Sūtra 9.2.1 (Marks of inference enumerated)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.2.1:

अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि विरोधि समवायि चेति लैङ्गिकम् ॥ ९.२.१ ॥

asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam || 9.2.1 ||

asya—of this; idaṃ—it; kāryaṃ—effect; kāraṇaṃ—cause; saṃyogi—conjunct; virodhi—contradictory; samavāyi—combined; ca—or; iti—such; laiṅgikaṃ—produced by the mark of inference, mediate.

1. “It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory to, or combined in, this,”—such is (cognition) produced by the mark of inference.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Thus in the preceding chapter the perception of yoyins and non-yogins has been determined according to its cause, its nature, and its characteristic. Of the two kinds into which pramāṇa or proof has been divided, viz., perceptual or sensuous and inferential or produced by marks, the author now commences to determine that which in produced by means of marks:

[Read sūtra 9.2.1 above]

‘Cognition’—this is the topic in hand. ‘Laiṅgika’ means produced from liṅga or mark. Liṅga is a property of the pakṣa, possessing vyāpti, pervasion or invariable concomitance with the major term. Therein vyāpti has been already declared. (Vide III.i.14, supra.) One thing is pakṣa in relation to another, when there is in the former nonexistence of proof or evidence repugnant to the desire for proving the latter. Such evidence includes proof and disproof, or is demonstrative as well as obstructive, for a pakṣa or minor term is that which contains non-existence of both of them. For, there existing either demonstrative or obstructive evidence, no one feels doubt or desire of demonstration. It is for this reason that the ancients defined the pakṣa to be an object wherein the existence of the sādhya, that which has to be established, the major term, is doubtful, or an object wherein the existence of the sādhya, is desired to be demonstrated. According to Jīvanātha Miśra, a pakṣa is that in which there is non-existence determined by the being evidence preventive of the appearance of doubt terminable by the ascertainment of the possession of producible sādhya. Some others say that that is a pakṣa in which there is non-existence of demonstrative evidence accompanied with absence of desire of proof. In this view, the nature of the pakṣa will exist even in the case of obstruction (i.e., even where obstructive evidence, in other words evidence which disproves the existence of the major term in the minor, exists.) This then may be seen in the Anumāna-Mayūkha.

It then becomes apparent that the property or characteristic of this pakṣa is the liṅga or mark of inference. And the cognition, in the form of a presentative state of consciousness, which the mark, whether it be a visible, an inferred, or a heard one, produces, is ‘laiṅgikaṃ’ or that which is produced from a mark.

Accordingly it has been said.

anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhañ[?] tadanvite |
tadabhāve tu nāstyeva talliṅgamanumāpakam ||

That mark is the medium of inference, which is connected with that which is to be inferred, is known to exist in that which is accompanied with that which is to be inferred, and does not exist at all where that does not exist.

If is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of inferential cognition, and not its parāmarśa, subsumption, inasmuch as subsumption, being destitute of function, lacks causality whereas it is the same (i.e., to cause inference) that is the function of the mark.

Objection.—How can there be illation or inferential cognition, where the smoke, etc., (i.e., marks) are either past or future?

Answer.—This is not a valid objection, as in this case the sādhya or that which is to be proved, is also inferred as past or future.

Objection.—How can there be illation where, in consequence of an impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke, etc., be past, future or present?

Answer.—There can be by no means, since in such an instance there is uncertainty also as to the sādhya, that which is to be proved.

Objection.—How can an illation take place where there is certainty as to the existence (of the mark) on a previous and a following day, and uncertainty as to the intermediate day?

Answer.—In such a case, the inferential cognition results from the inference of fire, etc., limited to those days, by means of smoke, etc, limited to those days, such having been ascertained to be the causality of vyāpti, pervasion or the universal concomitance of the major and minor terms, (in the process of inference.)

Objection.—How does inferential cognition arise from a cloud of dust mistaken for smoke?

Answer.—It is because that which is understood to be pervaded (i.e., the cloud of dust, supposed to be smoke, and therefore pervaded by fire), is the mark of inference, and because the inference is correct or incorrect according to the correctness or incorrectness of such understanding; else how should your own parāmarśa or subsumption be the instrument (of inferential cognition) in such a case?

Objection.—In the case of a supersensible mark, parāmarśa or subsumption not being producible thereby, how can the mark have the function (of being the means of inference)?

Answer.—Such function is effected by there being a practical or saving argument demonstrative of existence (kṣaimika sādhanatā), for, otherwise, the function of combination in tḥe case of hearing, etc,, would not be possible.

Inference results from a mark which is an effect, as the inference of fire, etc., from smoke, light, etc.; also from (a mark which is) a cause, as the inference of sound by a deaf man from a particular conjunction of the drum and the drumstick, or the inference of dharma or merit, heaven, etc., by a pious man from the due performance of. sacrifice, ablution, etc., or the inference of rain from the due performance of kārīrī or Sacrifice for rain, or the inference of the efflux of water from a channel which men are digging out from a river, etc., full of water, or the inference of the rising of a stream from the observation of rain overhead. This is, then, a single connection, characterised as the relation of effect and cause, which has been stated in two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as the inference of the senseorgan of the skin from the observation of the physical organism which is in conjunction with it. Inference from a contradictory or repugnant object is such as the inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, etc., from the observation of an excited snake which is its natural antagonist. Inference from a combined object is such as the inference of fire connected with water by means of the warmth of the water.—1.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

* * * * Cognition by means of marks is of three kinds, according as it contains a cause, or an effect or a co-existent thing as the mark, and is called pūrva-vat, śeṣa-vat, or sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa. Pūrva-vat means that which contains as the mark the antecedent, that is, the cause. Śeṣa-vat means that which contains as the mark the consequent, that is, the effect. Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa means that which contains as the mark something other than a cause or an effect. The author explains these forms of inference, which have been also explained in the aphorisms of Gautama (i.e., the Nyāya-Sūtra). ‘Asya idaṃ kāryaṃ’; ‘Asya,’ of this, i.e., of the sādhya or that which is to be proved, ‘idaṃ,’ this the sādhana or that which will prove the sādhya, is ‘kāryam,’ i.e., the effect—where such usage arises, there it is the case of inference by means of an effect as the inferential mark, e.g., the inference of fire and the like, by the mark of the smoke and the like ‘Asya idaṃ kāraṇaṃ’: that is inference of which the mark is a cause is as, e.g., the inference of a shower by means of a particular ascent of clouds. Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa or that which appears in the form of that of which the inferential mark is something other than a cause or an effect, is manifold; as, for example, the inference of the iron ring as being in conjunction with the mortar and the like, by means of the mark of a particular pestle which is conjoint with the iron ring (at its end); so also is the inference of an ichneumon concealed behind, bushes and the like, by the sight of a particular excited snake which is the enemy of the ichneumon; and also the inference of fire and the like (as existing) in a frying pan and the like, by means of the hot touch combining in fire, in the form of the counter-opposite of combination favourable to fire.