Text 41: On Ākāśa

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 41:

आकाशकालदिशामेकैकत्वादपरजात्यभावे पारिभाषिक्यस्तिस्रः संज्ञा भवन्ति । आकाशः कालो दिगिति । तत्राकाशस्य गुणाः शब्दसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागाः । शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वे सत्यकारणगुणपूर्वकत्वादयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वादाश्रयादन्यत्रोपलब्धेश्च न स्पर्शवद्विशेषगुणः । बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्मान्तरग्राह्यत्वादात्मन्यसमवायादहङ्कारेण विभक्तग्रहणाच्च नात्मगुणः । श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वाद्वैशेषिकगुणभावाच्च न दिक्कालमनसाम् । परिशेषाद्गुणो भूत्वा आकाशस्याधिगमे लिङ्गम् । शब्दलिङ्गाविशेषादेकत्वं सिद्धम् । तदनुविधानादेकपृथक्त्वम् । विभववचनात् परममहत्परिमाणम् । शब्दकारणत्ववचनात् सम्योगविभागाविति । अतो गुणवत्त्वादनाश्रितत्वाच्च द्रव्यम् । समानासमानजातोयकारणाभावाच्च नित्यं सर्वप्राणिनां च शब्दोपलब्धौ निमित्तं श्रोत्रभावेन । श्रोत्रं पुनः श्रवणविवरसंज्ञको नभोदेशः शब्दनिमित्तोपभोगप्रापकधर्माधर्मोपनिबद्धस् तस्य च नित्यत्वे सत्युपनिबन्धकवैकल्याद्बाधिर्यमिति ॥ ४१ ॥

ākāśakāladiśāmekaikatvādaparajātyabhāve pāribhāṣikyastisraḥ saṃjñā bhavanti | ākāśaḥ kālo digiti | tatrākāśasya guṇāḥ śabdasaṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgāḥ | śabdaḥ pratyakṣatve satyakāraṇaguṇapūrvakatvādayāvaddravyabhāvitvādāśrayādanyatropalabdheśca na sparśavadviśeṣaguṇaḥ | bāhyendriyapratyakṣatvādātmāntaragrāhyatvādātmanyasamavāyādahaṅkāreṇa vibhaktagrahaṇācca nātmaguṇaḥ | śrotragrāhyatvādvaiśeṣikaguṇabhāvācca na dikkālamanasām | pariśeṣādguṇo bhūtvā ākāśasyādhigame liṅgam | śabdaliṅgāviśeṣādekatvaṃ siddham | tadanuvidhānādekapṛthaktvam | vibhavavacanāt paramamahatparimāṇam | śabdakāraṇatvavacanāt samyogavibhāgāviti | ato guṇavattvādanāśritatvācca dravyam | samānāsamānajātoyakāraṇābhāvācca nityaṃ sarvaprāṇināṃ ca śabdopalabdhau nimittaṃ śrotrabhāvena | śrotraṃ punaḥ śravaṇavivarasaṃjñako nabhodeśaḥ śabdanimittopabhogaprāpakadharmādharmopanibaddhas tasya ca nityatve satyupanibandhakavaikalyādbādhiryamiti || 41 ||

Text (41)—Ākāśa, Time and Space, having no lower species, these are three technical names given to the individuals themselves.—(II-i-27, 29-31).

Of Ākāśa the qualities are—Sound, Number, Dimension Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction.—(VII-i-22).

Sound cannot be the property of those substances that can be touched.—(1) because, being perceptible, its production is not preceded by any quality in the material cause of the substance (to which it belongs); (2) because it does not pervade over, and is not coeval with, the substance to which it belongs; (3) because it is perceived elsewhere than in the substratum wherein it is produced. I cannot be regarded as belonging to the Soul, because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ; (2) because it is perceived by other souls; (3) because it is not found to inhere in the soul; and (4) because it is perceived as apart from all idea of ‘I’. It cannot be the quality of Space, Time, and Mind, (1) because it is perceptible by the Ear, and (2) because it is a ‘Viśeṣaguṇa’ (a specific quality). And thus the only substance to which it could belong as a quality, and be a distinguishing feature of, is Ākāśa.—(II-i-24 to 27).

As the distinguishing feature of sound is common to all Ākāśa, this is regarded as one only.—(II-i-30, 29).

From this unity follows its individual separateness or isolation.—(II-i-31).

Ākāśa being spoken of as ‘vibhu’ (omnipresent or all-pervading), it points to its Dimension being the largest or highest.—(VII-i-22).

In as much as Ākāśa is spoken of as the cause of sound, it follows that it has Conjunction and Disjunction.—(II-i-31).

Thus then, being endowed with qualities, and not being located in any thing else, it is regarded as a substance. And in as much as it has no cause, either homogenous or heterogenous, it is eternal.—(II-i-18).

In the shape of the Auditory sense-organ it is the cause of the perceiving of sound, by all living beings. The Auditory sense-organ again is the name given to that part of the Ākāśa which is called the ‘Cavity of the Ear’; it is aided by the virtue and vice (of souls) that bring about the experiencing of sound. This sense-organ being eternal (as a portion of Ākāśa), deafness is caused by a derangement of its accessories.—(II-ii-21).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

For the sake of brevity, the author points out, in a single place, the differentiating qualities of Ākāśa, Time and Space. Each of these being one only, there are no lower genuses of these; as a genus always resides in a number of individuals, and there being no lower genus, the names,—‘Ākāśa,’ ‘Time’ and ‘Space’—must be regarded as merely conventional, and not as based upon any genuses, like the name ‘Earth’ &c. That is to say, these names also are mere differentiating qualities. That name is called ‘conventional’ (or ‘technical which without any reason, is agreed upon as applying to a certain thing pointed out from among a number of things,—e.g. ‘this is Devadatta’; on the other hand, that name is called ‘naimittika’ which is agreed upon on the basis of a certain reason.

The author next proceeds to take each of these separately. Among these three, Ākāśa has the distinguishing feature of having the qualities of Sound &c.

Objection: “What proof is there for the existence of Ākāśa? Some people urge that it is Perception; as is evinced by the fact of our having an idea through the eye, of a flying bird being at a certain point, and not at another. But this is not correct; as a substance which (like Ākāśa) is devoid of form and colour cannot be amenable to visual perception, and as for the idea, in the case of the flying bird, of the substratum or place in the sky at which the bird is seen, this substratum appears to be nothing else besides the extended held of light.”

In view of this the Author proceeds to show that Sound cannot be the property of any other substance,—thereby seeking to establish the existence of Ākāśa, by a Pariśeṣa–Inference.

(1) Sound is not preceded by (an outcome of) any quality in the material cause of its substratum; as like the colour of the cloth &c. it appears after its substratum has been produced.

(2) Then again, like pleasure &c., it cannot be a specific quality of such things as can be touched. Nor should one think that this negativing of the fact of Sound being a specific quality of such things indicates that it is a generic or ordinary property of these. As Sound is a quality which, alike in its specific and generic forms, is perceptible by a single external sense-organ; and hence, like colour and the rest, it is only a specific quality (and hence the negativing of specific sound means the preclusion of all sound). The Colour and other qualities of the atoms of earth &c. are the specific qualities of such substances as can be touched; and they are such as are not preceded by any quality in the material cause of their substratum; for the simple reason that atoms (which are their substratum) are not caused entities; hence in order to preclude these colour &c, (which are not perceptible', our author has the qualification added ‘while being perceptible’ to Sound.

(3) Then again, Sound is not coeval with the substance in which it is produced; as for instance, we find that the conch still exists though the sound produced in it has long disappeared. For this reason too, like pleasure, etc. it cannot be the specific quality of things that can be touched. Herein also, the same being the case with the colour of the Earth-atom which, even while the atom still exists, is destroyed by contact with fire,—and as such the argument being found to be defective, as being too wide, we must connect with this also, the words ‘while being perceptible’ (which qualification includes the colour of the atom).

(4). Another reason is put forward—As it is perceived elsewhere than in its substratum. If Sound were the quality of things that can be touched, then we should have to speak of the Conch and such other things as its Substratum; and the sound proceeding from the conch is perceived elsewhere than in these things—i.e. in the drum of the Ear; and because as a rule the Quality of one thing could not be perceived apart from it, we cannot regard Sound as the quality of any such substance.

Objection: “The sound that is perceived is in the same place as the conch, and (the perception is made possible by the fact that) the sense-organ pervades all over the world.”

Reply: This can not be; for if it were so then the sound near us, as well as that at a distance from us, would be perceived equally well.

Objection: “Though the sense-organ is all-pervading, yet, in as much as it would be moved to activity only by the purpose of the person (to whom it belongs) it would apprehend its objects only when it would move out from its resting place (in the body), with an operative energy in keeping with the character of the apprehension of the object concerned; and as such there would be no absence of restriction (as to the perceptibility of near and distant sounds).”

Reply: The sense-organs are for the purpose of the perception of objects; the perception of the object is dependent upon the operative energy (of the organs); but as a matter of fact, the sense-organ too is nothing apart from these operative energies; as anything apart from these would be useless, and would have no evidence for its existence. Now then, the operative energy of the Ear does not, as a matter of fact, go to rhe place where its object is situated, and then apprehend it; as if it were so, then as in the case of visual perception, so in that of auditory perception also, there could be no doubt as to the direction from which the sound proceed. Nor could the quality itself come out of its own substratum (to the places of the sense-organ); nor can the sound in the conch be said to produce other sounds in the interval (between the conch and the Ear); as in the case of all qualities of tangible substances, we find, it is only in another substance produced out of those substances, that the specific qualities of these latter are found to produce like qualities in these produced substances; while in the case of the couch, we do not find, in the interval between the conch and the Ear, any substance produced out of the conch (wherein the sound of the conch could produce another sound); nor can there be an apprehension of that which does not reach the sense-organ; as otherwise there would be many absurd possibilities; hence it must be admitted that if the sound were a quality of the couch, it could never be perceived (heard). As a matter of fact however we do find it being perceived; hence it is this perception that proves the fact of its being the quality of a substance other than any such as the conch and the like;—this other substance being one that pervades over the space intervening between the conch and the Ear, and wherein the sound proceeding from the conch would produce successive sounds, till the proximity of the Ear is reached, and its perception duly accomplished.

The author next proceeds to show that Sound cannot be the quality of the Soul.

(1) Because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ. The Ear is an external sense-organ; because it always manifests (or makes perceptible), external objects, like the Eye. Then again, Sound is made perceptible by that organ, as its perception is found to appear only so long as the organ exists. And that which is perceptible by the external sense-organs cannot be a quality of the Soul; as we find in the case of Colour and other qualities (perceived by the external sense-Organs). Hence it must be concluded that Sound cannot be the property of the Soul.

(2). For the following reason too, Sound cannot belong to the Soul: Because it is perceived by other Souls—i.e. it is perceived by many cognising Souls. In the case of the sound proceeding from the lute, we find that the same sound that is heard by one man is also heard by another person at the same place, through the series of sound-vibrations (emanating from the lute). Such is not found to he the case with Pleasure and other such internal qualities (belonging to the Soul). Hence differing in this important point from the recognised qualities of the Soul, Sound cannot be regarded as a quality of that.

(3) Also because it is not found to inhere in the Soul,—in this resembling the qualities of Colour etc. (which do not belong to the Soul).

Objection: “It has not been proved that Sound does not inhere in the Soul.”

Reply: Not so; because, as a matter of fact we find that Sound like Colour &c., is perceived as something external, while all the qualities of the Soul are perceived as internal.

(4) Sound canpot be a quality of the Soul—because it is always perceived as distinct from, all notions of ‘I’—that is to say it is not perceived as existing in the same substratum as the idea of ‘I’. It is a well-recognised fact that, that which is a quality of the Soul is always perceived as being in the same substratum as the notion of ‘I’—e. g. ‘I am happy,’ ‘I am unhappy’ and the like, (where happiness is cognised as existing in the Soul which is also spoken of as ‘I’). Sound is never found to be perceived in the same manner; hence it cannot be a quality of the Soul.

Objection: “We have such a notion as ‘I am a man of pleasant words’ (‘priyavāgaham’[?] where the ‘word’ is expressed as existing in the same substratum as the notion of ‘I’.”

Reply: True; but in this assert ion the ‘I’ is spoken of as one capable of giving utterance to pleasant words, and not as the substratum of these. As for instance, in the case of the Sounds proceeding from the drum, we never recognise the drum as the substratum of the sound (but only as emitting it.)

In order to show that Sound cannot be a property of Space, or of Time, or of the Mind,—the Author adds the reason because it is perceptible by the Ear, The sense of this is that the qualities of Conjunction and the like, which are accepted by both parties as belonging to Space, Time and Mind, are never found to be perceptible by the Ear; while Sound is found to be perceptible by it; hence Sound cannot be a quality of these.

Then again, the very fact of Sound being a Specific quality proves that it cannot belong to Space, &c., which do not possess any specific qualities. This is what is meant by the expression because it is a specific quality—which embodies the argument: Sound is not a quality of Space, Time and Mind,—because it is a specific quality,—like Pleasure &c.

Objection: “For proving a single fact, it is useless to bring forward a large number of arguments.”

Reply. The uselessness of other proofs in a matter proved by one proof—is this uselessness due to the fact of there being no good arising from them, or to the fact of no further arguments being needed by men? It cannot be the former; as we find th it the later proofs are also found to actually serve a useful purpose, just like the first proof. Nor is it that men do not need further proofs. As we find that, in the case of a thing that is exceptionally sweet in its nature, and which gives additional pleasure at each sight or experience of it,—there is a desire to see it again and again, even after it has been seen once; e.g. in the case of a dear child. Even in a case where men should not require further proofs, we find that the man is urged to activity as much by the later, as by the former proofs; and as such none could be rejected as altogether useless. Specially as they are found to serve the distinctly useful purpose of all pointing out the same object.

Objection: “When there is a pounding of what has already been pounded (doing of what has already been done), there can be no cessation of activity in the same line; and this will lead to no useful result. As what the former proof does is also to point out the object with a view to which the other person is urged to activity towards a useful purpose; and when this object has been once pointed out by that proof, any other proof for the same effect, could not have the same degree of operative instrumentality (towards the same end).”

Reply: Not so; because towards its own object the latter proof has the same degree of operative instrumentality as any other If it were not so, there would be no validity for the cognitions appearing in a continuous series; as every one of these refer is to the same object; and even the slight differences in the point of time of each of these are not, quite perceptible. Nor would this lead to a regressus ad infinitum; as the series would naturally stop when there would be no means for the appearance of the cognition.

Question: “Even though Sound may not be a quality of Earth and the other seven substances, yet what has that got to do with the existence of Ākāśa?”

The Author supplies the answer—‘Pariśeṣāt’, (by ‘exclusion’). That is to say, Sound is a quality; a quality could not exist without something in which it would subsist; it does not subsist in Earth and the other seven substances except Ākāśā; hence that in which the quality of Sound subsists is Ākāśā; this is the reason which, by exclusion, proves the existence, and gives us an idea, of Ākāśa. The proper form of the inferential argument would be this:—Sound is a quality of a substance other than the Earth &c.—because while being a quality, it is not found to subsist in the Earth and the other seven substances; that which is not a quality of some other substance can never be a quality and yet not subsist in the Earth and the other seven substances,—as a corroborative instance we have the case of Colour &c. which proves the proposition by the law of contraries.

The fact of Sound being a quality of Ākāśa, has been pointed out by means of the argument brought forward to prove the existence of Ākāśa itself; and the author now proceeds to point out other qualities of Ākāśa, such as Number and the rest.

The distinguishing feature of Sound being common, &c. Sound is the distinguishing feature of Ākāśa; and as Sound is common to all Ākāśa, it proves that Ākāśa is one only;—that is to say, in the absence of any proof for any diversity or multiplicity thereof.

Objection: “Sounds are many, in the shape of the loud, the louder and so forth.”

Reply: True; but it is not in this form of loud &c. that sound is the distinguishing feature of Ākāśa, to which it belongs only as a quality; and certainly the quality of sound is one only, and being common to the Ākāśa, it could not in any way be indicative of the diversity in its substrate; and as for the diversities of ‘loud’ &c, it is quite possible for these to proceed from a single substratum, through the diversities in the originating cause.

From this singleness follows its individual isolation:— In as much as there are no proofs for the diversity of Ākāśa it is universally recognised as one only; and this also proves its Isolation or separateness.

Some people hold that unity is not a particular number, but is only the specific form of the object But for these people, there could be no such expression as ‘one jar,’ as the two words being synonymous, it would be tautological.

Others hold Isolation or separateness to be natural to all things. But these people would have a cognition of the separateness of a thing without any idea of the other thing (from which it is separate),—just as we have of unity. As a matter of fact, however, this is not possible; as the idea of separateness that people have is always tn this form—‘this is separate from that’ (which involves an idea of both things). Therefore Unity and Separateness cannot be regarded as one and the same.

Ākāśa being spoken of as all-pervading, it indicates the fact of its Dimension being the highest. The fact of Ākāśa being a substance having proved that it has Dimension, the Sūtra—The Ākāśa is great because of its all-pervading character’ shows that it is endowed with the highest Dimension. Whatever is all-pervading has the greatest Dimension,—e.g. the Soul,—and Ākāśa is all-pervading;—therefore this too has the greatest Dimension.

Question: “ How is the all-pervading character of Ākāśa proved?”

Answer: This is proved by the fact of sound being produced at all places. If Ākāśa were not all-pervading, then sound could not be produced everywhere; as without its material cause, no effect can be produced (and Ākāśa is the material cause of sound). All the sound that is produced, in heaven, in the sky, or on the earth, must be regarded as inhering in one and the same substrate,—because they all belong to the class of ‘sound’, like the sound that is heard, and that which is produced in the starting; the fact of the sound as it is heard, and as it is produced in the beginning, inhering in one and the same substratum must be inferred from the relationship between them of cause and effect; (i.e. the sound in its initial stage is the cause of the same in the condition in which it is heard); because nothing that is not in the same substratum as the effect can ever be the material cause of this latter.

The Sūtra laying dozen the fact of Ākāśa being the ‘cause of Sound’ indicates the presence in it of Conjunction and Disjunction. We have the Sūtra—‘Sound is produced by Conjunction, Disjunction and Sound’; and this Sūtra distinctly indicates that Conjunction and Disjunction are the cause of Sound, a quality of Ākāśa; and this shows that these—Conjunction and Disjunction—belong to Ākāśa; as if they did not subsist in the same substratum (with sound), they could not be its material cause.

Thus then, being endowed with qualities, and not subsisting in any other substrate Ākāśa must be regarded as a substance. As Ākāśa has qualities, it is a substance, like the jar &c. Nor for this reason alone is Ākāśa a substance, but for another reason also,—i.e on account of its not subsisting in any other thing,—being in this, like the Atom.

In as much as it is without cause, either homogenous or heterogenous, it is eternal. A ‘homogenous’ cause is the material cause, and the ‘heterogenous’ cause is the immaterial i cause and the instrumental cause; the absence of these, in the case of Ākāśa proves that it is eternal.

It is the cause of the perception of sound by all living beings.

Objection: “If it were so then all beings would hear all sounds, Ākāśa existing everywhere equally.”

Reply: In the shape of the Ear; and the Ear also &c. ‘Śravaṇa’ (‘Ear’) is that whereby something is heard (‘Śrūyate-anena). The meaning is that the sense of Audition is that portion of Ākāśa which is called by the name of ‘Śravaṇavivara’ (‘Ear-cavity’); this is proved by the fact of there being no perception of Sound when this cavity is closed.

The author points out the qualifications of this organ: It is aided &c. The ‘experiences caused by Sound’ are those of pleasure and pain; and the organ is aided by such Virtue and Vice as bring about the pleasures and pains due to Sound. The sense of this is that the exterior sense-organ which apprehends the specific quality of a substance is itself endowed with the same quality, e.g. the Eye which apprehends Colour is itself a substratum of Odour; similarly in as much as the Ear apprehends the Sound described above, it must be regarded as having Sound for its quality; but we have proved that Sound can be a quality of Ākāśa only; hence we conclude that the Auditory organ is Ākāśa; and though, as such, it is all-pervading in its character, yet it does not bring about the perception of all Sounds everywhere; as it is only when the Ākāśa is limited within the tympanum of the Ear that it acquires the character of the ‘sense-organ.’ Just as though the Soul is allpervading, yet it is only when it is confined within the body that it has the character of the ‘Cogniser’; and the reason for this is that the only purpose served by the body is that it brings about the experiences of the Soul, otherwise the body would be altogether useless.

Objection: “ If such be the case, then the deaf person would also hear Sound, as he teas the tympanum inact.”

Reply: Though the Ākāśa of the Ear is eternal, yet deafness is produced by the discrepancies in the accessories, in the shape of Virtue and Vice.