A. Understanding (paññā)

1. [436] Now, concentration was described under the heading of consciousness in the stanza:

When a wise man, established well in virtue,
Develops consciousness and understanding (I.1).

And that has been developed in all its aspects by the bhikkhu who is thus possessed of the more advanced development of concentration that has acquired with direct-knowledge the benefits [described in Chs. XII and XIII]. But understanding comes next and that has still to be developed. Now, that is not easy, firstly even to know about, let alone to develop, when it is taught very briefly. In order, therefore, to deal with the detailed method of its development there is the following set of questions:

1. What is understanding?
2. In what sense is it understanding?
3. What are its characteristic, function, manifestation, and proximate cause?
4. How many kinds of understanding are there?
5. How is it developed?
6. What are the benefits of developing understanding?

2. Here are the answers:

(i) WHAT IS UNDERSTANDING? Understanding (paññā) is of many sorts and has various aspects. An answer that attempted to explain it all would accomplish neither its intention nor its purpose, and would, besides, lead to distraction; so we shall confine ourselves to the kind intended here, which is understanding consisting in insight knowledge associated with profitable consciousness.

3. (ii) IN WHAT SENSE IS IT UNDERSTANDING? It is understanding (paññā) in the sense of act of understanding (pajānana).^[1] What is this act of understanding? It is knowing (jānana) in a particular mode separate from the modes of perceiving (sañjānana) and cognizing (vijānana). [437] For though the state of knowing (jānana-bhāva) is equally present in perception (saññā), in consciousness (viññāṇa), and in understanding (paññā), nevertheless perception is only the mere perceiving of an object as, say, blue or yellow; it cannot bring about the penetration of its characteristics as impermanent, painful, and not-self. Consciousness knows the objects as blue or yellow, and it brings about the penetration of its characteristics, but it cannot bring about, by endeavouring, the manifestation of the [supramundane] path. Understanding knows the object in the way already stated, it brings about the penetration of the characteristics, and it brings about, by endeavouring, the manifestation of the path.

4. Suppose there were three people, a child without discretion, a villager, and a money-changer, who saw a heap of coins lying on a money-changer’s counter. The child without discretion knows merely that the coins are figured and ornamented, long, square or round; he does not know that they are reckoned as valuable for human use and enjoyment. And the villager knows that they are figured and ornamented, etc., and that they are reckoned as valuable for human use and enjoyment; but he does not know such distinctions as, “This one is genuine, this is false, this is half-value.” The money-changer knows all those kinds, and he does so by looking at the coin, and by listening to the sound of it when struck, and by smelling its smell, tasting its taste, and weighing it in his hand, and he knows that it was made in a certain village or town or city or on a certain mountain or by a certain master. And this may be understood as an illustration.

5. Perception is like the child without discretion seeing the coin, because it apprehends the mere mode of appearance of the object as blue and so on. Consciousness is like the villager seeing the coin, because it apprehends the mode of the object as blue, etc., and because it extends further, reaching the penetration of its characteristics. Understanding is like the money-changer seeing the coin, because, after apprehending the mode of the object as blue, etc., and extending to the penetration of the characteristics, it extends still further, reaching the manifestation of the path.

That is why this act of understanding should be understood as “knowing in a particular mode separate from the modes of perceiving and cognizing.” For that is what the words “it is understanding in the sense of act of understanding” refer to.

6. However, it is not always to be found where perception and consciousness are.² [438] But when it is, it is not disconnected from those states. And because it cannot be taken as disconnected thus: “This is perception, this is consciousness, this is understanding,” its difference is consequently subtle and hard to see. Hence the venerable Nāgasena said: “A difficult thing, O King, has been done by the Blessed One.”—“What, venerable Nāgasena, is the difficult thing that has been done by the Blessed One?”—“The difficult thing, O King, done by the Blessed One was the defining of the immaterial states of consciousness and its concomitants, which^[2] occur with a single object, and which he declared thus: ‘This is contact, this is feeling, this is perception, this is volition, this is consciousness’” (Mil 87).

7. (iii) WHAT ARE ITS CHARACTERISTIC, FUNCTION, MANIFESTATION AND PROXIMATE CAUSE? Understanding has the characteristic of penetrating the individual essences of states.^[3] Its function is to abolish the darkness of delusion, which conceals the individual essences of states. It is manifested as non-delusion. Because of the words, “One who is concentrated knows and sees correctly” (A V 3), its proximate cause is concentration.

8. (iv) HOW MANY KINDS OF UNDERSTANDING ARE THERE?

1. Firstly, as having the characteristic of penetrating the individual essences of states, it is of one kind.
2. As mundane and supramundane it is of two kinds.
3. Likewise as subject to cankers and free from cankers, and so on,
4. As the defining of mentality and of materiality,
5. As accompanied by joy or by equanimity,
6. As the planes of seeing and of development.
7. It is of three kinds as consisting in what is reasoned, consisting in what is learnt (heard), and consisting in development.
8. Likewise as having a limited, exalted, or measureless object,
9. As skill in improvement, detriment, and means,
10. As interpreting the internal, and so on.
11. It is of four kinds as knowledge of the four truths,
12. And as the four discriminations.^[4]

9. 1. Herein, the singlefold section is obvious in meaning.

2. As regards the twofold section, the mundane is that associated with the mundane path and the supramundane is that associated with the supramundane path. So it is of two kinds as mundane and supramundane.

10. 3. In the second dyad, that subject to cankers is that which is the object of cankers. That free from cankers is not their object. This dyad is the same in meaning as the mundane and supramundane. The same method applies to the dyads subject to cankers and free from cankers, associated with cankers and dissociated from cankers (Dhs 3), and so on. So it is of two kinds as subject to cankers and free from cankers, and so on.

11. 4. In the third dyad, when a man wants to begin insight, his understanding of the defining of the four immaterial aggregates is understanding as defining of mentality, [439] and his understanding of the defining of the material aggregate is understanding as defining of materiality. So it is of two kinds as the defining of mentality and of materiality.

12. 5. In the fourth dyad, understanding belonging to two of the kinds of sense-sphere profitable consciousness, and belonging to sixteen^[5] of the kinds of path consciousness with four of the jhānas in the fivefold method, is accompanied by joy. Understanding belonging to two of the kinds of sense-sphere profitable consciousness, and belonging to (the remaining) four kinds of path consciousness with the fifth jhānas is accompanied by equanimity. So it is of two kinds as accompanied by joy or by equanimity.

13. 6. In the fifth dyad, understanding belonging to the first path is the plane of seeing. Understanding belonging to the remaining three paths is the plane of development (see XXII.127). So it is of two kinds as the planes of seeing and of development.

14. 7. As regards the triads, understanding acquired without hearing from another is that consisting in what is reasoned because it is produced by one’s own reasoning. Understanding acquired by hearing from another is that consisting in what is heard, because it is produced by hearing. Understanding that has reached absorption, having been somehow produced by (meditative) development, is that consisting in development. And this is said: Herein, what is understanding consisting in what is reasoned? In the spheres of work invented by ingenuity, or in the spheres of craft invented by ingenuity, or in the sorts of science invented by ingenuity, any preference, view, choice, opinion, judgment, liking for pondering over things, that concerns ownership of deeds (kamma) or is in conformity with truth or is of such kind as to conform with (the axioms) ‘Materiality is impermanent’ or ‘Feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is impermanent’ that one acquires without hearing it from another—that is called understanding consisting in what is reasoned.

(In the spheres) that one acquires by hearing it from another—that is called understanding consisting in what is learnt (heard).

And all understanding in anyone who has attained (an attainment) is understanding consisting in development (Vibh 324–25).

So it is of three kinds as consisting in what is thought out, in what is heard, and in development.

15. 8. In the second triad, the understanding that occurs contingent upon sense-sphere states has a limited object. That which occurs contingent upon fine-material-sphere states or immaterial-sphere states has an exalted object. That is mundane insight. That which occurs contingent upon Nibbāna has a measureless object. That is supramundane insight. So it is of three kinds as having a limited, an exalted, or a measureless object.

16. 9. In the third triad, it is increase that is called improvement. That is twofold as the elimination of harm and the arousing of good. Skill in improvement is skill in these, according as it is said: Herein, what is skill in improvement? When a man brings these things to mind both unarisen unprofitable things do not arise and arisen unprofitable things are abandoned in him; or when he brings these things to mind [440] both unarisen profitable things arise and arisen profitable things advance to growth, increase, development, and perfection in him. Whatever here is understanding, act of understanding [for words elided see Dhs 16] non-delusion, investigation of states, right view, is called skill in improvement (Vibh 325–26).

17. Non-increase is what is called detriment. That also is twofold as the diminution of good and the arousing of harm. Skill in detriment is skill in these, according as it is said: “Herein, what is skill in detriment? When a man brings these things to mind, both unarisen profitable things do not arise …” (Vibh 326), and so on.

18. But in either of these cases any skill in means to cause the production of such and such things, which skill occurs at that moment and is aroused on that occasion, is what is called skill in means, according as it is said: “And all understanding of means thereto is skill in means” (Vibh 326).

So it is of three kinds as skill in improvement, in detriment, and in means.

19. 10. In the fourth triad, insight-understanding initiated by apprehending one’s own aggregates is interpreting the internal.^[6] That initiated by apprehending another’s aggregates or external materiality not bound up with the faculties, [that is, inanimate matter], is interpreting the external. That initiated by apprehending both is interpreting the internal and external. So it is of three kinds as interpreting the internal, and so on.

20. 11. As regards the tetrads, in the first tetrad, knowledge that occurs contingent upon the truth of suffering is knowledge of suffering;knowledge that occurs contingent upon the origin of suffering is knowledge of the origin of suffering; knowledge that occurs contingent upon the cessation of suffering is knowledge of the cessation of suffering; and knowledge that occurs contingent upon the way leading to the cessation of suffering is knowledge of the way leading to the cessation of suffering. So it is of four kinds as knowledge of the four truths.

21. 12. In the second tetrad, the four kinds of knowledge classed as that concerned with meaning, etc., are called the four discriminations. For this is said: “Knowledge about meaning is the discrimination of meaning (atthapaṭisambhidā). Knowledge about law is the discrimination of law (dhammapaṭisambhidā). Knowledge about enunciation of language dealing with meaning and law is the discrimination of language (nirutti-paṭisambhidā). Knowledge about kinds of knowledge is discrimination of perspicuity (paṭibhānapaṭisambhidā)” (Vibh 293).

22. Herein, meaning (attha) is briefly a term for the fruit of a cause (hetu). For in accordance with the cause it is served^[7] arrived at, reached, therefore it is called “meaning” (or “purpose”). But in particular the five things, namely, (i) anything conditionally produced, [441] (ii) Nibbāna, (iii) the meaning of what is spoken, (iv) (kamma-) result, and (v) functional (consciousness), should be understood as meaning. When anyone reviews that meaning, any knowledge of his, falling within the category (pabheda) concerned with meaning, is the discrimination of meaning.

23. Law (dhamma) is briefly a term for a condition (paccaya). For since a condition necessitates (dahati) whatever it may be, makes it occur or allows it to happen, it is therefore called “law” (dhamma). But in particular the five things, namely, (i) any cause that produces fruit, (ii) the noble path, (iii) what is spoken, (iv) what is profitable, and (v) what is unprofitable, should be understood as law. When anyone reviews that law, any knowledge of his, falling within the category concerned with law, is the discrimination of law.

24. This same meaning is shown in the Abhidhamma by the following analysis:

(a) “Knowledge about suffering is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the origin of suffering is the discrimination of law. [Knowledge about the cessation of suffering is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the way leading to the cessation of suffering is the discrimination of law] …

(b) “Knowledge about cause is the discrimination of law. Knowledge about the fruit of a cause is the discrimination of meaning …

(c) “Knowledge about whatever things are born, become, brought to birth,produced, completed, made manifest, is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the things from which those things were born, became, were brought to birth, produced, completed, made manifest, is the discrimination of law …

(d) “Knowledge about ageing and death is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the origin of ageing and death is the discrimination of law. [Knowledge about the cessation of ageing and death is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the way leading to the cessation of ageing and death is the discrimination of law. Knowledge about birth … becoming … clinging … craving … feeling … contact … the sixfold base … mentalitymateriality … consciousness … knowledge about formations is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the origin of formations is the discrimination of law.] Knowledge about the cessation of formations is the discrimination of meaning. Knowledge about the way leading to the cessation of formations is the discrimination of law …

(e) “Here a bhikkhu knows the Dhamma (Law)—the Discourses, Songs,[Expositions, Stanzas, Exclamations, Sayings, Birth Stories, Marvels, and] Answers to Questions—this is called the discrimination of law. He knows the meaning of whatever is said thus: ‘This is the meaning of this that was said; this is the meaning of this that was said’—this is called the discrimination of meaning …

(f) “What states are profitable? On an occasion when profitableconsciousness of the sense sphere has arisen [that is accompanied by joy and associated with knowledge, having a visible datum as its object … or a mental datum as its object, or contingent upon whatever it may be, on that occasion there is contact … (for elision see Dhs §1) … there is non-wavering]—these things are profitable. Knowledge about these things is the discrimination of law. Knowledge about their result is the discrimination of meaning” … (Vibh 293–95).^[8]

25. Knowledge about enunciation of language dealing with meaning and law (§21): there is the language that is individual essence, the usage that has no exceptions,^[9] and deals with that meaning and that law. Any knowledge falling within the category concerned with the enunciation of that, with the speaking, with the utterance of that, concerned with the root-speech of all beings, the Magadhan language that is individual essence, in other words, the language of law (dhamma), [any knowledge that] as soon as it hears it spoken, pronounced, uttered, knows, “This is the individual-essence language; this is not the individualessence language”—[such knowledge] is discrimination of language.^[10] [442] One who has reached the discrimination of language knows, on hearing the words “phasso, vedanā,” etc., that that is the individual-essence language, and on hearing “phassā, vedano,” etc., he knows that that is not the individual-essence language.

26. Knowledge about kinds of knowledge (§21): when a man is reviewing and makes any of the foregoing kinds of knowledge the object [of his knowledge], then any knowledge in him that has knowledge as its object is discrimination of perspicuity, and so is any knowledge about these aforesaid kinds of knowledge, which is concerned with details of their individual domains, functions, and so on.

27. And these four kinds of discrimination can be placed in two categories: the plane of the trainer and the plane of the non-trainer. Herein, those of the chief disciples and great disciples come into the category of the non-trainer’s plane. Those of the Elder Ānanda, the householder Citta, the layman Dhammika, the householder Upāli, the laywoman Khujjuttarā, etc., come into the category of the trainer’s plane.

28. And though they come into the categories of the two planes thus, they are nevertheless distinguishable in five aspects, that is to say, as achievement, mastery of scriptures, hearing, questioning, and prior effort. Herein, achievement is the reaching of Arahantship. Mastery of scriptures is mastery of the Buddha’s word. Hearing is learning the Dhamma carefully and attentively. Questioning is discussion of knotty passages and explanatory passages in the texts, commentaries, and so on. Prior effort is devotion to insight in the dispensation of former Buddhas, up to the vicinity of [the stages of] conformity and change-oflineage by one who has practiced [the duty of] going [with the meditation subject on alms round] and coming back [with it].^[11]

29. Others have said:

A prior effort, and great knowledge,
[Knowledge of] dialects, of scriptures,
And questioning, and then achievement,
And likewise waiting on a teacher,
Success in friends—these are conditions
Productive of discriminations.

30. Herein, prior effort is the same as that already stated. Great learning is skill in some science or sphere of craft. Dialects means skill in the hundred-and-one tongues, particularly in that of Magadha. Scriptures means mastery of the Buddha’s word, even if only of the Chapter of Similes.^[12] Questioning is questioning about defining the meaning of even a single stanza. Achievement is stream-entry … or Arahantship. Waiting on a teacher is living with very learned intelligent teachers. Success in friends is acquisition of friends such as that. [443]

31. Herein, Buddhas and Paccekabuddhas reach the discriminations through prior effort and through achievement. Disciples do so through all these means. And there is no special way of developing a meditation subject in order to attain discriminations. But in trainers the attaining of the discriminations comes about next upon the liberation consisting in trainers’ fruition, and in non-trainers it does so next upon the liberation consisting in non-trainers’ fruition. For the discriminations come to success in Noble Ones only through the noble fruition as the ten powers do in Perfect Ones.

So these were the discriminations referred to when it was said above: “It is of four kinds … as the four discriminations” (§8).

32. (v) HOW IS IT DEVELOPED? Now, the things classed as aggregates, bases, elements, faculties, truths, dependent origination, etc., are the soil of this understanding, and the [first] two purifications, namely, purification of virtue and purification of consciousness, are its roots, while the five purifications, namely, purification of view, purification by overcoming doubt, purification by knowledge and vision of what is the path and what is not the path, purification by knowledge and vision of the way, and purification by knowledge and vision, are the trunk. Consequently, one who is perfecting these should first fortify his knowledge by learning and questioning about those things that are the “soil” after he has perfected the two purifications that are the “roots,” then he can develop the five purifications that are the “trunk.” This is in brief. The detail is as follows.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Cf. Paṭis I 42, etc.;Abhidhamma definitions very commonly make use of the Pali forms of verbal nouns, here instanced by paññā (understanding = state of understanding) and pajānana (understanding = act of understanding), both from the verb pajānāti (he understands). English does not always, as in this case, distinguish between the two. Similarly, for example, from the verb socati (he sorrows) we find soka (sorrow, state of sorrowing) and socana (sorrowing, act of sorrowing), and here the English differentiates. Cf. parallel treatment of paññā at M-a II 343f.

[2]:

“In arisings of consciousness with two root-causes [i.e. with non-greed and nonhate but without non-delusion], or without root-cause, understanding does not occur” (Vism-mhṭ 432). “Just as pleasure is not invariably inseparable from happiness, so perception and consciousness are not invariably inseparable from understanding. But just as happiness is invariably inseparable from pleasure, so understanding is invariably inseparable from perception and consciousness” (Vism-mhṭ 432).

[3]:

“A phenomenon’s own essence (sako bhāvo) or existing essence (samāno vā bhāva) is its individual essence (sabhāva)” (Vism-mhṭ 433). Cf. Ch. VIII, note 68, where Vismmhṭ gives the definition from saha-bhāva (with essence).

[4]:

Paṭisambhidā is usually rendered by “analysis” (see e.g. Points of Controversy—Kathāvatthu translation—pp. 377ff). But the Tipiṭaka explanations of the four paṭisambhidā suggest no emphasis on analysis rather than synthesis. Vism-mhṭ gives the following definition of the term: “Knowledge that is classified (pabheda-gata = put into a division) under meaning (attha) as capable of effecting the explanation and definition of specific characteristics of the meaning class (meaning division) is called attha-paṭisambhidā;and so with the other three” (Vism-mhṭ 436). “Discrimination” has been chosen for paṭisambhidā because, while it has the sense of “division,” it does not imply an opposite process as “analysis” does. Also it may be questioned whether the four are well described as “entirely logical”: “entirely epistemological” might perhaps be both less rigid and nearer; for they seem to cover four interlocking fields, namely: meanings of statements and effects of causes (etc.), statements of meanings and causes of effects (etc.), language as restricted to etymological rules of verbal expression, and clarity (or perspicuous inspiration) in marshalling the other three.

[5]:

I.e. the four paths with the first jhāna and those with the second, third, and fourth, out of the five (Vism-mh 434).

[6]:

The word abhinivisati with its noun abhinivesa means literally “to dwell on,” and so “to adhere,” or “insist.” In the Tipiṭaka it always appears in a bad sense and always appears in contexts with wrong view and clinging (see e.g. M III 30–31, Nidd I 436, and also Vism-mhṭ quoted above at I. 140). However, in the Commentaries, the word appears also in a good sense as at XIV.130, XXI.73 and 83f., and at M-a I 250 (cf. saddhaṃ nivisati, M II 173). In this good sense it is synonymous with right interpretation of experience. All the bare experience of perception is interpreted by the mind either in the sense of permanence, pleasure, self, which is wrong because it is not confirmed by experience, or in the sense of impermanence, etc., which is right because it is confirmed by experience (see XIV. 130). There is no not interpreting experience, and it is a function of the mind that the interpretation adopted is “dwelt upon,” i.e. insisted upon. And so it is this insistence or interpretation in accordance with reality as confirmed by experience that is the abhinivesa of the Commentaries in the good sense. For these reasons the words interpretation, misinterpretation and insistence have been chosen here as renderings.

[7]:

Arīyati—“to honour, to serve.” Not in PED. Cf. ger. araṇīya (M-a I 21,173), also not in PED, explained by the Majjhima Nidāya ṭīkā as “to be honoured” (payirūpasitabba).

[8]:

This quotation has been filled out from the Vibhaṅga text for clarity.

[9]:

Byabhicāra (vyabhicāra): not in PED; normal grammarian’s term for an “exception.”

[10]:

The idea behind the term “individual-essence language” (sabhāvanirutti), that is to say, that there is a real name for each thing that is part of that thing’s individual essence, is dealt with at Dhs-a 391–92. Magadhan as “the root speech of all beings” and the “individual-essence language” is dealt with in greater detail at Vibh-a 387.

[11]:

The expression garapaccāgatikabhāva refers to the practice of “carrying the meditation subject to and from the alms round,” which is described at M-a I 257 in detail. The same expression is also used of a certain kind of refuse-rag (see II. 17).

[12]:

“The ‘Chapter of Similes’ is the Chapter of Twin Verses in the Dhammapada (Dhp 1–20), they say. Others say that it is the Book of Pairs in the First Fifty (MN 31–40)” (Vism-mhṭ 436).