2.2. Perception according to Vātsyāyana

[Full title: 2. The Prācina-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to Vātsyāyana]

Vātsyāyana is the first and main commentator of Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra. He interprets the definition of perception and explains the entire process of perceptual knowledge.

According to him,

“the self comes in contact with the mind, the mind with the senseorgan, and the sense-organ with the objects of the world and thereafter the perceptual cognition arises.”^[1]

It is a clear explanation of the epistemological process of a perceptual knowledge. Knowing is an activity and it begins from the initiative taken by the soul. When it begins its initiative, the first result is with the internal sense-organ known as manas (mind); after the self is associated with the mind another effect is seen and that is the contact of the mind with the senses. After that, the senses communicate with the objects of the world and thereafter a perceptual process which is purely indeterminate starts. It is followed by a verbalizable perceptual cognition i.e. determinate.

It is believed that the self and the mind, the external senses are substances while the objects of the world are not purely substance it may be a quality or an action or any other positive or negative thing too. When there are two substances there arises a contact. But when there is a quality and a substance, an action and a substance, a universal and a substance, a whole and its parts, a distinguishing feature and a permanent substance this relationship is known as samavāya i.e. inherence in Nyāya system. This is the reason why there is contact between the self and the internal sense organs i.e. mind, between mind and the external sense-organs and between an external sense-organ and the objects of world which are made of substance.

From the Gautama’s definition of perception, Vātsyāyana examines the phrase Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam and describes the cause of perception in detail. According to him in every perceptual process the self associates with the mind, the mind with the sense and the sense with the object. He makes it clear that only sense-object contact is not the cause of perception but the self-mind contact and the mind-sense contact are also its causes. Vātsyāyana, however, does not feel any mistake of the author of Nyāyasūtra for providing only one reason of perception. He rather praises him for mentioning the concept of sense object contact is common to perception and other sources while the mind sense contact and sense-object contact are particular characteristics of perception.^[2]

He further mentions the cognition of pleasure or pain by the self is the case of perception. The mind according to him is a sense-organ, although it is different from other sense organs, i.e. it is non-material and without any qualities and works on all object without being confined to specific ones.^[3] In brief, according to Vātsyāyana, the sense-object contact is an essential condition for all types of perception which includes the cognition of pleasure or pain by the self.

In the Nyāyabhāṣya, Vātsyāyana states that Indriyārthasannikarṣa is the specific cause (karaṇa) of perception. And the sensible things i.e. quality (guṇa), action (kriyā), universal (jāti) etc. do not have any connection of contact (saṃyoga) with the senses. Thus, Gautama in his work has used the term sannikarṣa (in place of the word saṃyoga) by which the other connection including saṃyoga are to be understood.^[4]

This sense-object-contact is of six types:

1. Saṃyoga

According to Nyāya, the senses come in direct contact with the things; these things are substances or finite things. The sense-object-contact is known as saṃyoga or conjunction. It happens between two separated substances i.e. sense and objects. For instance, in perception of a thing like a pot or a cloth, one may perceive either by visual or by tactual sense-organs. In both types of perception the sense organs i.e. visual or tactual comes in direct conjunction (saṃyoga) with the thing which is the operative relation.^[5]

2. Saṃyukta-Samavāya

The perception of a quality (guṇa) or an action is due to its inherence in a substance which is in union with a sense-organ is known as saṃyukta-samavāya. It happens between the sense-organ and the sensible qualities of the object. According to Viśvanātha “the sense comes in contact with movement through their conjunction with the things in which it inheres.”^[6] For instance: when one perceives a table one cannot have direct perception of the colour of it. The connection between the sense and the colour is not directly apprehended by the senses. Thus the relation between the sense and quality is known as “inherence in the conjoined” (saṃyukta samavāya).

3. Saṃyukta-Samaveta-Samavāya

When the sense-object contact is mediated by two intermediary terms it becomes more indirect. For instance: when one perceives the yellowness of a table, the universal colourness is already there in the table (substance) which is conjoined with the eye. Hence, perception of yellowness by the eye includes two successive inherences and one conjunction. So, it is known as saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya.^[7]

4. Samavāya

When the sense-object contact is indirect it is known as inherence (samavāya).

Samavāya is illustrated in the perception of sound by ear. “It is completely distinct from Saṃyukta-Samavāya in the sense that sound being a part of ether enclosed within the ear, there is no need of its conjunction with any other substance.”^[8] The colour of a table is already exist in the pot and the eye perceives it when it is united with the table, whereas the sound is already exist in the organ that grasp it.

5. Samaveta-Samavāya

In this kind of sense-object contact the sense is in contact with its object by the medium of an intermediary term which is connected to both. For example, in the auditory perception of soundness the sense-organ (ear) is in contact with the object “soundness” because it inheres in sound which, on its part, inheres as a quality in the ear. The relation between “soundness” and ear is called samaveta-samavāya.

6. Viśeṣana-Viśeṣyabhāva

It is illustrated as the perception of negation. According to Nyāya School, the absence of an object is also an object of perception. For example: when one perceives the absence of a table in the room there is a contact of the eye with the room and by this medium the eye comes in contact with the absence of table as a qualification of theorem. According to Naiyāyikas, samavāya is also known with the help of this kind of sense-object contact.

In order to adjust absence in perception, the Naiyāyikas accept this sixth type of senseobject contact. As per this view, non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) and presumption (arthāpatti) are not different pramāṇas but they are included in perception and inference. So, the Naiyāyikas have to accept the sixth type of “sense object contact”, where it is mentioned that it is possible for absence to come in contact with the senseorgan.

Here it may be considered the objective of the addition of the word avyapadeśyam which means “non-expressible” through words. For Vātsyāyana, every single manifestation of knowledge of a thing is expressed by words like colour, taste etc. The knowledge which is expressed in terms of words would be taken as generated from verbal testimony. In order to avoid this possibility the word avyapadeśyam has been added in the definition. Further, it has been mentioned by him that the name of the perceived thing is necessary when this knowledge is being transmitted to others. The main objective of the use of the term is to make it clear that the knowledge generated from the sense-object-contact can never be regarded as verbal comprehension.^[9]

Further, he signifies the insertion of the word avyabhicāri in the Gautama’s definition of perception. In mirage when one gets the knowledge of water which is associated with rays of sun in summer, the knowledge of water would come under the process of perception as it is arised out of the sense-object-contact. The term avyabhicāri implies that this kind of knowledge would not be regarded as a perceptual one. The knowledge that produced out of perception would always be non-deviated (avyabhicāri) and thus it is always the right knowledge of a thing. When an object is known as such, it is known as non-deviated knowledge and an object known otherwise is known as deviated knowledge (vyabhicāri).

He then mentions the purpose of inserting the term vyavasāyātmaka. According to him, one may uncertain about the nature of a thing perceived at a distance. For instance: “whether it is smoke or dust”. This kind of questionable knowledge would be considered as a perceptual knowledge as it is arised from the sense-object contact. To exclude such kind of knowledge from perception, the word vyavasāyātmaka has been added to the definition. The cognition that arised from the sense-object contact becomes undoubtful in character is called perception.^[10]

One may be argued that uncertain cognition is generated from the contact of the soul with mind and not by sense-object contact. So, it is not necessary to include the term vyavasāyātmaka in the definition.

Naiyāyikas reply to this argument that one has an uncertain cognition when one perceives a thing with the help of eye. But it is seen that in perception our sense-organ is operative. And the uncertain knowledge would be inserted in perception on the basis of having the feature “sense-object-contact”. To exclude such kind of knowledge from the area of perception the term vyavasāyātmaka has been added in the definition.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

ātmā manasā saṃyujyate, mana indiyeṇa, indriyamarthena, tataḥ pratyakṣam. Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya On Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.4.

[2]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p. 69.

[3]:

Indriyasya bai sato manasa indriyebhyaḥ pṛthagupadeśo dharma bhedāt.

[4]:

NP., P.138.

[5]:

J.N. Sinha, op.cit., p.76.

[6]:

Y.V. Athalye & M.R. Bodas, Tarkasaṃgraha, p.221.

[7]:

gatarūpapratyakṣajanane saṃyukta-samavāyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ. Bhāṣāpariccheda , pp.54-56

[8]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p.112.

[9]:

tatredamindriyārthasannikarṣādutpannamarthajñānam “rūpam”iti vā “rasa” ityevaṃ vā bhavati, rūparasaśabdāśca viṣayanāmadheyaṃ, tena vyapadiśyate jñānaṃ “rūpamiti janīte” “rasa iti jānīte”, nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānaṃ sacchābdaṃ prasajyate, ata āha avyapadeśyamiti. Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.4.

[10]:

dūrāccakṣuṣā hyamarthaṃ paśyannāvadhyārayati dhūma iti vā reṇuriti vā, tadetadindriyārthasannikarṣotpannamanavadhāraṇaajñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prasajyata ityata āha vyavasāyātmakamiti. Ibid. 1.1.4.