Chapterization

The thesis consists of five chapters, excluding the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter deals with some basic epistemological aspects of Indian philosophy. Indian epistemology deals with four important terms i.e. pramā, pramāṇa, prameya and pramātā. This chapter begins with the understanding and analysis of the concept of knowledge. Knowledge is an important concept in all schools of Indian philosophy but their views are different. It also discusses the nature and the number of pramāṇas accepted by different schools of philosophy. In Indian philosophy, all schools whether it is Buddhism or non-Buddhism aim at searching truth in their own independent way. Pramāṇa-shāstra has played an important role in all the systems. Without evidence or proof nothing can be given and accepted. Pramāṇa basically means the ability to produce valid knowledge (pramā). All pramāṇas have different way of expressing knowledge. The philosophers of Buddhism provide different definition of pramāṇa.

The two realistic schools of Theravāda, the Sautrāntika, and the Vaibhāṣika state that the means of knowledge is that which provides us the true knowledge of things. Here, the true knowledge means the sameness of content amongst the cognition and the object. On the other hand, the idealistic school of Buddhism, the Vijñānavāda and also known as Yogācāra states that consciousness is the ultimate principle of self-manifestation. For this School, consciousness is the instrument of knowledge. Except consciousness there is nothing in this world which is real, what is real is only consciousness. According to this school, pramā is that knowledge which is practically useful, and pramāṇa is that which takes us to achieve this knowledge. The Mādhyamika School does not accept any pramāṇa, pramā, pramāṇaphala and pramātā. The expounder of this school, Nāgārjuna rejects the existence of all things. So, there is no point of his admitting any pramāṇa. In Buddhist theory of knowledge, especially in Diṅnāga’s tradition, there is no difference between pramāṇa and its result (pramāṇaphala=pramā). The act of cognizing totally concurs with the cognition of an object. For Buddhist knowledge is self-evidencing. This is the reason why they do not make distinction between means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and its result (pramāṇaphala). For Buddhist pramāṇa is that through which one can know the object (Pramīyate artho aneneti).^[1] As opposed to Buddhist, Nyāya School takes pramāṇa as a means of knowledge (kārana) and pramāṇa is different from pramāṇaphala. According to Nyāya, pramāṇa is a process that leads us to pramā should be distinguished from the latter. For Nyāya School, pramā or valid knowledge is the resulted cognition (pramāṇaphala) while pramāṇa is the cause of pramā. The Naiyāyikas are the follower of the theory of parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda. For them, pramāṇa is the evidencing condition for the truth of knowledge and pramā (valid knowledge) is the evidenced knowledge (pramāyāḥ karaṇam iti pramāṇam).^[2]

Further, there are eight valid means of knowledge. The Buddhist adopts only two sources of knowledge, which they call perception and inference. They reduced verbal testimony and comparison into inference. The difference lying between the two sources (perception and inference) of valid knowledge is, in the Buddhist school, a radical one, a real one and a transcendental one. What is apprehended by senses is never subject to cognition by inference and vice versa. On the other hand, the Nyāya school accepts four sources of knowledge i.e. perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. The Nyāya and the Buddhist both accept perception as the primary source of knowledge however, their views are completely different.

The second chapter deals with the metaphysical as well as the epistemological foundation of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. These four schools are considered as important in Indian Buddhism.

The Vaibhāṣika admits the reality of external world; however they consider them to be momentary. According to this school, sensory awareness is regarded as an essential way to attain reliable knowledge. The Vaibhāṣika considers that at the time of cognition, consciousness is the subject or the cognizer. The cognizable objects are the sense-data of colour, sound, odour, taste and touch. This school divided knowledge into three types: the immediate sensory apprehension, the intellectual apprehension, and the mystical apprehension which transcends the realm of concept. The Vaibhāṣika believes that direct knowledge (perception) and inference are the means that provides us valid knowledge.

The Sautrāntika agrees with the Vaibhāṣika in maintaining that the objects of external world are momentary. Hence their existence is admitted, but they known with the help of particular inferences instead of direct perception. According to this school, during the contact of the sense-organ and the object, the object leaves behind an image (impression) which is produced in mind. In Sautrāntika School the object, the cognizer and the cognition are all different. The consciousness or cognizer cognizes merely the impression of object and object being momentary in nature does not exist in the next moment. This school maintains the representative theory of perception according to it all cognitions are active cognitions of the object.

This chapter also discusses various aspects of metaphysics and epistemology of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra School. The discussion on Mādhyamika epistemology is based on Nagārjuna’s works, like Mūla madhyamakakārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanī and Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, while Yogācāra epistemology is based on Daśabhūmikāsūtra, Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other works of Asaṅga, Maitreyanātha, Vasubandhu and Dharmapāla.

The Mādhyamika School is well-known for the theory of two truths, conventional (saṃvṛti-satya) and ultimate (paramārtha-satya). The conventional truth is known to be illusory because knowledge based on it is relative and contradictory. The means of knowledge associating with this truth are also considered as illusory. In relative truth, all sensual organs, their functions and their objects cannot be perceived directly. They are inferred from the existence of their product, viz., knowledge. According to Nāgārjuna, perception is the foundation of human knowledge, while emptiness or wisdom of detachment is the foundation of liberating knowledge. Liberation cannot be attained without grasping the ultimate truth and one cannot understand ultimate truth without depending on conventional truth.

The Yogācāra discusses four stages of the cognitive operation of the eight consciousnesses. The first is objectiveness (lakshanatvam), which takes place when there is contact between consciousness and an individual object. The second is perception (dṛshtṛtvam). The third is witness (svāsākshitvam) in which consciousness examines and proves itself whether the outcome of perception is correct. The fourth and last stage is establishing a case (sākshisvasākshitvam), in which consciousness analyzes the conclusion arrived at in the third stage. This school also classified knowledge into three forms on the basis of the nature (svabhāva) of existence, viz., parikalpitasvabhāva which is the nature of imagination, pratantrasvabhāva, it is the nature of dependence on other and pariniṣpannasvabhāva, it is the nature of ultimate reality.

The third chapter discusses Diṅnāga’s theory of perception. It starts with a comprehensive introduction of the life, date and work of Diṅnāga. Most of his original works have been lost but fortunately their Chinese and Tibetan versions are available. Of these works, Pramāṇasamuccaya is the excellent one. Its Sanskrit original work is lost, but its Tibetan translation is still available. The important chapters of the work have been translated into English by Hattori and R. Hayes, two leading thinkers of Diṅnāga philosophy. The main source materials used in this chapter are Diṅnāga’s famous epistemological works, like, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, Nyāyamukha, Yogāvatāra, etc.

This chapter focuses on the main topics of Diṅnāga’s theory of perception, which consists of objects of perception, kinds of perception, dual form of consciousness and so on. The analysis is made in the light of comparison to other works of Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, Jinendrabuddhi, Dharmottara, etc. Diṅnāga maintains that there are two types of objects corresponding to two similar kinds of cognition. The object of perception is the particular (sva-lakṣana) and the object of inference is the universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). The former is real, while the latter is conceptual construction.

Diṅnāga identifies four kinds of perception (sense-perception, mental sensation, selfcognition and yogic perception) and two types of inferences (inference for oneself and inference for the sake of others). Diṅnāga’s theory of apoha is an epistemological attempt to solve metaphysical problem.

Further, this chapter provides a survey in detail, of Dharmakīrti’s explanation of theory of perception. Diṅnāga maintains, the effect of a pramāṇa should include selfcognition. Dharmakīrti regards pramāṇa as non-deceptive cognition. Cognition is valid only if it is non-deceptive. Another important aspect of valid cognition is declared by Dharmakīrti, that it must shows some hitherto unknown part of reality and make us realize something that is first true and second new. A right cognition thus, must be aimed at not merely the real object but also the real nature of that object. It must add something new to our existing stock of knowledge and provide us new information. The other aspect of this chapter is the comparison of Diṅnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s views on the theory of perception.

The fourth chapter discusses the Nyāya system of theory of perception. It begins with a comprehensive introduction of Nyāya School. The Nyāya School has two broad divisions viz, Prācina-Nyāya and Navya-Nyāya. The founder of Nyāya School is sage Gotama. The other famous scholars of this system are Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Jayanta and so on. This system holds the position of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. They maintain that everything is padārtha (category). Knowledge is defined by Nyāya as apprehension or manifestation of the object. This system divided knowledge into two: valid and invalid knowledge. The valid knowledge must be identical with reality and it produces with four means of knowledge, viz, perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. On the other hand, invalid knowledge is produced by memory, doubt, error and hypothetical reasoning.

This chapter focuses on the main subjects of Nyāya’s theory of perception which consists of definition of perception given by different scholars of Nyāya, object of perception and kinds of perception and so on. According to Nyāya School, there are two stages of perception: indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa). The former is bare sensation of the object while the latter is when the object with its characterization. These two stages are associated with each other. One cannot separate it in order to know the object through perception. Nyāya recognizes two kinds of perception (ordinary and extra ordinary). The analysis of perception is made in the light of comparison to other works of Gaṅgeśa, Viśvanatha, Bhāsarvajña, Śivāditya, Keśava miśra and Annam Bhaṭṭa. The main source materials exploited in this chapter are Nyāya-Sūtra, Nyāya Kusumāñjali, Nyāya-mañjari, Tarkasaṃgraha etc.

The fifth chapter refers to the common ground and uncommon ground between Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti and Nyāya school. The method of exposition adopted in this chapter is comparative and critical. For Buddhist, perception is the both a form of valid knowledge (pramiti) and the means of acquiring such knowledge (pramāṇa) while the Nyāya system including other schools of Indian philosophy considered pramāṇa as methods or means of knowledge. Perception is the most primary and fundamental of all the means of knowledge identified in any system of philosophy. In the first place, perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge. However, it is not right to say that all knowledge arises from perception. The empiricists like the Cārvākas are wrong when they maintain that sense-perception is sufficient to explain the entire body of human knowledge. According to Nyāya, perception is not the only means of knowledge, but it is the foundation of the other means of knowledge. One of the main discussions of this chapter is comparison between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and Nyāya views on different aspects of perception.

The conclusion sums up issues presented in previous chapters. It also provides some suggestions providing the basis and scope for further discussions. Epistemology in Buddhism not only points out to the study of knowledge for its own sake, but also aims at bringing the knower an understanding of how living beings can identify the root causes of their own suffering, find the path to get rid of their problems and eventually achieve liberation.

Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti’s views on epistemology provide empirical data which have been analysed by various western thinkers. The difference between them is the motivation. In the case of Buddhist Epistemology, different aspects of knowledge are studied with the aim of removing the human fundamental confusion and providing path for attainment of right knowledge which is regarded as one of the most important factors in the process of spiritual cultivation.

Diṅnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s works was a path to create an epistemological turn which was part of a broader movement affecting the whole of Indian philosophy. These two thinkers have an important position in a vast movement of Indian scholars, who turned away from traditional metaphysical questions, such as the nature of world, self, and the way to attain liberation etc. Instead, they focused themselves, to the study of epistemology. Their concern was to validate philosophical and spiritual claims through argumentation and to motivate thinkers to elaborate theories about the sources and kinds of knowledge. Their contribution are significant not only for Buddhist thought but for the overall evolution of Indian philosophy. They emerge at the time when Indian philosophy turned toward logic and epistemology as a path to support existing theories. This situation indicates the reason why Buddhist tradition of logic and epistemology were so popular during that time.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

S.R. Bhatt & A. Mehrotra, Buddhist Epistemology, P. 13.

[2]:

Ibid.