Prasthanatrayi Swaminarayan Bhashyam (Study)

by Sadhu Gyanananddas | 2021 | 123,778 words

This page relates ‘Pramanas: Basic Introduction’ of the study on the Prasthanatrayi Swaminarayan Bhashyam in Light of Swaminarayan Vachanamrut (Vacanamrita). His 18th-century teachings belong to Vedanta philosophy and were compiled as the Vacanamrita, revolving around the five ontological entities of Jiva, Ishvara, Maya, Aksharabrahman, and Parabrahman. Roughly 200 years later, Bhadreshdas composed a commentary (Bhasya) correlating the principles of Vachanamrut.

1.3. Pramāṇas: Basic Introduction

[Full title: Pramāṇamimāṃsā (Epistemology) (3): Pramāṇas: Basic Introduction]

Here, we will discuss the principal means (source) of knowledge in the Indian Vedic tradition.

1. Perception

Annama Bhaṭṭa defines perception as:

tatra pratyakṣajñānakaraṇaṃ pratyakṣam |
indriyārthasannikarṣajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam
[1]

Knowledge produced by proximity of sense and object is perception. Its instrumental cause is sense.

Gautama defines perception:

indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam” (Nyāya-sūtra 1/1/4)

In this manner, sense perception is considered a direct means of knowledge. Therefore, almost every tradition in Indian darśanic thought accepts it. In order to remove many epistemological issues, perception is considered a foundational source of knowledge.

2. Inference

Annama Bhaṭṭa explains:

anumitikaraṇam anumānam |[2]

An inference is the knowledge that emerges from the deduction. Anuman is dependent on first knowledge, the knowledge that follows another knowledge. To define the sādhya, they explain the medium of some mark that is called reason. The base of inference is invariable concomitance. The subject, where the sādhya lies is already defined with the parāmarśa. When one perceives smoke on a distant hill, one recalls his or her experience on the common concomitance between smoke and fire. As a result, he concludes that there is fire on that hill.

82 Bhaṭṭa Annama, op.cit., p. 95

83 Bilimoriyā Puruṣottama, Sabdaprarnaa: Word and Knowledge, Kluwer Academic Publishers, AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1988, p.14

84 Bhaṭṭa Annama, op.cit., 2012, p. 158

3. Verbal Testimony

Śabda (Verbal Testimony) is a means to valid knowledge which is accepted by all bhakti traditions.[3]

Since there are a lot of definitions of verbal testimony but Annama Bhaṭṭa puts it in a simple way:

āptavākyaṃ śabdaḥ | āptastu yathārthavaktā | vākyaṃ padasamūhaḥ | yathā gām ānayeti | śaktaṃ padam | asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya itīśvarasaṃketaḥ śaktiḥ ||[4]

Śabda is a statement of a trustworthy person (Āptavākya) and consists in understanding its meaning. That person may be human or divine. The scriptures are written or explained by the ancient sages. Hence, they are trustworthy. Vedas and Vedic literature fall into this category too. Even for human trustworthy persons, if their words are spoken in a particular sense are valid.

4. Analogy and Similarity

Upa’ and ‘māna’ collectively express the meaning ‘upamāna’ (analogy and similarity). The word ‘upa’ explains similarity and the term ‘māna’ means ‘cognition’. Therefore, upamāna as a means of knowledge is derived from the resemblance between two objects. It is a means of knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. When the knowledge emerges due to similarity, it falls in this stratum.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which advocates, as we see in the words of Annam Bhaṭṭa:

upamitikaraṇam upamānam | saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandhajñānam upamitiḥ | tatkaraṇaṃ sādṛśyajñānam |[5]

“Comparison or the recognition of likeness is the cause of an inference from similarity.”

5. Presumption

The Mimāṃsaka and Advaitīns claim Arthāpatti (presumption) as a special source of valid knowledge. Moreover, the Advaitīns assume arthāpatti as a right way of cognition: ‘tatropapādyajñānenopapādaka-kalpanamarthāpattiḥ |[6] The term “arthāpatti” is a group of two words; first ‘artha’ and second ‘āpatti’. Artha means fact and āpatti shows imagination.

Therefore, this means of knowledge removes the issue between fact and fact and imagination. For instance,

pīno devadatta divā na bhuṅkte

Devadatta is a fat boy who never eats food during the day. In this example, two statements are shown which are against each other. In this case, presumption comes and solves the problem and leads us to the right knowledge that Devadatta eats food at night. The Upaniṣad reveals, ‘tarati śokam ātmavid’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad XII 7/1/3) ‘the knower of the soul transcends sorrow’ indicates the perishable nature of the world by the implementation of postulation.[7]

6. Non-cognition

Anupalabdhī (non-cognition) is the instant knowledge of the non-existence of things. The Advaitins and Kumārīla accept Anupalabdhī but Prabhākara refutes it.[8]

The Vedanta Paribhāṣā defines Anupalabdhī as:

jñānakaraṇājanyābhāvānubhavāsādhāraṇa-karaṇamanulabdhirūpaṃ pramāṇam[9]

“The mean of valid knowledge known as non-cognition is the special cause of that apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowledge as an instrument.”

Non-cognition was invariably used to refute other’s philosophical positions in ancient philosophical debates in India.

7. Suppositional Reasoning

Annama Bhaṭṭa describes:

vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropastarkaḥ yathā yadi vahnir na syāt tarhi dhūmo'pi na syād iti ||[10]

If there is not the existence of fire means there is no possibility of smoke. Using positive correlations of invariable concomitance, the philosopher uses its negative correlations to refute others’ positions. As a result, a doubt in the form of effect might arise without a cause. It is a kind of pure logic. For example, smoke and fire are positively related as far as their existence is concerned, but by saying if there is no fire means there is no smoke, they make it very difficult for the opponents to make put arguments right. This argument is also found in the Nyāya-sūtra and other works.[11]

In this way, epistemology in the Indian Vedic tradition has a profound and significant value in understanding the Vedic principles in their respective school of Vedanta. Before we proceed to analyze the Svāminārāyaṇa Darśana found in the Prasthānatrayī Svāminārāyaṇa Bhāṣya on the basis of epistemology, the above-mentioned study is inevitable to understand, grasp and differentiate the Svāminārāyaṇa School from others.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Bhaṭṭa Annama, Tarka Saṃgraha, with Hindī Vyākhyā -Brahmacāriṇī Gītā Banarjī, Caukhambā Vidyā Bhavanaa, Vārāṇasī, 2012, p.80

[2]:

Bhaṭṭa Annama, op.cit., p. 95

[3]:

Bilimoriyā Puruṣottama, Sabdaprarnaa: Word and Knowledge, Kluwer Academic Publishers, AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1988, p.14

[4]:

Bhaṭṭa Annama, op.cit., 2012, p. 158

[5]:

Bhaṭṭa Annama, op.cit., p.154

[6]:

Adhvarindra Dharmarājā, Vedanta Paribhāṣā, Ed., Gajñāna na Śāstrī, Caukhambā Vidya Bhavana, Vārāṇasī, 2015, p. 466

[7]:

Adhvarindra Dharmarājā, op.cit., p.269

[8]:

Dāsaguptā Surendranātha, A history of indian philosophy vol-1, Motīlāla Banārasīdāsa, Varanasi, p.379

[9]:

Adhvarindra Dharmarājā, Vedanta Paribhāṣā, op.cit., p.279

[10]:

Bhaṭṭa Annama, op.cit., p. 172

[11]:

Nyāya-sūtra1/1/1

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