Chapter 9 - Conclusion

From our foregoing discussion it is clear that Tarkasaṃgraha of Annaṃbhaṭṭa is an excellent work on the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which may be regarded as a door to the system. Annaṃbhaṭṭa’s work is easy and simple. Because of its simplicity of style and lucidity of language this book is invariably prescribed for the beginners by the Universities of India. The work itself is not a detail one and Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not discussed the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories very elaborately. It is found that he has not endeavoured to criticize any opponent view in this work. Even definitions are put forward very minutely as has been the practice of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. This defect of the work has been rectified by him in his own commentary Tarkadīpikā or Dīpikā. In this commentary the author has delved deep into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines by sometimes elaborately, sometimes defending his own views expressed in the Tarkasaṃgraha. So in the foregoing study these two works are taken together for showing Annaṃbhaṭṭa’s contribution. It is also found that Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not deviated from his predecessors regarding different concepts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy and as a whole he follows faithfully their doctrines.

Now, in the following lines we are going to collect together our findings.

1. Tarkasaṃgraha is a work of syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and as such it accepts the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika School and four pramāṇas of the Nyāya school. In dealing with the categories he generally follows Navya Nyāya views and uses Navya Nyāya terminology to some extent in the dīpikā.

2. There is some controversy regarding the exact date of Annaṃbhaṭṭa. Scholars differ among themselves about his date, the time varying from 15^th century A.D. to 18^th century A.D. However, from the discussions of different arguments it can be concluded that Annaṃbhaṭṭa flourished in 17^th century A.D.

3. Annaṃbhaṭṭa maintains that all things of the world and their relationship with one another come under the seven independent categories. Among the seven categories, the first six have existence, nameability and knowability. These categories are objects of the positive notion of being. The seventh one also has existence etc. but is the object of negative notion and depends on its counter entity.

4. Annaṃbhaṭṭa brings Nyāya category of pramāṇa under the quality buddhi, as is done by most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers of syncretic school.

5. In defining pratyakṣa, Annaṃbhaṭṭa follows the earlier Naiyāyikas and defines it as that knowledge which is produced by the sannikarṣa of an object with a senseorgan. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not at all mentioned about the perceptual knowledge of God etc. where no sense-object–contact is necessary. This point has not been clarified by him though the Navya Nyāya philosophers discussed about it critically.

6. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not at all discussed about the concept of alaukika pratyakṣa (extra-ordinary perception) which is discussed in detail by other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas like Viśvanātha etc.

7. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not defined dravya in his Tarkasaṃgraha but gives a definition of it in the Dīpikā as that which possesses the universal of dravyatva or which possesses quality. He himself shows that the second definition can also be reduced to the first definition. This definition of substance, i.e., possessing dravyatvajāti, is accepted as faultless definition of substance by all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers.

8. Elaborate descriptions of the substances like earth, water, fire, air and ether are found in Tarkasaṃgraha and Dīpikā. While discussing fire Annaṃbhaṭṭa has put forward arguments to prove that gold is tejas and not pṛthivi.. This argument is actually in line with all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. About other substances Tarkasaṃgraha offers mere descriptions.

9. In the Dīpikā, Annaṃbhaṭṭa has raised a question regarding the proof of the existence of God. He offers inference as proof here. Here also Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not shown any novelty, but follows other philosophers of this school. Thus he says that as it is a general rule that every effect must have a cause and as the universe is an effect, so it also must have a cause. This cause is God.

10. So far as the Vaiśeṣika theory of atom is concerned Annaṃbhaṭṭa argues in his Dīpikā that atom as the minutest part of earth etc. has to be accepted, otherwise the mountain Meru and the mustard seed will be of equal size. The creation process from the atoms with the creative will of God as the efficient cause has been discussed in a few lines.

11. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has only enumerated the twenty-four kinds of guṇa in Tarkasaṃgraha and defines it in Dīpikā. He gives two definitions which are critically discussed by him again and concludes that the definition guṇatvajātiman (possessing the universal guṇatva) is preferable for its brevity of expression.

12. There are different opinions on the divisions of guṇa. Kaṇāda mentions seventeen guṇas. Praśastapāda adds seven more guṇas. Annaṃbhaṭṭa, like other modern Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, accept twenty-four guṇas. Some philosophers add some more guṇas to these like laghūtva, mṛdutva and kaṭhinatva. Annaṃbhaṭṭa is against this view and argues that these are only opposites of gurutva etc.

13. Regarding pākajaguṇa, Annaṃbhaṭṭa supports the Vaiśeṣika view of pīlupākavāda. He maintains that change of colour etc.in earth through the action of fire takes place only in atoms and not in dvyaṇuka etc.

14. Sāmānya is not regarded as an objective reality of Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda. But the latter Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas including Annaṃbhaṭṭa accept the objective reality of sāmānya and accept it to be the basis of the idea of common character among different individuals. Annaṃbhaṭṭa gives a simple definition of sāmānya which actually serves the purpose of describing it. But he explains this definition minutely and removes the defect pertaining to it in Dīpikā. He defines it as that which is eternal, one and exists in many. He shows that here ‘exists’ means exists in the relation of samavāya. This is the view of all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not at all discussed about the jātibādhakas which occupy an important place in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika polemics.

15. Regarding the category viśeṣa, Annaṃbhaṭṭa offers only a description. Viśeṣa is the ultimate distinguishing factor of aneternal substance. The Navya Nyāya philosophers maintain that it is svato vyāvartaka (self-distinguishing) and as such is called antya (ultimate). It differentiates all eternal substances, but there is no other differentiator of viśeṣa, it is the ultimate differentiator and can differentiate itself also. The character of viśeṣa has not been highlighted by Annaṃbhaṭṭa. He simply says that viśeṣas are differentiators.

16. Relation plays an important role in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, They have discussed about many types of relations. Of these saṃyoga and samāvaya are important. Annaṃbhaṭṭa discusses about saṃyoga in connection with guṇa. He also describes different types of saṃyoga, which are all in the line of the general Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought. He also defines samavāya as eternal relation which remains in two ayutasiddha things. His definition of ayutasiddha is accepted by all and is very exact.

17. It is noticed that the theory of samāvaya at first was postulated in connection with the concept of causation. Later on this concept was extended to include all inseparable things.

18. Abhāva is accepted as a separate category by all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas including Annaṃbhaṭṭa. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have faced the greatest objection from the Buddhists and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas regarding the reality of abhāva. Actually the concept of abhāva developed through their conflict with these schools. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not defined abhāva but enumerates the different kinds of it. He also defines these different types of abhāva. In the Dīpikā he also refutes the Prābhākara view regarding abhāva.

19. Regarding the concept of cause also Annaṃbhaṭṭa’s view is not at all different. He defines cause as that which invariably precedes the effect. But this definition is deficient as it does not take care of the essential condition of anyathāsiddha in the definition. However, this is rectified by him in the Dīpikā.

In this way it is found that Annaṃbhaṭṭa has followed the general trend of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers in dealing with the different categories of the system. In fact before the advent of Annaṃbhaṭṭa, all these concepts have been established refuting all rival attacks. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has found these concepts in their developed form and he has not tried to add anything to these already existing concepts.

But even then the works of Annaṃbhaṭṭa are not devoid of importance. The importance of Tarkasaṃgraha and Dīpikā lies in the fact that here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concepts are presented in a lucid and systematic manner avoiding the jugglery of language found in other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. The Navya Nyāya language style is not totally absent here, but is found in the Dīpikā only, that also for explicating different ideas. That is why, Annaṃbhaṭṭa’s work is prescribed for the beginners of Indian logic. But this work is also useful to the advanced learners, because it presents the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories in a precise and comprehensive manner. Hence, the importance of Annaṃbhaṭṭa in the field of the study Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic can never be over-estimated.