by E. B. Cowell | 1882 | 102,190 words | ISBN-13: 9788174791962
The Sarva-darsana-samgraha (English translation) of Madhava Acharya is a compendium of different philosophical schools of Hindu thought and Pancadasi, an important text in the Advaita Vedanta tradition. Full title: Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha or Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy (author Mādhava Ācārya)...
If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great Commentary," is "atha śabdānuśāsanam," "Now comes the exposition of words." The particle atha ("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is meant the system of grammar put forth by Pāṇini. Now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed the particle atha, since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else.
The word "exposition" (anuśāsana), as here used, implies that thereby Vaidic words, such as those in the line śaṃ no devīr abhiṣṭaye, &c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for "cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of the exposition, i.e., are deduced from their original roots and properly formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix. We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object [śabdānuśāsanam standing for śabdasyānuśāsanam], and as there is a rule of Pāṇini (karmaṇi ca, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the phrase śabdānuśāsanam does not come before us as a duly authorised compound.
Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the alleged rule of Pāṇini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with a kṛt affix, there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent; this limitation arising from our taking ubhayaprāpti in the sūtra as a bahuvrīhi compound. Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in the Kāśikā Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words of the teacher' or 'by the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended relates to words and not to things, and since this can be at once understood without any mention of the agent, i.e., the teacher, any such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object and the agent are not both expressed in one and the same sentence, this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in connection with a word ending with a kṛt affix, is to be put in the genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the tatpuruṣa compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms as idhma-pravraścana, palāśa-śātana, &c. Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this shaṣṭhītatpuruṣa is one of the class called "residual," in accordance with Pāṇini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used in the residuum," [i.e., in the other constructions not provided for by special rules]; and in this way we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīya has shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to the accent. To this effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamāna—
"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,
"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed.
"Thus have they explained the meaning of Pāṇini's sūtras, since
"He himself uses such phrases as janikartuḥ and tatprayojakaḥ."
Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question (of the Mahābhāṣya) is that "it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning words' are now commenced."
"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since the employment of such a word as śabdānuśāsanam, the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate study (aṅga) to the Veda. Otherwise, if there were no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) end," because, even though there be such an injunction, it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an aṅga of the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say—
"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,
"And therefore grammar is useless?"
Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an aṅga of the Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that grammar is an aṅga of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Sarasvatī." Now it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an aṅga of the Veda that he uses the words atha śabdānuśāsanam and not atha vyākaraṇam. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words, i.e., propriety of speech. "But," an objector may say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and improper words. Thus there is a tradition that Bṛhaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by word, and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was Bṛhaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,—how much less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means,—reading, understanding, practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), karmaṇi, the affix aṇ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it; and by this rule we learn many words, as kumbhakāra, "a potter," kāṇḍalāva, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special rule (iii. 2, 3), āto 'nupasarge kaḥ, directing that the affix ka is to be used after a root that ends in long ā when there is no upasarga, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be [since it would never teach us how to distinguish an upasarga]. "But since there are other aṅgas, why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six aṅgas the principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said—
"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,
"The wise have called grammar the first aṅga of the Veda."
Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary [quoting a Vārttika], "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance." Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus Kātyāyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word according to the śāstra; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in Svarga the desire-milking cow." Thus (they say)—
"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;
"But those who use such false forms as acīkramata must trudge thither on foot."
Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?" since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. For the Śruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,—roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great commentator thus explains it:—The "four horns" are the four kinds of words—nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes, laṭ, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the "manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs—the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" (vṛṣabha) is applied from its pouring forth (varshaṇa), i.e., from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," i.e., utters sound, for the root ru means "sound;" here by the word "sound" developed speech (or language) is implied; "the great god enters mortals,"—the "great god," i.e., speech,—enters mortals, i.e., men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is declared the likeness [of speech] to the supreme Brahman.
The eternal word, called sphoṭa, without parts, and the cause of the world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartṛhari in the part of his book called the Brahmakāṇḍa—
"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,
"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."
"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakīrṇaka—
"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,
"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."
Helārāja interprets the fivefold division as including karmapravacanīyas. But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, since karmapravacanīyas distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions (upasargas).
"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called sphoṭa? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception.
Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as sphoṭa, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma:—Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a sphoṭa by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this sphoṭa is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (sphuṭyate) or revealed by the letters," hence it is called sphoṭa, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called sphoṭa as causing the knowledge of the meaning,—these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word 'cow' gauḥ? It is that word by which, when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "The Vākyapadīya has established at length that it is the sphoṭa which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound, expresses the meaning."
Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that the sphoṭa has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as sphoṭa is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that sphoṭa conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest sphoṭa." This has been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika—
"The grammarian who holds that sphoṭa is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."
The truth is, that, as Pāṇini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sūt. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help. If you object that as there are the same letters in rasa as in sara, in nava as in vana, in dīnā as in nadī, in māra as in rāma, in rāja as in jāra, &c., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautātita—
"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."
Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called sphoṭa is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant].
All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw; for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause, could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of sphoṭa. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called sphoṭa which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by.'" This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible sphoṭa, and each successive letter makes this sphoṭa more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, since Bhartṛhari has shown in his first book that the letters of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such a word," we are forced to assume the existence of an indivisible sphoṭa as a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the Mahābhāṣya) on "genus" (jāti), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that summum genus, i.e., that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality (Brahman).
"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said—
"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."
"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."
All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the summum genus, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species, as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the summum genus) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have the following authoritative testimony—
"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."
And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the affixed tva, tal, &c., express" (Pāṇini v. 1, 119).
"Existence" is that great summum genus which is found in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (gotva and aśvatva) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one summum genus existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (prātipadika). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expresses bhāva; now, as bhāva is "existence," the meaning of a root is really existence. Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (kriyā); but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line—
"Others say that action (kriyā) is a genus, residing in many individuals."
So, too, if we accept Pāṇini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the affixes tva and tal come after a word [denoting anything], when we speak of the nature (bhāva) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in tva or tā [as aśvatva and aśvatā] are used in the sense of bhāva, that they do express "existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two kārikās quoted above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on sambandha [in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.
"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination, but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."
So, too, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, when explaining the Vārttika, "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and determined by various unreal conditions [as "the nature of horse," &c.]
According to the opinion of Vājapyāyana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," &c., denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c., denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood, &c. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in paṭhati, "he reads," &c., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.
In the doctrine of Vyāḍi, who maintained that words meant individual things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."
Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pāṇini; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that "when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Brāhman is to be honoured," which may equally run, "Brāhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form" [i.e., the dual means Rāma and Rāma, and the plural means Rāma, and Rāma and Rāma; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. Therefore both theories are in a sense true; but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.
As it has been said—
"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."
Hari also, in his chapter discussing sambandha, thus describes the nature of this true meaning—
So too in his description of substance, he says—
"That which remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,—that wherein change comes and goes, that they call the Supreme Nature."
The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.
"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls."
The meaning of this Kārikā is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of "concealment" [exercised by illusion] at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedānta lore tell us—
"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a development of illusion likewise."
When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman." And thus we establish the fact that the "exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.
Thus it has been said—
"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the science of sciences."
And so again—
"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation."
Therefore our final conclusion is that the Śāstra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.
E. B. C.
Footnotes and references:
Mādhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the Pūrva-Mímáṃsá school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats of sphoṭa here, and not in his Jaimini chapter.
Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.
Śabdānuśāsana, if judged by the apparent sense of Pāṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressed as well as an object, i.e., if such a word as ācāryeṇa followed. In the example given, we cannot say āścaryo godoho śikṣitena gopālena (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we say āścaryo gavāṃ doho' śikṣitasya gopālasya (as it would violate ii. 3, 66).
That is, the ubhayaprāpti of ii. 3, 66, is a bahuvrīhi agreeing with kṛti in ii. 3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Pāṇini.
These actually occur in the Commentaries to Pāṇini, ii. 2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.
This takes in all cases of relation, sambandha (i.e., shaṣṭhī-sambandha).
As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.
These compounds occur in Pāṇini's own sūtras (i. 4, 30, and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as shaṣṭhī śeṣe.
The very word śabda in śabdānuśāsanam implies the Veda, since this is pre-eminently śabda.
Compare Max Müller, Sansk. Liter., p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the Mahābhāshya.
In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele daṇḍa in line 3 after bhavet, and insert it in line 4 after śabdānām.
As in the so-called pada text.
See Ballantyne's Mahābhāshya, pp. 12, 64.
Acīkramata seems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative of kram for acaṅkramyata.
Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartṛhari which immediately follow.
One would naturally supply śabdasya after sāmyam, but the Mahābhāshya has naḥ sāmyam (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).
I.e., prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.
The karmapravacanīyas imply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus in the example, Śākalyasaṃhitām anu prāvarshat, "he rained after the Śākalya hymns," anu implies an understood verb niśamya, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This anu is said to determine this relation.
This is not very clear, the anu in anugraha might mean krameṇa, and so imply the successive order of the letters.
See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.
In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read kalpam for kalpanam.
In p. 142, line 3, I add vinā after nimittam.
The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means uddeśyāsiddhi.
In p. 143, line 13, I read sphoṭakabhāvam for sphoṭābhāvam.
Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahābhāshya, pp. 9, 32.
The Mīmāṃsâ holds that a word means the genus (jāti) and not the individual (vyakti); the Nyāya holds that a word means an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).
Cf. Rig-Veda Prātiś. xii. 5.
He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.
Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.
So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really meant, the one abiding existence.
Cf. Ballantyne's Mahābhāshya, pp. 44, 50.
In p. 145, line 8, read asatya for aśvattha.
We have here the well-known four grammatical categories, jāti, guna, dravya or saṅjnā, and kriyā.
But cf. Siddh. Muktāv., p. 6, line 12.
Thus we read in the Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 82, that the Mīmāṃsā holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, since otherwise there would be vyabhicāra and ānantya (cf. also Maheśacandra Nyāyaratna's note, Kāvya-prakāśa, p. 10). If a word is held to mean only one individual, there will be the first fault, as it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not include; if it is held to mean many individuals, it will have an endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."
This seems the meaning of the text as printed tasmāt dvayaṃ satyam, but I should prefer to read conjecturally tasmād advayaṃ satyam, "therefore non-duality is the truth."
Scil. they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone exists.
Scil. the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman.
The Saṃvṛti of the text seems to correspond to the āvaraṇa so frequent in Vedānta books.
This passage is quoted in the Maitrī Upaniṣad, vi. 22.
Adhividyam occurs in Taitt. Upaniṣad, i. 3, 1, where it is explained by [']Saṃkara as vidyāsv adhi yad dar[']sanaṃ tad adhividyam.