separate it from its substratum and so, being fully determined, it does not denote the general idea at all. On this point, it has been said:—

“That is natural.”⁸

Similarly, it is according to the view that each word in a ‘dvandva’ compound gets its correct form separately that the vārttika

“In a dvandva compound, the gotra suffix must be elided even in the numbers other than plural?”⁹

has been taught. On the view that it is the whole which gets the correct form, it has been said:—

“Or it may not be taught, as, in a dvandva compound, every word is in the plural number.”¹⁰

Similarly, all the sūtras beginning with

“A qualifying word ending in a case-affix, is variously combined with a qualified word ending in a case-affix”¹¹ and

“Words expressive of the standard of comparison and ending in a case-suffix are combined with words expressive of the common property ending in a case-affix,”¹²

are to be understood as having been composed on the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis. It is after accepting that it is the word which has to be grammatically analysed that such divisions as bhū ti, bhū ati, leading to the understanding of groups of other words (than the sentence) have been postulated and accepted as means (pratipādaka).

What is meant by ‘causality’ is this; when the cognition which has parts of the appearances of the object and is superimposed on the object is taken as the object, then, of that object, the word is the cause. Since the relation of identity between the word and the meaning in the form ‘It is this’ is established, that cognition of the meaning is the cause of the application of the word which is within and which is manifested by the sounds. Because of the relation of illuminator and illuminated between particular words and particular meanings, as in the case of the senses and their objects, there is an eternal fitness, not created by anybody, of the expressive words possessing unvarying and well-established correctness in regard to the meanings expressed by them.¹³ In the case of words whose relation with their meanings is not established at the time of their first application, the fitness depends upon convention.

The relation of the correct word with its meaning becomes auxiliary to the understanding of the meaning and when it is used with a knowledge of Grammar,¹⁴ it becomes auxiliary to the manifestation of merit. In the production of special knowledge of the meaning, it brings about a condition similar to perception. Corrupt forms, on the other hand, become, like winking etc., auxiliary to the production of special knowledge in the manner of inference, by their connection with what is connected with the meaning.

What is meant by “These have been described through indications” is this:—When, in order to carry on the work of Grammar, the analysis of some unified meaning is made, there can be difference of opinion among men regarding the different limits of the (analysed) meanings. How is it to be known whether the suffix ‘ṇic’ is to be added to the root when the causative is to be expressed or whether it is to be added to the root of which it is the meaning?¹⁵ Similarly, in regard to the sūtra

“When the idea of the feminine is to be expressed”¹⁶ the doubt arises whether the suffixes ‘tap’ etc., are to be added to a nominal stem when the idea of the feminine gender is to be expressed or to a stem which includes the feminine gender in its own meaning. Similarly, the doubt arises: the meaning of which element is important in a compound-word formed according to the rule.

“The negative particle ‘na’ may be compounded with a word connected with it in meaning and the resulting compound word is to be called tatpuruṣa.”¹⁷

These options do not exist in the world, because the worldly meaning is the whole and in regard to that, there is no deviation. The alternatives adopted by men being thus indefinite, that option is accepted by which the decisions of the Science of Grammar are not affected. Similarly, that the meanings of the inflectional suffixes are the numbers one etc., or the accessories to the actions like the object, that the meaning of a nominal stem is the group of five or of four or of three, such alternative views are due to the variations in human intelligence¹⁸ Action, accessary to action and time are also analysed as the expressed meanings in different ways by different people. It has been said:

“The root stands for the accessories, action and time, person and number, that is the verb; gender and number, accessories to action, this is what the nominal stem stands for.”¹⁹

That the ātmanepada suffix comes after a root which expresses mere action or the object of action, that the parasmaipada suffix is added to a root which expresses the agent has been said on the basis of an imaginary separation. The statement

“After conveying its own meaning (the universal) which inheres (in its substratum) the word, (though) free from any further requirement, denotes the substance”

Is nothing more than the following of the order in which the understanding takes place.²⁰ A word does not convey its own meaning and others by pausing again and again, because it is uttered only once. Nor is it ever separated from its meaning. Nor is there any fixed sequence in the understanding of the meaning by the hearer or the speaker.²¹ The object, qualified by all the attributes, a bundle of all the parts, which are closely linked, comes at one and the same time- within the range of a single cognition and later, one deliberately analyses it into different cognitions. But, since an intuition leading to purposeful activity cannot take place without the reunification of what has, been divided, one again understands the connected form. The sequence of the cognitions of the speaker or the hearer who understands the parts separately, through considerations of proximity, width of scope, abundance of the causes of manifestation, the desire to know and the tendency to awaken the seed of another cognition²² is not fixed in regard to the parts which are to be understood. For it has been said:—

“The one object is divided in many ways on the basis of difference of powers, by following the different forms of cognition, by those who know the nature of knowledge.”

The meaning with a fixed character in the Science of Grammar is either the word-meaning or the sentence-meaning. For it has been said:—

“Or no, for it is the word which is used to convey the meaning.”²³ and

“What is extra, that is the meaning of the sentence.”²⁴ In the Saṅgraha also, it has been said:—

“What is called the word is not fixed in its form. The form and the meaning of a word are born from the meaning of a sentence.”

Even though the form of the word to be explained is determined, according to the view that the sentence is the limit of analysis, there is no fixity in the form to be accepted when it comes to division into stem and suffix, of words like marutta, indrāṇī, aikāgārika, giriśa, śrotriya, kṣattriya etc.²⁵ It has been said:—

“The word with its meaning comes from the meaning (of the sentence). It is through the word that the meaning of a sentence is determined. The sentence is born of a collection of words and the word is born of a collection of phonemes.”

At the time of derivation, it is stated that the word exists in the sentence and that the word is born of a collection of phonemes.

The relation has also been shown as that of cause and effect. For example:—

“They, describing their fortunes from birth to death, reveal them as existing, as figuring in the mind.”²⁶

Here and there, the relation has also been described as fitness. For example:—

“Expression, on the other hand, is natural.”²⁷ While the colour remains the same, the words śoṇa, karka and hema are applied to a horse and not to a cow and others.²⁸

Similarly, it has been said:—

“Among those who work and study equally, some are rewarded with understanding while others are not”²⁹ and so on.

“Such roots having the circumflex accent and ñ as indicatory letter have been taught by the Teacher which are both, i.e., the fruit of whose action is meant for the agent and not meant for the agent.”³⁰

The author of the Saṅgraha says:—

“When the word and the meaning are separated, there is division in usage. Because (really speaking) the unity of the word and the meaning is established.”

Again he says:—

“Neither in the world nor in the Veda is there any person who creates the relation. How can the relation of words (with meanings) be created through words?”

Notes

1. Yeyam aupacārikī sattā sā sarvaśabdapravṛttikāraṇam (Vṛ.).

2. It is not merely the indivisible meaning of the sentence which is artificially divided but the meaning of a single word can also be so divided. The addition of the verb asti to the single word vṛkṣa shows that even sentences consisting of single words are artificially divided.

3. Namasyati etc. Even though namasyati is explained as namaḥ karoti, ‘he pays homage’ as involving an agent’ an object and an action, what is understood from it in the end does not involve such differentiation, but is a unified whole. The separation of the elements at the time of the explanation is artificial. When grammar speaks about primary and secondary suffixes and their meanings, it is all artificial. It is the whole word ending in one of these suffixes which has a meaning. See P. 3.1.17, 19, 21; 25.

4. Vā. 19 on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bhā. I. p. 237).

5. M.Bhā. I. p. 319, I. 6.

6. Padāvadhikam anvākhyānam. Tire word śukla ordinarily denotes the quality white. When one wants the word to denote, not the quality, but the thing which has that quality, the suffix matup has to be added to the word according to P. 5.2.94. But the elision of this suffix after words expressive of quality has also been taught. Thus when the word means ‘a white thing’ the form would still be śukla. Thus the word śukla denotes two different things: the quality white and the thing having that quality. The fact of being white (śuklatva) exists in both and, on that basis, the word gets its form; namely, its singular number and neuter gender: śuklam. Even when a word expressive of die thing or things in which the quality resides is used like paṭāḥ, the word śuklam which has already acquired its form according to the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis, would retain it and we would get the expression: śuklaṃ paṭāḥ. But as the expression is wrong, Pānini, in order to prevent its occurrence; says: Viśeṣaṇānām cājāṭeḥ (P. 1.2.52). According to this rule, adjectives take the gender and number of the words which they qualify. The very tact that he makes such a sūtra shows that he considers die word to be the limit of grammatical analysis.

Vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam. According to this view, a quality always resides in its substratum. It cannot be thought of in isolation. The gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum would inevitably belong to the word expressive of the quality. Therefore words like śukla never express the quality white, in isolation. So it would never have the singular number and neuter gender in isolation. It would have the gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum where it resides. Therefore, no special sūtra is necessary to bring it about. That is why it has been declared unnecessary in the sūtra Tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt (P. 1.2.53).

7. P. 1.2.52.

8. M.Bhā. I. p. 430, 1. 11.

9. Vā. 5. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bhā. I. p. 490).

10. Vā. 8. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bhā. I. p. 491).

11. P. 2.1.57.

12. P. 2.1.55.

13. See the Vṛtti on Kā 23.

14. Śabdapūrvake vā prayoge. See Vā. 9, Paspaśāhnika and the M. Bhā thereon. But śabdapūrvaka prayoga which leads to dharma and abhyudaya must be distinguished from śabdapurva yoga which is mentioned in several places in the Vṛtti. See the Vṛtti on Kā 14, 131, 142. It must also be distinguished from Vāgyoga which is already mentioned in the M. Bhā, Paspaśāhnika and here in the Vṛtti on I. 130.

15. P. 3. 1. 26.

16. P. 4.1.3.

17. P. 2.2.6.

18. There are different views current among grammarians as to the number of meanings which a bare stem (prātipadika) can convey. Some hold that it can denote five things (pañcaka): svārtha (the universal), dravya (the particular) liṅga (gender), saṃkhyā (number) and accesory to action (kāraka). For example, in the sentence dadhyānaya, the word dadhi denotes all the five things, even though, in form, it is no more than the bare stem. Others thiṅk that the accessory to action is conveyed by the suffix and so attribute only four (catuṣka) to the bare stem. Others thiṅk that number^- also is the meaning of the suffix, in which case only three (trika) remain for the bare stem. If the feminine gender is considered to be the meaning of the feminine suffix, the bare stem would convey only two ideas (dvika).

19. According to Vṛṣabha, this is a sūtra belonging to the Kāśakṛtsna school. He is also our sole authority for the meanings of the technical words used in the sūtra. From his explanation it follows that, according to Kāśakṛtsna, the suffixes do not express any meaning apart from what the root or the nominal stem expresses. As Vṛ. puts it: pratyayānāmavyatiriktārthābhidhānāt. It is also to be noted that, in the supposed sūtra of Kāśakṛtsna, which verbal element expresses which meaning is directly stated, so that one does not have to depend on indications.

20. Pratipattikramaniyamānugamamātram—Na śabdagato'abhidhānakramo'pi tu pratipattyapratipattikramaḥ (Vṛ.).

21. Pratipattikramo hy ayaṃ śrotur abhidhātur vā na vyavasthitaḥ. The idea is that there is no sequence at all. The following sentence makes it clear.

22. In understanding the parts abstracted from the unified whole, the speaker or the hearer is guided by the following factors, as explained by Vṛṣabha:—1. Pratyāsatti=proximity. It is the universal which exists in a particular that helps one to distinguish the latter from other kinds of particulars. So that universal is proximate to the particular and, therefore, it is understood first. But the universal cannot be understood except through the particular in which it inheres nor can gender be understood except through the particular in which it resides. So, through the desire to cognise the universal and proximity to gender, the particular is grasped. Gender is understood before number and accessory because it does not depend upon any other particular for its comprehension and it also helps to distinguish the particular in which it exists from other particulars; 2. Width of scope (mahāviṣayatva) can be seen in the universal which inheres in all the particulars. Compared to gender, the particular has a wider scope, because all the genders can exist in the particular. One gender excludes the others and so it has a narrower scope. Gender is wider in scope than number, because the same gender can cover all numbers, whereas one number excludes the other numbers. As all the particulars can manifest the universal, the latter has abundant causes of manifestation; 3. (abhivyaktinimittopavyañjanaprakarṣa). The universal has more manifestors compared to the particular which is manifested by its own parts only; 4. The desire to know (upalipsā) is also a factor: what is desired to be known first is known first. Finally, all cognitions have inner dispositions (bīja) among their causes. They are awakened (vṛttilābha) before the cognitions take place. The cog- nition of the universal tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise the particular while that of the latter tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise gender etc. This is what is called; 5. bījavṛttilābhānuguṇyam.

23. Vā. 19, on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bhā. I. p. 237).

24. M.Bhā on Vā. 2. on P. 2.3.49. (M.Bhā. I. p. 462).

25. These words can be analysed in different ways—
Marutta: Marut + tap (Vā. 10 on P. 5.2.122) or Marut + dā + kta, in the sense of marudbhir dattaḥ, the root dā being elided.
Indrāṇī: Indra + ānuk + ṅīṣ or Indra + ān (causative of an) + aṇ + ṅīp.
Aikāgārika: Ekāgāra + ṭhañṭ or Ekāgāra + ṭhañ.
Giriśa: Giri + śī + ḍa (auṇādika) or Giri + śa (matvarthīya).
Śrotriya: nipāta according to P. 5.2.84. Or Chandas = śrotra + ghan (adhīte ityarthe).
Kṣatriya: Kṣatra + gha or Kṣatra + iya, 26. M. Bhā on Vā. 15 on P. 3.1.26.

27. Vā. 15 on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 433).

28. Cf. M.Bhā. Vol. I. p. 433. It is there pointed out that the words Śoṇa, hema and karka which mean red, black and white respectively, can be applied only to a horse of that colour and not to other animals of the same colour.

29. M.Bhā. on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 430, 1. 12).

30. M.Bhā. on P. 1.3.72. (Vol. I. p. 292, 1. 22).