Text 88: On Conjunction (Samyoga)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 88:

सम्योगः सम्युक्तप्रत्ययनिमित्तम् । स च द्रव्यगुणकर्महेतुः । द्रव्यारम्भे निरपेक्षस्तथा भवतीति सापेक्षेभ्यो निरपेक्षेभ्यश्चेति वचनात् । गुणकर्मारम्भे तु सापेक्षः सम्युक्तसमवायादग्नेर्वैशेषिकमिति वचनात् । अथ कथंलक्षणः कतिविधश्चेति । अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः सम्योगः स च त्रिविधः अन्यतरकर्मजः उभयकर्मजः सम्योगजश्च । तत्रान्यतरकर्मजः क्रियावता निष्क्रियस्य । यथा स्थाणोः श्येनेन्न विभूनां च मूर्त्तैः । उभयकर्मजो विरुद्धदिक्क्रिययोः सन्निपातः । यथा मल्लयोर्मेषायोर्वा । सम्योगजस्तूत्पन्नमात्रस्य चिरोत्पन्नस्य वा निष्क्रियस्य कारणसम्योगिभिरकारणैः कारणाकारणसम्योगपूर्वकः कार्याकार्यगतः सम्योगः । स चैकस्माद्द्वाभ्यां बहुभ्यश्च भवति । एकस्मात् तावत् तन्तुवीरणसम्योगात् द्वितन्तुकवीरणसम्योगः । द्वाभ्यां तन्त्वाकाशसम्योगाभ्यामेको द्वितन्तुकाकाशसम्योगः । बहुभ्यश्च तन्त्तुरीसम्योगेभ्य एकः पटतुरीसम्योगः । एकस्माच्च द्वयोरुत्पत्तिः । कथम् । यदा पार्थिवाप्ययोरण्वोः सम्योगे सत्यन्येन पार्थिवेन पार्थिवस्यान्येनाप्येन चाप्यस्य युगपत्सम्योगौ भवतस्तदा ताभ्यां सम्योगाभ्यां पार्ह्तिवाप्ये द्व्यणुके युगपदारभ्येते । ततो यस्मिन् काले द्व्यणुकयोः कारणगुणपूर्वक्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः तस्मिन्नेव काले इतरेतरकारणाकारणगतात् सम्योगादितरेतरकायाकार्यगतौ सम्योगौ युगपदुत्पद्येते । किं कारणम् । कारणसायोगिना ह्यकारणेन कार्यमवश्यं सम्युज्यते इति न्यायः अतः पार्थिवं द्व्यणुकं कारणसम्योगिनाप्येनाणुना सम्बद्ध्यते आप्यमपि द्व्यणुकं कारण्सम्योगिना पार्थिवेनेति । अथ द्व्यणुकयोरितरेतरकारणाकारणसम्बद्धयोः कथं परस्परतः सम्बन्ध इति । तयोरपि।सम्योगजाभ्यां सम्योगाभ्यां सम्बन्ध इति । नास्त्यजः सम्योगो नित्यपरिमण्डलवत् पृथगनभिधानात् । यथा चतुर्विधं परिमाणमुत्पाद्यमुक्त्वाह नित्यं परिमण्डलमित्येवमन्यतरकर्मजादिसम्योगमुत्पाद्यमुक्त्वा पृथङ्नित्यं ब्रूयान्न त्वेवमब्रवीत् तस्मान्नास्त्यजः सम्योगः । परमाणुभिराकाशादीनां प्रदेशवृत्तिर्।अन्यतरकर्मजः सम्योगः । विभूनां तु परस्परतः सम्योगो नास्ति युतसिद्ध्यभावात् । सा पुनर्द्वयोरन्यतरस्य वा पृथग्गतिमत्त्वं पृथगाश्रयाश्रयित्वं चेति । विनाशस्तु सर्वस्य सम्योगस्यैकार्थसमवेताद्विभागात् क्वचिदेस्रयविनाशादपि । कथम् । यदा तन्त्वोः सम्योगे सत्यन्यतरतन्त्वारम्भके अंशौ कर्मोत्पद्यते तेन कर्मणा अंश्वन्ततराद्विभागः क्रियते विभागाच्च तन्त्वारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः सम्योगविनाशात् तन्तुविनाशस्तद्विनाशे तदाश्रितस्य तन्त्वन्तरसम्योगस्य विनाश इति ॥ ८८ ॥

samyogaḥ samyuktapratyayanimittam | sa ca dravyaguṇakarmahetuḥ | dravyārambhe nirapekṣastathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaśceti vacanāt | guṇakarmārambhe tu sāpekṣaḥ samyuktasamavāyādagnervaiśeṣikamiti vacanāt | atha kathaṃlakṣaṇaḥ katividhaśceti | aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ samyogaḥ sa ca trividhaḥ anyatarakarmajaḥ ubhayakarmajaḥ samyogajaśca | tatrānyatarakarmajaḥ kriyāvatā niṣkriyasya | yathā sthāṇoḥ śyenenna vibhūnāṃ ca mūrttaiḥ | ubhayakarmajo viruddhadikkriyayoḥ sannipātaḥ | yathā mallayormeṣāyorvā | samyogajastūtpannamātrasya cirotpannasya vā niṣkriyasya kāraṇasamyogibhirakāraṇaiḥ kāraṇākāraṇasamyogapūrvakaḥ kāryākāryagataḥ samyogaḥ | sa caikasmāddvābhyāṃ bahubhyaśca bhavati | ekasmāt tāvat tantuvīraṇasamyogāt dvitantukavīraṇasamyogaḥ | dvābhyāṃ tantvākāśasamyogābhyāmeko dvitantukākāśasamyogaḥ | bahubhyaśca tantturīsamyogebhya ekaḥ paṭaturīsamyogaḥ | ekasmācca dvayorutpattiḥ | katham | yadā pārthivāpyayoraṇvoḥ samyoge satyanyena pārthivena pārthivasyānyenāpyena cāpyasya yugapatsamyogau bhavatastadā tābhyāṃ samyogābhyāṃ pārhtivāpye dvyaṇuke yugapadārabhyete | tato yasmin kāle dvyaṇukayoḥ kāraṇaguṇapūrvakrameṇa rūpādyutpattiḥ tasminneva kāle itaretarakāraṇākāraṇagatāt samyogāditaretarakāyākāryagatau samyogau yugapadutpadyete | kiṃ kāraṇam | kāraṇasāyoginā hyakāraṇena kāryamavaśyaṃ samyujyate iti nyāyaḥ ataḥ pārthivaṃ dvyaṇukaṃ kāraṇasamyogināpyenāṇunā sambaddhyate āpyamapi dvyaṇukaṃ kāraṇsamyoginā pārthiveneti | atha dvyaṇukayoritaretarakāraṇākāraṇasambaddhayoḥ kathaṃ parasparataḥ sambandha iti | tayorapi.samyogajābhyāṃ samyogābhyāṃ sambandha iti | nāstyajaḥ samyogo nityaparimaṇḍalavat pṛthaganabhidhānāt | yathā caturvidhaṃ parimāṇamutpādyamuktvāha nityaṃ parimaṇḍalamityevamanyatarakarmajādisamyogamutpādyamuktvā pṛthaṅnityaṃ brūyānna tvevamabravīt tasmānnāstyajaḥ samyogaḥ | paramāṇubhirākāśādīnāṃ pradeśavṛttir.anyatarakarmajaḥ samyogaḥ | vibhūnāṃ tu parasparataḥ samyogo nāsti yutasiddhyabhāvāt | sā punardvayoranyatarasya vā pṛthaggatimattvaṃ pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvaṃ ceti | vināśastu sarvasya samyogasyaikārthasamavetādvibhāgāt kvacidesrayavināśādapi | katham | yadā tantvoḥ samyoge satyanyataratantvārambhake aṃśau karmotpadyate tena karmaṇā aṃśvantatarādvibhāgaḥ kriyate vibhāgācca tantvārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ samyogavināśāt tantuvināśastadvināśe tadāśritasya tantvantarasamyogasya vināśa iti || 88 ||

Text (88).—Conjunction forms the basis of the idea of two things being ‘joined together.’ It is the cause of Substances, Qualities and Actions. In the producing of Substances, it functions independently; as is declared in the Sūtra.—‘Sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaśca’. In the producing of Qualities and Actions however it is dependent upon other things; as declared in the sūtra—‘Samyuktasa—mavāyāt agnervaiśeṣikam’—(X-ii-5 to 7; I-i-27, 29, V-i-1 to 6, V-i-10, 14, 17, V-ii-1, 5, 6, 8, 15).

Question: What is the nature of Conjunction, and how many kinds of it are there?

Answer: Conjunction consists in the coming together of two things that were lying apart from one another. It is of three kinds; (1) Brought about by the action of one of the two things coming together; (2) brought about by the action of both, and (3) brought about by another Conjunction. That of the first kind is possible only in the case of an active object coming in contact with an inactive one; f.i. the contact of the pole with the kite alighting upon it; and that of material objects with the omnipresent substances. As an instance of Conjunction of the second kind we have the collision of two things moving in opposite directions and with contrary actions—f.i. the coming together of two wrestlers, or of two fighting rams. Conjunction of the third kind we find in the case of an object that has just been produced, or that which has been in existence for a long time, coming in contact with its immaterial causes, which latter are in contact with the material cause,—this Conjunction being that of the effect with the cause, preceded (and brought about) by the Conjunction of the material and immaterial causes. This Conjunction proceeds from one or two or many Conjunctions. As an instance of one born of one Conjunction, we have the Conjunction of the double thread with the vīraṇa, brought about by that of the single thread with the vīraṇa. The Conjunction born of two Conjunctions is that of the double thread with Ākāśa, produced by the two Conjunctions of the threads with the Ākāśa. As the Conjunction born of many Conjunctions is that of the cloth with the Turī, produced by the Conjunctions of the several threads with the Turī. A single Conjunction also, in certain cases, gives rise to two Conjunctions; e.g. when there is a contact of the atom of earth with that of water, and there comes about a contact of that earth-atom with another earth-atom, and also of that water-atom with another water-atom, then these two Conjunctions simultaneously bring about two diads—one of earth and another of water; and then, at the time that there appear, in the two diads, their respective Colour &c., in accordance with those residing in their cause, there appear, simultaneously, the two Conjunctions inhering in the cause and effect, from out of the mutual Conjunction of their material and immaterial causes.—(VII-ii-9.)

Question: “What is the reason for all this?”

Answer: Even with that which is not a cause, if it happen to be in contact with the cause, the effect becomes connected,—such is the law; And it is for this reason that the Earth-Diad becomes connected with the Aqueous Diad in contact with the cause of the former,—and so also does the Aqueous diad become connected with the Earth-diad.

Question: “The two diads being connected with the each other’s cause and non-cause, how do they come to be related to each other?”

Answer: Their relationship is due to the Contacts produced by Contacts. There is no Contact or Conjunction that is not born of a cause; as no such, eternal unborn thing as Conjunction has been separately postulated, like the parimaṇḍala. That is to say, having spoken of the four kinds of Dimension as ‘produced,’, the author has added—‘the parimaṇḍala is eternal’; and so if he had meant the same in regard to Conjunction, he must have spoken of as ‘produced by the action of one or other of the things in contact’; and then he should have mentioned the ‘eternal’ Conjunction separately. This however he has not done; and hence we conclude that there is no unborn, eternal, Conjunction.

The Conjunction of atoms with Ākāśa &c. exists only in one portion of those latter, and is brought about by the action of one or the other.

There is no mutual Conjunction among all-pervading things themselves; as they have no separate existence (apart from one another). ‘Separate existence’ consists in one or both members having separate motion or distinct receptacle.

The destruction of all conjunction is brought about by Disjunction inhering in one of the members: and sometimes also by the destruction of the substratum.

Question: “How?”

Answer: When two threads are in contact with each other, if a certain action appear in any one part of either thread, this action disjoins that part from the other part of the thread; this disjunction destroys the contact (of the thread particles) that went to make up the thread; the destruction of this Conjunction destroys the thread; and the destruction of the thread brings about the destruction of the contact of the two threads, which inhered in the thread destroyed.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to prove the existence of Conjunction—Samyoga [samyogaḥ] &c. Ordinary men have such a notion as ‘this is joined to that’; this notion cannot be based upon any such quality as Colour and the like; as the notions of these latter are wholly different from the one in question; hence that which is the basis of this notion cannot be any thing else but Conjunction.

Objection: “The notion may be due to absence of intervening space between the two objects concerned.”

Reply:—What do you mean by this ‘absence of intervening space’? Do you mean close contact, or the absence of any separateness? If the former, then what you say is nothing different from our view; as it is only this dose contact which we call ‘Conjunction.’ If the latter, then you should explain what else besides Conjunction is there that could eliminate the separateness of two separate things.

Objection: “That which for you is the cause the Conjunction of non-conjunct substances, will, for us, be the cause of the absence of the separateness of separate substances.”

Reply: It may be as you wish; but this ‘cause’ of yours—does it transport its substratum to another place, and then eliminates the Separateness, or does it do this without transporting the substratum? In the latter case, the absence of separateness would be hardly obtainable; as the object would be stationery in its former position (and as such the separateness would remain constant). If however the substratum be held to be transported to another position, then what besides that very cause, is Conjunction, that you seek to deny?

Objection: “We talk of Conjunction only in a case where a substance is produced in a place not separate from another substance.”

Reply: It is not the mere production of an object that we apeak of as ‘Conjunction’; but the word is applied to the close contact or nonseparate existence of two such substances as have been produced.

This conjunction is the cause of Substances, Qualities and Action. For instance, the contact of threads is the cause of the Cloth, a substance; the contact of the Soul and the Mind is the cause of Buddhi and other such qualities; similarly the contact of the drum and Ākāśa is the cause of Sound, a quality; the contact of the hand and the exerting Soul is the cause of Actions; and the contact of Air with velocity is the cause of the action (motion) of the tuft of grass; and so forth.

The author next proceeds to show in what manner Conjunction produces Substances, and Qualities and Actions—Dravyārambhe &c. What is meant by its ‘functioning independently’ is that, in the producing of substances, Conjunction does not stand in need of anything else save its own substratum, and efficient cause; and it does not mean that it does not stand in need of a subsequently appearing cause; as if it were so, then we would have no^[1] possibility of the independent (without any other cause) operation towards the production of properties born of ‘cooking’ (baking), of the final contact of the fire and the atom, appearing after the destruction of the dark colour of the (unbaked jar).

Question: “How do you know that in the producing of substances, Conjunction functions independently?”

Reply: Tathā bhavati &c. In the Sūtra we have the words ‘Tathābhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaśca’— occurring after the author has explained that we have an idea that the Cloth will be produced from out of the threads which will be aided in their operation towards the accomplishment of the cloth. The sense of this is that, just as we have the notion that the Cloth will be produced out of the threads as aided, so also have we the notion that it is produced out of threads that are dependent and independent. If this were not the sense of the Sūtra the present tense used would not be possible; that is to say, when some of the threads would be in contact, and others would be still far apart, then we would have the notion the ‘cloth is produced’ (which is an absurdity). The sense of all this is that, in the Sūtra in question, the threads are spoken of as the cause of the notion with regard to the present (in connection with the production of the Cloth); and the word ‘independent’ is used with regard to such threads as are in mutual contact; which shows that in the production of substances, Conjunction is independent of all else; but in the production of Qualities it is dependent upon other aids—this difference between the two processes is indicated by the particle ‘tu’.

Question: “How do you make this out”?

Answer: Samyuktasamavāyāt—The words ‘Agnervaiśeṣikam’ (in the Sūtra) refers to the heat of fire; and when this inheres in the fire that is in contact with the atom of earth, it becomes the cause of the production of Colour &c.; and this declaration in the Sūtra therefore may be taken as showing that, in the production of the Qualities (of Colour &c.) the contact of the fire and the Atom stands in need of the heat of fire. For if it were not so, then the touch of fire could not be spoken of as a cause of the production of Colour, which is found to be produced by the Conjunction of fire. In the production of Buddhi, the Conjunction of the Soul and the Mind requires the aid of Dharma &c., even though these latter are totally different from its substratum and its efficient cause. Similarly too, as a case of the production of Action, we find the action of the tuft of grass produced by the Conjunction (of wind).

Objection: “As a matter of fact, we find that the sprout is produced after the destruction of the seed, and the jar is produced after the destruction of the lump of clay; and from this we infer that substances are produced out of Negations, and not out of Conjunctions.”

Reply: This is not right; as substances are distinctly found to be produced out of particular Conjunctions and combinations of the particles that enter into their constitution. And as Negation would be equally applicable to all things there could be no restriction upon the production of. particular things only at definite times.

A discussion is here started as to whether it is only a previously existing entity that is produced by causes, or it is something that did not exist before, which is produced.

The Sankhyas hold the following view ‘Sāṅkhya-Kārikā 9):—“It is a previously existing thing that is produced by causes. (1) Because of the non-production of the non-existent; That is to say, that which does not exist, for instance the ‘sky-flower,’ cannot be brought into existence by any means; on the other hand, it is quite natural that that which is already an entity should be brought into existence; as ‘existence’ constitutes its very nature. In ordinary experience we find that when the seasamum seed is pressed, what is produced is the oil that already existed in the seeds. We have no instance of a nonentity being produced.

“(2) Because of the causes. That is to say we find definite causes taken up by, and related to, definite effects; and this shows that the effects are entities; as otherwise they could not have any such fixed relationship. Nor can it be rightly held that it is an unconnected effect that is brought by an unrelated cause. As it is not possible for all this to be produced. That is to say, absence of relation would pertain to all effects and causes equally, and hence all effects would come out of all causes; as a matter of fact however, this is not the case; hence it must be admitted that prior to its production the effect existed and bore a definite relationship to its cause. This is what has been declared in the following verse: ‘Causes connected with entities have no connection with non-entities; one who would hold the production of unrelated effects would have no resting ground.’

“(3) Then again, does causal afficiency belong to that which has the necessary potency? or to that which is devoid of this potency? If the latter, then you have the same absurdity as before (anything being produced of any cause). If the former, then, does this potency pertain to all things or only to certain things? If everywhere, then the same absurd contingency arises. If only in certain things, then it will have to be explained how, in the absence of the effects, the potency of the cause could be restricted to these? As a nonentity can not be the object of anything. Hence on account of the efficient cause bringing about that for which it is potent, it must be admitted that this latter had prior existence.

“(4) Because of the identity of the effect with the cause. That is to say, the effect is found to he of the same nature as the cause. Because the whole is nothing apart from its parts,—as it is found to occupy the same space as these parts;, and different things we find always occupying different places or having different extensions; and it has been proved that a thing that occupies the same space as another is nondifferent from this latter. And as the cause has been proved to be an entity, the effect cannot but be the same.

“These arguments have been summed in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā—9.—‘Asadakaraṇāt’ &c.”

To the above we make the following reply: If even before the operation of the cause, the Cloth already exists in the threads, then how is it that we do not see it, even when we seek for it, and our organs of vision are all right? It might be said that we do not see it because of its not having become manifested. But, what is this ‘non-manifestation’? If by this you mean merely ‘want of perception,’ then it is this very want of perception that we have put forward as inexplicable in accordance with your theory; and hence that same fact cannot be accepted as a right explanation of itself. If however by ‘non-manifestation’ be meant ‘the absence of such form as would be perceptible and capable of effective action,’ then this would amount to an acceptance of the non-existence of the Effect (prior to causal operation); as what this means is that something, in the shape of that form, which did not exist before, is brought into existence by the operation of the cause.

Objection: “For the perception of the Cloth, we need the aid of such accessories as the action of the weaver, and the like, just as much as that of the organs of perception and hence as long as these have not functioned, the Cloth even though extant, is not perceived.”

Reply: This can not be; because the action of its causes would always be possible (and hence the Cloth should be always perceptible).

Objection: “ Yes; but even this action of the causes which remains unmanifested at first, comes to be manifested by means of causes; and then alone does it serve to render the cloth perceptible.”

Reply: If this ‘manifestation’ of the cause were nonexistent before, then (according to you) how could it be brought about by any causes? And if it were existent, then the thing would also be always perceptible. Hence the perception of something not perceptible before could not be possible, until some peculiarity, that did not exist there before, were produced in it.

Then, it has been argued above that, that which does not exist cannot be produced by any causes.—e.g. ‘sky-flowers.’

But this is not right; as there is no analogy between the two cases. That is to say, ‘sky-flowers ' are of the nature of nonentity pure and simple, while the things in question, jar and the like, are such as have the dual character of entities and non-entities; as prior to the operation of their causes they remain non-entities, and when the causes operate duly, they become entities.

Question: “How could these two contrary characters of ‘entity’ and ‘non-entity’ cohere in the same thing?”

Answer: The coherence becomes quite explicable, when the two are taken as existing at different times.

Question: “As prior to its production, the object Cloth would (according to you) be non-existent, how could ‘non-existence,’ a property, be postulated to it when it does not exist?”

Answer: ‘As the demon, so its offering’—i.e. our answer will be of the same nature as your objection, exactly in keeping with your way of arguing;—it is only ‘existence’ that could not belong a non-entity; as for ‘non-existence’ it is only proper that it should belong to a non-entity.

Question: “If the thing were non-existent before, then how does it come to have existence?”

Answer: By the force of the operations of the Causes. There is a peculiar power in the shuttle &c. on account of which, whenever they come together and function in unison, there appears some thing that did not exist before—viz., the cloth.

Objection: “If something not existing before, and hence not in any way connected with the causes, ware to be produced by these, then there would be a great disorder confusion (any causes giving rise to any effects).”

Reply: This could not be; as the cause in the form of the (thread) has its efficiency restricted to the effect in the form of ‘Cloth’ alone.

Question “How can that be?”

Answer: How would that be, in accordance with your theory also?

Objection: “Well, in accordance with our theory, it is the threads alone, and nothing else, that have the nature of, and are nondifferent from, the Cloth,—such being the nature of things.”

Reply: The same might be said in our case also. In fact it is for this reason that there is a limitation or restriction as to the natural causes of definite things;—the potency of one class of things towards a certain definite class of things being ascertained by means of invariable concomitance, both positive and negative.

Then again, it has been argued above that, the effect being nondifferent from the cause, the existence of the cause would mean the existence of the effect also. But this is far from proved; and it is sought to be proved by a fact that itself has not been duly established. As it is a patent fact that the effect differs from the cause, in point of form, potency and position. Then too, if the effect were in every way non-different from the cause, then the whole world, which is held by the Sankhya to be a product of Primordial Matter, would be imperceptible, as Primordial Matter is held to be so.

Then, as for the fact of the effect occupying the same extension in space as the cause, this idea is merely due to the fact of the effect resting in, having its receptacle in, the cause. This will be enough, and we need not press the “old people” (the Sāṅkhyas) any further.

We now proceed to consider—what is ‘Potency,’ ‘Śakti?’ Some good people have declared that it is something supersensuous, imperceptible by the senses. But that is not right; as there can be no evidence for the existence of any such supersensuous Potency.

Objection: “We find fire under certain conditions producing the effect of burning; and at another time we find that the same fire under the same conditions does not produce any such effect, when brought into close touch with certain incantations or medicinal herbs; and if the visible form of the fire were the cause of the burning, then as the visible form of fire remains the same in the latter case also, there could not be an absence of burning. As a matter of fact however we do find this absent; and this clearly shows that there is some sort of incapacity in the invisible form of the fire; and thereby proves the fact of potency itself being something quite imperceptible, a potency the suppression or destruction whereof is brought about by the incantation &c. In cases where counter-remedies are found to revive the potency there has been a mere suppression, whereas when there is an absolute absence of the necessary effect, there is destruction of the potency.

“Objection: ‘The incantation is neither in contact with, nor inherent in the fire; and as such how could it destroy the potency that existed in a wholly different substratum from itself? If it does destroy such things, then it would destroy anything and everything.’

“Reply: But the fact is that the incantation is aimed at the potency of the fire. Just as the ‘murderous rites,’ even though having no material connection with any person, kill only that person against whom they are aimed, and no other person,—so, in the same manner, the incantation would destroy the potency only of that individual fire against which it would be aimed, and not of all fires.

“Objection: ‘If Potency is of the nature of Substance, then it could be destroyed only by the destruction, either of its material or of its immaterial cause: and if it be held to be of the nature of Qualities, then it could be destroyed

either by the destruction of its substratum, or by the production of another Quality of a contrary nature.’

“Reply: We do not admit of these conventional laws of yours. Whenever we find the destruction of one thing following from something else, we always regard this latter to be the cause of that destruction; and we do not accept any such hard anti fast rules as you speak of; as all such rules are condemned by facts of direct perception. Even if it be absolutely necessary to accept your laws, we might accept them as applicable only to the destruction of those Substances “and Qualities wherein they are found to be operative. Potency however is something like Similarity, wholly different from Substance, Quality and the other categories; and as such it could be open to other modes of destruction also.

“Objection: ‘The potency of fire is inferred from the production or non-production of its effects; but how is it that you assume its existence in all things?

“Reply: Having in one case, that of fire, assumed its existence on the strength of its effects, we infer, from similar circumstances, its existence in other things, whenever we find these latter also producing definite effects.”

To the above we make the following reply:—The absence of the proper effects (of fire), in the presence of incantations &c., does not indicate any invisible form. Because, just as of burning we regard fire to be the cause,—inasmuch as it has its power of burning fully known by positive as well as negative concomitance,—so in the same manner is also the prior non-existence of obstacles in the shape of incantation &c. accepted as the cause (of burning); and when this ‘non-existence’ would be set aside by the reciting of the incantation, it is only natural that there should be no burning, for the simple reason that the necessary accessory circumstances in the shape of the non-existence of obstacles would not be present,—and the absence of burning thus would not be due to the absence of due ‘potency’ in the fire.

Objection: “A positive effect is always found to proceed from a positive cause,—and as such no positive effect (like burning) could have a negative cause (in the shape of the ‘non-existence of obstacles’).”

Reply: Not so; because we find sin (a positive thing) being produced by the non-performance of the necessary religious duties; if it were not so, then the laying down of expiatory rites for such omissions would be absolutely useless and superfluous.

Objection: “The sin, involved in the non-performance of necessary duties, is produced by the performance of some other acts (at the time for which the necessary duties are laid down),—and it is not due to the mere non-existence,, or absence, of the performance of those duties.”

Reply: The non-performance of the necessary duties must be regarded at least as an aid in the producing of the sin,—specially as Sin is always found to appear when there is such a non-performance.

Objection: “In regard to the case of the burning by fire when there are counter-incantations, you have said that when the obstacle (to burning) in the form of the incantation is put forth, the absence of this obstacle ceases, and hence there is burning. But in that case, when the obstacle would be set aside after having been brought in once, then too there could be no burning; as there would be no prior non-existence of the obstacle (which will have disappeared after having come in); and it is such non-existence that you hold to be the cause of the burning. As a matter of fact however, we find that when obstacles to burning are set aside by means of counter-incantations, burning does appear. And hence we conclude that no negative entity can be the cause; and it is only positive Potency that could be accepted as the cause; and even in a case where after the burning has been stopped by one incantation, and revived again by means of another incantation, we can safely assume that the former incantation held the potency in. check, and the latter let it lose and made it operative again.”

Reply: This is not admissible; because so long as a visible explanation is available, we cannot rightly have recourse to any invisible factors. As causes of certain effects (put forward above) we may have certain circumstantial accessories aided sometimes by the absence of preventive incantations, at other times by the presence of favouring incantations; and what objection have you got to this explanation that you seek to assume the existence of invisible substances? As a matter of fact we often find that a single effect has got various kinds of circumstantial accessories for its cause. For instance, Fire is produced out of the rubbing together of two sticks as well as from the solar gem. This is the secret of the Logican’s theory. The secret of the Mīmāṃsā theory I have explained in the Tattvaprabodha.

Question: “We have understood that Conjunction is the basis of the notion of two things being joined together; but what is the form of this Conjunction? and what are its varieties? In the text we have the expression ‘kathaṃlakṣaṇaḥ’; and here ‘katham’ = kim, ‘what;’ as in the expression ‘ko dharmaḥ kathaṃlakṣāṇakaḥ’ (Śābara-Bhāṣya); and ‘lakṣaṇa’ is ‘Svarūpa,’ ‘form.’”

The author gives the answer to this question; and in doing this, he supplies the definition of Conjunction: Conjunction is the coming together of two things that were apart from each other. The qualification ‘apart from each other’ is added with a view to distinguish Conjunction from Inherence.

The author next proceeds to point out the different kinds of Conjunction: It is of three kinds only. (1) Anyatarakarmaja—the conjunction brought about by the action of one of the two substances in contact; (2) Ubhayakarmaja—that brought about by the action of both substances, and (3) Saṃyogaja—that due to another Conjunction. To the former kind belongs the conjunction of an active or mobile,—substance with another substance which is inactive or immobile,—e.g. the conjunction of the fixed post with the flying kite alighting upon it; and also that of all-pervading substances with corporeal substances,—the all-pervading substances being immobile and inactive, and the corporeal substances being mobile and of limited extension.

Objection: “In the case of two things or persons, both of which are moving, though with different degrees of speed,—we find them coining in contact with each other; and in this case the Conjunction is surely due to the action of any one of the two things; why then should the first kind of Conjunction be specified as that between an active and an inactive substance?”

Reply: True; but what is meant by ‘inactive’ is only that one of the two substances is devoid of the action that tends to bring about the Conjunction (and not that it has no action at all)

Some people say that in the case of the Conjunction of the kite with the post, there is first, the Conjunction of the atoms of the kite’s feet with the head of the post; and then that of the whole substance kite with the whole substance post; and here the former Conjunction of the parts is ‘due to action’ Karmaja, and the latter Conjunction of the two wholes is ‘born of Conjunction,’ Samyogaja.

But this is not admissible; specially as the Conjunction is between one active whole with another whole. If this be not accepted, then, inasmuch as the parts also would be whole in comparison with their own constituent parts, the ‘Conjunction born of action’ among wholes would become altogether impossible. And then it would become necessary to deny the activity of all wholes; or to set aside the definition of Action, as ‘the independent cause Conjunction and Disjunction,’—at-least in so far as the action of wholes is concerned. How many of such pitfalls shall I point out in the way of those people who renounce the paths of reasoning and the teachings of great masters!

As an instance of the Conjunction of the second kind we have the collision of two things moving in opposite directions. By ‘opposite directions are meant those directions, by moving towards which two things come finally to obstruct each other,—e.g. North and South, East and West. The compound ‘Viruddhadikkriyayoḥ’ is to be taken as ‘Karmadhāraya’ in the first instance—‘Viruddhe diśāu’ ‘opposite directions,’—and then as Bahuvrīhi—‘Viruddhadiśoh kriyā yayordravyayoḥ’ ‘of the two substance whose actions are towards opposite directions.’ The collision of two substances—e.g., that between two wrestlers or two fighting rams—is cited as an instance of ‘ubhayakarmaja’ Conjunction, because it is due to the action of both the things concerned.

The third kind of Conjunction—the ‘Saṃyogaja’ kind,—is produced by one, two or many Conjunctions. As an example of Conjunction produced by a single Conjunction, we have the Conjunction of the shuttle with the duplicate-thread, brought about by the Conjunction of the same shuttle with one of the threads. In this case we find that from the previous single Conjunction of the shuttle and the one thread, there proceeds the Conjunction of the thread-duplicate, with that same shuttle, which is in contact with the single thread that forms the material cause of that ‘duplicate,’—which in its turn, is without any action of its own, and is the product of that thread which being in contact with the shuttle is conjoined to the other thread. This kind of Conjunction is also called ‘one brought about by the contact of the cause with the non-cause,’—the thread being the ‘cause,’ and the shuttle the ‘non-cause,’ of the ‘thread-duplicate’, and the Conjunction of the shuttle with this ‘duplicate,’ inhering in both of these.

Of this Conjunction we accept the previous Conjunction to be the cause, as we cannot lay our hands upon any other cause; and as such this declaration is based upon the law of ‘Pariśeṣa,’ and the ‘pratyāsatti,’ or ‘proximity’ in this case, will be in the form of the ‘co-inherence of the cause in the same substance as its effect,’—in as much as the cause, the contact of the shuttle with the single thread, would inhere in the shuttle, wherein would also inhere the effect viz: the contact of the shuttle with the ‘thread-duplicate.’

Objection: “If one Conjunction were to produce another Conjunction, then this would be something opposed to the Sūtra ‘guṇāśca guṇāntaram ārabhante,’ wherein it is said that ‘Qualities’ (in the Plural) produce another Quality.”

Reply: Not so; the objector apparently does not understand the sense of the Sūtra referred to; as what the Sūtra means is that even Qualities have the causal efficiency of producing a quality; and it does not mean that it is only many Qualities,—and not one or two of them—that can produce another quality. Some people hold that the Sūtra does specify more than two Qualities as being productive of a quality, and that this specification is with reference to those Qualities that belong to the cause—and produce, in the effect, qualities homogeneous to themselves, and it does not refer to all qualities; (and that as such there is no contradiction of this Sūtra by the assertion that one Conjunction produces another Conjunction). Such explanations can suit only exceptionally clever people who can invent unheard of explanations; it can never satisfy us.

As an instance of Conjunction produced by two Conjunctions we have that of the ‘thread-duplicate’ with Ākāśa, brought about by the contact of each of the two threads with Ākāśa.

As soon as the ‘thread-duplicate’ is produced there immediately comes about a contact of this with Ākāśa,—because Ākāśa is in contact with the causes (the single threads) of this ‘duplicate,’, like the shuttle in contact with the material causes of the ‘thread-duplicate.’ There is no other cause for this contact, save the contact of the Ākāśa with the two single threads that go to make up the duplicate; and hence the contact of the duplicate with Ākāśa cannot but be regarded as produced by this contact of the Ākāśa with the constituent threads.

As an example of Conjunction produced by many Conjunctions we have the contact of the Cloth, with the Brush, which proceeds from the many contacts of the Brush with the many threads that make up the Cloth.

The threads are productive of the Cloth through many intervening wholes—that is to say, some threads combine to make up a certain substance, which forms an intervening link between the threads and the fully prepared piece of cloth. In regard to corporeal substances, there is no chance of any such anomaly as that of two wholes occupying the same point in space; as we do not admit of any whole inhering over exactly the same number of constituent parts as another whole; for instance the Thread Duplicate—which is a whole made up of two threads, inheres in two threads, while the Thread Duplicate inheres in these two threads and also in a third; how then could these two occupy the same point in space? It is for this very reason that when a large piece of cloth has been torn, we have notions of several piece-wholes of varying dimensions; and when these are destroyed, then, if we were to begin to make a cloth out of the same threads, it would be a well nigh impossible task.

Objection: “If such were the case, then the constituent particles of the child’s body, accompanied by the particles of food eaten, would produce quite a new body, even while the previous body has not been destroyed.”

Reply: Yes, they might so produce it; if all the previous bodies were perceptible while the old body existed, or even when it is destroyed,—as we find in the case of the pieces of cloth which are quite perceptible while the entire piece exists, as well as when it is torn to pieces. If however, the previous bodies be not thus perceptible, then the same process could not rightly be applied to their case; as we apply processes only in accordance with the facts as we actually perceive them in ordinary experience.

This same reason meets the assertion that, ‘in accordance with the theory of the production of the producible, there would be no perception or comprehension of the universe in the atomic state’;—as we have shown in the section on ‘Earth,’ that atoms have the nature of producing such perceptible things as the Triad and the like. Or even if the atoms were to produce the Diads, and then along with these Diads the Triads, and along with the Triads, other substances,—then too, how could there be any imperceptibility in the universe? As in any case, there would be present such conditions of perceptibility as largeness, multiplicity of constituent molecules, the presence of particular colours, and so forth. If even when these would be present, the Universe were imperceptible by the senses, on account of its having an imperceptible and supersensous substratum in the shape of the atom, then, in that case, in accordance with your theory also, the Triads made up of Diads (which are imperceptible) would be imperceptible, and thence the whole universe also, made up of these Triads, would become imperceptible. Hence the objection cannot apply to the case io question. And as for the Triads not being made up directly of atoms themselves, we can only refer to the arguments we have put forward in the section on ‘Earth.’

A question is here put by the ignorant; “How can two Conjunctions proceed from a single Conjunction.”

In reply to this the author says—Yadā &c., when there is a conjunction of two atoms of Earth and Water, there comes about simultaneously a conjunction of this Earth-atom with another Earth-atom, and that of this water-atom with another water-atom; and from these two Conjunctions there result simultaneously the two diads of Earth and Water; as the Conjunction of two homogeneous things always results in a third substance. And at the same time that there are produced, in the Earth and Water diads, the Colour &c., in accordance with the Colour &c. of these respective causes,—at that very time, there are produced, out of the conjunctions of material cause and non-causes, conjunctions of the effects of each of those two. The ‘two’ meant here are the Earth and Water Diads; and the ‘material cause and non-causes’ of these are the Earth and Water atoms in contact with each other.—the Earth-atoms being the cause of the Earth-Diad, and the non-cause of the Water-diad; and similarly the Water-atoms being the cause of the Water-diad, and the non-cause of the Earth-Diad; and from the Conjunction of these ‘two,’ there results the conjunction of the Earth-Diad,—which is the effect of the Earth-atom—with the Water-diad which is the non-effect of the Earth-atom; and similarly also the conjunction of the Water-Diad, which is the effect of the Water-atom, with the Earth-diad, which is not an effect of the Water-atom; and thus from a single, Conjunction we have two Conjunctions.

Question: “What are your proofs for accepting the Conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms, in the Earth and Water Diads?”

The author says in answer: Kāraṇasaṃyoginā &c. That is to say the Earth-atom becomes related to the Water-diad,—because it is in contact with its cause,—like the Cloth in contact with the Brush (through its cause, the Threads). The same argument may be applied to the case of the Water-atom also. In as much as the effect is always in contact with whatever may be in contact with its material cause,—the Earth-diad becomes conjoined with the Water-atom which is in contact with the Earth-atom constituting that Earth-diad; and similarly the Water-diad becomes conjoined with the Earth-atom which is in contact with the Water-atom constituting that Water-diad.

Question: “How can there be any connection between the Earth and the Water Diads, which may be in contact with the cause and non-cause of each other? That is to say, how can there be any connection between the Earth diads [which may be connected with the Water-atom which is the cause of the Water diad and the non-cause of the Earth diad] and the Water diad [which may be connected with the Earth-atom which is the cause of the Earth diad, and the non-cause of the Water diad]?

In answer, the author says: Tayorapi &c. That is to say, between the Earth-diad and the Water-atom, and also between the Water-diad and the Earth-atom, there is the ‘Saṃyogaja’ Conjunction (i.e. Conjunction produced by Conjunction); and from these two Conjunctions of the Earth and Water-atoms follows the mutual Conjunction between the two Diads. In this case too we have the same law as before—viz., that the effect is in contact with something which, though not its cause, is in Conjunction with its cause.

Objection: “It is not right to say that Conjunction is of three kinds only; because there is a possibility of a Conjunction that may be eternal (and this would not be included in any one of the three kinds enumerated above).”

With a view to deny this, the author adds that there is no Conjunction that is not produced; and this fact we deduce from the fact of the omniscient sage, in course of describing all things in the universe, not having mentioned any such eternal Conjunction, as he did with regard to the “atomic” dimension. On this we can safely assert that an unproduced (eternal) Conjunction is as great an impossibility as the ‘sky-flower.’ To explain this further: what we mean is that Conjunction is never unproduced, and not that there is no unproduced Conjunction: as the latter form of the proposition would involve the fallacy of an impossible (non-existent) major term (‘unproduced Conjunction.’)

Objection: “The Conjunction of the atom with Ākāśa is eternal: as both of them are eternal, and they are never separate from each other. As for Kaṇāda not having spoken of. this, that may have been mistake on his part; and, to err is but human.”

To this the Author replies—Paramāṇubhiḥ &c. The Conjunction and Disjunction of the atom with the all-pervading Ākāśa is only partial (at least as regards the latter), and are produced by the action of the atom; just as the conjunction and disjunction of a man with the banyan tree (which extends all over from the roots to the top), are due to his movements up and down the tree. Consequently there can be no eternity for the Conjunction of the atom with Ākāśa.

Objection: “This you have succeeded in proving; but what have you got to say to the Conjunction of two allpervading substances? This Conjunction cannot be produced by the action of any one of the two, for the simple reason that; both are devoid of action. Nor could it be produced by any Conjunction, as a Conjunction born of Conjunction is possible only when an effect is in contact with something that is not its cause, but is in contact with this cause; and no such contact is possible in. the case of omnipresent things as they are all eternal, and as such can have no causes. There is however a Conjunction among omnipresent things; as can be proved by the following argument—Ākāśa is in Conjunction with non-corporeal things also, because it conjoins with corporeal things,—like the Cloth. And as there can be no cause for this Conjunction it must be regarded as eternal; and hence we cannot admit that there is no unproduced Conjunction.”

Reply: Vibhūnām &c. As a matter of fact, we find that Conjunction exists only among substances that have bad separate existences; in the case of all-pervading substances there can be no such separate existence; and hence the condition of greater extension (i.e., separate existence) is not found to exist in these substances; consequently the resultant condition of lesser extension cannot possibly exist. As for the argument the opponent has put forward, that does not prove anything; as it applies equally to both sides of the question. That is to say, just as it lays down the Conjunction of omnipresent things, so also does it prove their Disjunction also, by the very same premiss and example.

Objection: “It may be so; and so we must accept both, as proved by convincing arguments.”

Reply: That cannot be; as between Conjunction and Disjunction, if one is eternal, the other is absolutely impossible; and as the two are contradictory, and the argument applies equally to both, it cannot be accepted to prove either.

Question: “What is this ‘separate existence,’ on the absence whereof in omnipresent substances, you base your denial of Conjunction in them?”

Answer: Sā punaḥ &c. By ‘yutasiddhi’ ‘separate existence,’ is meant the moving apart of one or both of the things concerned, as regards eternal substances; as regards non-eternal substances, what is meant by it is the having of a receptacle or substratum apart from that of the other. And none of these two kinds of ‘separate existence’ is possible in the case of Ākāśa.

The destruction of all Conjunction follows from the Disjunction inhering in the same substrata as the Conjunction. That is to say, whenever there is a disjunction of two things, Conjunction is destroyed forthwith. Though at the time of the Disjunction the Conjunction exists, yet the two are never found to co-exist; and this may be due either to the destruction of the Conjunction appearing very quickly (after the Disjunction), or to the fact of the perception of Conjunction being obstructed by the Disjunction.

In some cases Conjunction is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. As for instance, when two threads are in contact, if there appears, by some cause or other, an action in any part of one of the two threads, then there arises Disjunction of that part from another part; and this disjunction destroys the contact of the parts, which means the destruction of the thread (to which those parts belonged); and then there follows the destruction of the Conjunction that had this thread for one of its substrata; as a Conjunction can never exist without two substrata; and hence when one of these substrata is destroyed, it cannot be found to exist.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The reading noted in the footnote is decidedly preferable; that given in the text gives no sense.