Text 105

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 105:

शब्दादीनाम् अप्यनुमाने'न्तर्भावः समानविधित्वात् | यथा प्रसिद्धसमयस्यासन्दिग्धलिङ्गदर्शनप्रसिद्ध्यनुस्मरणाभ्याम् अतीन्द्रिये'र्थे भवत्यनुमानमेवं शब्दादिभ्यो'पीति | श्रुतिस्मृतिलक्षणो'प्याम्नायोवक्तृप्रामाण्यापेक्षः तद्वचनाद् आम्नायप्रामाण्यं लिङ्गाच्चानित्यो बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे बुद्धिपूर्वो ददातिरित्युक्तत्वात् ॥ १०५ ॥

śabdādīnām apyanumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ samānavidhitvāt | yathā prasiddhasamayasyāsandigdhaliṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye'rthe bhavatyanumānamevaṃ śabdādibhyo'pīti | śrutismṛtilakṣaṇo'pyāmnāyovaktṛprāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyaṃ liṅgāccānityo buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtirvede buddhipūrvo dadātirityuktatvāt || 105 ||

Text (105):—Word, and the other means of knowledge, are included under ‘Inference’; because of the process of those being similar to that of Inferences Just as for one who is cognisant of the invariable concomitance, there arises, from the perception of an undoubted ‘liṅga’ and the remembranes of another concomitance, an inferential cognition of supersensuous things,—so in the same manner, does cognition arise from Word &c. also Scripture even in the form of śrutis and Smṛtis depends upon the authoritative character of the speaker; as the authority of the scripture rests upon his authority. And that Word is non-eternal is proved by inference:—‘the creation, of a sentence is due an intelligent action.,’ and ‘the word dadāti the Veda is preceded by intelligent action because, of its being spoken of as dadāti—(Vaiśeṣika Sūtras VI-i-1, 3).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Question: “Philosophers have spoken of other means, or forms, of knowledge—such as Word (or Verbal) and the like—(besidesSensuous cognition and Inference); how then is it that; these others have not been mentioned here?”

In answer to this, the author proceeds to show that these other means of knowledge are not mentioned for the simple-reason that they are all included in the two that have been described. ‘Word’ and the rest do not differ from Inference, because the process of cognition by those means is similar to the process of inferential cognition. That is to say, just as the Inferential process functions through invariable concomitance so do Word &c., also; the verbal cognition is inferential in its character,—as it takes cognizance of objects by means of invariable concomitance—like smoke.

The author proceeds to show the similarity of the inferential and verbal processes of cognition. When the man who knows the invariable concomitance (of smoke with fire) happens to see smoke rising in a certain place, and then comes to recall in his mind his previous knowledge of the concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire also,—then he has an inferential cognition of the thing (fire) not directly perceptible to the senses; and the process is the same in the case of verbal and other cognitions also. As a matter of fact, we know that a word never denotes anything until it is known for certain that it never fails in its concomitance with such denotation; and when it does denote an object after the unfailing concomitance has been ascertained, it becomes an inferential ‘indicative’ pure and simple.

Against the above, some people put forward the following objection: “In inferential cognitions what is cognised is a certain object qualified by the ‘property to be inferred’ (the sādhya). What would be such an ‘object’in the case of the inference of the denotation from the Word? The denotation itself could not be this ‘object,’ as it is not known at the time. If the Word be regarded as that ‘object,’ then what would be its ‘sādhya’? Mere ‘denotability’ could net be this ‘sādhya’; as between the Word and its ‘denotation we cannot detect any such relationship as that of Conjunction or Inherence, which is perceptible in the case of the mountain and the fire; and hence the word as qualified by the denotation could not be the object to be inferred, as the only relation that there is between the Word and its denotation is that of the ‘denoter and the denoted’; and this comes after the word has signified the object, and not before that signification. Nor is there any strict unfailing concomitance between the word and its denotation, as there is between fire and smoke; for the simple reason that we do not find both appearing at one and the same place and time [the word is often heard without the hearer having any idea of the object signified by it, and the object is known even without its significant word being known]. For instance, even though there is no Yudhiṣṭhira living in the present Kali age, yet we find the word ‘yudhiṣṭhira’ being used (this with regard to time), and even though there is no Laṅkā in Jambudvīpa (India), yet we find the word ‘laṅkā’ used in India (this with reference to place). Thus then, in as much as we find the accessories of verbal cognition to be of a character quite different from those of inferential cognition, the two cannot be regarded as one and the same.

“Then again, verbal cognition cannot be regarded as the same as inferential cognition, because of the fact that in different countries one and the same word signifies different things; and thus there is no such invariable concomitance between the word and its denotation, as there is between smoke and fire; for instance, the word ‘cora’ is found among the people of the south, to be used as a name for cooked rice, though among the people of Āryāvarta (India to the north of the Vindhyā range) it is used for thief. If verbal cognition were the same as the inferential, then it would, like the latter, be duly cognised only when there would be present the three conditions of Inference (described in Text 104), and it would not be based upon the cognition of the fact of its having been uttered by a trustworthy person. As, however the authority of verbal cognition is based solely upon the fact of its originating from a trustworthy source, it cannot but be regarded, on account of this very dissimilarity, as wholly different from inferential cognition.”

To the above we make the following reply: When the fore-finger is raised, there appears an inference of number ten, with regard to things not present at that time and place. And in this case too, the number is not the ‘subject’ (dharmī) as it is not known; nor can the particular position of the forefinger be regarded as the ‘subject’; as it is something that is being made cognisable at the time, and as such having no other relationship with the number ten, could not indicate anything qualified by that number. Nor is there any coevality or co-extensiveness between the raising of the finger and the ten things. How then do you account for the process of inference in this case? And yet we find that in the usage of tradespeople there is an unfailing concomitance between that particular position of the forefinger and the desire of indicating the number ten.

Objection: “The gesture becomes indicative of the number ten, through the recognition (on the part of the observer) of the intention of the person (making the gesture) to convey an idea of that number (and this concomitance is the basis of the inference).”

Reply: The same may be said with regard to verbal cognition also. As in the first instance, when the word ‘go’ is uttered, we come to recognise the fact that the speaker wishes to indicate a certain animal with the hump &c;—this recognition being due to our having found that the utterance of the word ‘go,’ in its own turn, is preceded (originated) by an intention of speaking of that animal; and this intention leads to the inference of the animal. The inferential argument would be in the following syllogistic form:—“The subject, man, is endowed with the intention of speaking of the animal with the hump &c.,—because he is the pronouncer of the word ‘go,’—like myself.”

Objection: “In the case of the untrustworthy person, we find that they often have the intention of speaking of things that have no real existence; and hence the mere presence of the intention cannot indicate the existence of the object (there being no actual unfailing concomitance between the two)?”

Reply: How too could there be an indication of the object by Means of the word itself? As words are often used by mistake, or with the intention of cheating (hence there can be no certain relationship between the word and any object).

Objection: “The object is cognised only when the word is uttered by a trustworthy person (in whose case there is no chance of either mistake or an intention of cheating).”

Reply: This comes to the same thing as to assert that the; cognition of the object is due to the intention of the trustworthy person to speak of that thing.

It has been urged by the opponent that, “even though the word may be indicative of the object, yet the concomitance between the two (as we find when one and the same word is used in different countries) is not quite unfailing, as there is that between the smoke and the fire.” In reference to this we have the following reasoning: As for the smoke, it is indicative! of the fire by its natural (inborn) relationship to it; as for the word, on the other hand, it becomes indicative, like a gestured only when used in accordance with a certain convention made by the wish of the persons concerned; and as such it becomes, through the ‘intention of the person to speak’ of the thing, indicative of only that thing with regard to which the said convention has been fixed; as the object having been definitely cognised, as in the case of Gesture etc., only in accordance with the word as used by trustworthy persons, it is only when the word is used by the trustworthy that it has an unfailing concomitance with the object; just as it is only when the smoke is found to rise upwards in a continuous volume that it is indicative; of fire.

Objection: “Why cannot you assume the fact that the word denotes the object by direct denotation (without the intervention of conventions or notions of concomitance, etc)?”

Reply: For the simple reason that there is no such direct relation between the two; and if a word were to be denotative of an object without any relation, then there would be no restriction as to the denotations of words (any word) denoting anything).

Objection: “But there is a natural relationship between the word and its denotation.”

Reply: It is not so; as one and the same word is used, in different countries, in the sense of different things (which could not be if the word had an inborn relationship with any one denotation).

Objection: “The word may be regarded as denotative (vācaka) of that thing with regard to which it is used by the Āryas; while as regards other objects, in as much as it is dependent upon convention, it can only be regarded as indicative (liṅga).”

Reply: Not so; as we find that the word ‘cora’ is as expressive of the thief as of cooked rice (as used among the Āryas and the Southern people respectively); and we have no reason for making any such distinction as that in regard to the former, the word is denotative while with regard to the latter it is only indicative. Then again, even among the Āryas the verbal cognition of what is denoted by the word ‘cora’ is preceded by a definite inferential indicative,—because it is a cognition produced by the word ‘cora’,—like the cognition produced by the word ‘cora’ among the people of the south, in which latter case both opponents admit the fact of its following upon an inferential indicative. Nor is there any evidence for an inborn relationship between the word and the object denoted by it. You hold that the only relationship consists in the inborn denotativeness of the word as pertaining to that which is denoted,, as it is this that pervades over both (the denoter and the denoted); as has been declared—“relationship lies in potency;” and the denotative potency of the word existing naturally in the denoted object, this object would be cognised by the man ignorant of the meaning of the word, just as well as by the person who knows the word; as in both cases, the word, the object and the relation between them would be equally present.

Objection: “It is only when the relationship is duly known that it becomes the means of the verbal cognition of the object, and not when it merely exists (and is not known). As has been declared: ‘The relationship being the cause of the cognition, stands in need of its own cognition; and hence even when it exists, if it is not known or recognised, it does not lead] to the cognizance of the object (denoted).”

Reply: Of what sort is the knowledge of the; relationship?

Objection: “It is in the form that, ‘such and such a thing; is the denoted of such and such a word’.”

Reply: Whence does this knowledge proceed?

Objection: “From the usage of old experienced persons.”

Reply: This same knowledge based upon the name and the named, when appearing in the boy sitting near older people talking among themselves, is known as ‘saṅketa’, ‘convention’ or ‘vyutpatti,’ ‘knowledge of the word’; and this, through impressions left on the mind, would be the cause of the verbal cognition of the object (denoted by the word); and under the circumstances, what would be the use of assuming any other relationship? The inborn potency of the word constitutes its ‘śabdatva,’ verbal character and the adventitious (or caused appearing subsequently) potency constitutes the ‘saṅketa’ ‘convention’ with regard to it, and also the particular order (in which it occurs in a sentence); and as the cognition of its denotation would be quite explicable through this twofold potency, there would be no necessity for the assumption of another relationship; specially as so long as a thing can be explained on perceptible facts, there is no room for assuming imperceptible ones.

Objection: “If a word were significant only through the ‘intention of. speaking’ on the part of the speaker, then there could be no significance in the words and sentences of the Veda in which case there is no speaker (on whose intention the signification could be based).”

In reply to this the author says—the Scripture also in the form Śrutis and Smṛtis depends upon the authority of the speaker. That is to say, it is not only ordinary assertions that signify their meanings on the strength of the trustworthy character of speakers; but the assertions in the form of Vaidika and Smārta scriptures also are similarly significant; and the weakness or faultiness of these is due to the deficiencies in the speaker, and is not inherent in them, like the evil odour of foul smelling things; as has been thus declared: ‘In a word, the discrepancies of the origin, the letter and the rest are due to the person pronouncing it; and the word is not deficient by its nature, like the evil smell of malodorous substances.’

Objection; “The Veda being eternal, and as such there being no speaker in its case, there can be no room for any discrepancies, and thus alone is its absolute authority established; while if it were the work of an author, we could never get at an absolutely undoubted authority for it: as we find men often making use of false assertions, under the influence of certain likes and dislikes.”

Reply: The authority of the scriptures rests upon his authority. The word ‘his’ refers, by the ‘law of provision,’ to a speaker superior to ourselves, as described under the sūtra ‘asmadbuddhibhyo liṅgamṛṣeḥ. Thus the meaning comes to be that the authority of the Veda is due to the fact of its having been composed by a person superior to ourselves. That is to say, its authority is due to the absence of discrepancies, and not to eternality; for instance, we find in the case of the ear and the mind, that though both of these are eternal (the ear being eternal because it is only ākāśa), yet they often lose their authoritative or truthful character by reason of the subsequent advent of discrepancies; and obviously in the case of the eye and the other organs we find that even though they are not eternal, they have authority only when all their deficiencies have been removed. And we have already proved that there are no faults or discrepancies in the “superior person”; hence the scripture that is composed by him, must be regarded as authoritative, even though it be the work of a personal author. It is never suspected that one who sees the reality of things, and is free from likes and dislikes, when moved by mercy to instruct the people of the world, could impart wrong or false teachings.

Question: “How is it known that the Veda is the work of a superior person?”

Answer: It is inferred from the fact of its sense being indisputably accepted by all men of various castes and conditions. If it were the work of an ordinary person, it could not be indisputably followed in practice by all intelligent persons; as we find in the case of the scriptures composed by Buddha and others; there would always be some people who would not accept it as authoritative, and as such not regulate their conduct in accordance with it. But that with regard to which all men are agreed (on the point of its authority), cannot but be accepted as an authoritative means of knowledge; as we find in the case of sensuous cognition. The argument may be thus stated:—The Veda is authoritative, as it is always found to give rise, in all men, to non-contradictory cognition, like Sense-perception.

Though it is true that, in the case of certain actions laid down in the Veda as bringing about a visible result, we often find that even when the action is duly performed, the result does not appear,—yet this fact does not set aside the authoritative character of the Veda; as this failing is always due to the deficiencies in the auxiliaries leading up to the result; as is proved by the fact of the due result always appearing when these auxiliaries are present in full force.

Objection: “It is not right to say that the Veda is composed by trustworthy person; as at the time that the action laid down therein is performed, even the most learned of the performers have no idea of any such author, who would be most likely to be remembered.”

Reply: That that is non-eternal is proved by Inference. In as much as it is the ‘Veda’ or ‘scripture’ that has just been spoken of as having its authority based upon the fact of its having been composed by a superior person, we must take this ‘non-eternality’ as referring to the same; and the meaning of the sentence thus is that, that the Veda is noneternal is inferred from inferential indicatives.

The author formulates the necessary inferential arguments: (1) The creation or composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by, or due to, an intelligent action,—because it is a composition of sentences—like the composition of ordinary sentences. (2) The word ‘dadāti’ in the Veda is due to an intelligent action,—because it is spoken of as dadātiḥ’—like the word ‘dadāti’ used in ordinary parlance.

As for the argument that the Veda is not composed by a, human author, as no such author is remembered,—it is not based upon sound premises, (1) because the Veda itself has spoken of an author in such passages as—‘Prajāpati alone existed, there existed neither day nor night; he did penance; and from that penance the four Vedas were born &c. &c.’; and (2) because we find the premiss failing, in the case of an old well for instance [people have no idea of the actual person who sank the well, and yet that is not taken as a reason for accepting it as not done by human hands],

The non-eternality of the Veda having been thus proved, we are met with the following difficulty: “In as much as we often find human assertions to be both (true and false), there would always be a doubt as to the authoritative or truthful character of a declaration in the Veda; and under the circumstances, though people might be led by them to activity towards some visible end, with regard to which he may have no] doubts; but as regards imperceptible (supersensuous) objects, which are laid down as capable of being attained only by a vast amount of expenditure and bodily exertion, no intelligent person would ever betake himself to any activity on their account, until he will have fully ascertained the authoritative character of the declaration pertaining thereto. And in] ordinary parlance we find that the authoritative character of an assertion is always ascertained upon the recognition of, Certain good qualities in the speaker; and this leads us to think that in the case of Vedic declarations also any activity in accordance with them would be resorted to with a firm conviction only after the agent will have become cognisant of the good qualities of the author of the Veda.”

Some people (the Mīmāṃsakas) meet this difficulty by holding that, “the authority of an assertion is not due to the fact of its being spoken by a trustworthy person; all means of cognition are self-sufficient in their authority.”

But to These people we put the following question: What, in the first place, do you understand by ‘authoritative character’ or ‘validity’ of the means of cognition, prāmāṇya? Does it consist in the unfailing concomitance with, the real state of things? or in the bringing about of the cognition of the real thing? It cannot be the former; for even though smoke is invariably concomitant with fire, yet we find that a man who is not in his senses does not have any idea of fire (at the sight of smoke), and in this case thus there would be no ‘authoritative character’ for the inferential indicative (smoke);—aud also because in the case of the eye we find that though it is not ‘concomitant’ with any one of the colours, blue, yellow etc., yet it is sufficiently ‘authoritative’ in that it brings about the cognition of real things. If then, ‘authoritative character’ be held to consist in the bringing about of the cognition of real things, then we ask (what do you mean by saying that it is ‘self-sufficient’?) Does it mean—(1) that it is known, by itself? or (2; that it is produced, by itself? or (3) that it operates by itself? If the authoritative character of the means of cognition be known by itself, in the form that, ‘I am the bringer about of the knowledge of the real thing,’—then, with regard to no means of cognition would there ever be any doubt as to whether its objective is true or otherwise; nor would there be any activity following upon mistaken cognitions. And, if, on account of the incongruity of the means of cognition operating within itself, it were not to cognise itself, and hence not to cognise the fact of its bringing about the knowledge of the real thing, then for the cognition of this, something else, apart from the cognition, would be needed; as without a means of cognition, no cognition of the ‘cognisable’ is possible; and hence when the ‘authoritative character’ of a means of cognition would be the object to be cognised, it would certainly need something apart from itself as the means for its cognition; and thus the authoritative character would be due to this something else.

Objection: “If the authoritative character of one means of cognition would have to be cognised by another means, then this latter would have to be cognised by another, and so on and on, there would be an unending infinite series of means upon means.”

Reply: There would not be any such regressus ad infinitum; as it is not absolutely necessary that there should always be a desire to ascertain the authoritative character of the means of cognition. The means of cognition points to its objective, by its mere appearance, and not only after its own authoritative character has been ascertained. And in certain cases it so happens that when the objective has been duly pointed out, there arises, from some cause or other, a doubt as to whether the means of cognition is valid or invalid; and this doubt as to its validity giving rise to a doubt as to the reality of the object pointed out, the resultant activity towards that object does not come about. And for the sake of the due accomplishment of this activity there arises a desire to ascertain the authoritative character of the means of cognition: as until this has been ascertained, the doubt does not disappear. In a case however, where, either on account of the force of habit or of the due comprehension of all details in connection with the object, the means of cognition appears free from all taint of suspicion,—the mere appearance of this means brings about the full cognition of the object; and the cogniser having all his needs thus fully satisfied, there does not arise in his mind any wish for ascertaining its authoritative character; and hence there would be no need of having recourse to another means of cognition. One who would still fix some suspicion upon the cognition, on the ground of both sides of the question being perceived, will not be able to attach any such suspicion; for the simple reason that all suspicion has been set aside by the fact of the object having been definitely cognised; as has been declared by Mandana Miśra in his Brahmasiddhi: ‘A suspicion with regard to the cognition is set aside by the cognition itself.’

It may be that the validity or authoritative character of the means of cognition would be sought after for the sake of the requisite activity; but in a case where the activity was due to a doubtful idea of the object in the mind of the agent who had not ascertained the authoritative character of the means of cognition, when he would be fully satisfied as regards the character of the object itself, he would no longer have any desire for ascertaining the validity of the means.

Question,: “Is then, the usefulness of the means of cognition ascertained on the strength of the resultant activity?”

Answer: No; as in that case also the activity would be for the purpose of the testing of the validity of the means of cognition, just like the testing of the seed by the farmer; and in such cases there would always be a desire for ascertaining the said validity. When one has doubts as to the validity of the means of cognition, and having doubts as to the true nature of the object, betakes himself to activity for the sake of the due comprehension of that object,—if he gets at this object he has his purpose fulfilled;—and as for the ascertainment of the validity of the means of cognition, even though such ascertainment would not be quite at hand, yet it would be accomplished by the force of the object itself; specially as the force of the resultant activity does not fail in its concomitance with the validity of the means of cognition.

Thus then, the validity of the means of cognition is neither known nor produced by itself. Then alone could we accept the ‘self-sufficiency’ of the validity of the means of cognition, if the cognition, on having been produced, were subsequently to produce in itself the character of bringing about the cognition of the real object. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the cognition appears from its cause in full possession of the character of the knowledge of the real object; and as such we regard its validity to be dependent upon something else, apart from itself.

Objection: “By saying that the means of cognition is ‘self-sufficient’ in its validity, we do not mean that it produces its own validity; what we mean is that for the sake of the production of its validity the cognition does not stand in need of anything besides those causes that produce the cognition itself.”

Reply: This too is not the correct view; for if the only cause of the validity of a means of cognition consisted in the accessories bringing about a cognition that is neither more nor less than the exact object,—then whence could we have any i mistaken cognitions?

Objection: “It is in the very nature of the causes in question that they bring about cognitions in exact accordance with objects, and when this nature is disturbed or set aside by the; presence of discrepancies, then the causes produce cognitions not in accordance with objects,—while when the discrepancies that tend to disturb the nature are not present, then there remains the character of bringing about cognitions in due accordance with objects.”

Reply: Then, does the correctness of a verbal assertion follow merely from the preceding cognition of the speaker? In that case all assertions would be correct. If however the correctness of an assertion were to be produced from the comprehension of the means of knowledge; then in that case the validity would be based, not upon the nature of the causes, but upon their efficiency; that is to say, the cause of the word would be the knowledge of the object signified by it; and correctness is the efficiency, and incorrectness the deficiency, of this latter cognition; consequently if correctness were the cause of the validity of an assertion, then this validity would be based upon the efficiency of the cause, and not upon the very nature of the cause itself; and if the validity of verbal cognitions were based upon an efficiency, then the same Would be the case with the validity of the other kinds of cognition; as all cognitions under consideration must be regarded as having their validity based upon the quality of these causes,—because they are cognitions of the valid means of knowledge,—like the cognition of the means of verbal cognition.

Objection: “In the case of verbal cognition also the quality of the cause may operate towards the removal of discrepancies and not towards the production of validity.”

Reply: Not so; as what the quality leads to is the stopping of the way of the coining in of discrepancies.

Objection: “We grant that (in the absence of discrepancies) there will be no appearance of the incorrect cognition which is the result of discrepancies; but whence would the correctness—of the cognition proceed? What follows from the absence of the cause, is the absence of the effect, and not a contrary effect; as this contrary effect consists in the mere form of the cognition.”

Reply: Not so; as there would be no difference. That is to say, the only peculiarity that, there is in a cognition is its relation tor its object; and if this, being fully taken up in the stopping away of the discrepancies, were no help in the bringing about of correctness, on account of there being no difference in the forms,—then there would be no sentence restricted to any particular object, because of ‘nondifference;’ i.e. on account of the non-accomplishment of anything particular. If it be held that the cognition pertaining to an object produces a sentence pertaining to that same object, then it would be the correctness of the cognition, and not its mere cognitional form, that would be the cause of the correctness of the sentence; and this would come to the same thing as to hold the validity to be due to the presence of certain efficiencies.

Even if we grant that the presence of the efficiency operates towards the absence of discrepancies; even then, that would not in any way affect the theory of the ‘validity’ of the means of knowledge being due to something apart from itself; because whenever this ‘validity’ would appear we would always find by negative and affirmative concomitance, the active operation of the ‘absence of discrepancies,’ which would be something quite distinct from the ‘nature of the cause.’

Objection: “The absence of discrepancies is the cause off the absence of mistaken cognitions; while the validity in question is dependent upon the character of the sense-organ and the other channels of cognition.”

Reply: Why cannot you say that the presence of discrepancies acts as an obstacle to the production of validity, and; mistaken cognitions are dependent upon the character of the sense-organ etc.?

Objection: “We do not admit this, because as a matter of fact we always find mistaken cognitions following ini the wake of discrepancies.”

Reply: It would be equally reasonable to hold that, in as much as we always find validity following in the wake of the ‘absence of discrepancies,’ we cannot assume otherwise. As a matter of fact, there is no valid means of knowledge which does not stand in need of the previous non-existence and the utter destruction of discrepancies.

In the same manner it may be proved that the action of the means of knowledge in bringing about such effects as the; agent’s activity etc., also is due to something apart from itself, and not due to its own mere form; as in the bringing about of the said effects it is always found to be controlled by certain external aids and obstacles.

(1) By saying that the Veda is the composition of a superior person, the author do not ascribe the authorship of the Vedas to any ordinary man; he; holds God himself to be the author. The Mīmāṃsaka on the other hand holds that the Veda is coeval with God himself, and has no author at all. The latter rests his belief upon the fact that no person has ever, since time out of mind, had any idea of any author of the Veda, as they have had in regard to such other ancient books as the Mahābhārata, the Dharmasūtras, etc. The Naiyāyika holds that consisting of a number of sentences, like any ordinary work, the Vedas could not but have been the work of an intelligent author; and as the character of the work precludes the possibility of its having originated from any ordinary man, they conclude that the author of the Vedas could have been no other person than God Himself. The two views are very ingeniously reconciled by the Vedāuti who holds that though the form of the Veda as we have It is non-eternal, and as such, like all things in the world, the creation of God. it is in its essence a mere copy of something that has always existed, and as such absolutely eternal as to its substance. The non-eternality of the Vedas is a collolary to the more general theory of the non-eternality of all sound

(1) The Vaiśeṣika view of the inclusion of Verbal, under Inferential, cognition has been refuted by Udayanācārya in his Kusumāñjali under the Kārikā ‘Anaikāntaḥ paricchede, sambhave ca na nirhayaḥ [niścayaḥ?]’; that is to say an inference, like the one in which verbal cognition is sought to be involved, is not possibly; as the conclusion of such an inference could be either a definite cognition or a mere possibility; in the former case, the character of the premisses would not be such as to be able to lead to the desired conclusion; and in the former as the conclusion would be doubtful, it could not lead to any certain definite verbal cognition. (Vide Kusumāñjali, in loco).

(3) The question as to how we are to ascertain that a certain piece of know-edge is true or false has given rise to much discussion. The different views have been thus summed up in the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha. (1) The Sāṅkhyaa hold that validity, as well as invalidity, is inherent in the cognition itself; (2) the Naiyāyikas regard both to be proved by something apart from the cognition; (3) the Bauddha holds that while invalidity belongs to cognitions by their very nature, their validity is proved by something apart from themselves; and (4) the Mīmāṃsaka declares that it is validity that belongs to the very nature of the cognition; and invalidity is due to external causes; i.e. a cognition must always, be regarded as true until it is proved to be otherwise. The Naiyāyika contends that if a cognition were by its nature valid and true, then it would always be recognised as such; and there would never be any doubt as to whether a certain cognition is correct or incorrect; then again in ordinary experience we find that whenever we have a certain cognition, all that we feel is that it may be true and if, when acting in accordance with the piece of knowledge afforded by that cognition, we find that it corresponds with the real state of things, then alone do we conclude that it is true; otherwise it is fain; f. i. when the thirsty man perceives water and moves up to it to have a drink; if he does come upon real water he thinks his cognition to be true, while if he meets with sand instead, he concludes it to have been a misapprehension; and thus we find that the validity or otherwise of the cognition is established by external evidence. And so the truthfulness or otherwise of verbal cognition also is proved in accordance as it may or may not be found to be in harmony with the real state of things. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the validity of a cognition is due to the presence of a certain efficiency, in the organ concerned; while its invalidity is due to the presence of a discrepancy chiefly in it.

Importance has been attached to this discussion because of the way in which it affects the question of the self-sufficient authority of the Vedas; the Bauddhas denying all authority for them and the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika admitting their authority only in so far as they are the work of the all wise God.

Other Vaisheshika Concepts:

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Concepts being referred within the main category of Hinduism context and sources.

Eternal Veda, Authoritative character, Superior person, Verbal cognition, Means of Knowledge, Invariable concomitance, Non-eternal, Inferential Cognition, Trustworthy person, Non-eternality, Cognitive process, Cognition of the object, Perception of reality, Cognition of object, Authority of Scripture.