Sūtra 9.2.2 (Inference and the Law of Cause and Effect, how related)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.2.2:

अस्येदं कार्य कारणसम्बन्धश्चावयवाद्भवति ॥ ९.२.२ ॥

asyedaṃ kārya kāraṇasambandhaścāvayavādbhavati || 9.2.2 ||

asya—its, to it; idaṃ—it; kārya-kāraṇa-sambandhaḥ—(The suggestion or introduction of the relation of effect and cause); ca—and, whereas; avayavāt—from a member of the argument or syllogism; bhavati—arises.

2. ‘It is its’ (—this cognition is sufficient to cause an illation to be made); whereas (the introduction of) the relation of effect and cause arises from a (particular) member (of the argument).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be objected that this enumeration (of marks) is inadequate, since it does not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of the moon, of the rise of Canopus (a bright star in the southern constellation Argo navis) from the tranquility or clearness of the waters of the rising of the moon from the expansion of the Nymphaea, of the setting of the fourteen lunar mansions or nakṣatras from the rising of the other fourteen, of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a particular colour.

[Read sūtra 9.2.2 above]

In anticipation of this objection, he says.

‘It is its’—this much only becomes the instrument of illation. ‘Asya,’ i.e., of the means of illation, e.g., smoke, etc., ‘idaṃ,’ i.e., (it is) that which is to be established, e.g., fire, etc.; or, ‘asya,’ i.e., of the pervader, e.g., fire, etc., ‘idaṃ,’ i.e., (it is) that which can be pervaded, e.g., smoke, etc. It is, therefore, only the apprehension of the being that which can be pervaded, that governs (the process of illation), and not also the relation of effect and cause, etc. Lest it might be objected that the enumeration (of marks of inference) in the preceding aphorism is consequently futile, he adds ‘the relation of effect and cause.’ Other relation (i.e., of the conjunct, the contradictory, and the combined), mentioned above, are also hereby implied. In the word ‘relation,’ there is the tropical suggestion of that in which relation is the thing contained. ‘Relation’ accordingly means the introduction or talk of relation. Whence does the introduction or talk or relation arise? He gives the reply by saying ‘avayavāt,’ i.e., from a part or member (of the argument), that is to say, only from the udākaraṇa or example or illustration. The fifth case-ending or the ablative inflection (in ‘avayavāt’) bears the sense of the infinite The meaning, therefore, is that, in this Darśana or philosophy as well as in the Sāṃkhya and other Darśanas the introduction of the relation of effect and cause, etc., has been made in conformity with, or regard being had to, the udāharaṇa or illustration (q.v., further below).

Thus, then, vyāpyatva, the being that which can be pervaded (as the mark, by that of which it is the mark) denotes the possession of a natural connection, the natural being that which is not accidental or adventitious. This quality of being non-accidental is in the case of perceptive object, known simply from its being ascertained, in some cases that they do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant with) that which is to be proved (or that which is denoted by the major term), and from the certainty, in other cases that they pervade the instrument of inference or inferential mark. Of supersensible objects established by proof, some are pervasive of both (that which is to be proved, and the instrument of inference), or non-pervasive only of the instrument of inference, or non-pervasive only of that which is to be proved. Amongst these, the quality of being non-accidental is to be ascertained, in the first case, from their being pervasive of the instrument of inference; in the second case, from their being non-pervasive of that which is to be proved; and in the fourth case also, from their being pervasive of the instrument of inference. In the third case also, there being room for the further inquiry that while it is not possible or proved why that which pervades, should pervade only this much (i.e., the instrument of inference) and not more, how it is at the same time possible for that which does not pervade, to pervade even so much (i.e., the instrument of inference), and thus acquisition and preservation (or loss and gain) being counter-balanced, and from other considerations, the quality of being non-accidental should be determined. The attitude of mind that the demon of apprehension that some upādhi, accident, adjunct, or external condition, may exist is these cases, attacks all rules of conduct, prescriptive and prohibitive, should be rejected, inasmuch as there is possibility of certainty of non-accidental nature. The definitions of upādhi and vyāpti (pervasion) have been already stated.

This inference is of two kinds self-satisfying or logical, and other-satisfying or rhetorical. Therein inference for the sake of, or originating from, oneself, arises from the investigation by a person himself of vyāpti, pervasion or universal concomitance of the major and middle terms, and pakṣadharmatā, the being a property or characteristic of the minor term or the existence of the middle in the minor term; and inference for the sake of, or originating from, another, results from the knowledge of vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā produced from an argument (nyāya,) enunciated by another.

A nyāya argument or syllogism is a proposition productive of verbal cognition which leads to the recognition or sub-sumption of the mark of illation in the third member of the syllogism. The members thereof are five; and membership here denotes the being a proposition productive of verbal cognition, which again is productive of another verbal cognition leading to the recognition or sub-sumption of the inferential mark in the third member. Such propositions are: pratijñā, enunciation; hetu, mark or reason udāharaṇa, illustration; upanaya, application, ratiocination, or deduction; and nigamana, conclusion. Of these the pratijñā, enunciation, is a proposition which is a member of the argument or syllogism, conveying verbal cognition the object whereof is neither less nor greater than that of the inferential cognition desired; the hetu, mark or reason, is that member of the syllogism, ending with the ablative inflection, which is applied to the instrument of inference or the middle term under consideration; the udāharaṇa, illustration, is that member of the syllogism which is declaratory or demonstrative of the inseparable existence of the given major and middle terms; the upanaya, application or deduction, is that member of the syllogism which establishes that the hetu which is so distinguished by the possession of inseparable existence, is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the pakṣa, the subject of the conclusion, i.e., the minor term; and the nigamana, conclusion, is that member of the syllogism which declares that the object denoted by the given major term is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the pakṣa. Thus the syllogism proceeds as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,—pratijñā,
Because it is an effect,—hetu.
Whatever is an effect or producible is non-eternal,—udāharaṇa,
It (sound) possesses effectness or producibility pervaded by non-eternality,—upanaya,
Therefore, (it is) non-eternal,—nigamana.

The significant appellations given by the Vaiśeṣikas to these very members are pratijñā (enunciation of that which is to be proved), apadeśa (reason), nidarśana (instance), anusandhāna (investigation), and pratyāmnāya (re-statement of the pratijñā). In this connection, the mode of the application of vāda, theory or discourse, jalpa, disputation or demolition of the argument of the opponent and establishment of one’s own theory, and vitaṇḍā, controversion or only destructive criticism, and the characteristics of chala, misconstruction, jāti, futile or adverse reply, and nigraha-sthāna, ground of defeat, i.e., misapplication or non-application of the argument advanced, may be sought in the Vādi-vinoda.—2.