Yogadrstisamuccaya of Haribhadra Suri (Study)

by Riddhi J. Shah | 2014 | 98,110 words

This page relates ‘Fallacious argument (kutarka)’ of the study on the Yogadrstisamuccaya: a 6th-century work on Jain Yoga authored by Haribhadra Suri consisting of 228 Sanskrit verses. The book draws from numerous sources on traditional Yoga. Three important topics are stipulated throughout this study: 1) nature of liberation, 2) a liberated soul, and 3) omniscience.—This section belongs to the series “A Line of Demarcation between the first four and last four Yogadrishtis”.

There are two major obstacles which obstruct a seeker’s path of attaining samyagdarśana. They are:

  1. Crave for worldly existence.
  2. Deadly grip of fallacious argument (kutarkaviṣamagraha).

Till a seeker is in acarmāvarta and possesses oghadṛṣṭi, his fondness for material pleasures obstructs his way of attaining the samyagdarśana. As soon as he enters caramapudgalāvartana and obtains any of first four yoga dṛṣṭi his excessive attachment for worldly enjoyaments gets reduced. Even at this stage his adherence for fallacious argument [i.e., kutarka] does not go away. The reason for it is that still he has not become completely free from the possession of the avedyasaṃvedyapada. For a seeker who owns any of first four yoga dṛṣṭi is just one step away from the attainment of samyagdarśana and that one step is his adherence for fallacious argument (or logic chopping). Hence our author says that once the subject in question gets victory over the avedyasaṃvedyapada he is invariably, really, automatically and completely released from the deadly grip of the fallacious argument.[1] The former is an instrumental cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the tater. Therefore in the absence of the instrumental cause its effect automatically disappears.[2]

Upādhyāya yaśovijaya states this fact, by giving on example, in the twenty third dvātriṃśikā of the treatise Dvātriṃśad-dvātriṃśikā.

The verse is:

jīyanāmo'tra rājñīva camūcaraparicchdaḥ |
nivartate svataḥ śīghraṃ kutarkaviṣamagrahaḥ ||23.1||

Let us see now what Haribhadrasūrisūri says about definition, nature and characteristics of the deadly grip of the fallacious argument. Haribhadrasūrisūri defines a fallacious argument as a mere arrangement of alternatives. Majority of these alternatives are closely related with ignorance.[3]

A fallacious argument (kutarka) is also defined as kutarka-āgamanirapekṣa in the auto-commentary on verse -87th of the treatise Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

Disqualities of a fallacious argument:

[4]

  1. It appears as a disease to the understanding (bodha).
  2. It causes harm to the equanimity.
  3. It disintegrates the faith in religious truths.
  4. It gives rise to vanity.
  5. In many ways it is an enemy of a soul in real sense.

Here, we may find a link among following sentences of the auto-commentary of our our author. In verse 87 it is written that:

kutarkaḥ cotasaḥ anekadhā vyaktaṃ bhāvaśatruḥ”.

In the auto-commentary on this verse Haribhadrasūri says that:

kutarka - āgamanirapekṣā;
cotasaḥ - antaḥkaraṇasya;
bhāvaśatruṃ — paramārtharipuḥ;
anekadhā-āryāpavādādikāraṇena
”||87||

In the auto-commentary on verse 141 our author defines the word āryāpavāda. It is said that

“...āryāpavādastu punaḥ-sarvajñaparibhavaḥ ityarthaḥ,..”

In the auto-commentary on verse 87 our author simply states that since a fallacious argument [i.e., kutarka] is involved in doing repudiation of noble ones (āryāpavādā) and so on, it is an enemy of one’s inner mind. Further in auto-commentary on verse 141 Haribhadrasūri clarifies that by āryāpavāda he means sarvajñaparibhava.

The treatise Yogasāraprābhṛta composed by Amitagati defines the fallacious argument as follows. It says:

bodharodhaḥ śamā'pāyaḥ śraddhābhaṅgo'bhimānakṛt |
kutarko mānaso vyādhirdhyānaśatruranekadhā ||7.42||

Upādhyaya Yaśovijaya presents the negative impacts of a fallacious argument in a poetic way in his text Dvātriṃśad-dvātriṃśikā.

It is said:

śamā''rāmā'nalajvālā himāni jñānapaṅkajo |
śraddhāśalyaṃ smayollasaḥ kutarkaḥ sunayā'rgalā ||23.2||”

A Fallacious argument is like fire flame that destroys garden of equanimity. It is like snow to shatter a lotus of knowledge. It is like a painful thorn for faith. It raises vanity. It intervens as an obstruction (like a bar used to fasten a door) for obtaining right stand point.

The destructive nature of the fallacious argument (kutarka) is well mentioned in the text Adhyātmatattvāloka written by Muni Nyāyavijaya.

The verse is:

śamāmbuvāhe pratikūlavātaṃ sadbodhapadme ca himopapātam |
śraddhānaśalyaṃ smayaṣoṣakañca nijaṃ hitaṃ dhnanti kutarkamotya ||3.108

Nature of a fallacious argument

[5]

  1. It is almost entirely of the nature of an incorrect refutation (hetvābhāsa = jātiprāya)
  2. It stands contradictory with findings of the direct observation.
  3. It gives rise to many confusions in the process of concluding any proposition.
  4. With help of a fallacious argument, which is chiefly based on illustration everything can be said to be present everywhere.

(1) It is almost entirely of the nature of an incorrect refutation (hetvābhāsa = jātiprāya):-

A statement of a disputant is never understood in right sense by an opponent. The later always tries to catch the otherwise meaning of the statement presented by the former one. Such opponent is not the one who is an enquirer of the truth. Rather he is merely interested in refuting the former one. An opponent’s chief object is to find unnecessary faults in the statement of the disputant. And ultimately prove the proposition of the disputant to be wrong. For doing it the opponent forms a series of groundless alternatives. They are of the nature of incorrect refutation. A fallacious argument comprises of such alternatives. Therefore a fallacious argument is of the nature of incorrect refutation.[6]

(2) It stands contradictory with the findings of the direct observation:

The conclusion established with the help of a fallacious argument dose not conform to reality. A controller of a mad elephant was telling people to move away form the road because the mad elephant may kill them. When a student of logic heard it he thought of two alternatives.

They are:

  1. Does this elephant kill one who is in contact with it?
  2. Or, does it kill one who is not in contact with it?

When he contemplated on the suitability of both the alternatives in present situation, he concluded that there exists logical difficulties in both of them. Such an arrangement of verbal as well as mental alternatives born out of the ignorance of the student is called a fallacious argument. While the student was busy in forming the fallacious argument the mad elephant caught him. Somehow he was rescued by the controller.[7]

This is how the fallacious argument astrays the intellect of the student and does not confirm to reality. The mad elephant neither kills one who is in its contact nor one who is not in its contact. In reality it kills one, who comes in its way from the front side.[8] But this fact can not be grasped with the help of the fallacious argument.

(3) It gives rise to many confusions in the process of concluding any proposition:

Haribhadrasūrisūri states that at the summing up of a discussion a fallacious argument [i.e., kutarka] culminates in the statement that such is the very nature of a substance. But as a matter of fact, this nature of things is beyond the logical comprehension of non-omniscient ones. Moreover, we may also find some one else who posits this very nature in an altogether different manner.[9]

In a discussion a disputant as well as an opponent, both, try to estabish his own predicate. To establish his predicate “every substance is momentary” the disputant would take resort to illustrations. He says that the fire burns and the water makes things wet because such is their very nature. Similarly the nature of a substance is momentary. The disputant represents the kṣaṇikavādin Buddhists. The Buddhist system of logic states that the momentary nature of a substance should be established by saying that such is the very nature of a substance.

According to Haribhadrasūrisūri this statement of Buddhist logic has two following flows.

  1. The very nature of a substance is beyond the logical comprehension of the nonomniscient ones.
  2. The propounder of other philosophical schools posits this very nature in an altogether different manner by using various logical arguments.

Every substance is momentary because such is its very nature. If an opponent wants to refute this statement of the disputant, the opponent would present this very nature of a substance in an altogether different manner by giving illustrations. At this point of time no one can judge as who is right because this very nature of a substance can not grasped by logical comprehension of the non-omniscient ones. Taking its advantage the disputant as well as the opponent would go on establishing their own belief. And none of them will be able to point out each other’s mistake as both have resorted to the fallacious arguments.

Let us see in brief how the opponent refutes the established predicate of the disputant. The disputant says the nature of water is to make things wet. To refute it the opponent would state that water burns when situated near the fire. If the opponent says that water burns, his statement would appear controversial to the reality. Therefore he manipulated his statement and presented it as water burns in the proximity of fire. The same is said for the fire. That is “fire makes things wet when placed near to the water”. The opponent would say that this is so because such is their nature i.e. of water and fire.[10]

To justify his statement the opponent would expand his explanation. While fire burns some one and water is lying in proximity of the fire. At this circumstance instead of saying fire burns the opponent would say water burns because fire and water are near to each other. If a wise man tells that though fire and water exist in proximity that which burns a man is fire and not the water which is lying little far from the fire. However the opponent would refute this statement of the wise man by employing the fallacious argument.

To refute it the opponent can offer the following illustration:

“This is so because the magnet is found to perform its function even from distance. There is nothing incongruous about our thesis on fire and water because things can actually perform their respective functions from a distance”[11] .

On hearing the whole fallacious argument of the opponent, the disputant would ask him to an oath by saying that whatever he has said about the nature of fire and water is true.

Now for deciding the issue in this case non of them have no means at their disposal except a declaration made on oath.[12]

(4) With the help of a fallacious argument, which is chiefly based on illustration, everything can be said to be present everywhere:

In the third point we have seen how the opponent used the illustration of a magnet to establish his predicate. Haribhadrasūri says that in this way illustrations are in each case so cheaply available all around. Hence no one can refute with the help of argument the cases of fallacious arguments that are chiefly based on illustrations.[13]

The illustrations used in the fallacious argument, manipulate truth in the desired manner–for it Haribhadrasūri says as follows:-Basing oneself on the illustrations viz. “two moons” and “the experience at a dream” one can seek to prove the all knowledge whatsoever is independent.[14]

The yogācāra Buddhists are vijñānavādins they believe that only knowledge exists in the world. Nothing is real other than knowledge. All knowledge whatsoever is devoid of an object. The discussion to prove this predicate is as follows.:

An opponent: If you do not accept the existence of anything except knowledge, then how would you justify the existence of direct perception of all objects in this world?

A vijñānavādin: The direct perception of an object is a mere illusion. In reality only knowledge exists. The existence of an object, which is perceived directly, is illusory.

An opponent: If it is the case then how does it become possible to have a direct perception of an object that does not exist in reality.

A vijñānavādin: It is possible. To strengthen the argument following examples are presented.

  1. Though there is only one moon in the sky, a diseased person views it as two.
  2. Though one sees horses, elephants etc. in dream, they do not exist really in dream.

We have seen that in these illustrations those objects are perceived which do not exist in reality. Similarly even though nothing exist except knowledge, one has cognition of various things other than knowledge due to illusion.

This is how a vijñānavādin, on the base of illustrations establishes his predicate even though it is not compatible with what is evident in the world. From this we may conclude that with the help of illustrations even truths can be proved as untruth. Hence a fallacious argument, chiefly based on illustrations, serves no purpose.

In Yogabindu Haribhadrasūri mentions uselessness of disputation and refutation. It is said:

vādāṃśca prativādāṃśca, vadanto niścitāṃstathā |
tattvāntaṃ naiva gacchnti, tilapīlakavadgatau” ||67||

The same verse is presented in 23.5 of Dvātriṃśad-dvātriṃśikā and 1.47 of Adhyātmopaniṣad. Both these treatises are written by Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya.

The disputation (vāda) and refutation (prativāda), constituents of the fallacious argument, never result into acknowledging the real nature of truth (tattva).

This fact is wellstated in the following verses. They are:

acire dhyānamārgajñā dhyānoddhūtarajaścayāḥ |
bhāviyogihitoyedaṃ dhvāntadīpasamaṃ vacaḥ ||
vādanāṃ prativādānāṃ bhāṣitāro viniścitam |
naiva gacchnti tattvāntaṃ gateriva vilambitaḥ ||
   -Yogasāraprābhṛta 7.32.33

The verse, presented in the treatise Adhyātmatattvāloka, resembles with the aforementioned verses of Yogasāraprābhṛta.

The verse is:

sabhāsu vāda-prativāda-jalpā viśāradānāṃ vividhā bhavanti |
tattvāntasiddharna hi labhyate tairdṛṣṭāntabhūtastilapīlako'tra || 3.109

Uselessness of a fallacious argument:

Haribhadrasūri states that since time immemorial many thoughtful/wise persons have been attempting to establish the existence of supra-sensuous entity. However while doing so none has resorted to a fallacious argument. For a reason a supra sensuous entity is an object of scriptural knowledge alone. That means only the sacred texts do tell us of such entity.

Reasons:

An attachment for a fallacious argument [i.e., kutarka] is worth abandoning Haribhadrasūri gives the following reasons for it. They are:

1. A fallacious argument is incapable of ascertaining the essential nature of a suprasensuous entity. The thoughtful persons have directed their all endeavor towards establishing the existence of supra-sensuous entity viz. dharma etc. However such an entity is never an object of dry logic chopping. As a matter of fact, such an entity is an object of scriptural knowledge alone. Therefore our author advices an aspirant to leave adherence for the fallacious argument.[15]

2. Haribhadrasūri states that a fallacious argument is unproductive and potentially destructive by nature. It causes false pride. Therefore one who is desirous of liberation should abandon inclination for a fallacious argument.[16]

3. A soul, who is desirous of liberation, should not have attachment for anything what so ever. As a matter of fact he leaves even virtues at the time of attaining liberation why should he have the attachment for such an unproductive fallacious argument.[17] The lines of Yogasāraprābhṛta support this last reason given by Haribhadrasūri.

The lines are:

na kutrā'pyāgrahastattve vidhātavyo mumukṣubhiḥ |
nirvāṇaṃ sādhyate yasmāt samastā''grahavajitaiḥ”||19.34||

An advice of Haribhadrasūri:

Till now we are informed about the nature, disqualities as well as malfunctions of a fallacious argument. This information states the fact that a fallacious argument is worthless in every sense. Hence, Haribhadrasūri gives an advice to a soul who is desirous of attaining liberation. He says that such a soul should, in all respect, abstain from owing inclination for a fallacious argument. Instead of involving into the useless fallacious argument, a worthy soul should have an inclination for sacred texts, noble conduct as well as meditative concentration.[18] In order to ripen the attachment for above mentioned things one has to do good to others. It has been proved to be the ultimate seed of these three. It is that seed which never fails to yield fruit as per the experience of all yogins.[19]

According to Haribhadrasūri when a soul in question imbibe completely all these in himself he mainly relies on scriptures, possesses right faith, is of noble conduct and constantly practises yoga. On acquiring such qualities he becomes worthy of acknowledging supra-sensuous entities.[20] Their acknowledgment help him in his spiritual journey of attaining liberation.

In the text Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya our author refers to the thought of the great sage Patañjali. He states the pre-requisites of an aspirant who is desirous of acquiring knowledge about the ultimate truth.

The verse is:

āgamonā'numānena, yogābhyāsarasona ca |
tridhā prakalpayan prajñāṃ, labhate tattvamuttamam ||101||
   — Yogadṛṣṭisamyccaya.

We are told that the aspirant should mainly relies on the scriptures for acknowledging the real nature of supra-sensuous entities. After knowing this fact one would most obviously think that various schools of philosophy have different scriptures. Therefore which particular scriptural text of a specific school of philosophy imparts knowledge of suprasensuous entities?

Haribhadrasūri has stated that though the omniscients are different personalities possessing different names etc., they all are one from real stand point.[21] Therefore they do not have expressed divergent opinions regarding reality in their respective scriptures. It is but a delusion on the part of their devotees who hold in special reverence one or another from among the omniscient ones to discriminate between them.[22]

Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya states the following lines in the present context in his treatise Dvātriṃśad -dvātriṃśikā.

The lines are:

tattvataḥ śāstrabhodaśca na śāstṛṇāmabhedataḥ |
mohastadadhimuktīnāṃ tadbhedā''śrayaṇaṃ tataḥ ||23.114||

Translation:

In a real sense no difference exist among the scriptural texts because their composers are not essentially different. Therefore the sense of discrimination held by those who have high regard for the composers of scriptural text is delusion on part of former ones.

Jainas believe that twenty four tīrthaṅkaras appear in each ascending and descending half of the time cycle, have done so from beginning less time, and will continue to do so forever.

All these tīrthaṅkaras are omniscients. Though they flourish in different time and place and they are different individuals, the omniscience which they all possess is one and the same.[23]

Haribhadrasūri states that since all omniscients are one from real view point, the devotees of other schools of philosophy, who have faith in their respective omniscient person, are all votaries of chief omniscient one[24]

In the twenty-third dvātriṃśikā Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has commented upon the aforementioned statements of Haribhadrasūri. Haribhadrasūri states that all omniscients are one. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya says that they are one because they all belong to one class (jāti). The quality of omniscience is the essential characteristic of every one who belongs to the class of omniscient. This distinguishes the omniscient persons from all other classes.

The another statement of Haribhadrasūri is that those who worship an omniscient one, in general fashion are worshiper of chief omniscient only. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya states that all worshippers worship an omniscient, though a different personality, as the best man of virtues. This attribute is common among all omniscients. Therefore though all worshippers worship different different personality they all worship only one i.e. chief omniscient who is endowed with best virtues.

A votary may argue with other votary that the omniscient person, whom I worship, possesses virtues and knowledge far better than the omniscient whom you worship. Therefore there is difference between the omniscient person whom I worship and you worship. To prove such argumentation of votaries erroneous Haribhadrasūri states the following lines.: The nonomniscient (i.e.votary) can never comprehend the details of nature of an omniscient person in its entirety. In this sense no non-omniscient votary can claim himself as a real knower of an omniscient person.[25] Therefore every votary who has faith in an omniscient person, in a general fashion, is placed in the same category, namely “a worshipper of an omniscient” by the wise men in so far as the faith of the votary is concerned.[26]

An example:

Just as a king’s numerous dependents who differ among themselves in various ways viz. some stay at places that are near to the king’s seat whereas some others stay at the places away from the seat of a king. Nonetheless, all of them are his attendants. In the same way since there is oneness in an element of omniscience (sarvajñatattva), all those who have faith in an omniscient person, in spite of their divergent conduct, should be considered to be the followers of the omniscient.[27]

The various religious performances of aspirants, whose nearness or farness to the omniscience depend on their various religious performances practiced by them. They have obtained different different stages on the path of spirituality. On the basis of their varied spiritual eligibilities their nearness or farness to the omniscients is decided. Though the aspirants differ from one another with respect to closeness and farness, they all are worshippers of an omniscient person. Similarly many attendants of one king, who may serve the king with different different services are called his servants only. This is how the example given by our author is most apt in the present context. After giving the example our author repeats to conclude that the noble persons (mahātman) should contemplate over the fact that even though the great personages differ in name etc. they are not mutually different in essence.[28]

The word noble soul (=mahātman) is used for carmāvartin soul who is holder of any of the first four yogadṛṣṭis. His contemplation over the afore mentioned fact paves the way to achieve victory over the deadly grip of the fallacious argument [i.e., kutarka]. Such contemplation broadens his vision to understand the principles of every philosophical system with subtlety. It results into the achievement of the state vedyasaṃvedyapada.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

jīyamāne ca niyamā-detasmiṃstattvato nṛṇām |
nivarttate svato'tyantaṃ, kutarkaviṣamagrahaḥ ||86||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[2]:

nivarttate svata-ātmanaivā'paropadeśona, nimittābhāve naimittikābhāvāt,......... ||86||
   -Auto-commentary of Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[3]:

avidyāsaṅgatāḥ prāyo, vikalpāḥ sarva eva yat |
tadyayojanātmakaścaiṣa, kutarka: kimanena tat ||90JJ
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya

[4]:

bodharogaḥ śamāpāyaḥ śraddhābhaṅgo'bhimānakṛt |
kutarkaścetaso vyaktaṃ, bhāvaśatruranekadhā ||87JJ
   -ibid.

[5]:

a. jātiprāyaśca sarvo'yaṃ, pratītipha labādhitaḥ |
hastī..........,...........||91||
b. savarṃ sarvatra cā''pnoti, yadasmādasamañjasam | ................,............||97||
c. dṛṣṭāntamātraṃ sarvatra, yadevaṃ sulabhaṃ kṣitau | .................,..........||95||
   -ibid.

[6]:

| jātiprāyatā sarvatra bhinnārthagrahaṇasvabhāvasaṃvedanavedane taetākāravikalpanasyaivamprāyatvāditi cacitamanyatra ||91||
   -Auto-commentary of Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[7]:

sarvo'yaṃ-kutarka:, pratītipha labādhita itikṛtvā, etadevā''ha-hastī vyāpādayatyuktau moṇṭhena, kimivetyāha- prāptā'prāptavikalpavaditi | kaścinnaiyāyikaśchatraḥ kutaścidāgacchn avaśībhūtamattahastyārūḍhenakenaciduktaḥ-‘bho bhoḥ ! tvaritamapasara; hastī vyāpādayatīti’ | sa tathā-'pariṇatanyāyaśāstra āha- ‘re re baṭhara’ ! kimova yuktibāhyaṃ pralapasi ! tathāhi-kimayaṃ prāptaṃ vyāpādayati kiṃ vā'prāptamiti? ādyapakṣo bhavata eva vyāpattiprasaṅgaḥ prāptibhāvāt, dvitīyapakṣo tu trailokasya, aprāptyaviśoṣāt | evaṃ yāvadāha tāvaddhastinā gṛhītaḥ sa kathamapi moṇṭhena mocita iti |...||91||
   -Auto-commentary of Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[8]:

See pg.276, line-6-9, Part-2, Mota.

[9]:

svabhāvottaraparyanta, eṣo'sāvapi tattvataḥ |
nā'rvāgdṛggocaro, nyāyā-danyathā'nyena kalpitaḥ ||92||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[10]:

ato'ginaḥ vledayatyambu-sannidhau dahatīti ca |
ambvaginasannidhau tatsvā-bhāvyādityudite tayoḥ ||93||
   -ibid.

[11]:

|..... evetyāha-viprakṛṣṭo'pyayaskāntaḥ -lohākarṣaka upalaviśoṣaḥ svārthakṛt-lohākarṣādisvakāryakaraṇaśīlaḥ dṛśyate yataḥ loke | sa hi viprakṛṣṭa eva na sannikṛṣṭaḥ, lohamova na tāmrādi, ākarṣatyeva na kartayati | taditthamasyevā'gnyādīnāṃ tathāsvābhāvakalpanaṃ kena bādhyate ?....||94||
   -Auto-commentary of Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[12]:

kośapānā?te jñāno-pāyo nā'styatra yuktitaḥ |
viprakṛṣṭo'pyayaskāntaḥ, svārthakṛd dṛśyate yataḥ ||98||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[13]:

dṛṣṭāntamātraṃ sarvatra, yadevaṃ sulabhaṃ kṣitau |
etatpradhānastat kena, svanītyā'podyate syam ||95JJ
   -ibid.

[14]:

dvicandrasvapnavijñāna-nidarśanabalotthitaḥ |
nirālambanatāṃ sarva-jñānānāṃ sādhayan yathā ||96||
   -ibid.

[15]:

atīndriyārthasiddhyarthaṃ yathālocitakāriṇām |
prayāsaḥ śuckatarkasya na cāsau gocaraḥ kvacit ||98||
   -ibid.

gaucarastvāgamasyaiva tatastadupalabdhitaḥ |
candrasūryoparāgādisaṃvādyāgamadarśanāt ||99||
   -ibid.

[16]:

tasmā-cchuckatarkagraho mahān |
mithyābhimānahetutvāt, tyājya eva mumukṣubhiḥ ||186||
   -ibid.

[17]:

grahaḥ sarvatra tattvena, mumukṣūṇāmasaṅgataḥ |
muktau dharmā api prāya-styaktavyāḥ kimanena tat? ||148||
   -ibid.

[18]:

kutarke'bhiniveśasta-nna yukto muktivādinām |
yuktaḥ punaḥ śrute śīle, samādhau ca mahātmanām ||88||

......abhiniveśastathātadgraharūpaḥ,......| yuktaḥ punaḥ śrute- āgamo śīle-paradrohaviratilakṣaṇo samādhau ca -dhyānaph labhūte mahātmanāṃ-muktivādināmabhiniveśo yukta iti ||88||

- Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and its auto-commentary.

[19]:

bījaṃ cā'sya paraṃ siddha-mavandhyaṃ sarvayoginām |
parārthakaraṇaṃ yena, pariśuddhamatro'tra ca ||89||

.......sarvayogināṃ-kulayogiprabhṛtīnām,...... —parārthakaraṇaṃ-paraprayojananicpādanaṃ........ ||89||

- Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and its auto-commentary.

[20]:

etatpradhānaḥ sacchrāddhaḥ, śīlavān yogatatparaḥ |
jānātyatīndriyānarthāṃ-stathā cā''ha mahāmatiḥ ||100||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya

[21]:

sarvajño nāma yaḥ kaścit, pāramāthika eva hi |
sa eka eva sarvatra, vyaktibhede'pi tattvataḥ ||103||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[22]:

na tattvato bhinnamatāḥ, sarvajñā bahavo yataḥ |
mohastadadhimuktīnāṃ, tadbhedāśraṇaṃ tataḥ ||102||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[23]:

sarvajño nāma yaḥ kaścidarhadādiḥ, pāramāthika eva hi nirūpacaritaḥ |
sa eka eva sarvatra sarvajñatvena, vyaktibhode'pi tattvataḥ ṛṣabhādilakṣaṇo sati ||103||
   -Auto-commentary of Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[24]:

pratipattistatastasya, sāmānyenaiva yāvātām |
te sarve'pi tamāpannā, kati nyāyagatiḥ parā ||104||

pratipattiḥ tatastasya-sarvajñasya sāmānyenaiva yāvatāṃ tantrāntarīyāṇāmapi te sarve'pi tamāpannāḥ sarvajñaṃ mukhyamoveti nyāyagatiḥ parā, tamantareṇa tatpratipattorasiddheḥ ||104||

- Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and its auto-commentary.

[25]:

viśoṣastu punastasya, kārtsnyenā'sarvadaśibhiḥ |
sarvairna jñāyate tena, tamāpanno na kaścana ||105||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[26]:

tasmāt sāmānyato'pyena-mabhyupaiti ya eva hi |
nirvyājaṃ tulya evā'sau, tenāṃśoneha dhīmatām ||106||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya.

[27]:

yathaivaikasya nṛpate-rbahavo'pi samāśritāḥ |
dūrāsannādibhode'pi, tajृtyāḥ sarva eva te ||107||
sarvajñatattvābhodena, tathā sarvajñavādinaḥ |
sarve tattattvagā jñoyā, bhinnācārasthitā api ||108||
   - Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya

[28]:

na bhoda eva tattvena, sarvajñānāṃ mahātmanām |
tathānāmādibhode'pi, bhāvyamotanmahātmabhiḥ ||109||
   -ibid.

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