Verse 1.23

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 1.23:

नित्याः शब्दार्थसंबन्धास्तत्रान्नाता महर्षिभिः ।
सूत्राणां सानुतन्त्राणां भाष्याणां च प्रणेतृभिः ॥ २३ ॥

nityāḥ śabdārthasaṃbandhāstatrānnātā maharṣibhiḥ |
sūtrāṇāṃ sānutantrāṇāṃ bhāṣyāṇāṃ ca praṇetṛbhiḥ || 23 ||

23. There, the great sages who are the authors of the Sūtras, Vārttikas and the Bhāṣya have declared words, meanings and their relation to one another to be eternal.

Commentary

The very basis of the science of Grammar is that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. In it, by ‘word’ is meant the universal (ākṛti) of the word. It has been said:—

“As the universal is eternal, so is the word eternal.”¹ This science proceeds on the basis of the universal. In fact, it has been said:—

“That is already established, because it is the universal which is taught.”²

This universal is different from the particular universal called ‘wordness’. Wordness is a universal which coexists in the same thing with other (lesser) universals which cannot co-exist in the same thing. Universals of words, like the universal of the word tree, when there is vagueness, are mixed up with the causes of the manifestation of the individual word and when manifested by the individual word, are called words.³ Just as, in a pot, the facts of being substance, earth and pot can co-inhere, in the same way, in the word ‘tree’, universals like those of being an attribute, a word and the word tree can co-inhere without mutual opposition.

(Objection) In the case of objects like the pot, the parts of which exist at the same time, one can see that the whole (avayavī) is the cause of the manifestation of the particular universal (pot-ness). But the parts of a particular word cannot co-exist, they are not produced at the same time, they do not exist at the same time, they are unnameable (avyayadeśya) and so they cannot produce the whole word, the many material parts of which do not co-exist and where the universal can inhere. The universal word-ness exists in each part. If, similarly, it is maintained that the universal of the particular word tree also exists in each part, then the cognition having the form of the word tree would occur even after the first part is uttered, i.e., when parts like ‘v’ are uttered in isolation (and that does not happen).

This is not a valid objection. It is as in the case of actions like lifting, revolving, pouring etc., which are produced and perish and whose parts do not produce another action corresponding to the whole (avayavī). Nor is the inherence, in the parts, of universals like the fact of being lifting etc., distinct from the fact of being action, not accepted.⁴ Nor do cognitions having the form of particular actions like lifting arise when only a part is seen. ‘These parts of actions are due to special efforts and each of them is the substratum of universals like the fact of being lifting etc., but as this particularity is difficult to grasp, they do not produce a cognition having a particular universal as its object. All the manifesting factors of that particular cognition have not yet come into being. Therefore, there cannot be any verbal usage based on it. But when these actions, involving contacts and separations, determined by a particular direction, are perceived in succession, then verbal usage, characterised by a particular universal, becomes possible. In the same way, in the case of words like ‘vṛkṣa’, distinct parts like ‘v’ are produced by special effort, but their distinction is difficult to grasp and even though they, at the time of the utterance of each part, suggest the universals of particular words, one cannot perform any verbal usage with them, because universals do not, at that time, have many elements to suggest them. But when a succession of the parts is gradually perceived, verbal usage based on particular universals becomes possible.

Grammarians do not necessarily accept the view current in other śāstras regarding the mode of suggestion of the universals.⁵ Suggestors do not necessarily suggest what inheres in them. Even though the universal of a word may not inhere in the word, when the mind is prepared by the successive impressions left by the cognition of the previous phonemes of a word, the universal of the word, previously not cognised or indistinctly cognised, is perceived through the cognition of the last phoneme.⁶ One infers the existence of the universal of a particular word from the recognition which one makes in the form ‘This is the same as that’ when words like ‘vṛkṣa’ are uttered by parrots, sārikās, men etc.

Even those who do not accept the existence of such a universal declare that there is one eternal word which is suggested by the many sounds of a word.⁷ Others still accept divisions in the form of phonemes within the word.⁸ Some others hold that the word is one, whether it be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, but appears to have parts produced in a sequence. Others still hold that, due to the continuity of tradition, there is constant usage and the speakers are not aware of the beginning of words which are eternal because of uninterrupted usage.⁹

The eternality of meanings is also accepted by some on the basis of the eternality of universals. It has been asked:—

“According to what conception of word-meaning would the analysis “siddhe śabde arthe saṃbandhe” be proper? And the answer is:—

“That it is the universal.”¹⁰

In this Bhāṣya passage, the eternity of meanings has been variously explained, according to all the views. It has to be understood according to the Bhāṣya.

The relation is also eternal. What is meant in this: where there is the idea of mutual appurtenance, the relation between word and meaning in the form ‘It is this’ is since meaning cannot be assigned (by grammar)¹¹, eternal, self-existing and not something not known before and made for the first time by some speaker for the benefit of some listener. Therefore the relation between word and meaning is beginningless and unbroken. Or, it may be stated that the relation between word and meaning is that of the illuminator and the illuminated (prakāśyaprakāśakabhāva), based upon convention (samayopādhiḥ) a kind of fitness, like that between the senses and their objects. Or it may be said that the relation between word and meaning is causality based on unbroken tradition, considering that the cognition (arising from words) having the form of external objects, thought of as external and accepted as having a mental as well as an external object, just as the letters of the script are thought of as the phonemess of the alphabet, because they bring the latter to the minds. It has been said (in order to show that the meaning is essentially mental):—

“They, while explaining their deeds from birth to death,. make them present to the mind, objects of the mind.”¹²

What is meant by ‘taught there by the great sages’, is: by the authors of the sūtras etc. Those who have composed the sūtras etc. of the science of Grammar are referred to. The very fact that the sūtras have been composed shows that they considered the words to be eternal. There would be no purpose in composing the science of Grammar if the words were not eternal. Because they would be a matter of mere usage and great cultured persons would not take the trouble of expounding them. Therefore, the science of Grammar proceeds only when the correct forms of words are well established. Others bring forward sūtras like Tadaśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt.

“This, (the concord of gender and number taught in P. 1, 2, 51.) need not be taught because names are to be accepted as they are (pramāṇa).”¹³

As proof that the words are eternal. In the vārttikas also, there are the following statements which show the eternality of the word.

“On the basis that the word, the meaning and their relation are eternal.”¹⁴

“That is already proved because the word is eternal.”¹⁵

“It is sphoṭa which is the word, the sound is only the product of effort”¹⁶ (vyāyāma).

“The whole word takes the place of the whole word.”¹⁷

In the Bhāṣya also, it has, indeed, been said:—

“This matter has been specifically considered in the Saṅgraha, namely whether the word is eternal.”¹⁸

It has also been said in a Bhāṣya passage.

“Word being eternal, the phonemes also should be eternal and changeless.”¹⁹

Even if eternality is taken as something merely practical (the teaching of augments and substitutes does not violate it). As has been said:—

“(As) both Khadira and Barbura have fine leaves and yellow stalks, (when one says) ‘the Khadira has thorns’, (what happens is not that the statement adds thorns which were not there, but that the idea of Khadira which might have extended to both is now restricted to Khadira only.)²⁰ Similarly, when one, after having said:—

“To the east of the village are the mango-trees” (one adds), “the banyan trees have milk, downward growths and wide leaves”.

(All that happens is that the idea of mango-trees which might have been wrongly extended to the banyan trees also now disappears and, in its place, the idea of banyan tree comes).

Or (it might be said) those very sages who have realised the truth and have, in the course of their different teachings, composed Sūtras, Anutantrā (vārttikas) and Bhāṣya, have, in the science of Grammar also, declared that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. And their authority in the world is established.

Notes

1. Though the idea is found expressed in the M.Bhā, the actual words are not traceable.

2. M. Bhā I, p. 13.

3. Śabdākṛtiviśeṣā hi etc. This sentence is somewhat obscure. The previous sentences told us that the word stands for the universal and that the universal of a word can co-inhere in it with other lesser universals. If the word stands for the universal, why do we say ‘word’ instead of saying ‘wordness’? This sentence is apparently an answer to that question. The main part of the sentence is vṛkṣaśabdatvādayaḥ śabdā ityapadiśyante = The universals of words like Vṛkṣaśabdatva are merely referred to as the words. That is because they are identified (sarūpatām āpannāḥ) with the cause of their manifestation (nimitta), namely, the individual words. This manifestation is necessary. Otherwise there would be extreme vagueness (sati vastusampramohe) and there would be no verbal usage at all.

4. Karmatvasāmānyādanye utkṣepaṇatvādayasteṣu karmakṣaṇeṣu samavetā abhyupagamyanta eva vaiśeṣikaiḥ—Vṛ.

5. Na cāvaśyaṃ śāstrāntare pariḍṛṣṭā jātyabhivyaktiprakriyā vaiyākaraṇaiḥ parigṛhyate. The usual view connected particularly with the Vaiśeṣikas, is that the universal (jāti) inheres in the particular which, therefore, reveals it. Though the universal is eternal according to them, it exists in the particular and it can be perceived only as existing in the particular. The latter, therefore, is said to reveal it (abhivyañjaka). When such a process is described, universals like ghaṭatva, existing in ghaṭa, are kept in mind. The universal vṛkṣaśabdatva does not exist in the word vṛkṣa exactly as ghaṭatva exists in the ghaṭa and its perception is also a different process which is described in greater detail in the course of the work. For the present, it may be noted that when light and the senses reveal objects, they reveal things which do not inhere in them, but are external to them.

6. There are two views on this question: (1) cognition of the last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions left by the cognitions of the previous phonemes, cause the cognition of the universal, (2) the cognition of the last phoneme, together with those of the previous phonemes, leave impressions which cause the cognition of the universal.

7. Yair apyākṛtivyavahāro nābhyupagamyate etc. The same word, uttered by different persons, at different times or even by parrots etc, is recognised as the same word. But this recognition of identity must not be confused with the universal. If it were the universal it should rest on a particular word as ghaṭatva rests on a particular ghaṭa. But it seems to be somewhat independent of it. So it is conceived by some as an eternal independent entity and not as a universal. The fact that it is suggested by the impressions left by the different phonemes of a word also points to the same conclusion.

8. Vṛ. remarks: parasparavyāvṛttā varṇāstatreti bhāgavantaṃ sphoṭaṃ manyante.

9. Vyavahāranityatayā nityāḥ śabdā iti. Vyavahāranityatā, vyavasthānityatā, pravāhanityatā, all mean continuity as distinguished from Kūṭasthanityatā, absolute eternaliity or changelessness.

10. M.Bhā. I, p. 7, 1. 8.

11. Arthānādeśanāt. tacca laghvartham. ko hi samartho dhātuprātipadikapratyayanipātānām arthān ādeṣṭum. (M.Bhā. I, p. 363).

12. M.Bhā. on P. 3.1.26.

13. P. 1.2.53.

14. M.Bhā. 1.1.

15. Not traceable.

16. Not found in the Vārttikas nor in the M.Bhā.

17. M.Bhā on P. 1.1.20 (I, p. 75).

18. M.Bhā. I. p. 6, 1. 12.

19. M.Bhā. I. p. 18. 1. 14-15.

20. M.Bhā. I. p. 113. 1. 12.