3.2. Sentence according to the Nyāya School

Gautama, in his Nyāyasūtra, refers to the word ' Vākya' in the aphorism:

"vākyavibhāgasya cārthagrahaṇāt"
  —(Nyāyasūtra 2.1.161).

But no precise definition of sentence is formulated by him. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on the aphorism 2.1.54, states that a sentence consists of several units in the form of two or more words. Thus he considers sentence as that which is consisting of a group of words.

Jayantabhaṭṭa makes his opinion that the absence of any reference to the sentence in Nyāyasūtras shows that the early Naiyāyikas treated the sentence to be merely a combination of words:

"kiṃ punaridaṃ padaṃ nāma, kiṃ ca vākyam iti uktam atra varṇasamūhaḥ padaṃ padasamūho vākyamiti",
  —(1970, p.143).

Vācaspatimiśra states that varṇas or syllables constitute a word and the collection of words denotes a sentence.

He also opines that the semantic relation among word-meanings has been comprehended to give rise to the recollection of their meaning and then to the sentencemeaning which is unknown hitherto:

"tasmāt padāni kṛtasaṅketāni svārthaṃ smārayitvā ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-āsatti-sādhrīcīnāni adṛṣṭapūrvaṃ vākyārthaṃ bodhayanti,
  —(1967, p.178).

Later scholars in Nyāya consider sentence as not mere combination of words, but group of words possessing ākāṅkṣa, yogyatā and sannidhi.

Among the later scholars, Keśavamiśra gives a vivid description about the nature of sentence in his Tarkabhāṣā.

He defines sentence as the group of words possessing three qualities viz. ākāṅkṣā (verbal expectancy), yogyatā (congruity) and sannidhi (proximity):

"vākyaṃ tu ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhimatāṃ padānāṃ samūhaḥ,
  —(1995, p.121).

Thus he says that a mere combination of words like 'gauḥ, aśvaḥ, puruṣaḥ, hastī' etc. cannot be called a sentence, for it lacks verbal expectancy. Similarly the sentences like 'vahninā siñcati' (spray with fire) is also not an authentic sentence as it lacks congruity. Fire cannot be taken as an instrument for the act of spraying. Similarly if one says the word ' gām' and after a long interval, he says ' ānaya', it will not form a sentence because of the absence of proximity.

Thus, he mentions that sentence is a group of words, which have these peculiarities;

(i) Words produce the verbal expectancy in the listener's mind through the denotation of their meanings.

(ii) They convey meanings that are capable of being connected without contradiction.

(iii) They are close enough to produce the intended meaning without undue delay.

arthapratipādanadvārā śrotuḥ padāntaraviṣayāṃ vākāṅkṣāṃ janayatāṃ, pratīyamāna-parasparānvaya-yogyatārthapratipādakānāṃ, sannihitānāṃ padānāṃ samūho vākyam,
  —(1995, p.125).

When compared to the Old School of Nyāya, the Neo Logicians (Navya Naiyāyikas) have special interest in the concept of language and language analysis.

Dr. L C Mullatti, argues in his thesis The Navya Nyāya Theory of Inference that the Neo Logicians gave much importance to sentences because of their special interest in the extra-linguistic entities, namely, cognitions.

There was, in fact, an important reason, for the Navya Naiyāyikas' interest in sentences. Though they did not realise it, they were inevitably faced with the problem of individuation of the extra-linguistic entities they allowed, namely, cognitions. Lacking any other principle of individuation, they were forced to rely on linguistic considerations (1972, p.40).

This special emphasis on the concept of sentence and its analysis can be evidently seen in the works of Neo Logicians.

Udayana in his Nyāyakusumāñjali, one of the major works in the Navya Nyāya School, affirms that sentence is only a group of words. He also states that the group of words is not different from the words, which are its constituents. It is also known to him that words, which do not have the syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), congruity (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi), do not constitute a sentence or verbal testimony (5.6). Another major work in this School, Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa too explains the nature of sentence as the group of words and it constitutes the cause of verbal cognition.

He states that the words are the instrumental cause (karaṇa [karaṇam]), the recollection of word-meaning is the intermediate cause (vyāpāra), the syntactic expectancy etc. are the auxiliary cause (sahakārikāraṇa [sahakārikāraṇam]) and the experience (anubhava) of the relation among the recollected word-meanings on the strength of the auxiliary cause is the fruit:

"tasmāt padam karaṇaṃ, padārthasmaraṇaṃ vyāpāraḥ, ākāṅkṣādisahakārivaśāt smāritārthānvayānubhavaḥ phalam",
  —(1990, p.548).

A statement from Tattvacintāmaṇi is referred to in the work Nyāyakośa as follows:

"vākyaṃ padasamūhaḥ. vākyatvaṃ ca viśiṣṭārthaparaśabdatvam"
  —(1978, p.730).

It says that a sentence is a group of words; and the state of a sentence lies in giving rise to the cognition of the relation among the word-meanings.

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā of Jagadiśa is one of the major works in Navya Nyāya, which specially focuses on the language theory of Naiyāyikas. He elaborately discusses on the nature of sentence.

According to him, sentence is a group of words having mutual syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) etc. and which is conducive to give rise to a unified awareness of the connected meanings of the words:

"athavā yādṛśaśabdānāṃ yādṛśārthaviṣayakabodhaṃ pratyanukūlā parasparākāṅkṣā, tādṛśaśabdastoma eva tathāvidhārthe vākyam",
  —(2002, p.12).

Annambhaṭṭa also says that a word is that which have a semantic potential and a sentence is a group of such words:

"śaktaṃ padam. vākyaṃ padasamūhaḥ",
  —(Tarkasaṅgraha, 1971, p.151).

Thus it can be concluded that Naiyāyikas accept sentence as a group of words having syntactic expectancy, congruity and proximity.

According to them, the collective form is not different from its units or parts and therefore a sentence is not different from the articulated alphabets. But how the articulated alphabets can be perceived as a sentence is the problem to be solved.

Vātsyāyana, in his Nyāyabhāṣya, tries to explain how the sentence is not distinct from the phonemes.

vākyastheṣu khalu varṇeṣūccaratsu prativarṇam tāvat śravaṇaṃ bhavati. śrutaṃ varṇamekamanekaṃ vā padabhāvena pratisandhatte. pratisandhāya padaṃ vyavasyati. sambaddhāṃśca padārthān gṛhītvā vākyārthaṃ pratipadyate.
  —(Nyāyabhāṣya 3.2.59)

It is Jayantabhaṭṭa who discusses the matter elaborately in his Nyāyamañjarī. He says that initially, the cognition of the first phoneme is awakened and it is followed by its latent impression. Then the cognition of the second phoneme, followed by its latent impression takes place. In this manner, the latent impressions are awakened till the cognition of the last phoneme. In the end, when the last phoneme is heard, there occurs a single recollection comprehending all the phonemes and is the word. In the same way, there takes place the cognition of the first word followed by its latent impression and by the recollection of its significative relation to its meaning simultaneously. Thus the word-meaning is also cognised, followed by its latent impression. The same continues till the cognition of the last word. Thus due to the previous latent impressions, a recollection comprehending all the words is occurred and is the sentence. There happens another recollection based upon the latent impressions of all the word-meanings comprehending the meaning of the last word and is the sentence-meaning (6.2).

Similar view can be seen in Nyāyalīlāvatī also as:

"kiṃ tarhi prātipadikam? kramavadvarṇasaṃhatiriti brūmaḥ"
  —(Quoted by Tatacharya, 2005, p.115).

Naiyāyikas, in contradiction with grammarians, do not accept the eternity of śabda. They refute the theory of Sphoṭa and the theory of sentence indivisibility, formulated by grammarians. Gautama refutes the view of śabdanityatva saying that śabda is not eternal, as it has a beginning and an end:

"ādimatvāt-aindriyakatvāt kṛtakatvāt-upacārācca",
  —(Nyāya Sūtras 2.2.13).

As described, logicians accept sentence as an aggregate of phonemes.

According to them, word is the meaningful unit of language:

"śaktam padam",
  —(Tarkasaṅgraha, 1971, p.151).

They refute the theory of sphoṭa and the theory of indivisibility of sentence because they hold that a word or a sentence becomes the source of valid knowledge when it is uttered by a trustworthy person. Sphoṭa, being eternal, does not owe its existence to a trustworthy person (Punitha Sarma, 1998, p.80).