Text 42: On Time (Kāla)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 42:

कालः परापरव्यतिकरयौगपद्यायौगपद्यचिरक्षिप्रप्रत्ययलिङ्गम् । तेषां विषयेषु पूर्वप्रत्ययविलक्षणानामुत्पत्ताव्।अन्यनिमित्ताभावाद्यदत्र निमित्तं स कालः । सर्वकार्याणां चोत्पत्तिस्थितिविनाशहेतुस्तद्व्यपदेशात् । क्षणलवनिमेषकाष्ठाकलामुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रार्धमासमासर्त्वयनसंवत्सरयुगकलपमन्वन्तरप्रलयमहाप्रलयव्यवहारहेतुः । तस्य गुणाः संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागाः । काललिङ्गाविशेषादेकत्वं सिद्धम् । तदनुविधानात् पृथक्त्वम् । कारणे काल इतिवचनात् परममहत्परिमाणम् । कारणपरत्वादिवचनात् सम्योगः । तद्विनाशकत्वाद्विभाग इति । तस्याकाशवद्द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे सिद्धे काललिङ्गाविशेषादंजसैकत्वेपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भक्रियाभिनिर्वृत्तिस्थितिनिरोधोपपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकवद्वा नानात्वोपचार इति ॥ ४२ ॥

kālaḥ parāparavyatikarayaugapadyāyaugapadyacirakṣiprapratyayaliṅgam | teṣāṃ viṣayeṣu pūrvapratyayavilakṣaṇānāmutpattāv.anyanimittābhāvādyadatra nimittaṃ sa kālaḥ | sarvakāryāṇāṃ cotpattisthitivināśahetustadvyapadeśāt | kṣaṇalavanimeṣakāṣṭhākalāmuhūrtayāmāhorātrārdhamāsamāsartvayanasaṃvatsarayugakalapamanvantarapralayamahāpralayavyavahārahetuḥ | tasya guṇāḥ saṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgāḥ | kālaliṅgāviśeṣādekatvaṃ siddham | tadanuvidhānāt pṛthaktvam | kāraṇe kāla itivacanāt paramamahatparimāṇam | kāraṇaparatvādivacanāt samyogaḥ | tadvināśakatvādvibhāga iti | tasyākāśavaddravyatvanityatve siddhe kālaliṅgāviśeṣādaṃjasaikatvepi sarvakāryāṇāmārambhakriyābhinirvṛttisthitinirodhopapādhibhedānmaṇivatpācakavadvā nānātvopacāra iti || 42 ||

Text (42):—Time is the cause of the contrary notions of ‘Priority’ ‘Posteriority’ of ‘simultaneity’ and ‘succession,’ and of ‘late’ and ‘soon.’ In as much as there is no other cause or basis for these notions, as appearing with regard to these objects,—notions which differ in character from all notions described before,—we conclude ‘Time’ to be the basis of these.—(II-ii-6).

Note.—The translation follows the rather forced interpretation of the Kandalī. It appears better to take ‘vyatikara’ in the sense of relationship; Time in that case would be the basis of the notion of such relationships as those of ‘Priority’ and Posteriority.’

Time is the cause or basis of the production, persistence and destruction (or cessation.) of all produced things; as all these are spoken of in terms of time. It is also the basis of such, conventional usages as ‘Kṣaṇa,’ lava,’ ‘nimeṣa,’ ‘kāṣṭhā,’ ‘kāla,’ ‘muhūrta,’ ‘yāma,’ ‘ahorātra,’ ‘ardhamāsa,’ ‘māsa,’ ‘ṛtu,’ ‘ayana,’ ‘samvatsara,’ ‘yuga,’ ‘kalpa’ ‘manvantara,’ ‘pralaya’ and ‘mahāpralaya.’—(II-ii-9).

Its qualities are—Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction. Its unity is proved by the fact of the distinguishing feature of ‘time’ being common (to all periods of it). From that ṭollows its Separateness. The declaration ‘the name kāla applies to the cause’ in the Sūtra indicates the presence in Time of the greatest Dimension,. The declaration of the ‘posteriority and priority of the cause causing the notions of posteriority and priority’ indicates the presence of Conjunction; and there would be Disjunction as the destroyer of this Conjunction.—(II-ii-8 II-i-31 VII-i-25 VII-ii-22).

The fact of time being a substance, and that of its being eternal are proved as in the case of Ākāśa.—(II-ii-7).

Though from the uniformity of the distinguishing character of Time, Time is directly by itself, one only, yet, it is indirectly, or figuratively, spoken of as manifold, on account of the diversity among the conditions afforded by the production, persistence and cessation of all produced things; just as we have (diversity) in the case of the Gem or the Cook.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author now proceeds to describe Time. The notions of the ‘Posteriority’ and ‘Priority’ of time are spoken of as ‘contrary,’ with reference to the same notions as regarding Space. That is to say, that which is ‘prior’ in point of space is ‘posterior’ in point of time, and vice versa. This notion, as well as of those of ‘succession’ &c. &c is based upon time.

Objection: “Time is imperceptible; hence there could be no recognition of its invariable concomitance with the notions of ‘priority’ and ‘posteriority’; how then could it be regarded as the distinctive cause of these notions?”

Reply: We infer this from the fact of there being no other cause for the notions of succession &c., with regard to their respective objects;—these notions being totally differe it in character from those described before. That is to say, it is a well recognised fact that with regard to such objects as Substance; and the rest, there appear the notions of ‘priority,’ ‘posteriority’ and the like. Substance and other things themselves could not be the cause of these notions; as these are wholly different from the notions of substance &c; nor could any effect be produced without at adequate cause; hence we conclude that that which is the cause of these, is Time.

Some people hold that the notions of ‘priority’ and ‘posteriority’, in the case of the ‘old’ and ‘young’ respectively, is based upon the greater and lesser number of the revolutions of the Sun.

This is not right; as the revolutions of the Sun are not in any way related to the young and old; and if that which is pot related were to be regarded as the cause, then that would mean a total confusion (anything could be regarded as the cause of anything).

Others regard ‘simultaniety’ to consist in mere ‘Sahabhāva’ (existence together, Association or co-existence). This too is not right; as unless we accept the existence of Time, the word ‘saha’ (‘together’) in this connection would have no meaning.

Objection: “The meaning of ‘saha’ would consist in the simultaneous mutual preclusion of things, with regard to a certain action.”

Reply: This cannot be; as there pan be no such mutual preclusion among things that are not such as have been produced, have existed, and have ceased to exist. If the mutual preclusion be held to belong to things that exist together,—then that would be an admission of ‘Time.’

Similar explanations may also be given of the notions of non-simultaneity (‘Succession’) &c. also.

Question: “Time being one and the same always, whence the diversity of notions with regard to it?”

Answer: This diversity is due to the diversity in the accessory circumstances. For instance, when we have a simultaneous apprehension of the production and persistence of two objects, by one and the same cognition (notion or idea),—then it is that the Time, accompanying these (production and persistence) gives rise to the nations of ‘later’ and ‘sooner’ (as ‘posteriority’ and ‘priority’). We have the notion of simultaneity brought about by a single c ignition of the productions and operations of many things; while the notions of ‘quick’ and ‘slow’ are brought about by the cognition of the greater and less numb r of the active moments intervening between the production and functioning of the objects under consideration; and so firth we explain the other ideas in regard to Time.

Objection: “We may attribute the various notions to the circumstances peculiar to each case; and thus there would be no need of postulating any such thing as Time.”

Reply: This cannot be; as if there were no Time, nothing could be produced. That is to say, there can be no production for Ākāśa which has an absolute existence; nor of the ‘man’s, horn’ which is absolutely non-existent; and hence the only production that would be possible would be that of something not having a previous existence; and if there were no Time, the word ‘previous’ would have no meaning; and as such the said qualification of the non-existence (of the object to be produced) not being available, there would be no peculiarity that would make it an object of production as distinguished from Ākāśa and ‘man’s horns’; and thus we would have no production at all.

Question.: “ How could any actual cognition be qualified by Time, which is an imperceptible entity?”

To this some people make the following reply: The action of Time in the bringing about of a qualified cognition, is in the manner of cause, like the sense-organs—and not in the way of a mere accessory, like that of the stick (in the making of the jar)

But this is not correct. As a cognition, consisting as it does of pure consciousness, can have no peculiar cause, apart from the relationship of the object.. Hence we offer another reply to the above question:

In the old and the young we find that there is a difference in their bodily conditions; as a cause of this difference we infer the connection of Time; and it is after this inference that we have an idea of their being qualified by Time; and in as much as the cogniser of both (the young and the old) is one and the same person, there can be nothing incongruous in the fact of the qualifying adjunct (Time) being cognised by means of cognition (Inference) other than that of the objects (old and young) themselves. As instances of diverse means of knowledge coalescing in their functions, we have such notions as ‘this sandal is fragrant’ (where the sandal is seen by the Eye, and the fragrance is inferred); or the notion ‘this earth is without the jar,’ in which, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, the absence of the jar is cognised by Negation, while the spot is perceived by the Eye. In the case of such objects as the jar and the like, on account of their being corporeal (material or bodied) substances,—or on account of these having various conditions,—we infer the relationship of the bodied substance with Time; and then there follow the notions of simultaneity &c., as qualified by that Time. And these notions (of simultaneity &c.) are put forward as the pointers of Time, only against one who denies the fact of these being the effects of Time. And certainly, there can be nothing wrong in this.

The author gives a reason for this. ‘Tadvyapadeśāt’—(‘As all these are spoken of in terms of Time’)—That is to say, the productions &c. are spoken of in terms of Time, e. g. ‘the time of production,’ ‘time of destruction,’ and so forth. And from this fact we infer that Time is the cause of all these.

He points out other effects of time—‘Kṣaṇa &c.’ 2 Kṣaṇas make one Lava, 4 Kṣaṇas make one nimeṣa—which is the time taken by a single wink of the Eye; and so forth the various divisions of Time treated of in Arithmetical works.

The Substance Time having been proved to exist, the author proceeds to point out its qualities. ‘Tasya guṇāh, &c.’ Time being a Substance, it must have the qualities of Number &c.; and so the Author with a view to explain the particular forms of these, says—‘kālaliṅgāviśeṣāt.’ That is to say, the distinguishing features of Time, in the form of the notions of simultaneity and the rest, being common t all Time, it is regarded as one only; specially as there is no proof for believing in a multiplicity of Time.

Objection: “The notions of simultaneity and succession &c. are themselves diverse; and these distinctly point to the multiplicity of Time.”

Reply: It is not so; because eyen when Time is one only, the diversity of the notions can be explained as being due to the diversity of other attendant auxilliary conditions.

From this follows its separateness—That is to say unity is always accompanied by separateness; hence the unity of Time proves its separateness also.

Kāraṇe kālam &c.—This refers to the Sūtra kāraṇe kālākhyā.’ The meaning of the Sūtra is that the name ‘Time is applied to the cause of the notions of simultaneity &c., and this shows that Time is all-pervading; as these notions are present everywhere (which would not be possible if their cause were not all-pervading).

Kāraṇaparatvādivacanāt &c. This refers to the Sūtra—‘Kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāt ca paratvāparatve,’— in which the expression ‘kāraṇaparatva’ denotes the conjunction of Time with the material object; and this proves that Time has the quality of Conjunction.

Tadvināśakatvāt &c.—i.e. the Conjunction being caused and as such necessarily destructible, the destroyer of this could be nothing else save Disjunction; as the destruction of the substrate (of the Conjunction) does not always precede the destruction of the Conjunction (i.e. the two things conjoined together continue to exist, even after they have been disjoined from each other). This proves that Disjunction is a quality of Time; because the Disjunction destructive of a previous Conjunction could not exist without a substratum.

Like Ākāśa, Time is a Substance and is eternal. That is to say, just as Ākāśa is a substance, on account of its having qualities, and not having any other substratum,—so in the same manner, is Time also; and just as Ākāśa is regarded to be eternal, on account of its having no homogenous or heterogenous cause,—so is Time also.

Question—“If Time is one only, whence, then, does it come to be spoken of as manifold?”

Answer—Kālaliṅgāviśeṣāt That is to say, though the denoters of Time—such as the notions of priority, posteriority and the like—are the same in all cases, and as such properly speaking, primarily Time is one only, yet it is spoken of as diverse, through diversity being imposed upon it indirectly. That is to say, it is spoken of as manifold on account of the diversity of such conditions as the beginning or production, continuance or persistence, and disappearance or destruction, of all things. Just as a single piece of crystal comes to be spoken of as blue, yellow &c., through the diversity of the coloured objects in its proximity,—so in the same manner, though Time is one only, yet on account of the diversity of the said conditions, it comes to be spoken of as the ‘time of production,’ ‘time of persistence,’ ‘time of destruction,’ and so forth.

In view of the fact that the connection of the crystal with the coloured objects is not real (but merely imposed from without), while that of Time with the said actions is real,—the author cites another example: Pācaka; just as one and the same person comes to be spoken of as a ‘cook’ and a ‘reader’ through the diversity of his actions, so in the same manner, with Time also. Nor can the actions of beginning &c. themselves be said to be Time, as they are recognised as something wholly different.