Padarthadharmasamgraha and Nyayakandali
by Ganganatha Jha | 1915 | 250,428 words
The English translation of the Padarthadharmasamgraha of Prashastapada including the commentary called the Nyayakandali of Shridhara. Although the Padartha-dharma-sangraha is officially a commentary (bhashya) on the Vaisheshika-Sutra by Kanada, it is presented as an independent work on Vaisesika philosophy: It reorders and combines the original Sut...
Text 103
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 103:
यत्तु यथोक्तात् त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गादेकेन धर्मेण द्वाभ्यां वा विपरीतं तदनुमेयस्याधिगमे लिङ्गं न भवतीत्येतदेवाह सूत्रकारः अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेशोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चेति ॥ १०३ ॥
yattu yathoktāt trirūpālliṅgādekena dharmeṇa dvābhyāṃ vā viparītaṃ tadanumeyasyādhigame liṅgaṃ na bhavatītyetadevāha sūtrakāraḥ aprasiddho'napadeśo'san sandigdhaśceti || 103 ||
Text (103): That which differs from the above-mentioned ‘liṅga’ in one or both points is not a ‘liṅga’ (means) in the comprehension of the object to be inferred; this is what the author of the Sūtra has declared in the Sūtra ‘aprasiddho'napadeśo'san digdhaśca’—(Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra III-i-15).
Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.
(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)
In the sūtra, the word ‘anapadeśa’ means’ no Reason,’ the word ‘apadeśa’ meaning ‘hetu.’ The word ‘aprasiddha’ is meant to include the viruddha, ‘contradictory’ and asādhāraṇa ‘too special,’ Reason; in as much as both these not being known to be concomitant with the property to be proved, they cannot have the character of the true Reason. ‘Asat’ includes the asiddha, ‘not proved’ Reason; because, even though such a Reason is known to be concomitant with the property to be proved, yet it does not exist in the Subject having that property; and as such it cannot be regarded as the. true Reason. The word ‘Saṃdigdha’ means the anaikāntika, ‘doubtful’ Reason; though this is found to exist in the subject, yet it is doubtful whether it is concomitant with the property to be proved, or is devoid of it; and as such it cannot indicate or bring to view any one only of these two characters; as it is found to have both these characters.
That with regard to which we have no such notion as that ‘this is invariably concomitant with that,’—in reference to such a thing the ‘property’ could not be regarded as a true ‘liṅga,’ even though it were invariably concomitant with the ‘Subject’; for this purpose the remembrance of invariable concomitance is a necessary accessory in the inferential cognition of the object to be inferred; the author next proceeds to explain this.