Chapter 5 - Concluding Remarks

We have already noted that Udayana wrote not only commentaries but also a few independent works. Both as a commentator and independent author he surpasses many of the Indian philosophers. He belonged to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. In fact the tendency of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika combining into a single system starts from him and reaches a great height. His commentary in the series of commentaries on Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra is the last most important contribution. The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama and its commentary are the basic works of the Nyāya system which may be said to have developed almost solely on the series of commentaries on them by Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Udayana. After Udayana we have practically no original thinker and commentator of the Nyāya system. Navya Nyāya belongs rather to a different category and moreover it concerns itself exclusively with epistemology. Udayana is perhaps the last notable commentator on Nyāya as a whole.

His contribution to the interpretation of the Vaiśeṣika is also no less important. Works on the Vaiśeṣika are somewhat lesser in number than those on Nyāya. No early authentic commentary on Kaṇāda’s Sūtras has come down us. The only notable commentary on it written by Śaṃkara Miśra belongs to a much later period. At that time the tradition of Vaiśeṣika is already lost. Moreover, at that time Navya Nyāya has already attained its great height. Śaṃkara Miśra was also a great scholar of Navya Nyāya and his commentary though masterly only shows how the Vaiśeṣika position can be defended by adopting Navya Nyāya terminology. Even accepting its quality as a commentary and philosophical work it is difficult to say how far the ancient Vaiśeṣika is represented by it.

Praśastapāda’s work on the Vaiśeṣika may be a commentary or may be an independent work. It is almost equal in authenticity and importance to the Sūtras of Kaṇāda. Among the commentaries on this most systematic work of the Vaiśeṣika, Udayana’s Kiraṇāvalī stands out prominently. Udayana examines, expresses and defends the Vaiśeṣika position in an elaborate way. He notes and refutes the objections raised later against the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. In his defence of the Vaiśeṣika position he even does not spare the Nyāya views, in spite of the fact that the Nyāya is considered to be a samānatantra system. As we have noted, comparison and verbal testimony are not accepted as separate sources of knowledge by the Vaiśeṣika, though they are so by the Nyāya. In the third stavaka of the Nyāyakusumāñjali he has defended the Nyāya position by offering some specific arguments. But in the Kiraṇāvalī the same arguments are rejected from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint. Thus in the role of Naiyāyika he tries to bring out the actual implication of Nyāya and again in the role of Vaiśeṣika he makes an effort to present the actual implication of the Vaiśeṣika. His two monumental independent works are the Ātmatattvaviveka and the Nyāyakusumāñjali They cannot be characterized specifically as Nyāya works or Vaiśeṣika works. They can at best be called Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. The former is actually a strong criticism of Buddhist philosophy. Some basic and vital doctrines of the Buddhist are taken up for discussion. The position of the opponent is presented in great detail and with great faithfulness. Often the views of the Buddhist are presented in original language of their text and then subjected to very strong criticism. The Nyāyakusumāñjali also is a masterly work but the opponent here is not exclusively represented by the Buddhist. The particular topic discussed is also exclusively a Nyāya topic.

It is generally said that the Nyāyakusumāñjali is concerned with proving the existence of God. In the opening verse of the Nyāyakusumāñjali which represents both a maṅgalācaraṇa and a declaration of the subjectmatter of the work, it has been clearly stated that Udayana is going to offer inferential proofs for the existence of God which are totally free from logical fallacies. But as we have seen the positive arguments for proving the existence of God have been given only in the last stavaka of Nyāyakusumāñjali He has mentioned no less than eight grounds and has also provided alternative interpretation of each. He has also noted the criticism of these particular grounds by the opponent and has refuted them. Thus, in a sense the actual subject-matter has been presented only in one stavaka.

However following the Indian tradition of philosophical discussion he did not consider this enough. It is not sufficient to present one’s own view logically, it is also equally necessary to reject the arguments of the opponent. Udayana has done this in a grand style in the first four stavakas. In this he has also followed the Nyāya tradition faithfully. According to Nyāya methodology there can be no debate or critical examination without a doubt. Doubt is the precondition for any logical enquiry. If it is known for certain that a thing exists or that a thing does not exist there can be no discussion on the point. But if two contradictory views are found regarding the same object there can be a critical discussion about its nature. Thus, a critical discussion of the existence of God becomes justified only if it can be shown that there is doubt regarding the existence of God. In fact, just as God is admitted by the Nyāya, so also God is denied by many other systems. Udayana points out that the existence of God has been challenged on many grounds from many viewpoints. It is not possible to note and examine each one of them. He therefore selects some basic objections the refutation of which will be sufficient to silence any sort of opposition to God. He formulates five counter-positions or contradictory statements which go against the admission of God and refutes them in the five stavakas.

The Nyāyakusumāñjali is really encyclopedic in nature. The sole purpose of the work is said to be proving the existence of God no doubt, but Udayana has also utilized the opportunity of incidentally establishing the Nyāya views on almost all the major issues discussed in the Nyāya system. The law of causation is a fundamental problem of philosophy. Taking the Cārvāka as an opponent, Udayana has noted the objection against it and then defended it by refuting the opponent. He has critically analyzed the views of the opponent, stating his arguments in detail and in great depth. May be some of the arguments were not actually offered by the opponent. But Udayana makes note of even possibilities. He gives some probable objections and also provides answers to them. Even if some of the problems are not directly relevant to the problem of God, he focuses attention on them and discusses them from his own Nyāya standpoint. For example, he discusses the Mīmāṃsā theory of śakti as a separate category. After a thorough discussion of both sahaja-śakti and ādheya-śakti, he shows that there is no necessity of admitting any of them. The Mīmāṃsakas think that abhāva cannot be a cause. But Udayana has shown that the position is not logical. He has also criticized the basic views of many other systems. The Sāṃkhya theory of prakṛti and pusruṣa has been refuted by him. As it is well well-known, in the Indian philosophical tradition the Cārvākas are unique in holding that the body itself is the self and there is no distinct self other than the body as is admitted by all the other systems both orthodox and heterodox. In fact, the main argument given by Udayana is accepted by all the systems as authoritative. One of the basic and most important theories of the Buddhist is the doctrine of momentariness. There is a lot of literature of the Buddhist thoroughly propounding and defending this doctrine. Udayana has taken it up for discussion and shown that it cannot be logically defended. However, Udayana has actually made a detailed study of the major Buddhist views in the Ātmatattvaviveka In the Nyāyakusumāñjali he has made only a brief discussion, though giving the main arguments which make the Buddhist claim illogical.

Udayana has also paid great attention to some of the controversies between the Nyaya and the Mīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsakas admit svataḥ-prāmāṇya in both jñapti and utpatti, whereas the Nyāya admits parataḥ-prāmāṇya in both jñapti and utpatti. Udayana has defended the Nyāya position in great detail. This is because if the Mīmāṃsā position is accepted there remains no relevance for admitting God. According to Nyāya, the Veda is valid because it represents the words of God. But if the words are valid by their own nature there will be no necessity to admit God. That the doctrine of eternality of words is also not logically tenable has been shown by Udayana. There is also a refutation of the Sāṃkhya position that the seers can be accepted as the speakers of the Veda which may thus be regarded as valid and admission of God becomes unnecessary. The Nyāya theory of God as the speaker of the Veda cannot be logically defended if pralaya or cosmic dissolution is not admitted. In fact, so many arguments against the admission of pralaya are given by the Mīmāṃsaka. So Udayana takes up each of the arguments one by one and shows that all of them are fallacious. Finally he records some positive arguments which go to prove that pralaya is to be admitted as a fact.

A conclusion can be established only with the help of a pramāṇa in favour of it. If there are pramāṇas negating the existence of God then the Nyāya position naturally becomes illogical. So it has to be shown that not any form of pramāṇa can establish the nonexistence of God. Udayana shows that there is no pramāṇa disproving God. But in this context he also finds an opportunity to examine the nature of pramāṇas not only admitted by the Nyāya but also of those admitted by other systems. In this respect he strongly defends the Nyāya position that pramāṇas are only four, neither more nor less. He even refers to the Vaiśeṣika view which brings verbal testimony and comparison under inference. He gives the arguments of the

Vaiśeṣika, but finally rejects them in favour of the Nyāya view. Comparison is accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka also. But the Mīmāṃsaka conception of comparison is totally different from that of the Nyāya. Mīmāṃsā admits similarity as a separate category and comparison is admitted only as a source of knowledge for it. But Nyāya does not accept similarity as a separate category and argues that the purpose served by comparison is totally different. Udayana further shows that there is really no justification for admitting arthāpatti as a separate source of knowledge because it can be easily included in inference. There is also no need for admitting a separate source of knowledge for cognizing absence. Bhāṭṭas also admit absence as a separate category but contends that no accepted pramāṇa can produce a cognition of it. So an additional source of knowledge called anupalabdhi has to be admitted. But Udayana rejects this view by showing that it is possible to cognize an absence very well by perception.

In the Indian tradition there are different views regarding the nature of pramā and its essential characteristics. Udayana specially refutes the Mīmāṃsā view in this regard. He also rejects the Bhāṭṭa theory of jñātatā.

In the final stavaka Udayana mentions the positive arguments for the existence of God. He explains each argument refuting the objections raised against them by the opponents. He offers alternative interpretation of the arguments. Incidentally he also examines what should actually be the significance of a vidhi or injunction.

Udayana has rightly been acclaimed as one of the greatest philosophers in the Indian tradition. In fact, he is not simply looked upon as the propounder of a particular system of Indian philosophy only. Many of his conclusions are accepted as general principles in the field of philosophy in general. His examination of a problem is very thorough. He takes into consideration each and every aspect of a problem, examines the logicality from every standpoint and then gives his final verdict. His analysis is very deep and subtle. In fact, according to some scholars his method of critical analysis contributed to the advent of NavyaNyāya. Gaṅgeśa has referred to many of his views, although he has also criticized some of them. In any case the excellence of Udayana’s critical method can hardly by overlooked and he is justifiably one of the outstanding figures in the whole range of Indian philosophy.