Text 36: The Earth

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 36:

पृथिवीत्वाभिसम्बन्धात् पृथिवी । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वसंस्कारवती । एते च गुणविनिवेशाधिकारे रूपादयो गुणविशेषाः सिद्धाः । चाक्षुषवचनात् सप्तसङ्ख्यादयः । पतनोपदेशाद्गुरुत्वम् । अद्भिः सामान्यवचनाद्द्रव्यत्वम् । उत्तरकर्म वचनात् संस्कारः । क्षितावेव गन्धः । रूपमनेकप्रकारम् शुक्लादि । रसः षड्विधो मधुरादिः । अन्धो द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरबिह्श्च । स्पर्शोऽस्या अनुष्णाशीतत्वे सति पाकजः । सा तु द्विविधा । नित्या चानित्या च । परमाणुलक्षणा नित्या । कार्यलक्षणा त्वनित्या । सा च स्थैर्याद्यवयवसन्निवेशविशिष्टाऽपरजातिबहुत्वोपेता शयनासनाद्यनेकोपकारकरी च । त्रिविधम् चास्याः कार्यम् । शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकं शरीरं द्विविधम् योनिजमयोनिजं च । तत्रायोनिजमनपेक्ष्य शुक्रशोणितं देवर्षीणां धर्मविशेषसहितेभ्योऽणुभ्यो जायते । क्षुद्रजन्तूनां यातनाशरीराण्यधर्मविशेषसहितेभ्योऽणुभ्यो जायन्ते । शुक्रशोणितसन्निपातजं योनिजम् । तद्विविधं जरायुजमण्डजम् च । माणुषपशुमृगाणां जरायुजम् । पक्षिसरीसृपाणामण्डजम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धव्यंजकं सर्वप्राणिनां जलाद्यनभिभूतैः पार्थिवावयवैरारब्धं घ्राणम् । विषयस्तु द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेणारब्धस्त्रिविधो मृत्पाषाणस्थावरलक्षणः । तत्र भूप्रदेशाः प्राकारेष्टकादयः मृत्प्रकाराः । पाषाणा उपलमणिवज्रादयः । स्थावरास्तृणौषधिवृक्षगुल्मलतावतानवनस्पतय इति ॥ ३६ ॥

pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī | rūparasagandhasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvadravatvasaṃskāravatī | ete ca guṇaviniveśādhikāre rūpādayo guṇaviśeṣāḥ siddhāḥ | cākṣuṣavacanāt saptasaṅkhyādayaḥ | patanopadeśādgurutvam | adbhiḥ sāmānyavacanāddravyatvam | uttarakarma vacanāt saṃskāraḥ | kṣitāveva gandhaḥ | rūpamanekaprakāram śuklādi | rasaḥ ṣaḍvidho madhurādiḥ | andho dvividhaḥ surabhirasurabihśca | sparśo'syā anuṣṇāśītatve sati pākajaḥ | sā tu dvividhā | nityā cānityā ca | paramāṇulakṣaṇā nityā | kāryalakṣaṇā tvanityā | sā ca sthairyādyavayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭā'parajātibahutvopetā śayanāsanādyanekopakārakarī ca | trividham cāsyāḥ kāryam | śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñakaṃ śarīraṃ dvividham yonijamayonijaṃ ca | tatrāyonijamanapekṣya śukraśoṇitaṃ devarṣīṇāṃ dharmaviśeṣasahitebhyo'ṇubhyo jāyate | kṣudrajantūnāṃ yātanāśarīrāṇyadharmaviśeṣasahitebhyo'ṇubhyo jāyante | śukraśoṇitasannipātajaṃ yonijam | tadvividhaṃ jarāyujamaṇḍajam ca | māṇuṣapaśumṛgāṇāṃ jarāyujam | pakṣisarīsṛpāṇāmaṇḍajam | indriyaṃ gandhavyaṃjakaṃ sarvaprāṇināṃ jalādyanabhibhūtaiḥ pārthivāvayavairārabdhaṃ ghrāṇam | viṣayastu dvyaṇukādikrameṇārabdhastrividho mṛtpāṣāṇasthāvaralakṣaṇaḥ | tatra bhūpradeśāḥ prākāreṣṭakādayaḥ mṛtprakārāḥ | pāṣāṇā upalamaṇivajrādayaḥ | sthāvarāstṛṇauṣadhivṛkṣagulmalatāvatānavanaspataya iti || 36 ||

Text (36):—Earth is that which is comprised in the class ‘Earth.’

It has the qualities of—Colour, Taste, Odour Touch, Number, Dimension, Isolation, Distance Proximity, Gravity, Fluidity, and Faculty. These quailities have been described in the section (of the Sūtras dealing with the distribution of qualities). For instance, the word Cākṣuṣa.’ (perceptible by the eye) (in the Sūtra) indicates the seven qualities beginning with ‘Number’; the mention of ‘patana’ (falling) implies ‘Gravity’; the mention of the Earth as possessing certain points in Common with Water indicates ‘Fluidity’; and the mention of one action (of earth) following upon another indicates Family.—(II-i-1, 6; IV-i-?; V-i-16, 17, 18, 7, II-ii-2; V-ii-1)

As for odour it belongs to the Earth only.—(II-ii-1)

The colour of Earth is of various kinds viz:—white and the like.
Taste is of six kinds—sweet etc.,
Odour is of two kinds—good and bad.
Its touch is neither warm nor cool, and is brought about by cooking.—(VII-i-6).

Earth, is of two kinds: Eternal and Evanescent, that in the form of the atom is enteral; and that which is in the form of products is evanescent. The evanescent earth is qualified by such an arrangement of its component particles as tends to make it solid or rigid; it comprises many subclasses; and supplies many useful things, in the shape of beds, chairand the like.—(IV-i-1; II-iii-4, 5; VII-i-20, 21)

The products of Earth are three-fold,—in the form of the Body, the Sense-organ and the Object of of perception.—(IV-ii-1)

The body is of two kinds: that which is born of the womb, and that which is not so born. (IV-ii-5)

Such of the latter kind as belong to the Gods and the Ṛṣis are born independently of the semen and the ovule, out of atoms acted upon by certain meritorious deeds; while those that belong to the little insects &c., which serves as bodies fitted for the experiencing of certain punishments, are born out of atoms acted upon by non-meritorious deeds. The Body born of the womb is produced from the semen and the ovule. This again is of two kinds: Viviparous and Oviparous. The former belongs to the man, the cow and other quadrupeds; and the latter to birds and reptiles.—(IV-ii-6 to 11)

The Sense-organ, that which makes odour perceptible is the olfactory organ; this belongs to all animals, and is made up of earth-molecules not affected by the molecules of water and other substances.—(VIII-ii-5)

The Object, appearing in the order of the Diad and the rest, is of three kinds: the clay, the stone and the vegetable. To the first kind belong the various parts of the earth’s surface, and such products of clay as bricks and walls. To the second belong the minerals, the various kinds of stones and gems, the diamond and the like. And of the third kind are the various grasses, herbs, trees with their flowers and fruits, creepers, spreading plants, such trees as bear fruits without flowers, and so forth.—(IV-ii-1)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

“Earth is that which is comprised in the class ‘Earth.’ This statement points out the distinctive feature of Earth for one who though knowing the general character of Earth is, through some delusion, disabled from making use of the word,—with a view to enable him to speak of it by itself, independently of the connection of other things. The sense is that we can use the word ‘earth’ with regard to that which is found to have the general character of ‘earth’; as that which is not spoken of as ‘earth’ is never found to have that general character; e.g. water and the like, which are not found to have the generic character of ‘earth’ Hence we must use the word ‘Earth’ in a definition of Earth.

Or, the definition may be taken as put forward for the sake of the person who has often heard the word ‘earth’ used, but does not know what the general form of earth is,—in order to point out to him that character of earth which differentiates it from all other things. The sense of the text thus comes to be that a certain thing is spoken of as ‘Earth’ in the world because of its having the general form of Earth. In fact Udyotakara has defined a definition as that which serves to differentiate a thing from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things. This sets aside the argument that—“if a thing is well known it need not be defined, and if a thing is not known, it cannot be defined.” As the function of the definition consists in—(1) enabling it, when known in its generic form, to be used specifically, and (2) in pointing out its specific features, when it is known in a general way.

Objection:—“If such be the case, then there would be no end to it; as like the object that is defined, it would, in the end, be necessary for the definition also to be defined and explained.”

Reply:—Not so; as a definition is needed only when the thing is not duly known or comprehended; and certainly it is not possible that there would be an equal want of comprehension in all cases. For instance, when a learned person receives the injunction: ‘gauḥ anubandhyaḥ’ (the cow should be tied—for being killed at a sacrifice), he wants to know which part of the cow’s body is to be tied; and when he is told that it is to be tied either in the head (neck) or the leg, he does not stand in need of any further instruction as to what these two (head and leg) are. In fact, a person who is wholly ignorant does not require any instructions; and no instructions are meant for him; as he would not be entitled to the performance of any actions, like the infant or the dumb and the like.

The Author next proceeds to show that another distinctive feature of Eirth consists in its having fourteén definite qualities, along with its specific quality of Odour. The possessive affix ‘matup’ at the end of the Dvandva compound shows that each of the qualities mentioned is by itself related to the earth.

The author then proceeds to show that these qualities as belonging to the earth have been indicated in the Sūtras also.

‘Guṇaniveśādhikara’ is that Adhyāya (the second) of the Sūtras which deals with the distribution of the qualities among Substances; and in this Adhyāya we have the Sūtra—the Earth is endowed with Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,’—which distinctly points to the presence of these qualities in Earth.

“The word ‘cākṣuṣa’ &c.”—this refers to Number, Dimension, Isolation, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance and Proximity,—and also Action (though this is not a quality, yet it is laid down here as belonging to Earth). All these are ‘cākṣuṣa,’ visible, as they inhere in such substances as have Colour; hence the meaning is that all these qualities belong to

the Earth, Which has Colour. If these did not exist in coloured substances, then the author of the Sūtra could not have spoken of them as ‘visible’ on account of their inhering in such substances.

“The mention of falling &c.”—We have the Sūtra— “When there is no attempt at conjunction, we have falling due to gravity”; and this Sūtra distinctly indicates that the Earth, which is capable of falling, has gravity; as if gravity did not co-exist with falling (in the Earth), it could not have been the cause of this fulling.

“The mention of the Earth &c.”—we have the Sūtra: “The earthy substances, Butter, Lac, and Beeswax become fluid on contact with fire; and in this lies their similarity with Water;” and this distinctly shows that to Earth belongs such fluidity as is due to extraneous causes.

“The mention of one action &c.”—We have the Sūtra: “The first action in the arrow is produced by the momentum imparted to.it, and its subsequent motions are due to the faculty or force produced in it by that action,”—which distinctly mentions the fact of there appearing in the arrow, which is an earthy substance, a faculty brought about by action; and this shows that Earth has speed (a particular form of faculty); as if it did not exist in the arrow it could not he the cause of its subsequent actions. We shall show later on bow there is a single. Faculty caused by Falling.?

“Odour belongs to the Earth alone.”—That is to say, it is Odour alone that forms the specific distinctive feature of Earth.

Objection:—“We have such ideas as the water is sweet-smelling, the Air is fragrant, and this distinctly shows that we have odour in other substances (Water, Air) also.”

Reply:—Not so; as in Water, Air &c., the odour that is perceived is that inhering in the Earth molecules mixed with those substances.

Question: “How do you ascertain this?”

Answer: Simply from the fact of there being no odour in the absence of Earth-particles.

Though Colour belongs to the three substances (Earth, Water and Fire), yet it is spoken of as a distinctive feature of Earth alone, as it is in this alone that we have the various kinds of colour (Water and Fire having each one colour only).

“The colour of Earth is of various kinds”—The expression ‘kṣitāveva’ (in the Earth alone) has to be taken along with this sentence also. The sense is that the several kinds of colour—white, yellow and the like, belong to Earth alone, and not to any other substance That is to say, in the single class “Earth” we find inhering many kinds of individual colours. In certain cases however, we find even an individual earthy object having many colours, where the object is made up of particles of various colours.

We now proceed to explain how this is: Just as the particles go to make the composite whole, so the colours of the particles go to make up the colour of the whole; and the particles have not a single colour white, but various colours, such as black white, green &c. Nor is, there any such restriction as that it is only a single colour of these particles, and not the other, that produces the colour (in the object made up of these particles); as we find elsewhere each of these colours having the capability of producing its like. Nor is it right to assert that none of these colours can produce their likes, on account of their mutually contradictory character. Because we do actually see objects with variegated colours; and it is not possible for colourless objects to be seen. It might be argued that in such cases what is seen to be variegated is the aggregate of the several colours of the component particles; and that it is through this aggregate that the whole object is seen. But this may be said with regard to all cases (even the case of objects of single colour); and then it would be necessary to deny the presence of colour in all objects. Hence it must be admitted that the variegated colour of the object is produced conjointly by the

several colours of its component particles; and in as much as this colour would be produced by causes of different natures [i.e. the several colours), it could not but consist of the black, white and green colours; and it is this that is called “citra,” ‘variegated.’ It may be argued that it is not possible for a single object to have a variegated character; as is declared by a popular saying—‘That a single object should be of a variegated colour is extremely wonderful.’ But wherein is there any contradiction in this? as certainly, the various colours. Blue and the like, are not of the nature of the negation of one another (as held by the Bauddba); as they are held to have a positive (and not a negative) character; and also because if they were held to be the negations of one another, there would be a most objectionable interdependence.

“The contradiction lies in the fact of the difference in the form.”

True; such a contradiction does exist; yet it is not wrong to admit of the variegated colour; specially as its existence is directly perceived by all men, as originating from various coloured materials.

Objection:—“In the case of a multi-coloured piece of cloth,. in which colours appear only on one side of the cloth, there would, in accordance with what you say, be a possibility of the perception of the variegated colour even on the plain side of the cloth; as the colour belongs to the cloth, which is perceptible on that side as well, and which is one only.”

Reply:—This could not be; because what is known, on the ground of invariable concomitance and non-concomitance, as the basis of the perception of the variegated colour, is the perception of the various colours belonging to the constituent parts of the coloured object,—a perception which is recognised as one of the causes of the perception of the variegated colour; and as the constituent parts of the cloth on the plain side are devoid of any colours, there could be no perception of the variegated colour on that side.

“In that case there could be no perception of the variegated colour in any substance; as all such substances would be made up of the diads of various colours; and these diads having the invisible atoms for their constituent parts, the colours in question could not be perceived; as there could be no perception of the colours of these atoms that go to make up the diads.”

Who says it is not so? It is quite true that we cannot distinguish the colours of extremely subtle things; it is, only in the case of those substances whose colour can be distinguished, that we have a perception of the colours of their constituent parts.

There are some people who hold that in the case of the multicoloured object, what we see are the several variegated colours extending only over certain parts of the object; but for these people there would be no colour in a cloth where the two threads are yellow and blue; as the colour of neither of these two constituent threads could bring about the ‘variegated’ colour. It might be argued that in this case the two colours give rise to a single ‘variegated’ colour. But then, this could be said of all cases equally: For instance, we can say that ‘the substance of variegated colour, that forms the subject of discussion, is related to a single-coloured object, because it is a substance, like other substances’: and again, ‘the colour of that substance is one only because it is the colour of a material object, like the odour of other material substances,’; and hence the multicoloured object cannot be said to have several variegated colours, each extending over a portion of the object certain.

Taste is of six kinds—to be explained as before.

The pointing out of the various kinds of odour would be an indirect mention of the forms of Earth; hence the Author says: Odour is of two kinds. These two kinds are—the Good and the Bad. What is meant by ‘Asurabhi’ (Lit: non-good-smell) is not a mere negation of good smell, but a distinct odour, contrary in its nature to good odour, inhering in certain substances, and perceived as something undesirable; because it is always perceived in a positive form, in its varying grades.

The odour that is unnoticable is that wherein the goodness or badness is uot manifested; and hence this has not been mentioned as a distinct kind of odour; of, this also may be included iu ‘Asurabhi’ this word being explained as ‘not-surabhi’ (and certainly the odour that is neither good nor bad may be spoken of as ‘not good.’)

The author now proceeds to point out the kind of Touch that serves to differentiate the Ear h from other Substances. The peculiarity of its touch is that it is brought about by cooking, and is neither cool nor warm. Though like Touch, the Colour and Taste also of Earth have the peculiarity of being brought about by cooking, yet this peculiarity has not been mentioned in connection with these; because these (Colour and Taste) have other peculiarities also, and all that is wanted here is to show the points wherein these differ from those in the other substances. In the case of such Earthy things as the pillar and the like, the fact of their Touch being due to cooking, though not directly perceptible, is to be inferred in the following manner: ‘the touch of the pillar is due to cooking,—because it is a Touch belonging to the Earth, like the Touch of the Jar.’ The fact of the Touch of the Jar being due to cooking is to be inferred from the fact of its being such a property of the Jar as is perceptible by a single sense-organ,—like the Colour of the Jar.’

The author proceeds to show the subdivisions of Earth:—Earth is eternal and non-eternal—The two ‘ca’s are added with a view to indicate that these two divisions are wholly inclusive, and no third kind is possible. He next points out the two kinds: That in the shape of atoms is eternal and and that in the shape of products is noir-eternal. The word “lakṣaṇa” in both cases signifies nature or form.

Question: “What are your proofs fur the existence of earth in the shape of “atoms”?

Answer: It is Inference: The varying grades in the scale of minute dimensions must have an end somewhere,—because it is a scale of dimensions,—like the scale of large dimensions. And that point wherein that scale ends, further than which there is nothing minuter, is the Atom, (Lit. the most minute.') For this very reason, the atom is eternal, on account of its being a substance without constituent parts, like the Ākáśa. If it had any constituent parts, it could not be the atom, the "most minute;” as the parts would be minuter than the compound product; and in that case these parts would be the Atoms; and if this part too were not so, on account of this too having its constituent parts, then there would be no end of these parts, and we would have a regressus ad infinitum. And under the circumstances, in as much as all material things would be the products of an equally endless number of constituent parts, there would be no actual difference in the dimensions of things; as there would be no difference in the numbers of the constituent factors of things, which difference is the sole basis of the differentation of things into those of larger and smaller dimensions. That there is such a differentation cannot be denied; hence it must be admitted that there is a certain thing wherein we have the minutest dimension; and it is this minutest thing that is the Atom, and this is eternal. A single Atom is not productive; for if-an eternal thing were singly productive, there would be an unceasing production of products, as there would be no time at which any factor could be wanting: and this would necessitate the admitting of the indestructible character of the products also. As there would be no destruction of either the substratum or the constituent parts of these products,—and it is the destruction of these alone that can bring about the destruction of things. Nor could the combination of three atoms be regarded as productive. Because as a rule we find that a gross material object is the product of such factors as are of a smaller dimension than that object (a jar is made of pieces smaller than itself;) and then the Triad must be regarded as the product of something that is itself a product,—because it is of a gross dimension, like the ordinary jar. Thus then the productiveness of a single atom, as well as of three atoms having been rejected, it must be admitted that it is only two atoms that are productive; and it is this product, the Diad (two-atoms) that produces all things. Of Diads, it must be more than two, and not two only, that can be regarded as productive; as on account of the presence of the productive cause of the minute dimension of the Diad, it would be a product of minute dimension that would be produced, and as such the production would be absolutely useless. This would not be the case when there would be more than two Diads. Some products are made up of three diads and these are called “Triads;” some of four or five atoms, and so forth. Nor are these graduated products absolutely useless; as the number of the productive Diads goes on increasing, there is a corresponding increase in the dimension of the product. Nor would this theory necessitate the belief that all things—such as the jar—are produced out of diads alone; as when the jar is broken we find it reduced to parts of varying dimensions; and it is in accordance with these that we attribute the. causality of the jar. Thus then we find that the Earth in the form of its products, is produced from the diad downwards. And in this form the Earth is non-eternal; as we find in it present the two causes of non-eternality, in the shape of the disruption of the constituent cause, and the destruction of its substrate.

The Author next points out another property of Earth products, that appears along with their non-eternality: This is hard or rigid etc. “Etc.” refers to such properties as Looseness (Softness) and the like. It comprises many sub-classes—such as the “cow” and the like. Though there are no sub-classes in the atoms, yet we have to admit of such conglomerations of these, due to the unseen force of destiny as come to produce the subclasses of things made up of those atoms.

Objection: “The creation of all things is due to the influences of the unseen force of the Destiny of a human agent; and what useful function for man does the Earth product perform that it should have been produced by his destiny?”

Reply: It supplies the many useful things, in the shape of beds &c.

The author points out other useful purposes that the Earth serves for man: Its products are threefold, as consisting of the Body &c. The Body is the receptacle of the experiences of the conscious agent; the dead body is called a “body” because of its past capability of being such a receptacle. The “Sense-organ” is that substance in the body which is the means of the direct perception of the cogniser. The “Object"; is the substance that serves as the subject of the agent’s experiences.

The author next shows the different kinds of bodies related to the Earth: It is of two kinds: oviparous (that born of the womb) and non-oviparous. By “womb” (ovum) here is meant the admixture of the man’s semen and the woman’s ovule; and the ‘oviparous’ is that which is born out of that; and that which is not so born is the ‘non-oviparous;’ and this latter is born independently of the semen and the ovule. This kind of body belongs to the Gods and the Sages.

Objection: “As a matter of fact we find that there is an invariable concomitance between the production of the Body; and the presence of the semen and ovule; how then, could anybody be produced in the absence of such semen and ovule?”

Reply: Such bodies are produced out of atoms aided by particular kinds of virtues. The sense is this: The atoms, and not a mixture of semen and ovule, are the origin from which the body is produced; as even in the case of the oviparous body, what the body is directly produced from are the atoms wherein have been produced by a process of cooking (modification) certain qualities, following upon the disruption of the semen and the ovule,—this disruption being due to the law that everything is to be regarded as destroyed after it has performed its function. Nor is there any real difference between the semen and the ovule, and the atoms; as all these belong to the Earth. In case of such effects, the cause that regulates the character or kind of each body, lies in an unseen agency (Destiny.) Under the circumstances there can be nothing unreasonable in the theory that the non-oviparous body is born out of atoms aided by certain particular virtues.

Objection: “As a matter of fact we find that the production of all bodies is preceded by an admixture of semen and ovule.”

Reply: True; but that fact does not show definitely whether the sequence of the production of our body to semen &c. is absolutely independent of all unseen agency, or it is the mere arrangement of the material particles that follows from the semen &c. This same fact also sets aside the opposite syllogistic argument put forward above; as its basic premises (that the production of the body is invariably proceded by an admixture of semen and ovule) is open to doubt. We shall deal with this matter further, on the occasion of -dealing with the sensuous perception of yogis.

There is a kind of the non-oviparous body which is due to particular sins. Such is the body of the smaller animals—viz. insects, moths and the like. These bodies are meant to be punishments for the ensouling Jīvas: and as such are brought about by atoms as aided by the effects of particular kinds of sin. This fact is well known to all people.

The author now proceeds to describe the oviparous body. It is the body produced out of the mixture of the semen of the father and the ovule of the mother. When these two become mixed up in a particular way, the mixture comes to be acted upon by the digestive fire of the mother; and this fire having destroyed the qualities of colour &c. of the atoms making up that mixture, there appear in it other homogenous qualities, and the atoms giving rise to the diad, the diad to the triad, we have finally the appearance of the embryonic body; the mind enters into the body at this stage, and not while there are mere semen and ovule in their own forms; because it is only a body that can serve as the substratum for the mind. A portion of the essence of the food eaten by the mother is transferred to the fœtus. Then this comes to be acted upon by the unseen force (of the ensouling jīva’s deeds.) And the further action of the internal fire leads to a further dismemberment of the atoms due to their functioning, which brings about the differentiation of the embryonic body; and then there appears another body produced out of the atoms costituting the embryonic body—these atoms acquiring in themselves certain qualities due to ‘cooking’, and congregating themselves with the atoms of food eaten by the mother, which latter begin to function by reason of the aforesaid unseen force. This process goes on every day in regard to all bodies,

Question: “What are your proofs for supposing two distinct bodies (the embryonic and the ordinary)?”

Answer:—We have a proof for this in the difference in the dimensions of bodies; and certainly a body of larger dimensions could not be contained in another whose dimensions are smaller (i.e. the ordinary body of the child could not be contained in the fœtus.)

Objection:—“It would be quite possible for the larger dimension to be contained in the smaller body, after this latter has undergone certain modifications.”

Reply:—Would this modification be brought about by the particles of the smaller body helping the action of the particles of food, or by the body as helped by these latter? In either case, we would in the end, have a number of bodies of varying dimensions; just as we have in the case of pieces of cloth produced out of yarns. (As a piece of cloth is found to consist of several smaller pieces.) As a matter of fact, however, we do not come across such bodies. Hence it must be admitted that the body of the fœtus is destroyed, and another body is produced (out of the particles of the former;) specially as the dimensions of the bodies must be regarded as different, on account of one dimension being larger than the other, like the dimensions of the jar end the saucer; and then again the dimension in question (of the fœtus) also is destroyed along with its substratum, because it is a dimension, like the dimension of the jar broken by a stroke of the stick.

Objection:—“The body must be regarded as one only; as it is actually recognised to be the same.”

Reply:—Not so; because the recognition of sameness can be explained as being due to similarity. There is always a chance of such recognition of identity between certain things when these appear immediately after one another, and when they are extremely similar to one another; as we find in the case of flames rising from the fire; and even though there be no such cognition to the contrary, as that ‘these are not the same,’ yet the notion of identity may be rejected on the ground of well-founded reasoning.

The kinds of Body are now shown: It is of two kinds, ‘jarāyu’ is the placenta; and that which is born surrounded by it is the ‘jarāyuja’; and that which is born encased within the two discs of an egg is the eggborn, ‘andaja’. These two kinds of bodies are pointed out. The body of men, like ourselves, of paśus (by ‘paśu’ here is to be taken the goat because of such sentences ‘agniṣomīyam paśam &c.’ and ‘saptadaś prājāpatyān paśūnālabheta’ where the word means ‘goat’,) of mṛgas (in the kṛṣṇasāra and other species of deer,) and also of other quadrupeds, belongs to the class of the jarāyuja; and to the class of ‘andaja’ belong the bodies of birds and serpents, and fishes.

The author next points out the sense-organ related to the earth. In all animals the organ that brings about the cognition of smell is made up of earth-particles. In order to show that there is no such hard and fast rule that the organ brings about the cognition of smell only, and not of any other things related to the earth, the author says:—It is made up of earth molecules not affected by the molecules of water &c. That is to say, this organ, through the agency of an unseen force, is made up, in a way that distinguishes it from others, of earth-molecules, whose energy is not weakened by the presence of the molecules of water and other substances; thus having its production of a peculiar character, it is this organ, and none other, that is capable of making smell perceptible. The name of this is ‘ghrāṇa’ ‘olfactory organ’ (nose;) the word being etymologically explained ‘jighratyanena’—i.e. that by means of which the self smells or perceives odour: the existence, of this organ is proved by the preception of smell,—every action being accomplished only by means of a certain instrument (and the action of smell-perception has its instrument in the olfactory organ); specially as we do not find any smell-perception resulting from the operation of the -visionary and other organs. And the fact of the olfactory organ being of the earth is proved by its manifesting smell only from among colour, taste &c. (and smell belongs specifically to the Earth.) As a corroborative instance, we have the perceptibility of the smell of Kunkuma brought about by butter. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the butter manifests the smell of the Kunkuma only as accompanied with the smell of the butter itself, and in the same manner the olfactory organ can be an organ of smell only when it itself has some sort of a smell. It is for this reason that the nose does not perceive its own odour, as it could not perceive itself. As in the case of this organ, so in the case of other organs of Taste &c. also, as we shall show by means of other instances, that they can have the character of organs only when endowed with taste, colour &c. And as such they are not capable of perceiving their own qualities. As for the Ear, it is an organ having sound for its quality (and sound does not enter into its constitution, as smell, taste &c. do in regard to their respective organs.) and hence it is by means of the Ear alone that sound is perceived.

The author next points out, by means of the word ‘tu’, the difference of Object from Body and Organ; appearing in the order of the diad &c.—This describes what is common to all earth objects. In the shape of clay, stone &c.—i.e. having the character of clay, stone, animals and vegetables. Of these the different forms in which clay is found are the various portions of the earth’s surface, in their various depths &c,. walls, bricks, &c. The forms of minerials are stones, gems (like the sūryakānta,) and the diamond. (The vegetables are) grasses, the cereal grains, (e.g. the wheat) the trees with flowers and fruits (like the kovidāra,) creepers, spreading plants (like the ketakī,) and those trees that have fruits without flowers (e.g. the audumbara.)

Objection: “The name ‘sthāvara’ implies the absence of self-initiated motion; and this applies to the minerals as well as vegetables (why then should the name be applied to these latter only?”)

Reply: True, it is so; but in as much as stone &c. have other characteristics also, they are not spoken of by that name.

Notes:

(1) Pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī— In this sentence the most general definition or Pṛthivī has been attempted. ‘Earth is that which is related to and belongs to the generality or genus earth; though this does not add anything to cur knowledge of earth, yet it cannot be denied that this is the most universal definition possible.

(2) Pākaja—Lit. produced by cooking or baking; according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the touch of earth and all earthy things, is ‘produced by baking’; and so also are their colour and taste. What appears to be meant by this is that the touch, colour and taste of all earthy things are changed by fire-contact; while of all other substances these qualities remain constant. This is the only explanation possible: otherwise it is not very easy to understand how the colour or touch of a clod of earth lying in the fields can be regarded as produced by fire contact.