Sūtra 2.2.8 (Like Existence, Time is one)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.2.8:

तत्त्वम्भावेन ॥ २.२.८ ॥

tattvambhāvena || 2.2.8 ||

tattvam—unity; bhāvena—by Existence.

8. The unity (of Time is explained), by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

“Even then,” it may be said, “there may be a plurality of Times.” So he says:

[Read sūtra 2.2.8 above]

The aphorism has grammatical connection with the word ‘vyākhyāte’ in the last aphorism, reduced to the form ‘vyākhyātam.’ The meaning is: Time, like Existence, is one, because, in spite of their multiplicity, the marks of Time, viz., the cognition ‘it is slow or late,’ etc., are the same in all places, and because no distinguishing mark, like those of Souls, exists.

It may be objected, “Time is manifold according to the difference of moments, two-moments, hours, three-hours, days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. How then can it ba one’?” We reply that it is not so, because the appearance of difference is due to upādhi or an external condition. For, it is found, that as the self-same crystal appears to be different according to the reflection thrown upon it by the external condition or upādhi of a China rose, tāpiñja (Xanthochymus pictorius), etc., so also does the one and indivisible Time appear to be different according to the limit set by the movement of the Sun, etc., as well as according to the limit imposed by their respective effects. Thus moment (kṣaṇa) is the-external condition of Time, which does not pervade or cover another external condition of Time, or it is Time which is not the receptacle of the counter-opposite of the prior as well as posterior non-existence of what is placed or contained in it; and this should be understood from the production of something and the destruction of something at every moment. It is proved by the Veda that a ‘lava,’ is an aggregate of two moments, and so on.

“Yet,” it may be objected,” “Time must be at least three-fold,, according to the difference of the past, the future, and the present; for it is heard, ‘The three times return,’ ‘The three Times are not accomplished or proved,’ etc.” We reply, it is not, for the use of three-fold Time is due to the limits of (the existence of) a thing, its prior non-existence, and its total destruction. The Time which is determined or delimited by a thing, is its present; the Time which is delimited by the prior non-existence of a thing, is its future; and the Time which is delimited by the total destruction of a thing, is its past. Thus the use of the threefoldness of Time depends upon the threefoldness of the determinant or that which delimits.—8.