Sūtra 1.24

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 1.24:

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ १.२४ ॥

kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ || 1.24 ||

24. God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

[Read Sūtra 1.24]

Those things which afflict are “afflictions” (kleśa). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. “Works” (karma), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the Śāstras), as also what are mixed, i.e., partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are “deserts” (vipāka). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (āsaya). “Untouched,” (aparāmṛṣṭa,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). “Particular soul” (Puruṣa-viśeṣa), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. “God” (īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom aud almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakṛti and Puruṣa cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogi, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Iśvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Śāstric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[The most important word in the aphorism is Īśvara, Derived from the root √Īś, it means ‘ruler’ or ‘governor,’ but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word puruṣa, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (shete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (φυχή) and spirit, or rational life (Πνεύμα) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patañjali did not much care for the Vedāntic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Ācārya’s summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works.

It runs thus:

“Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upaniṣads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patañjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahāpāśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Śaivasas Śiva,—the Vaiṣṇavas as Puruṣottoma,—the followers of the Purāṇas as the great Father (Brahmā),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mīmāṃsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Cārvākas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Śiva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?”—(Cowell’s Kusumāñjali, p.2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chārvākas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kāpilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved.

Kapila, in the Sāṅkhya aphorisms says,

“It is not proved that there is a God.” (Īśvarāsiddheḥ I.92.)

This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne’s translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world’s—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i. e.,] by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—[“by works alone, which are indispensable,”—and if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for “if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.”J.

Aph. 5.—Or [“if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely”] a technical term for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will”].

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, [“and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered.”—“Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply,—as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative”].

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. “In regard to the latter alternative he says”].

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; [“that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c.;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown”].

Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—“in the first place, there is not sense-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;” as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken “and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as ‘Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,’ the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion” that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world’s] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord].” (Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, pp. 114f.)

I should add here that some Kāpilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says “The existence of such a Lord is a settled point,” (III, 5 and 7), meaning by “such” an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedānta Sūtra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The Pātañjala Bhāṣya points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus:

“If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God.

Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord.”—

kaivalyam prāptāstarhi santi ca bahavaḥ kevalinaḥ.
te hi trīṇi bandhanām chitvā kaivalyaṃ prāptāh;
īśvarasya ca tat sambando na bhūto na bhāvī,
yathā muktasya pūrvabandhakoṭīḥ prajñāyate naivamīśvarasya,
yathā vā prakṛtilīnasyottarā bandhakoṭīḥ sambhāvyate naivamīśvarasya;
sa tu sadeva mnktaḥ sadeveśvaraḥ.]

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists.