Text 132

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 132:

संस्कारस्त्रिविधो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्च । तत्र वेगो मूर्तिमत्सु पञ्वसु द्रव्येषु निमित्तविशेषापेक्षात् कर्मणो जायते नियतदिक्क्रियाप्रबन्धहेतुः स्पर्शवद् द्रव्यसम्योगविशेषविरोधी क्वचित् कारणगुणपूर्वक्रमेणोत्पद्यते । भावनासंज्ञकस्त्वात्मगुणो दृष्टश्रुतानुभूतेष्वर्थेषु स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतुर्भवति ज्ञानमद् अदुह्खादिविरोधी । पट्वभ्यासादरप्रत्ययजः पटुप्रत्ययापेक्षाद् आत्ममनसोः सम्योगाद् आश्चर्येऽर्थे पटुः संस्कारातिशयो जायते । यथा दाक्षिणात्यस्योष्ट्रदर्शनाद् इति । विद्याशिल्पव्यायामादिष्वभ्यस्यमानेषु तस्मिन्न् एवार्थे पूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारम् अपेक्षमाणाद् उत्तरोत्तरस्मात् प्रत्ययाद् आत्ममनसोः सम्योगात् संस्कारातिशयो जायते । प्रयत्नेन मनश्चक्षुषि स्थापयित्वाऽपूर्वम् अर्थं दिदूक्षमाणस्य विद्युत् सम्पातदर्शनवद् आदरप्रत्ययः तम् अपेक्षमाणाद् आत्ममनसोः सम्योगात् संस्कारातिशयो जायते । यथा देवह्रदेराजतसौवर्णपद्मदर्शनाद् इति । स्थितिस्थापकस्तु स्पर्शवद् द्रव्येषु वर्तमानो घनावयवसन्निवेशविशिष्टेषु कालान्तरावस्थायिषु स्वाश्रयम् अन्यथाकृतं यथावस्थितं स्थापयति । स्थावरजङ्गमविकारेषु धनुह्शाखाशृङ्गदन्तास्थिसूत्रवस्त्रादिषु भुग्नसंवर्तितेषु स्थितिस्थापकस्य कार्यं संलक्ष्यते । नित्यानित्यत्वनिष्पत्तयोस्यापि गुरुत्ववत् ॥ १३२ ॥

saṃskārastrividho vego bhāvanā sthitisthāpakaśca | tatra vego mūrtimatsu pañcasu dravyeṣu nimittaviśeṣāpekṣāt karmaṇo jāyate niyatadikkriyāprabandhahetuḥ sparśavad dravyasamyogaviśeṣavirodhī kvacit kāraṇaguṇapūrvakrameṇotpadyate | bhāvanāsaṃjñakastvātmaguṇo dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣvartheṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānaheturbhavati jñānamad aduhkhādivirodhī | paṭvabhyāsādarapratyayajaḥ paṭupratyayāpekṣād ātmamanasoḥ samyogād āścarye'rthe paṭuḥ saṃskārātiśayo jāyate | yathā dākṣiṇātyasyoṣṭradarśanād iti | vidyāśilpavyāyāmādiṣvabhyasyamāneṣu tasminn evārthe pūrvapūrvasaṃskāram apekṣamāṇād uttarottarasmāt pratyayād ātmamanasoḥ samyogāt saṃskārātiśayo jāyate | prayatnena manaścakṣuṣi sthāpayitvā'pūrvam arthaṃ didūkṣamāṇasya vidyut sampātadarśanavad ādarapratyayaḥ tam apekṣamāṇād ātmamanasoḥ samyogāt saṃskārātiśayo jāyate | yathā devahraderājatasauvarṇapadmadarśanād iti | sthitisthāpakastu sparśavad dravyeṣu vartamāno ghanāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭeṣu kālāntarāvasthāyiṣu svāśrayam anyathākṛtaṃ yathāvasthitaṃ sthāpayati | sthāvarajaṅgamavikāreṣu dhanuhśākhāśṛṅgadantāsthisūtravastrādiṣu bhugnasaṃvartiteṣu sthitisthāpakasya kāryaṃ saṃlakṣyate | nityānityatvaniṣpattayosyāpi gurutvavat || 132 ||

Text (132): Faculty is of three kinds: (1) Speed or momentum (2) Mental impression and (3) Elasticity.

(1) Of these, speed is produced in the five corporeal substances, by an action or motion through some cause; it is the cause of a series of motions in a definite direction; it is counteracted by the conjunction of tangible (solid) substances; and in some cases, it is preceded by a like quality in the component parts of the substance.

(2) The faculty called ‘menial impression’ is a property of the Self; it is the cause of the remembrance and recognition of things previously seen or heard, or experienced; and is counteracted by contrary cognition, intoxication and extremes of pain &c. It is propuced [produced?] by (a) forcible cognitions, (b) by repeated cognitions and (c) by impressive cognitions produced by special efforts.

(a) The contact of mind and soul under the influence of a forcible cognition, brings about a peculiarly forcible faculty or impression with reference to an object of wonder to the observer; as for instance when a man from the south happens to see a camel.

(b) When study, arts, physical exercises and such other things are repeatedly practised, then in regard to them the mind—soul contact aided by the impression produced by one repetition brings about the next repetition; and so on and on, a peculiarly forcible faculty or impression is produced.

(c) The mind being with, special efforts, applied to the visual organ, with a view to see an interesting object never seen before,—there appears a perception which is as impressive as the perception of the flash of lightning; and the mindsoul contact under the influence of this impressive cognition, gives rise to a peculiar faculty; as for instance, when one happens to see silver and golden lotuses in the (Celestial Lake).

(3) Elasticity, on the other hand, resides in such substances as have their component molecules solidly packed together; and [when at a certain point of time]^[1] the object in which it resides happens to have its position changed, it tends to bring it bach to its original position..Effects of Elasticity are seen in such objects as a how, the branches of rees, horns, teeth, threads, cloth and the like,—all of which are products from certain animate and inanimate objects—whom we find to contract and expand.

The eternality and evanescence of this (Faculty or Elasticity) are line those of Gravity.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Faculty, saṃskāra is of three kinds; in the forms of (1) Speed, (2) mental impression and (3) elasticity. Of these, Speed is produced by action or motion in the five corporeal substances, Earth, Water, Light, Air and Mind; and in no other substance. Action or motion cannot be regarded as producing Speed by itself, as we do not find any speed proceeding from slow motion; hence it is only when the Action or Motion is aided by such accessory causes as pushing, striking and the like, that it gives rise to Speed. It is the series of actions in a definite direction; that is to say, it always gives rise to a series of actions or motions towards that direction in which the Speed is produced. Speed is destroyed by the peculiar contact of a tangible or solid object, the contact being with the extremely solid particles of that object; this peculiar solidarity of the particles is necessary in this object only when the Speed also is particularly forcible; as for slow speed, it is destroyed by the contact of any solid object. As for instance, in the case of the arrow that has been shot, as long as it retains the great momentum imparted to it, it can be obstructed only by coming into contact with a sufficiently solid and hard object; while when it has slowed down and lost its momentum its career is stopped even by the calm air of the atmosphere.

As a rule Speed is produced by motion in the object itself; but in some cases, as in the case of a mass of water composed of water molecules endowed with a certain momentum, we find it to be produced by the momentum of the component particles.

(2). The Faculty known as ‘mental impression,’ Bhāvanā, is a property of the Self. Its effects are described as the remembrance and recognition of things that have been seen, heard or otherwise known on a previous occasion. Under ‘otherwise known’ we must include even mistaken cognitions; as we find that we have remembrances of even such objects as may have been wrongly perceived.

This Faculty is destroyed or counteracted—(1) by contrary cognitions, as when what we have learnt we forget when our mind is under the influence of such excitements as those of gambling and the like;—(2) by intotication [intoxication?], as a drunken man loses all memory;—(3) by such extremes of pain &c., as are caused by death for instance; it is the extreme pain suffered in the womb and in the birth process that makes us lose the memory our past lives. Extremes of pleasure also are found to deprive us of our memory; as also do extreme anger &c.

Mental Impression is produced—(1) by forcible cognitions, (2) by repeated cognitions and (3) by impressive cognitions. (1) We find a forcible mental impression produced when the mind-soul contact is influenced by the forcible cognition of an object that excites the wonder of the observer; e.g., the man of the south having never seen a camel, it is for him a wonderful object; hence when he happens to see it, his cognition of it is so forcible as to leave on bis mind a lasting impression; and it makes him vividly remember it in his after life. (2) In regard to such things as ‘study’—learning of the scriptures etc.; ‘arts’—the painting of pictures etc.; and ‘physical exercise’—the exercises with weapons etc.;—we find that when they are regularly practised, with reference to one and the same object, the impression is made on the mind over and over

again for a long time; and thus the memory due to this is extremely vivid; this memory cannot be regarded as produced by only the first of the series of cognitions; as we find that a; simple cognition leaves no lasting impression and we have no memory of the object; nor can it be attributed to only the last cognition of the series, as if this alone were able to produce the vivid memory, then there would be no use for the repeated exercises; hence we conclude that memory is produced by the last cognition aided by the last but one impression, which in its turn is aided by the impression left by the previous cognition, and so on backwards, the whole series being aided by the impression made by the first cognition.

In this connection we consider the following question; when a certain scientific work is being studied, are the facts signified directly by the Words, or by sphoṭa?

Question. “Why should there be any such doubt.”

Answer. For the simple reason that there is a difference of opinion on the point: some people hold that what expresses the meaning is, not the word, but the sphoṭa; while others hold that meanings are expressed by the sentences (and words) themselves; and amid all this diversity of opinion, it is only natural that the enquirer should have his doubts. On this question then we have the following:

Pūrvapakṣa:

“What expresses the meaning is the sphoṭa. If the word had no existence apart from the component letters, and the sentence no existence apart from the words composing it, then there could be no comprehension of the meaning at all. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that no single letter brings about any cognition of the meaning; as if it did, there would bo nothing to be done by the remaining letters; and as for a collective aggregate of all the letters composing a word, no such aggregation is possible; as at the time that we hear the last letter of the word, the previous letters have ceased to exist,”

“It might be argued that all letters being eternal, an aggregation of these would be quite possible. Even if we admit this existence of the letters, yet our cognition of these can not be everlasting; and hence at the time of our cognition of the last letter, the cognition of the preceding letters will have ceased to exist; and if an uncognised letter were to express any meaning, then all meanings would be always comprehended; as in reality as regards the matter under consideration, there would be no difference between that which is not cognised after having been once cognised and that which is not cognised at all.

“It may be urged that the letters previously cognised become fixed in the memory, and this becomes the means of these being remembered at the time of the cognition of the last letter. But then, as for the remembrance of the letters, if this too is only gradual, the letters being remembered one after the other, then too any aggregation of these would not be possible; as at the time that we could cognise or hear the third letter, the remembrance of the first letter will have ceased to exist; and there is no possibility of the remembrances of all appearing simultaneously; as the simultaneity of cognitions has been shown to be impossible.

“The opponent may put forward the following view: What happens is this—(1) First of all we hear or cognise the first letter; (2) then we have an impression of the same; (3) then we cognise the second letter; (4) this is followed by the impression left by this cognition; (5) then we hear the third letter, and (6) this brings about an impression of itself but qualified by, and containing within itself, the impression of the preceding letters; and thus we find that what we have in the end is a combined impression of all the letters composing the word; and this impression brings about a simultanious remembrance of these letters as one composite whole.’

“If you admit this view of the case, then the orderly sequence ceases; as the sequence consists in one letter coming after the other; and this sequence could be with regard either to time or to space; and neither of these would have any place as regards letters; as each letter is omnipresent and eternal (and there could be no sequence of time or place with regard to such an object; as ‘sequence’ implies that one ceases to exist when the other appears). The only sequence that would be possible in the case of words would be the one based upon the cognitions that we have of them; and if all the letters were to appear in a single remembrance, then even this cognitive sequence would not be possible; and thus expressiveness would have to be attributed to letters devoid of all sequence; and there would be no difference in the cognition of the meanings of the words ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’, ‘vana’ and ‘nava’, ‘nadī’ and ‘dīna’; as each pair contains exactly the same letters (though in different orders); and sequence has no bearing on the cognition of meanings!! As a matter of fact however, we do cognise a difference in the meanings of words containing the same letters in different orders of sequence; and as this would not be otherwise explicable, this Apparent Inconsistency proves the existence of some other agency in the cognition of word-meanings, than the letters composing the words; and it is this agency to which we give the name of ‘sphoṭa’.

Objection.—‘The sphoṭa also, unless it is itself manifested, cannot express any meaning; as otherwise every meaning would be cognised at all times. And as for the manifestation of this sphoṭa, it could not be done by the letters; as in accordance with the reasoning brought forward by yourself, it could not be done by the letters either singly or collectively; and thus the expression of meanings by sphoṭa becomes as impossible as that of letters or words

“To this objection, the following reply is made:—Each of the sounds produced in the air by the efforts of the speaker gives rise to an indistinct sphoṭa corresponding to each individual letter; and having, in the first instance, acquired a correspondence to the object sought to be expressed by the word, they subsequently bring about the manifestation of the sphoṭa in its distinct form. And it is thus that at the close of the utterance of the word, we have the distinct cognition of the expressed object as one composite whole, altogether free from any notions of sequence in the order of the letters composing the word.

“If the word were nothing apart from the letters composing it, then, in as much as a number of letters could never be included in any single cognition, there would be no idea of the word as a single whole; and thus the idea of the word would be without any real substratum; and the assertion ‘we cognise the meaning by means of the word’ would become meaningless.

“For these reasons we conclude that apart from the letters composing the word, there is some single entity which makes the meaning clear, ‘sphuṭa’ (and this is what we call the ‘sphoṭa.’)

In reply to the above, we have the following.—

Siddhānta:

In such sentences as ‘Guṇaratnābharaṇaḥ kāyasthakulatilakaḥ pāṇḍudāsaḥ’ (‘Pāndudāsa [Pāṇḍudāsa?], the best of Kāyasthas is endowed with excellent qualities’), we do perceive the letters one after the other; but in the end we have no idea of anything apart from the letters we have heard. It could be so only if the word were in the first instance cognised as consisting of

letters, and then subsequently in its true character, which was something different from the letters, and hence this latter cognition falsified the former; as we have in the case of the shell and the silver, (where the shell is at first cognised as silver and then subsequently as the shell, and hence we accept the latter to be true and the former to be false). In the case in question we have no such idea as that ‘this word is not one made up of letters, but it is in the form of sphoṭa.’ As for the idea that we have of the word as a single whole, that too does not point to any distinct object (apart from the component letters); in fact it points only to those same letters taken collectively; exactly as we have the idea of ‘forest’ pointing to the trees contained in it collectively, so also the assertion ‘we comprehend’ the meaning form the word’ refers to the aggregate of the; letters taken collectively.

And as we do not directly perceive any such thing as sphoṭa, it could not be cognised by any of the other means of knowledge; as none of these would have any means of applying to such a thing.

Objection—“The apparent inconsistency of the cognition of meaning, which could not be otherwise explained, would be the means pointing to such a thing.”

Reply: The sphoṭa which you hold to be the means of the cognition of the meaning,—is this sphoṭa itself known or not known? If an unknown thing were to bring about the cognition, then we would have the cognition at all times. And as for its being known, we have already shown that there can be no cognition of it. As a matter of fact, we find the cognition of the meaning to have the relation of invariable concomitance with the component letters themselves; and hence it is far more reasonable to formulate a certain means whereby these letters themselves would, through their expressive power, denote the meaning,—than to assume a thing that has absolutely no existence, being exactly like the ‘sky-flower.’

Nor would it be right to argue that,—“if the letters were expressive of the meaning, then it would be possible for us to comprehend the meaning of the word, even when the order of the letters would be changed, or when the letters would be pronounced with long intervale of time between them.” Because the letters cannot be regarded as the means of the comprehension of meaning, when their order is changed, or when they are pronounced by different persons, or when they are separated from one another in time or space. As the potentialities of things have to be inferred from the effects they produce; that is to say, when we find certain effects to be produced by a thing, we infer the existence in thia latter of a potency or power capable of bringing about that effect; this has been thus declared by great writers.—‘As many letters, endowed with as many qualification, as are found to be capable of expressing a certain meaning,—so many and such letters alone can be regarded as expressive of that meaning.’ (Ślokavārtika—chapter on ‘sphoṛa,’ verse 69).

Then again, for the simple reason that letters are not omnipresent and not eternal (according to the Naiyāyika), there is sequence among them; and it is this difference in the sequential order of letters that makes the meaning of the word ‘dīna’ different from that of the word ‘nadī’. Nor would it be right to argue that—“no sequential order belonging to the words, no such order could be regarded as having an effect on the signification of words”; as we find the letters actually to be liable to production, and to have limited existence in space; and as such it is only natural that they should be affected by sequence both of time and space.

It has been argued above that the expressive power cannot belong to the letters either individually or collectively. But this assertion was made without understanding the position of the other parry. Though it is true that letters have no permanent existence, yet the impressions of all the letters composing a word combining together do actually bring about the cognition of the meaning of the word; or the meaning may be regarded as expressed by the last letter of the word, as aided, either by the impressions or by the actual remembrance of the preceding letters. As to how many impressions combine to bring about a single idea,—this we have shown while dealing with Duality.

Objection: “It is not right to hold the comprehension of the meaning to arise from the impressions of the letters composing the word; as an impression can bring about the remembrance of only that thing the cognition whereof gave it birth, and not of anything else; as has been declared by Maṇḍana Miśra in his Sphoṭasiddhi:—

Impressions give rise to the ideas of only those things by the character whereof they are themselves impressed; and hence it is not right to accept the idea of any other thing to be brought about by them.”

Reply: This argument also is not quite sound; as the impression of each letter produced by its cognition is such as is endowed with the faculty of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning of the word (composed of those letters),—this faculty having potencies different in nature from those that serve to bring about the remembrance of things. That it is so we infer from the nature of the effects produced. But even granting that the impressions in question are of the same nature as the bhāvanās (that produce remembrance),—it is quite possible for them to bring about the comprehension of word-meanings; that they bring about this comprehension can be inferred from the fact of the comprehension appearing only when we have the impressions. The person who would postulate the sphoṭa will find it necessary to assume certain potentalities in this sphoṭa, tending to bring about the comprehension of the word-meaning; and as such it would be necessary to make more assumptions in this case; whereas in our case the Impression is admitted by both parties, and it is necessary for us only to assume the peculiar faculty in them spoken of above; and this would certainly be a much simpler matter. To this same effect we have the following declaration of the learned.—“Though an Impression has certainly the faculty of bringing about remembrances, yet that fact does not preclude it from having a faculty tending to produce other effects’ (Ślokavārtika—Chapter on ‘Sphoṭa’ verse 102.)

Thus then we conclude that the comprehension of the word-meaning being quite explicable through the agency of the impressions, there can be no ground for the assuming of Sphoṭa.

The author now proceeds to describe the Faculty produced by impressive cognitions. When a man puts forth special efforts to perceive an object never seen before, the cognition that he has is as impressive as the perception of the lightningflash; and it is such a cognition that is meant by the expression ‘ādarapratyaya’; and when the mind-soul contact is aided by such a cognition, there appears a peculiarly forcible faculty; this character being indicated by the fact of its not disappearing even after the lapse of a long time.

Example: ‘On the full moon day of the month of Caitra,—when the moon is in the asterism of Citrā,—at midnight are seen silver and golden lotuses in the Devahrada’—having heard this many people congregate on that day on the banks of the lake, with a view to witness the phenomenon; and when the middle of night is about to arrive, they fix their eyes and their minds intently on the lake; and the lotuses actually appear; even though they are seen but for a moment, the sight is so impressive that the impression left on the mind is very strong; and tends to the scene being remembered very distinctly ever afterwards.

(3) Our author next describes the faculty in the form of

Elasticity: The particle ‘tu’ serves to distinguish the faculty known as ‘Mental Impression’—which resides in non-tangible substances—from Elasticity which subsists in tangible substances. The quality of Elasticity, residing in such tangible substances as have their component molecules solidly packed together, tends to bring back its substratum to its own final straight position after it has swerved from that position.

There are some people who deny the existence of Elasticity on the ground of its not being perceptible by the sense-organs; and for the sake of these persons, the author proceeds to show certain effects that cannot be due to any other cause save Elasticity: In certain things we find that they are often contracted, and then they expand again to their original position: and this could be due to nothing else save the existence in these objects of the quality of elasticity. For instance, in the case of such objects as the bow, the branch of a tree and the like, we find that when they are bent and let go again, they revert to their original position; and the immaterial cause of this reversion lies in a certain faculty that inheres in the objects along with the action that caused the bending; and to this faculty we -give the name of ‘elasticity;’ and no other cause is possible.

Some people regard the expression ‘bhugnasaṃvartiteṣu’ as qualifying ‘sūtravastrādiṣu;’ and explain it as ‘the contracted threads &c., that are expanded &c., &c.’

Just as Gravity is eternal in the atom, and evanescent in the products, so is Elasticity also.

Notes.

There is no reason why our commentator should have introduced the discussion of Sphoṭa in the present section. It would be in its proper place under the chapter dealing with words and their meanings.

To the objection brought forward on the strength of Maṇḍana Miśra’s Kārikā our commutator has missed a strong point, in that he has not based his reply on the argument that the fact of the impression bringing about the remembrance of the letters having been admitted by the opponent, the remembrance of the letters could bring about the comprehension of the meaning also; and thia would obviate the necessity of assuming a sphoṭa.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The word [kālāntarāvasthāyiṣu] appears to be misplaced; as it does not quite fit in with the rest of the sentence. The Kandali does not make any mention of it.