The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system

by Babu C. D | 2018 | 44,340 words

This thesis is called: The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system. It tries to establish the validity of Anumana through citing its application either consciously or unconsciously in every sphere of human life. Anumana in Nyaya system is the knowledge of any object not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a liṅga or sign ...

Chapter 4.2.1 - The Prakaranas (a): Nyayasara by Bhasarvajna

Bhasarvajna is a Brahmanic writer who is believed to have lived in the tenth century. He made an effort to reconstruct Brahmanic logic on the plan of Buddhist Logic and attempted to reduce the sixteen categories into one. He is known for his outstanding work titled, ‘Nyayasara.’ He has also written a commentary titled, ‘Nyayabhushana’ on his own work. His work titled Nyayasara meaning ‘the Essence of logic’ is a logical treatise. Over there, he defines pramana as the means of right knowledge free from doubt and error. According to him pramanas are of three types, viz., perception (pratyaksha) inference (anumana), and verbal testimony (shabda). For him the word agama is synonym to shabda.

He defines Anumana (Inference) as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the sense through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within their range. For instance, “the hill is fiery because it is smoky.” It is evident in the example that there is an inevitable connection between fire and smoke. This inevitable and indispensable relation is called as pervasion or invariable concomitance i.e. vyapti. It is of two kinds i.e., affirmative (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka). The former is the accompaniment of the middle term by the major term in all cases as in ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire’. The latter is the accompaniment of the absence of the major term by the absence of the middle term in all the cases as in ‘wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke’.

According to Bhasarvanjna there are two kinds of Inference, viz. inference for one’s self (svarthanumana) and inference for the sake of others (pararthanumana). As in Nyaya system, he proposes a five membered syllogism viz., a proposition, a reason, an application, an example and a conclusion. A proposition is the statement of the subject (minor term) of which something is desired to be established as for instance sound is noneternal. A reason is the statement of the mark which enables us to establish something. It is of three kinds: Kevalanvayi (exclusively affirmative), Kevala vyatireki (exclusively negative) and anvaya vyatireki (affirmative negative).The exhibition about invariable concomitance of reason and predicate is known as udhaharana, for e.g., a kitchen. The pakshavrttitva of invariable concomitant reason is known as upanaya as ‘the hill is smoky which is invariably accompanied by fire. The nigamana is a sentence which states the conclusion of inference. For instance, the hill has fire.

The essential nature of syllogism (paksha-dharmarta) refers to the character of the pervation of the middle term by the major term.

For example:

The hill is fiery
Because it is smoky
Like a kitchen

Hill is the subject (minor term) here, on which the fire has to be proved; kitchen is a homologue where fire is known with certainty to abide; and lake is a hetrologue where fire does not abide.

While homologue (sapaksha) is that in which the quality of the major term is known with certainty to abide, heterologue (vipaksha) is that in which it is known with certainty that the quality of the major term does not abide.[1]

He defines fallacy as that which possesses the appearance of a reason but not its essential characters. According to him the Hetvabhasas include: asiddha (unproved) the reason whose existence in the minor term has not been known with certainty; virudha (contradictory) the reason which abides in the minor term as well as in the opposite of it; anaikantika (uncertain) the reason which abides in the minor terms its homologues and heterologues; anadhyavasita (Non-tried or non-conclusive) that reason which abides in the minor term alone without a definite connection with the major term; and kalatyayapadista or badhita (Mistimed or incompatible reason) that reason which abides in the minor term as opposed by evidences.

The important commentaries on Nyayasara are: Nyayabhusana by Bhasarvajna, Nyayakalika by Jayanta, mentioned by Gunaratna in the Saddarsana Samuccaya Vritti. Nyayasaratika by Vijaya Simha Gani, Nyayasaratika by Jayatirtha, Nyayasarapada-panjika by Vasudeva, Nyayasaravicara by Bhatta Raghava, Nyayatatparyadipika by Jayasimha Suri.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

History of Indian Logic, 362.

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