Text 104

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 104:

विधिस्तु यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरग्न्यभावे धूमोऽपि न भवतीति । एवं प्रसिद्धसमयस्यासन्दिग्धधूमदर्शनात् साहचर्यानुस्मरणात् तदनन्तरम् अग्न्यध्यवसायो भवतीति । एवं सर्वत्र देशकालाविनाभूतम् इतरस्य लिङ्गम् । शास्त्रे कार्यादिग्रहणं निदर्शनार्थं कृतं नावधारणार्थं कस्माद्यूतिरेकदर्शनात् । तद्यथा अध्वर्युरोंश्रावयन् व्यवहितस्य होतुर्लिङ्गं चन्द्रोदयः समुद्रवृद्धेः कुमुदविकाशस्य च शरदि जलप्रसादोऽगस्त्योदयस्येति । एवमादि तत् सर्वम् अस्येदम् इति सम्बन्धमात्रवचनात् सिद्धम् । तत् तु द्विविधम् । दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्र दृष्टं प्रसिद्धसाध्ययोरत्यन्तजात्यभेदेऽनुमानम् । यथा गव्येव सास्नामात्रम् उपलभ्य देशान्तरेऽपि सास्नामात्रदर्शनाद् गवि प्रतिपत्तिः । प्रसिद्धसाध्ययोरत्यन्तजातिभेदे लिङ्गानुमेयधर्मसामान्यानुवृत्तितोऽनुमानं सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा कर्षकवणिग्राजपुरुषाणां च प्रवृत्तेः फलवत्त्वम् उपलभ्य वर्णाश्रमिणाम् अपि दृष्टं प्रयोजनम् अनुद्दिश्य प्रवर्तमानानां फलानुमानम् इति । तत्र लिङ्गदर्शनं प्रमाणं प्रमितिरग्निज्ञानम् । अथवाग्निज्ञानम् एव प्रमाणं प्रमितिरग्नौ गुणदोषमाध्यस्थ्यदर्शनम् इत्येतत् स्वनिश्चितार्थम् अनुमानम् ॥ १०४ ॥

vidhistu yatra dhūmastatrāgniragnyabhāve dhūmo'pi na bhavatīti | evaṃ prasiddhasamayasyāsandigdhadhūmadarśanāt sāhacaryānusmaraṇāt tadanantaram agnyadhyavasāyo bhavatīti | evaṃ sarvatra deśakālāvinābhūtam itarasya liṅgam | śāstre kāryādigrahaṇaṃ nidarśanārthaṃ kṛtaṃ nāvadhāraṇārthaṃ kasmādyūtirekadarśanāt | tadyathā adhvaryuroṃśrāvayan vyavahitasya hoturliṅgaṃ candrodayaḥ samudravṛddheḥ kumudavikāśasya ca śaradi jalaprasādo'gastyodayasyeti | evamādi tat sarvam asyedam iti sambandhamātravacanāt siddham | tat tu dvividham | dṛṣṭaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca | tatra dṛṣṭaṃ prasiddhasādhyayoratyantajātyabhede'numānam | yathā gavyeva sāsnāmātram upalabhya deśāntare'pi sāsnāmātradarśanād gavi pratipattiḥ | prasiddhasādhyayoratyantajātibhede liṅgānumeyadharmasāmānyānuvṛttito'numānaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam | yathā karṣakavaṇigrājapuruṣāṇāṃ ca pravṛtteḥ phalavattvam upalabhya varṇāśramiṇām api dṛṣṭaṃ prayojanam anuddiśya pravartamānānāṃ phalānumānam iti | tatra liṅgadarśanaṃ pramāṇaṃ pramitiragnijñānam | athavāgnijñānam eva pramāṇaṃ pramitiragnau guṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanam ityetat svaniścitārtham anumānam || 104 ||

Text (104):—The process (of inference) is as follows: ‘Whenever there is smoke there is fire; where there is no fire there is no smoke’—one whois cognisant of this concomitance, when he has an absolutely certain vision of smoke, he recalls to his mind its concomitance (with fire), after which comes the cognition of the presence of Are.—(IX-ii-1).

Thus in all cases when one thing is invariably concomitant with another in point of time and place, it becomes its ‘liṅga.’—(IX-ii-2).

In the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, the author has mentioned ‘effect and the rest’ only with a view to exemplification, and not for the purposes of restriction. ‘How so?’ Because we find (Inferences) apart from those therein specified. For instance, the fact of the Adhvaryu priestrepeating ‘om’ is indicative of the presence of the Hotṛ priest; the rise of the moon is indicative of the rise in the sea, and also of the blooming of the water-lily; the clearness of water in the autumn is indicative of the rise of the constellation of Agastya.

These and such other inferences are all justified and pointed out by the expression ‘asyedam’ (in the Sūtra) which denotes mere relationship (of concomitance).—(III-i-9 to 14, III-i-7 to 8).

This Inference is of two kinds: (a) the Dṛṣṭa and (b) the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.’ The ‘Dṛṣṭa’ inference is that where the ‘prasiddha,’ that which is already known (as concomitant with the ‘liṅga,’), and the ‘sādhya,’ whose presence has to be proved, belong absolutely to the same class. As for instance, when one has seen the dewlap only in the body of the cow, whenever, on any subsequent occasion, he happens to see the dewlap, he infers the existence of the cow. When, however, the ‘prasiddha’ and the ‘sadhya’ belong to absolutely different classes, the inference follows only from the concomitance of the ‘generic form’ of the ‘liṅga’ with the ‘generic form’ of the ‘object to be inferred’; and this inference is called the ‘Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa’ As for instance, having found the activity of such persons, as the farmer, the trader and the servants of the king always leading to certain results, we infer the fact that, of persons observing the rites of their respective castes and conditions also, the activity, which is not found to have reference to any visible purpose, must tend to definite results.

In Inference, the ‘means of knowledge’ is the perception of the ‘liṅga,’ and the ‘knowledge’ is the cognition of fire; or the cognition of fire itself may be regarded as the means the ‘knowledge’ is the cognition of the good or indifferent character of the fire.

Such is the inference that serves the purposes of ones own definite cognition.—(II-i-8).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The process of inferential cognition may be explained; When a man has become cognisant of the fact of fire existing wherever there is smoke, and there being no smoke when there is no fire, if be, on any occasion, has a definite and doubtless cognition of smoke,—as that ‘this is smoke, and not vapour or any such other thing’; and at the same time [?] he happens to recall the aforesaid invariable concomitance of the [?] and smoke,—then he is led to the inference of fire.

Objection: “If such be the process, then in this we do not meet with the second premiss (the minor premiss) (the conclusion being deduced from the single proposition ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire’).”

Reply: It does not matter if we do not find the minor premiss; as a matter of fact we do not need it; an inferential cognition of the subject of inference follows only frost the perception of the liṅga and the remembrance of it invariable concomitance. The fact of inferential cognition following after remembrance does not make it uncertain as to the points of time and place; as the perception of the liṅga would restrict it to a definite point of time and place. Nor would; the ‘upanaya’ (Minor Premiss) be absolutely useless; as it would always have to be brought forward in the case of inference for the sake of others, wherein it would serve the purpose of pointing out the fact of the liṅga belonging to the ‘pakṣa,’—a fact not indicated by any other factor in the process.

Objection: “Well Sir, what is this ‘avinābhāva’ (Invariable Concomitance)?”

Reply: It is ‘avyabhicāra’ (non-failure of concomitance).

Question: “From what cause doee this proceed?”

To this question, the Bauddhas offer the following answer: invariable concomitance follows from—(a) identity or connateness, and (b) ‘origination,’ (i.e. ‘from the characteristic features of the thing, and from the relation it bears to its cause).

“That is to say, (b) a chance relationship is such that it may or may not be, there being no restrictive cause. If a certain property is seen in the sapakṣa, and not seen in the pakṣa, these two facts alone are not enough for the recognition of an invariable concomitance between the two; as suspicious to its existing in the vipakṣa will not have been altogether set aside. When however, its ‘origination’ is duly ascertained, those suspicions are set aside; as in the absence of the cause, the effect cannot come into existence. The ascertainment of its origination is a cause in the case, having for instruments the five ‘perceptions and non-perceptions.’ These five are—(1) the non-perception’ of the effect prior to its origination; (2) the ‘perception’ of the effect on the perception of the cause; (3) the non-perception of the perceived effect due to the non-peception of the cause (thus of the effect there are two ‘non-perceptions’ and one ‘perception);’ (4) the ‘perception’ of the cause and (5) the ‘non-perception’ of the cause. By means of these five ‘perceptions’ and ‘non-perceptions’, is ascertained the fact that ‘smoke exists only where fire exists, and where fire does not exist smoke does not exist’ The very nature of the effect lies in this that it exists only when the cause exists, and not otherwise.

(a) The cognition of ‘identity’ also brings about the ascertainment of invariable concomitance. Any positive entity can never fail to have its characteristic feature; if it did, then it would be devoid of any such nature; as for the ascertainment of identity, it is brought about by the due operation of the negativing means of knowledge with regard to the vipakṣa; until there is this operation, even hundred cases of concomitance cannot set at rest the suspicion that the property in question might exist in the vipakṣa. To this end it has been declared—‘the ascertainment of invariable concomitance follows from such restrictive agencies as the relationship of cause and effect, and the characteristic feature of the thing, and not from non-perception,’—i.e. not from the ‘non-perception’ of the property in the vipakṣa, nor from its ‘perception’ in the sapakṣa.”

Against the above view of the Bauddha, we make the following observations: Do you mean that—(a) there is ‘invariable concomitance’ where there are ‘identity’ and ‘origination’? or (b) that there are ‘identity’ and ‘origination’ when there is ‘invariable concomitance’? (a) The former cannot be true; as even though the smoke ‘originates’ from fire, yet we find certain properties of this smoke—such as its

Earthiness and the like—not concomitant with fire; and even, though the particular tree is identical with (has the nature of) the generic character of the ‘tree,’ yet there is no invariable concomitance with the particular tree (śiṃśapā). (b) In the case of the latter alternative, on the other hand, the two conditions of ‘identity’ and ‘origination’ would be indicative only when the invariable concomitance would be there already; and under the circumstances, the concomitance by itself might wel be regarded as indicative; what would be the use of ‘identity’ and ‘origination’? Specially as what an ‘effect’ indicates is not merely that ‘such and such a thing is an effect’; nor does the ‘nature’ of the thing indicate that ‘it is its nature,’; what both of these do is to indicate that, such and such a thing does not fail in its concomitance with such another thing; and thus the only cause of indication lies in the invariable concomitance, and not in ‘identity’ or ‘origination’; specially as the causal efficiency of these latter has not been found to be always effectual. Nor does it appear reasonable to assert that it is only smoke itself that is produced by fire, and not the properties of smoke—earthiness &c.; because a thing is impartite (and cannot be separated from its properties). Nor have we ever had any cognition to the effect that the the ‘śiṃśapā’ tree is identical with (of the same nature as) the ‘tree’ (in general), and that the ‘tree’ is not identical with the śiṃśapā on account of the ‘tree’ in general pertaining to the śiṃśapā as well as to the other trees, the Dhava the Khadira and the like because there is no real difference between the ‘tree’ and ‘śiṃśapā.’ For if the generic character of the ‘tree,’ being common to the Dhava, were not identical with the character of the ‘śiṃśapā’ then the two could not be one, as a difference in nature is always indicative of real difference; if however there be no difference between the two, then, just as the generic character of the ‘tree’ is common to all trees, so would also be the general character of the ‘śiṃśapā’ Nor could any restriction be accomplished by the fact of ‘connateness’ being the basis of the relationship of the indicator and the indicated; as connateness’ is based upon ‘non-difference’; and if on the perception of the generic character of the ‘śiṃśapā,’ there were no perception of the generic character of the ‘tree,’ then where would the necessary ‘connateness’ be perceived? And on the other hand, if the perception of the latter were to follow on the perception of the former, then where would be the ‘inference

It might be argued that,—“the object as it exists, the generic character of the ‘śiṃśapā’ and the generic character of the ‘tree,’—all these are connate (of one and the same nature); and hence when the object wo be perceived, the two generic characters would also be necessarily perceived; as has been declared:—‘When an object is seen, all its qualities are seen; and which part of it would be unseen that could be taken up by other means of knowledge?’ That this becomes a determinate cognition of the śiṃśapā, and not of the tree, is due to the fact of the non-remembrance of the Word ‘tree’: as the determinate cognition of the śinśapā, brought about by the impression or recalled idea of the word ‘śiṃśapā’ leads to the Exclusion of the ‘non-śiṃśapā,’ and not to the Exclusion of the ‘non-tree’. If it were not so, then all determinate cognitions would become identical. As for the relation of the indicator and the indicated this also belongs to the two Exclusions of Contraries (apohas), and not of the things themselves, as there can be affirmation (or positive cognition) with regard to the thing itself. Then as regards the exclusions of the ‘non-tree’ and the ‘non-śiṃśapā,’ these are distinct from each other, as is shown by the fact of the excluded negations being in the two cases distinct; and hence there is no room for the objection put forward against the Bauddha theory.”

Reply: How excellent is the ingenuity of the learned in reconciling what has gone before and what is said afterwards!! It has been said before that ‘identity’, and ‘connateness’ are the root of inference, and subsequently it is said that there is a difference between the two Exclusions that respectively form the

‘object’ and the ‘means’ (of inference)! What may this wonderful magic be?

Objection: “There is a connateness’ between the generic characters of the ‘tree’ and the ‘śiṃśapā,’ and while these remain ‘connate,’ even though there is a difference between the Exclusions of the ‘non-tree’ and the ‘non-śiṃśapā,’ the ‘connateness’ is accepted in accordance with the cognition or idea that we have of them.”

Reply: When the ‘identity’ has been established, them alone the ‘exclusion of the non-tree’ in the ‘subject of Inference’ can be cognised by the exclusion of the non-śiṃśapā and then the ‘exclusion of the non-tree’ having been cognised the ‘identity’ could be established, in accordance with that cognition; and this would involve a most undesirable interdependence.

Objection: “At the time of the comprehension of the invariable concomitance, the two Exclusions are cognised as of the same nature; and this establishes their ‘identity’ or ‘connateness’?

Reply: Then, in that case, the ‘identity of the ascertained or cognised exclusion becomes a mere assumption; and if the inferential process were to be carried on by means of men assumptions, then there would be nothing that could not have the charset of the true ‘Reason’; as even for two such term as ‘knowability’ and ‘non-eternality,’ it might be possible to ne recognised as having one and the same nature, and thereby to be regarded as ‘identical’ in accordance with that cognition.

Objection: “In the case of these two terms; in as much as there is no ‘exclusion of existence in the vipakṣa’ there can be nd identity between ‘knowability’ and ‘non-eternality.’”

Reply. True; there can be no true identity between the two; but there does certainly always exist an assumed identity; and it is such an assumed identity that you would have as the means for the accomplishment of inferences; and under the circumstances, the ‘non-exclusion from the vipakṣa’ is as good as non-existent (i.e., of no avail in the fulfilment of the inference).

Then again, between ‘identity and origination,’ whichever happens to be cognised, it is the absence of that which cognised, through the cognition of the non-existence of the ‘Reason in the vipakṣa’; because of its non-perception when it would be otherwise quite perceptible. And the non-perception (in the. vipakṣa) constituting a factor in the inferential process, operates either by the cognition of ‘identity’ with, or the cognition of its ‘origination’ from, the ‘absence of the Reason’ in the vipakṣa, which ‘absence’ too would be provable by the said non-perception. Then too, the ascertaining of the ‘identity’ and ‘origination’ of that non-perception,’ in connection with that which would be proved by it, would be possible only by means of the cognition of the fact of its non-existence in the vipakṣa; and the cognition of this ‘absence’ would depend upon another ‘non-perception;’ as every negation is regarded to be an object of non-perception; and thus there being an infinite series of these non-existences and non-perceptions, the necessary negation not being established, the ‘identity’ and the ‘origination’ are not established; and hence either ‘nature’ or ‘effect’ (correlatives of ‘identity’ and ‘origination’) cannot be the ‘Reason’.

Then again, we find that in certain cases, even in the absence of any ‘identity’ or ‘origination,’ there is a relation of the inferential indicator and indicated; as for instance, between the setting of the asterism of Kṛttikā and the rising of that of Rohiṇī.

For these reasons, we conclude that the assertion that, “concomitance is due either to the causal relation or to the nature of things,” is an ill-considered one. Because the relationship of certain thing with a certain ‘nature’ is permanent, not being due to any adventitious circumstances; it is only an adventitious relationship that ceases to exist with the disappearance of the adventitious circumstance; which cannot be said of the natural relationship. If the relationship of smoke with fire were adventitious, then the adventitious circumstances would certainly be perceived; just as the act of learning following on the proximity of the teacher and the pupil When we have perceived [???e] than once, the smoke and the fire, there would be no cause for the non-perception of the adventitious circumstances (if any did exist); nor is it necessary that of an object that is perceived, the adventitious circumstances are always imperceptible. If these adventitious circumstances existed in the mere forms (of the objects concerned), then too, the concomitance would he duty established; as relationship based upon that also would exist as long as the objects themselves existed. Even if the adventitious circumstances were such as would come about subsequently, then too, the causes leading to them would be cognised. As for the circumstances as well as their causes being all supersensuous (and hence imperceptible), this would be too gratuitous an assumption. That smoke which has no adventitious circumstances would, at certain times, be cognised independently by itself. In the case of fire we find that having been cognised as related to smoke through an adventitious circumstance in the shape of a particular kinds of fuel, it is thought of as ‘smokeless’ when found supplied with dry fuel (which does not give rise to smoke); but it is not so in the case of the smoke which is never perceived as fireless (apart from the fire). Thus then, the adventitous circumstances being of a perceptible character, when they are not perceived they are taken as non-existent; and the particular subsequent conditions of the fuel that would be perceived at that time, when seen over and over again, would show that there is no concomitance; and that would prove that the character of the true Reason is not present in the case in question and hence all points of time and place having been brought into the case, there is no harm done by the perception of the absence of adventitious circumstances. Having ascertained the concomitance, based upon their very nature, of the generality of ‘smoke’ with the generality of ‘fire’ by means of the final sensuous cognition, from which all doubts and contradiction have been set aside, and which is aided by the impression left by the previous perceptions of concomitance,—we come to form an idea of the invariable concomitance of the two things, in the form that ‘this is invariably concomitant with that.’ Though mere concomitance is cognised at the very first sight of the two objects, yet the necessity or invariability of their concomitance is not recognised by a single perception. Because the invariability does not follow from mere concomitance; it follows from such concomitance as is independent, of all adventitious conditions; and the independence from such conditions is recognised only by means of repeated perceptions (of the two objects); hence we conclude that the invariable concomitance is ascertained by the determinate sensuous cognition appearing by the force of the perception of concomitance.

This explanation meets the following question also: “Sensuous cognition pertaining to such objects as are perceived at the present time, how could we perceive any invariable concomitance in the case of past and future objects?”

This invariable concomitance we do not hold to inhere in any particular individual only; it is only when we do not take any account of any particular individual, and cognise the invariable concomitance as referring to the ‘generalities of the objects concerned, that we have a certain cognition of the concomitance in all cases; the reason being that the generality is in all cases of one and the same form.

Question: “Then particular individuals do not enter into the invariable concomitance?”

Answer: Who says they do not enter into it? All that we mean is that they enter into it in their generic, and not in the individual forms. It is for this reason that whenever a man sees smoke, he has in his mind the idea of fire in general; and hence it is fire in general, and not any particular fire, of which he has the inferential cognition.

The invariable concomitance having in all cases, been ascertained in the generic form, if persons were to raise doubts without any authoritative reasoning, then, in the case of your theory also, even though the individual smoke and fire would be directly perceived by the eye, and the causal relationship between the two would be duly comprehended,—even then, (at the time of inference) the difference of time and place (from those of the previous perception of smoke and fire) might give rise to doubts, which would certainly put a stop to the, operation or functioning of the inferential process.

Says the Bauddha: “What is ascertained by repeated observation is the causal relation (and not invariable concomitance) (between fire and smoke); as a single perception would not set aside the suspicion of the smoke being due to certain adventitious conditions (and not to the fire itself); and the repeated observation pertains to the Generality; as individuals have but momentary existence, and as such could not be seen more than once. Hence we conclude that the causal relation, ascertained in one instance with reference to the generalities of the ‘exclusion of non-smoke’ and the ‘exclusion or non-fire,’ comes to be recognised as universal, the generality being one only.”

But it is iu similar manner that we explain the cognition in all cases of the universal character of the invariable concomitance; and what are the reasons for your dislike of our way of explanation? In reality, in the ease of your theory, the two objects that are amenable to sensuous cognition could never have the causal relation pertaining to their generalities, as the objects are (according to you) non-entities. That is to say, the individual objects (according to you) are mere non-entities; and it is in connection with individuals that all relations are directly perceived by the senses; nor is it possible for all past and future individuals to be recalled to the mind; because if the mind were to operate towards external objects independently by itself (without the help of the sense-organs), then there would be no blindness or deafness &c. Thus then, the causal relationship being recognised with reference to the individuals that are seen, there could be no resultant inference with regard to those that are not seen; as certainly those that are not seen are different from those that are seen. Nor again is any relationship of the proof (means) and the proved (the object) possible among individuals; as individuals as such are not related to one.another (by any such relationship as—would establish an invariable concomitance between them). Nor can the individuals be comprehended under a single generality; as there can be no relation between that which is a real object (the generality) and that which is not (the individual, according to the Bauddha); find if unconnected things were to be comprehended or included, there could be no restriction, and anything might be included in anything.

For these reasons, we do not know what is the objective of the ascertainment of ‘origination’—the ascertainment brought about by sensuous cognition,—on which would be based the inferential process (as explained by the Bauddha).

Thus then, we see that one thing is the ‘liṅga,’ or inferential indicative, of another when the two are invariably concomitant in time and place. E.g. Smoke is the liṅga of fire. The sense of this is that when a thing is found to be invariably concomitant, in time and place, with the ‘property to be proved,’ it becomes the inferential indicative of this latter. As for instance, the guarding of barley fields in Kashmirs, by persons in charge of gold, is indicative of the fact of gold being produced in the waterways in barley fields (this is an instance of concomitance in place). Similarly as an instance of concomitance in time, we have the morning songs and music in the houses of the Prāgjyotiṣas, which are indicative of the rising of the king.

Objection:—“If the indication be only by concomitances of time and place, then this would be contrary to the declaration, of the Sūtra to the effect that—‘such things are indicative as’ are either effects, causes, conjuncts, contradictories and inherents of another thing.’”

Reply: In the Sūtra &c. The ‘causes’ &c. are mentioned in the Sūtra only by way of showing of what character ‘liṅgas’ generally are; and it does not mean that there are Only so many kinds of ‘liṅga,’ and no more.

To the question—‘how do you know this?’—the author replies—Vyatirekadarśanāt. That is to say, we cannot regard, the enumeration as exhaustive, because we find inferences independent of the relationships enumerated. The author cites instances of such inferences.

(1) The Adhvaryu priest &c. It is laid down that the Adhvaryu, priest should repeat ‘om’ to the Hotṛ priest and to none else; hence one who is cognisant of this, when he hears ‘om’ repeated by the Adhvaryu, he infers the presence of the Hotṛ, who may be behind the walls; and here the Adhvaryu is neither the ‘cause’, nor the ‘effect’, nor the ‘conjunct’, nor the ‘contradictory’ nor the ‘inherent’, of the Hotṛ.

(2) Another instance is cited; The rise of the moon &c. When the moon rises, the sea rises in tides, and lilies bloom; and one who knows of these natural phenomena’ always infers the rise of the sea and the blooming of the lily, whenever he sees the moon appear; and the rise of the moon is not the effect of the rise of the sea &c; as the ‘rising’ of the moon consists only in its contact with a particular point in space, and this contact is only the effect of a certain action of the moon, and not of any action of the sea Nor is it the cause of the rise of the sea, or of the blooming of the lily; because the ‘rising of the sea’ consists only in the rising of the waters, and the blooming consists in the separating of the petals of the flower; and both these acts can be due only to the action of certain causes that may be in close proximity to the objects concerned (i.e, the water and the lily).

(3) The clearness of water in the autumn, is indicative of the rise of Agastya; because it is never found at any other time.

Objection: “If we have liṅgas even apart from the ‘effect’ &c., then the Sūtra cannot be said to apply to or include all “liṅgas.”

Reply: These and others are justified &c. That is to say, all such liṅgas as we find in the instances just cited, are included in the clause ‘asyaidam’ in the Sūtra, which denotes mere relationship. The another of the Sūtra has said ‘asyaidam’ in view of the objection that, “one object cannot be the liṅga; of another, as that would lead to a great confusion;” and What he means is that it does not matter whether one thing the liṅga) is the same as, or different from, the other (the subject), all that is necessary is that the one should be related to the other; and thus there can be no confusion; as it cannot be that everything would be the liṅga of any thing; but only that which is related to the other thing would be its liṅga.

It has been said that that which is invariably concomitant with something else in point of time or place, is its liṅga; and obversely, that which is invariably nonconcomitant with another cannot be indicative of it; as it would be possible for it to exist in other places.

We do not mean that the words of the Sūtra ‘Asyaidam kāryam etc.’ do not denote the fact of the two being related to each other; all that we mean is that the relations mentioned in the Sūtra are simply by way of examples and are not meant to be exhaustive; it is necessary for the teacher to explain a general law always with reference to certain concrete instances; and it is as a few concrete instances that the Sūtra has spoken of the relations of “cause” and the rest.

The author next proceeds to describe the different kinds of Inference. It is of two kinds etc. The word ‘ca’ has a restrictive force, meaning that Inference is of two kinds only.

(1) Of those two, the ‘dṛṣṭa’ is that which follows upon the absolute identity, in kind, of that which is known from before as concomitant with the liṅga, and that which has to be got at by means of the inference in question. E.g. having seen the dewlap in the cow only, we have the inferential recognition of an animal with the dewlap seen on some future occasion being a ‘cow’. In this case we see that on the former occasion the dewlap was seen to exist in an animal that belongs to the class ‘cow’ and that leads us, on the subsequent occasion of our seeing the dewlap, to infer that this dewlap too must belong to An animal that belongs to the same class; and this kind of inference is called ‘Dṛṣṭa,’ seen,—the name being due to the fact that the generality of ‘cow’ that is inferred, on the latter occasion in the forest, from the sight of the dewlap, has had its specific individuality ‘seen’ in the city on the former occasion.

(2) The Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is that where that which is already known as concomitant with the liṅga and that which has to be inferred belong to two distinct classes; that is to say, that Inference is the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa which follows from the invariable concomitance of the generality of the liṅga with the generality of the Object of Inference, For instance, having seen that the activity of the farmer, the; trader and the king’s servants always bring about certain results, we infer that the activity of such persons as perform the rites and duties of their castes must also lead to definite results. We find that the activity of the farmer brings about the result in the shape of a rich harvest; and that of the trader and the King's servants brings to them a mass of gold and jewels, horses and elephants; and this leads us to infer that the performance of the rites etc., also brings about results in the shape of heaven and the like.

The followers of Bṛhaspati (the Atheists) hold that we have never found any such result as Heaven necessarily following after any action; and hence the result of these rites etc., must be held to be the mere obtaining of a living. In opposition to this, the author adds—the activity which is not found to have reference to any visible purpose etc. It cannot be doubted that there are some people who, without the least desire for any visible results, betake themselves to such observances as those of the ‘Vānaprastha’ and the like; and what we seek to prove by the inference in question is the fruitful character of such observances; and as such it cannot be regarded as a mere repetition of the former inference.

The word ‘Pramāṇa’ has been explained as that which is the means towards a certain end; and as this character could not be complete without a definite result, the author proceeds to distinguish the means from the result——The ‘perception of the liṅga is the means of knowledge.’ That it is to say it is the perception of the liṅga by means of which, the inferential cognition is obtained, and the ‘cognition,’ brought about by that means is the ‘cognition of fire’ (in the case of the inference of fire from the presence of smoke). Though in regard to the origin of the cognitions of the liṅga and the liṅgi (that which is concomitant with the liṅga), there is a difference in the objectives of the two cognitions, yet, inasmuch a cognition of the liṅga has a certain action towards the bringing about of the cognition of the liṅga, that can iu any way, be said to have the liṅgi for its objective; and hence the ‘means of knowledge’ and its ‘result’ remain co-extensive (pertaining to the same objective'

Another explanation is given: Or the cognition of fire may be regarded as the ‘means of knowledge;’ and in that case, the character of the ‘result’ would belong to the cognition of the (1) good, (2) bad or (3) indifferent character of the fire—the ‘goodness’ of fire consisting in its being a cause of pleasure, badness in its leading to pain, and that of indifference in its being a source of neither pain nor pleasure; the idea of these is the ‘result’ because they appear only after the cognition of fire.

All this refers to inference for the sake of one's own definitive cognition. in the word ‘niścita’ the affix has the abstract signification.