Verse 5.39 - Classification of time as a substance

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Tattvartha sūtra 5.39:

कालश्च ॥ ५.३९ ॥

kālaśca || 5.39 ||

The time (kāla) also is a substance (dravya). (39)

Hindi Anvayarth:

अन्वयार्थ: [कालः] काल [च] भी द्रव्य है।

Anvayartha: [kalah] kala [ca] bhi dravya hai |

Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi:

The substances (dravya), whose attributes have been described, are entitled to be called substances. The next sūtra mentions the substance (dravya) not as yet explained.

The sūtra is ‘kālaśca’–‘the time (kāla) also’. What is meant by ‘also’? The word ‘substance’ (dravya) is to be inserted. How is the time (kāla) a substance (dravya)? Because it has the characteristic attributes of a substance. Substance has been defined in two ways. ‘Existence is with origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya)’. (sūtra 5-30). And, ‘that which has qualities (guṇa) and modes (paryāya) is a substance (dravya)’. (sūtra 5-38). Both these definitions apply to the time (kāla). It is explained as follows. The time (kāla) exhibits permanence (dhrauvya) based on its internal cause–svanimittaka–because it persists in own nature (svabhāva). Origination (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya) in the time (kāla) are based on external causes–paranimittaka–and also due to internal causes–svanimittaka–in view of the rhythmic rise and fall, ‘agurulaghuguṇa’. Further, the time (kāla) also has two kinds of attributes (guṇa), general (sāmānya or sādhāraṇa) and particular (viśeṣa or asādhāraṇa). The particular (viśeṣa or asādhāraṇa) attribute (guṇa) of the time (kāla) is assisting substances in their continuity of being through gradual changes–vartanā–and the general attributes include lifelessness (acetanatva), without having a form (amūrtatva), minuteness (sūkṣmatva) and power of maintaining distinction with all other substances (agurulaghutva). The modes (paryāya) of the time (kāla), characterized by origination (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya), must be similarly established. Since both the definitions of the substance (dravya) apply to the time (kāla), it is established as an independent substance, like the space (ākāśa). The marks (lakṣaṇa), like vartanā, of the time (kāla) have already been defined in sūtra 5-22.

Why is the time (kāla) mentioned separately? This also must have been mentioned along with the medium of motion (dharma), etc., in sūtra 5-1 itself. No. If the time had been included there, plurality of space-points (pradeśa) would apply to it. That is undesirable, as we cannot attribute multitude of space-points (pradeśa) to the time, neither from real (niścaya) nor from figurative or conventional (vyavahāra) points of view. The time (kāla) is not a ‘kāya’ or ‘body’. With regard to the medium of motion, etc., multitude of space-points has been mentioned from the real (niścaya) point of view. For instance, it has been mentioned that there are innumerable (asaṃkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa) in the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and in each individual soul (jīva). (sūtra 5-8). Similarly, multitude of space-points is attributed to the atom with a single space-point, figuratively, from a certain point of view, called pūrvottarabhāva prajñāpana naya. But for the time (kāla) there is no multitude of space-points from either point of view, real and figurative. Therefore, the time (kāla) has no spatiality (kāyatva). Now a question is raised. In sūtra 5-7, it is mentioned that the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa) are also without-movement (niṣkriya). This would imply that the time (kāla) should be with-movement in the same manner as has been interpreted in case of the souls (jīva) and the forms of matter (pudgala). So, the time (kāla) should have been included in sūtra 5-6 before the space (ākāśa). No, it is not so. The time (kāla) should not have been included there. If the time were included there, the substance (dravya) of the time (kāla) would be interpreted as an indivisible whole (i.e., one single continuum). Therefore, the time is mentioned separately here. What is the extent of the time if it is manifold? The static (niṣkriya) time-atoms (kālāṇu) exist throughout the universe-space, each space-point (pradeśa) being occupied by one time-atom.

It has been said in the Scripture:

“The real time–niścaya kāla–is of the extent of the space-points of the universe, pervading the entire universe-space (lokākāśa). Each particle or unit of the real time is distinct and occupies one unit of space; these innumerable particles of real time, thus, exist in the entire universe-space, like heaps of jewels.” (see ‘Dravyasaṃgraha’, verse 22).

The substances (dravya) that have multiple (many) space-points (pradeśa) exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya or pradeśa-pracaya); tiryakpracaya is the collection of space-points (pradeśa) in all directions. The collection of multiple (many) ‘samaya’ is termed the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya). All substances (dravya) exhibit the ūrdhvapracaya since these undergo transformation in time (kāla)–the past, the present and the future. All substances (dravya), except the substance of time (kāla dravya), exhibit the tiryakpracaya. The substance of space (ākāśa dravya) has inactive (niścala), infinite (ananta) space-points (pradeśa). The substances of medium-of-motion (dharma dravya) and medium-of-rest (adharma dravya) have inactive (niścala), innumerable (asaṃkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa). The substance of soul (jīva) too has innumerable (asaṃkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa) but these are active since the soul (jīva) undergoes expansion and contraction. The substance of matter (pudgala dravya) has single space-point (pradeśa) with respect to its substance (dravya), however, due to its modes (paryāya) arising out of union with other atoms, it has two, numerable, innumerable, and infinite space-points (pradeśa). The substance of time (kāla dravya) has single space-point (pradeśa) since the atoms of time (kālāṇu) do not unite. The five substances (dravya)–the space (ākāśa dravya), the medium-of-motion (dharma dravya), the medium-of-rest (adharma dravya), the soul (jīva) and the matter (pudgala dravya)–exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya); the substance of time (kāla dravya), being a substance of single space-point (pradeśa), does not exhibit the tiryakpracaya. All substances (dravya) exhibit the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya). The upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) that the five substances (dravya)–the space (ākāśa dravya), the medium-of-motion (dharma dravya), the medium-of-rest (adharma dravya), the soul (jīva) and the matter (pudgala dravya)–exhibit is due to the instrumentality of the substance of time (kāla dravya); these undergo transformation due to the substance of time (kāla dravya). The mode ‘samaya’ of the time (kāla) causes transformation in the five substances. The upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) of time (kāla) causes the ūrdhvapracaya of the five substances (dravya). The upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) of time (kāla) is by the time (kāla) itself; its transformation is the mode ‘samaya’. The time (kāla) itself is the substantive-cause (upādāna kāraṇa) as well as the instrumental-cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the ūrdhvapracaya of the time (kāla). For the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) of the other five substances (dravya), the substantive-cause (upādāna kāraṇa) is the substance (dravya) itself and the instrumental-cause (nimitta kāraṇa) is the ūrdhvapracaya of the substance of time (kāla). (see ‘Pravacanasāra’, p. 182-184).

The existence of a substance is characterized by simultaneousness of origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya). Without the space-points (pradeśa) of the substance (dravya), its existence cannot be maintained. If not even one space-point (pradeśa) is attributed to the substance of time (kāla), the root of its existence will vanish. One may argue, why not accept just the mode of ‘samaya’ without the existence of the atom of time (kālāṇu)? The answer is that the mode of ‘samaya’ cannot sustain itself without the associated permanence (dhrauvya) of the substance (dravya) that is the atom of time (kālāṇu). The support of the mode of ‘samaya’ is the atom of time (kālāṇu) having just one space-point (pradeśa). With this scheme, the origination (utpāda), the destruction (vyaya), and the permanence (dhrauvya) in the substance of time (kāla dravya) can occur simultaneously. Someone else may argue, why not consider the substance of time (kāla dravya) as one indivisible whole occupying the whole of the universe-space (lokākāśa), rather than as innumerable atoms of time (kālāṇu) filling up the universe-space? The answer is that if the substance of time (kāla dravya) is one indivisible whole, the mode of ‘samaya’ cannot be established; only when the indivisible atom of matter (pudgala-paramāṇu) traverses slowly from one space-point (pradeśa) to the other, the mode (paryāya) of the time ‘samaya’ appears as the time-atoms (kālāṇu) are different in the two space-points. One may argue next that if the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered to be an indivisible whole comprising innumerable space-points (pradeśa) filling up the universe-space (lokākāśa), as the indivisible atom of matter (pudgala-paramāṇu) traverses slowly from one space-point (pradeśa) to the other, the mode (paryāya) of the time ‘samaya’ can be established. This argument entails great fault. If the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered to be an indivisible whole, there can be no difference of mode (paryāya) of the time ‘samaya’. As the indivisible atom of matter (pudgala-paramāṇu) would traverse from one space-point (pradeśa) to another, it will encounter the same mode of the time ‘samaya’ in all space-points (pradeśa). There will be no difference of the time, that is, the ‘samaya’. The mode of the time ‘samaya’ can only be established when the time-atoms (kālāṇu) are different in different space-points (pradeśa) of the space (ākāśa). The argument has another fault. The substance of time (kāla dravya) does not exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya); it exhibits only the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya). If the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered to be an indivisible whole comprising innumerable space-points (pradeśa) filling up the universe (loka), it must exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya). And then the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya) must become the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya). This is not tenable. The mode of the time ‘samaya’ can only be established when the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered as comprising the atoms of time (kālāṇu), each occupying one space-point (pradeśa). (see ‘Pravacanasāra’, p. 187-188).