4.4b. Perception (pratyakṣa)

Perception (pratyakṣa) is the means of knowledge that is accepted by every school of philosophy in India. This is the first source of knowledge that we have to take into account here. It is knowledge obtained by the exercise of our sense organs, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. Each sense organ is suited to cognize or to catch mainly one kind of sense impression or sensation. The sense-objects are sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), color (rūpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha), grasped by the ear (śrotra), the skin (tvak), the eye (cakṣu) the tongue (rasanā), and the nose (gandha), respectively.

Svāminārāyaṇa explains the system of perception that how the indriyas get attached to their respective objects of pleasure by giving an example of a devotee. He elaborates: ā “For a bhakta (devotee) of Parabrahman, listening to the spiritual discourses of Parabrahman is the only subject (goal to connect) for his ears; touching the holy feet of Parabrahman or touching the holy dust from the feet of the Sādhu is the only subject for his skin; doing darśana of Parabrahman or the Sādhu is the only subject for his eyes; taking the prasāda of Parabrahman and singing His praises are the only subject for his tongue; and smelling the flowers and other objects which have been offered to Parabrahman is the only subject for his nose.” (Vacanāmṛta Gadhadā I/32, p.83)

Svāminārāyaṇa explicitly explains that each of the five gnan-indriya and the five karma indriya have total knowledge of their respective subject. Furthermore, both an enlightened person and an unenlightened person behave in the same manner through their indriyas; the indriyas of the enlightened do not behave in a different manner from those of the unenlightened. It means that they connect first to the objects and provide knowledge to the jivas.^[1] Thus, Svāminārāyaṇa speaks of perception as the first pramāṇa. However, he explains it into his unique style in the Vacanāmṛta. For example, according to Svāminārāyaṇa, only when one sees with one’s eyes does one come to know that milk is white; only when one smells with one’s nose does one come to know its smell; only when one touches it with one’s finger does one come to know whether it is hot or cold; only when one tastes it with one’s tongue does one come to know its taste. In this manner, only when milk is tested through all of the senses can one totally know its nature; it cannot be totally known through one sense alone ultimately to have such knowledge is called total jnāna.^[2]

The Bhāṣyakāra explores perception by explaining the instruments of it:

ātmā'ntaḥkaraṇā''ḍhyaṃ syāt pramāṇaṃ cakṣurādikam |
viṣayagrāhakāṇi syurindriyāṇi svavṛttibhiḥ ||121

“In perception, the means are as follows; the internal sense organs, external sense organs, and Ātman. They are all receivers of sense objects through their vṛtti (flow).”

He goes further that perceptual knowledge could be external or internal. When the sense organs like eyes, ears, nose, skin, and tongue come in contact with external objects of the world. We have external perceptual knowledge. When the self perceives the ideas and emotions arising in the mind, it is internal perception. The Svāminārāyaṇa Vedanta explains this point with an apt example. Suppose milk be sense perceptions; what happens? With my eyes, I see its white color; and through the nose, I perceive it as having pleasant smell typical to it; and though touch skin I perceive it as a liquid that is hot or cold; and when I perceive it with my tongue I experience its taste.

The example chosen here points out that:

1. Every ātman possesses knowledge, no absolute zero knowledge remains in the ātman.^[3]

2. Every perception apprehends things along with its qualities and determination;

3. In order to have valid pratyakṣa knowledge, one should attempt to apprehend reality with the help of as many sense organs (coordinately) as possible and necessary, because it helps in avoiding incompletes and error in perceptual judgment; and

4. The knowledge acquired through coordination of as many senses (including mind) and pramāṇa (means of knowledge) is subject to lead to perfectness.

Because the knowledge of reality turns out to be yathārtha (as it actually is), and it leads to pravṛtti sāmarthya, i.e., having practical utility leading to successful activity or workability. In other words, the valid knowledge corresponds with reality and is conducive to life or is in consonance with experience.

Thus, knowledge and action are mutually complementary and confirmatory. In short, the concept of ‘pramāṇa samplava or coordination of instruments of knowing is involved in a knowledge situation (jñāna prakriyā). We now discuss the errors of acquiring complete knowledge. To shed light on it, Svāminārāyaṇa also offers a contrasting example in the Vacanāmṛta. First, we analyze the example of the Vacanāmṛta: if a person enters a dark chamber where there are pillars and koṭhīs (large earthen pitchers for storing grains), etc. he perceives and knows them only through his sense of touch. Based on this experience, he forsakes a hypothesis. But this is not complete knowledge because, in the absence of light, he has failed to perceive other qualities and characteristics and allied details relating to the objects. Therefore, the knowledge in such cases either remains incomplete or may involve errors of misapprehension due to non-apprehension; and hence, the knowledge is not yathārtha.^[4]

Here, the Vacanāmṛta emphasizes complete and perfect knowledge. The example cited here by Svāminārāyaṇa is intended to state that such knowledge is to be treated as incomplete and inadequate, as it lacks the important criterion of yathārtha. Svāminārāyaṇa further says that mere apprehension, in perception, say of a tail, or a face, or a hoof or udders alone of a cow is no doubt the knowledge of a cow, but not complete, adequate and authentic knowledge.^[5] Therefore, in order to be valid, the knowledge must be ‘yathārtha’. Svāminārāyaṇa accepts here the pratyakṣa pramāṇa as described above.^[6] Moreover, the pratyakṣa of the Svāminārāyaṇa Vedanta can give the knowledge of Parabrahman or Akṣarabrahman because according to Him the Supreme Reality is always present on the earth in human form, either He Himself incarnates or He comes as the Parabrahman-realized Sādhu. When an aspirant, with the help of scriptures, knows him to be so, then he becomes a true devotee. Thus, the manifest form of Parabrahman always remains in front of our eyes.^[7] Parabrahman then divinizes his cognitive and conative senses. So, a devotee gets correct knowledge of Parabrahman, himself, and the world. Such transcendental knowledge of Parabrahman is available to all selves, both embodied and disembodied. No release can be attained without the transcendental knowledge of Parabrahman, which is beyond the comprehension of finite human apparatuses like the senses, mind, intellect, etc. Hence, there has to be room for the acquisition of such knowledge, if not by self-effort, then at least through Parabrahman’s grace. That alone will make the supreme goal accomplishable and the spiritual endeavor meaningful.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Vacanāmṛta Vartāl 17

[2]:

Vacanāmṛta Vartāl 2

[3]:

SSS p.148

[4]:

Vacanamrut Loyā 7

[5]:

Vacanamrut Loyā 15

[6]:

Vacanāmṛta Vartāl 19

[7]:

Bhagavad-Gītā 4/34, pp. 109-110