Dependent Origination (ii): Formations

[Full title: B. Exposition of Dependent Origination (III): Detailed Exposition (ii): Formations]

60. Formations are the six mentioned in brief above thus, “the three, namely, formations of merit, etc., and the three, namely, the bodily formation, etc.” (§44); but in detail here the [first] three formations are twenty-nine volitions, that is to say, the formation of merit consisting of thirteen volitions, counting the eight sense-sphere profitable volitions that occur in giving, in virtue, etc., and the five fine-material profitable volitions that occur in development [of meditation]; then the formation of demerit consisting of the twelve unprofitable volitions that occur in killing living things, etc.; then the formation of the imperturbable consisting in the four profitable volitions associated with the immaterial sphere, which occur in development [of those meditations].

61. As regards the other three, the bodily formation is bodily volition, the verbal formation is verbal volition, and the mental formation is mental volition. This triad is mentioned in order to show that at the moment of the accumulation of the kamma the formations of merit, etc., occur in these [three] kamma doors. For the eight sense-sphere profitable and twelve unprofitable volitions, making twenty, are the bodily formation when they occur in the body door and produce bodily intimation. Those same volitions [531] are called the verbal formation when they occur in the speech door and produce verbal intimation. But volition connected with direct-knowledge is not included here in these two cases because it is not a condition for [resultant rebirth-linking] consciousness later. And like directknowledge volition, so also volition connected with agitation is not included; therefore that too should not be included as a condition for [rebirth-linking] consciousness. However, all these have ignorance as their condition. And all the twenty-nine volitions are the mental formation when they arise in the mind door without originating either kind of intimation. So this triad comes within the first triad, and accordingly, as far as the meaning is concerned, ignorance can be understood as condition simply for formations of merit and so on.

62. Herein, it might be [asked]: How can it be known that these formations have ignorance as their condition?—By the fact that they exist when ignorance exists. For when unknowing—in other words, ignorance—of suffering, etc., is unabandoned in a man, owing firstly to his unknowing about suffering and about the past, etc., then he believes the suffering of the round of rebirths to be pleasant and he embarks upon the three kinds of formations which are the cause of that very suffering. Owing to his unknowing about suffering’s origin he embarks upon formations that, being subordinated to craving, are actually the cause of suffering, imagining them to be the cause of pleasure. And owing to his unknowing about cessation and the path, he misperceives the cessation of suffering to be in some particular destiny [such as the Brahmā-world] that is not in fact cessation; he misperceives the path to cessation, believing it to consist in sacrifices, mortification for immortality, etc., which are not in fact the path to cessation; and so while aspiring to the cessation of suffering, he embarks upon the three kinds of formations in the form of sacrifices, mortification for immortality, and so on.

63. Furthermore, his non-abandonment of that ignorance about the four truths in particular prevents him from recognizing as suffering the kind of suffering called the fruit of merit, which is fraught with the many dangers beginning with birth, ageing, disease and death, and so he embarks upon the formation of merit classed as bodily, verbal, and mental formations, in order to attain that [kind of suffering], like one desiring celestial nymphs [who jumps over] a cliff. Also, not seeing how that fruit of merit reckoned as pleasure eventually breeds great distress owing to the suffering in its change and that it gives little satisfaction, he embarks upon the formation of merit of the kinds already stated, which is the condition for that very [suffering in change], like a moth that falls into a lamp’s flame, and like the man who wants the drop of honey and licks the honey-smeared knife-edge. Also, not seeing the danger in the indulgence of sense desires, etc., with its results, [wrongly] perceiving pleasure and overcome by defilements, he embarks upon the formation of demerit that occurs in the three doors [of kamma], like a child who plays with filth, and like a man who wants to die and eats poison. Also, unaware of the suffering due to formations and the suffering-in-change [inherent] in kamma-results in the immaterial sphere, owing to the perversion of [wrongly perceiving them as] eternal, etc., he embarks upon the formation of the imperturbable which is a mental formation, like one who has lost his way and takes the road to a goblin city.

64. So formations exist only when ignorance exists, [532] not when it does not; and that is how it can be known that these formations have ignorance as their condition.

This is said too: “Not knowing, bhikkhus, in ignorance, he forms the formation of merit, forms the formation of demerit, forms the formation of the imperturbable. As soon as a bhikkhu’s ignorance is abandoned and clear vision arisen, bhikkhus, with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of clear vision he does not form even formations of merit” (cf. S II 82).

65. Here it might be said: “Let us then firstly agree that ignorance is a condition for formations. But it must now be stated for which formations, and in which way it is a condition.”

Here is the reply: “Twenty-four conditions have been stated by the Blessed One as follows.”

[The 24 Conditions]

66. “(1) Root-cause condition, (2) object condition, (3) predominance condition, (4) proximity condition, (5) contiguity condition, (6) conascence condition, (7) mutuality condition, (8) support condition, (9) decisive-support condition, (10) prenascence condition, (11) postnascence condition, (12) repetition condition, (13) kamma condition, (14) kamma-result condition, (15) nutriment condition, (16) faculty condition, (17) jhāna condition, (18) path condition, (19) association condition, (20) dissociation condition, (21) presence condition, (22) absence condition, (23) disappearance condition, (24) non-disappearance condition” (Paṭṭh I 1).

67. (1) Herein, it is a root-cause and a condition, thus it is root-cause condition. It is by its being a root-cause that it is a condition; what is meant is that it is a condition owing to its status as root-cause. The same method applies in the case of object condition and the rest.

Herein, “cause” (hetu) is a term for a part of a syllogism, for a reason, and for a root. For with the words “proposition” (paṭiññā), “cause” (hetu = middle term), etc., in the world it is a member of a syllogism (vacanāvayava) that is called a cause. But in the Dispensation, in such passages as “Those states that are produced from a cause” (Vin I 40), it is a reason (kāraṇa); and in such passages as “Three profitable [root-] causes, three unprofitable [root-]causes” (Dhs §1053), it is a root (mūla) that is called a cause. The last is intended here.

68. As to “condition” (paccaya), the word-meaning here is this: It [the fruit] comes from that, depending thereon (paṭicca etasmā eti), thus that is a condition; (paccaya, see note 2) the meaning is, [a state] occurs by not dispensing with that. What is meant is: when a state is indispensable to another state’s presence or arising, the former is a condition for the latter. But as to characteristic, a condition has the characteristic of assisting; for any given state [533] that assists the presence or arising of a given state is called the latter’s condition. The words condition, cause, reason, source, originator, producer, etc., are one in meaning though different in the letter. So, since it is a cause in the sense of a root, and a condition in the sense of assistance, briefly a state that is assistantial in the sense of a root is a [root-]cause condition.

69. The intention of [some] teachers is that it establishes the profitable, etc., state in what is profitable, etc., as paddy seeds, etc., do for paddy, etc., and as the colour of gems, etc., do for the lustre of gems, and so on.^[1] But if that is so, then [it follows that] the state of root-cause condition does not apply to the kinds of materiality originated by it, for it does not establish any profitableness, etc., in them. Nevertheless, it is a condition for them, for this is said: “Root-causes are a condition, as root-cause condition, for the states associated with a root-cause and for the kinds of materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh I 1). Again, the indeterminateness of root-causeless consciousness is established without it. And the profitableness, etc., of those with root-cause is bound up with wise attention, etc., not with the associated root-causes. And if the profitableness, etc., resided in the associated root-causes as an individual essence, then either the non-greed bound up with the root-cause in the associated states would be only profitable or it would be only indeterminate; but since it can be both, profitableness, etc., in the root-causes must still be sought for, just as in the associated states [such as wise attention, and so on].

70. But when the root-causes’ sense of root is taken as establishing stableness, rather than as establishing profitableness, etc., there is no contradiction. For states that have obtained a root-cause condition are firm, like trees, and stable; but those without root-cause are, like moss [with roots no bigger than] sesame seeds, etc., unstable. So an assistantial state may be understood as a root-cause condition, since it establishes stableness through being of assistance in the sense of a root.

71. (2) As to the others that follow, a state that assists by being an object is an object condition. Now, there are no states that are not object conditions; for the passage beginning “The visible-data base [is a condition, as object condition,] for the eye-consciousness element” concludes thus: “When any states, as states of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants, arise contingent upon any states, these [latter] states are conditions, as object condition, for those [former] states” (Paṭṭh I 1).^[2] For just as a weak man both gets up and stands by hanging on to (ālambitvā) a stick or rope, so states of consciousness and consciousnessconcomitants always arise and are present contingent upon visible data, etc., as their object (ārammaṇa = ālambana). Therefore all states that are objects of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants should be understood as object condition. [534]

72. (3) A state that assists in the sense of being foremost is a predominance condition. It is of two kinds as conascent and as object. Herein, because of the passage beginning “Predominance of zeal is a condition, as predominance condition, for states associated with zeal and for the kinds of materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh I 2), it is the four states called zeal, [purity of] consciousness, energy, and inquiry, that should be understood as predominance condition; but not simultaneously, for when consciousness occurs with emphasis on zeal and putting zeal foremost, then it is zeal and not the others that is predominant. So with the rest. But the state, by giving importance to which, immaterial states occur, is their object-predominance. Hence it is said: “When any states, as states of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants, arise by giving importance to any states, these [latter] states are a condition, as predominance condition, for those [former] states” (Paṭṭh I 2).

73. (4), (5) A state that assists by being proximate is a proximity condition. A state that assists by being contiguous is a contiguity condition. The explanation of this pair of conditions is very diffuse, but substantially it is this:^[3] the regular order of consciousness begins thus, mind element is proximate (next) after eyeconsciousness, mind-consciousness element is proximate (next) after mind element, and this is established only by each preceding consciousness, not otherwise; consequently, a state that is capable of arousing an appropriate kind of consciousness proximate (next) to itself is a proximity condition. Hence it is said: “Proximity condition: eye-consciousness and the states associated therewith are a condition, as proximity condition, for mind element and for the states associated therewith” (Paṭṭh I 2).

74. (5) Proximity condition is the same as contiguity condition. The difference here is only in the letter, there is none in the meaning; just as in the case of the words “growth” and “continuity” (XIV.66), etc., and as in the case of the “terminology dyad,” “language dyad,” (Dhs §1306) and so on.

75. The opinion of [certain] teachers^[4] is that proximity condition refers to proximity of aim (fruit) and contiguity condition refers to proximity of time. But that is contradicted by such statements as “The profitable [consciousness] belonging to the base consisting of neither perception nor non-perception in one who emerges from cessation is a condition, as contiguity condition, for fruition attainment [consciousness]” (Paṭṭh I 160).

76. Now, they say in this context that “the ability of states to produce [their fruit] is not diminished, but the influence of meditative development prevents states from arising in proximity.” But that only establishes that there is no proximity of time; and we also say the same, namely, that there is no proximity of time there owing to the influence of development. [535] But since there is no proximity of time, the state of contiguity condition is therefore impossible [according to them] since their belief is that the contiguity condition depends on proximity of time (cf. M-a II 363). Instead of adopting any such misinterpretation, the difference should be treated as residing in the letter only, not in the meaning. How? There is no interval (antara) between them, thus they are proximate (anantara);they are quite without interval because [even the distinction of] copresence is lacking, thus they are contiguous (samanantara).^[5]

77. (6) A state that, while arising, assists [another state] by making it arise together with itself is a conascence condition, as a lamp is for illumination. With the immaterial aggregates, etc., it is sixfold, according as it is said: “(i) The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as conascence condition, for each other, (ii) the four great primaries are … for each other; (iii) at the moment of descent into the womb mentality and materiality are … for each other; (iv) states of consciousness and its concomitants are … for the kinds of materiality originated by consciousness; (v) the great primaries are … for derived materiality; (vi) material states are sometimes [as at rebirth-linking] a condition, as conascence condition, and sometimes [as in the course of an existence] not a condition as conascence condition, for immaterial states” (Paṭṭh I 3). This refers only to the heart-basis.

78. (7) A state that assists by means of mutual arousing and consolidating is a mutuality condition, as the three sticks of a tripod give each other consolidating support. With the immaterial aggregates, etc., it is threefold, according as it is said: “The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]; the four great primaries are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]; at the moment of descent into the womb mentality and materiality are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]” (Paṭṭh I 3).

79. (8) A state that assists in the mode of foundation and in the mode of support is a support condition, as the earth is for trees, as canvas is for paintings, and so on. It should be understood in the way stated for conascence thus: “The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as support condition, for each other” (Paṭṭh I 3), but the sixth instance has been set forth in this way here: “The eye base [is a condition, as support condition,] for the eye-consciousness element [and for the states associated therewith]; the ear base … the nose base … the tongue base … the body base is a condition, as support condition, for the bodyconsciousness element and for the states associated therewith; the materiality with which as their support the mind element and the mind-consciousness element occur is a condition, as support condition, for the mind element, for the mindconsciousness element, and for the states associated therewith” (Paṭṭh I 4).

80. (9) Decisive-support condition: firstly, here is the word-meaning: [536] it is treated as support, not dispensed with, by its own fruit because [its own fruit’s] existence is dependent on it, thus it is the support. But just as great misery is despair, so great support is decisive support. This is a term for a cogent reason. Consequently, a state that assists by being a cogent reason should be understood as a decisive-support condition.

It is threefold, namely, (a) object-decisive-support, (b) proximate-decisivesupport, and (c) natural-decisive-support condition.

81. (a) Herein, firstly, object-decisive-support condition is set forth without differentiating it from object-predominance in the way beginning: “Having given a gift, having undertaken the precepts of virtue, having done the duties of the Uposatha, a man gives that importance and reviews it; he gives importance to former things well done and reviews them. Having emerged from jhāna, he gives jhāna importance and reviews it. Trainers give importance to change-oflineage and review it. They give importance to cleansing and review it.^[6] Trainers, having emerged from a path, give importance to the path and review it” (Paṭṭh I 165). Herein, the object in giving importance to which consciousness and consciousness concomitants arise, is necessarily a cogent one among these objects. So their difference may be understood in this way: object-predominance is in the sense of what is to be given importance to, and object-decisive-support is in the sense of a cogent reason.

82. (b) Also proximate-decisive-support condition is set forth without differentiating it from the proximity condition in the way beginning, “Any preceding profitable aggregates are a condition, as decisive-support condition, for any succeeding aggregates” (Paṭṭh I 165). But in the exposition there is a distinction, because in the exposition of the schedule (mātikā-nikkhepa) they are given as proximity in the way beginning, “Eye-consciousness element and the states associated therewith are a condition, as proximity condition, for mind element and for the states associated therewith” (Paṭṭh I 2) and as decisivesupport in the way beginning, “Any preceding profitable states are a condition as decisive-support condition, for any succeeding profitable states” (Paṭṭh I 4), though it comes to the same thing as regards the meaning. Nevertheless, proximity may be understood as the ability to cause the occurrence of an appropriate conscious arising proximate (next) to itself, and decisive support as the preceding consciousness’s cogency in the arousing of the succeeding consciousnesses.

83. For while in the cases of root-cause and other such conditions consciousness can arise actually without any of those conditions, there is no arising of consciousness without a proximate consciousness [to precede it], so this is a cogent condition. Their difference, then, may be understood in this way: proximity condition arouses an appropriate consciousness proximate (next) to itself, while proximity-decisive-support condition is a cogent reason.

84. (c) As to natural-decisive-support: the decisive-support is natural, thus it is a natural-decisive-support. Faith, virtue, etc., produced in, or climate, food, etc., habitual to, one’s own continuity are called natural. Or else, it is a decisivesupport by nature, [537] thus it is a natural-decisive-support. The meaning is that it is unmixed with object and proximity. It should be understood as variously divided up in the way beginning: “Natural-decisive-support: with faith as decisive-support a man gives a gift, undertakes the precepts of virtue, does the duties of the Uposatha, arouses jhāna, arouses insight, arouses the path, arouses direct-knowledge, arouses an attainment. With virtue … With learning … With generosity … With understanding as decisive-support a man gives a gift … arouses an attainment. Faith, virtue, learning, generosity, understanding, are conditions, as decisive-support condition, for [the repeated arising of] faith, virtue, learning, generosity, understanding” (Paṭṭh I 165). So these things beginning with faith are natural-decisive-support since they are both natural and decisive-supports in the sense of a cogent reason.

85. (10) A state that assists by being present, having arisen previously, is a prenascence condition. It is elevenfold as physical basis and object in the five doors, and as the heart-basis, according as it is said: “The eye base is a condition, as prenascence condition, for the eye-consciousness element and for the states associated therewith. The ear base … The nose base … The tongue base … The body base … The visible-data base … The sound base … The odour base … The flavour base … The tangible-data base is a condition, as prenascence condition, for the body-consciousness element and for the states associated therewith. The visible-data base … The sound base … The odour base … The flavour base … the tangible data base [is a condition, as prenascence condition,] for the mind element. The materiality with which as their support the mind element and mindconsciousness element occur is a condition, as prenascence condition, for the mind-element and for the states associated therewith, and it is sometimes [as in the course of an existence] a condition, as prenascence condition, sometimes [as at rebirth-linking] not a condition, as prenascence condition, for the mindconsciousness element and for the states associated therewith” (Paṭṭh I 4–5).

86. (11) An immaterial state that [while present] assists prenascent material states [also present] by consolidating them is a postnascence condition, like the volition of appetite for food, which assists the bodies of vultures’ young. Hence it is said: “Postnascent [538] states of consciousness and its concomitants are a condition, as postnascence condition, for the prenascent [co-present] body” (Paṭṭh I 5).

87. (12) A state that assists the efficiency and power of the proximate (next) in the sense of repetition is a repetition condition, like repeated application to books and so on. It is threefold as profitable, unprofitable, and functional impulsion; for it is said: “Preceding profitable states are a condition, as repetition condition, for succeeding profitable states … Preceding unprofitable … Preceding functional indeterminate states are a condition, as repetition condition, for succeeding functional indeterminate states” (Paṭṭh I 5).

88. (13) A state that assists by means of the action called intervening of consciousness is a kamma condition. It is twofold as (a) profitable and unprofitable volition acting from a different time, and (b) as all conascent volition (see Paṭṭh I 172), according as it is said: “Profitable and unprofitable kamma is a condition, as kamma condition, for resultant aggregates and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed. Conascent volition is a condition, as kamma condition, for associated states and for the kinds of materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh I 5).

89. (14) A resultant state that, by effortless quiet, assists effortless quiet [in other states] is a kamma-result condition. In the course of an existence it is a condition for states originated by it, and at rebirth-linking for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed, and in both cases for the associated states, according as it is said: “One resultant indeterminate aggregate is a condition, as kamma-result condition, for three aggregates and for the kinds of materiality originated by consciousness … At the moment of rebirth-linking one resultant indeterminate aggregate [is a condition …] for three aggregates … Three aggregates [are a condition …] for one aggregate … Two aggregates are a condition, as kamma-result condition, for two aggregates and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed. Aggregates are a condition, as kammaresult condition, for the physical basis” (Paṭṭh I 173).

90. (15) The four kinds of nutriment, which assist material and immaterial states by consolidating them, are nutriment conditions, according as it is said: “Physical nutriment is a condition, as nutriment condition, for this body. Immaterial nutriments are conditions, as nutriment condition, for associated states and for the kinds of materiality originated by them” (Paṭṭh I 5). But in the Question Section it is said: “At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant indeterminate nutriments are conditions, as nutriment condition, for aggregates associated therewith and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed” (Paṭṭh I 174).

91. (16) Leaving out the femininity and masculinity faculties, the twenty remaining faculties (see XIV.1), which assist in the sense of predominance, [539] are faculty conditions. Herein, the five, namely, the eye faculty, etc., are conditions only for immaterial states, the rest are conditions for material and immaterial states, according as it is said: “The eye faculty [is a condition, as faculty condition,] for eye-consciousness element [and for the states associated therewith]. The ear faculty … The nose faculty … The tongue faculty … The body faculty is a condition, as faculty condition, for the body-consciousness element and for the states associated therewith. The material life faculty is a condition, as faculty condition, for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed. The immaterial faculties are a condition, as faculty condition, for the states associated therewith and for the kinds of materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh 1, 5–6). But in the Question Section it is said: “At the moment of rebirth-linking resultant indeterminate faculties are a condition, as faculty condition, for associated aggregates and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed” (Paṭṭh I 175).

92. (17) All the seven jhāna factors classed as profitable, etc.—leaving out the pair, pleasant and painful feeling, in the case of the two sets of five consciousnesses—which factors assist in the sense of constituting a state of jhāna, are jhāna conditions, according as it is said: “The jhāna factors are a condition, as jhāna condition, for the states associated with jhāna and for the kinds of materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh I 6). But in the Question Section it is said: “At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant indeterminate jhāna factors are a condition, as jhāna condition, for associated aggregates and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed” (Paṭṭh I 175).

93. (18) The twelve path factors classed as profitable, etc., which assist in the sense of an outlet from whatever it may be, are path conditions, according as it is said: “The path factors are a condition, as path condition, for states associated therewith and for the kinds of materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh I 6). But in the Question Section it is said: “At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant indeterminate path factors are a condition, as path condition, for aggregates associated therewith and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed” (Paṭṭh I 176).

But these two, namely, jhāna and path conditions, should be understood as inapplicable to the two sets of five consciousnesses and to the consciousnesses without root-cause ((34)–(41), (50)–(56), (70)–(72)).

94. (19) Immaterial states that assist by the kind of association consisting in having the same physical basis, same object, same arising, same cessation, are association conditions, according as it is said: “The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as association condition, for each other” (Paṭṭh I 6).

95. (20) Material states that assist immaterial states, and immaterial states that assist material states by not having sameness of physical basis, etc., are dissociation conditions. This is threefold as conascent, postnascent, and prenascent, for this is said: “Conascent profitable aggregates are a condition, as dissociation condition, for the kinds of materiality originated by consciousness. Postnascent [540] profitable [mental] aggregates are a condition, as dissociation condition, for this prenascent body” (Paṭṭh I 176). But in the analysis of the conascent in the indeterminate clause it is said: “At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant indeterminate aggregates are a condition, as dissociation condition, for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed. The aggregates are a condition, as dissociation condition, for the physical basis, and the physical basis for the aggregates” (Paṭṭh I 176). But the prenascent should be understood as the eye faculty, etc., and the physical basis, according as it is said: “The prenascent eye base [is a condition, as dissociation condition,] for eye-consciousness … The body base is a condition, as dissociation condition, for body-consciousness. The physical basis [is a condition, as dissociation condition,] for resultantindeterminate and functional-indeterminate aggregates … The physical basis [is a condition, as dissociation condition,] for profitable aggregates … The physical basis [is a condition, as dissociation condition,] for unprofitable aggregates” (Paṭṭh I 176–77).

96. (21) A state that, by means of existingness characterized by presence, assists a like state by consolidating it, is a presence condition. A sevenfold summary is laid down for it according to immaterial aggregates, great primaries, mentalitymateriality, consciousness and consciousness-concomitants, great primaries, bases, and physical [heart] basis, according as it is said: “The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as presence condition, for each other. The four great primaries … are … for each other. At the time of descent into the womb mentality and materiality [are a condition, as presence condition,] for each other. States of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants are … for the kinds of materiality originated by consciousness. The four great primaries are … for derived materiality. The eye base is … for the eye-consciousness element [and for the states associated therewith]. The [ear base … nose base … tongue base …] body base is … for the body-consciousness element … The visible-data base [is … for the eye-consciousness element … The sound base … odour base … flavour base …] tangible-data base is a condition, as presence condition, for the bodyconsciousness element and for the states associated therewith. The visible-data base … The [sound base … odour base … flavour base …] tangible-data base is a condition, as presence condition, for the mind element and for the states associated therewith. The materiality with which as their support the mind element and mind-consciousness element occur is a condition, as presence condition, for the mind element, for the mind-consciousness element, and for the states associated therewith” (Paṭṭh I 6).

97. But in the Question Section, after setting forth conascence, prenascence, postnascence, nutriment, and faculty, the description is given first under conascence in the way beginning, “One aggregate is a condition, as presence condition, for three aggregates and for materiality originated thereby” (Paṭṭh I 178). Under prenascence the description is given according to the prenascent eye and so on. Under postnascence the description is given according to postnascent consciousness and consciousness-concomitants as conditions for this body. Under nutriments and faculties [respectively] the description is given thus: “Physical nutriment is a condition, as presence condition, for this body,” [541] and “The material life faculty is a condition, as presence condition, for materiality due to kamma performed” (Paṭṭh I 178).^[7]

98. (22) Immaterial states that, by their ceasing in contiguity [before], assist by giving opportunity to immaterial states that arise proximately (next) after them are absence conditions, according as it is said: “States of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants that have ceased in contiguity are a condition, as absence condition, for present states of consciousness and consciousnessconcomitants” (Paṭṭh I 7).

99. (23) Those same states, because they assist by their disappearance, are a disappearance condition, according as it is said: “States of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants that have disappeared in contiguity are a condition, as disappearance condition, for present states of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants” (Paṭṭh I 7).

100. (24) The same states that are presence condition, because they assist by their non-disappearance, should be understood as a non-disappearance condition. Or this dyad is stated as an embellishment of teaching to suit the needs of those who are teachable, just as [in the Mātikā of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī] the “dissociatedfrom-cause dyad” is given after the “causeless dyad.”

[How Ignorance is a Condition for Formations]

101. Now, as regards these twenty-four conditions:

For those of merit ignorance
Is a condition in two ways
And for the next in many ways
But for the last kind only once.

102. Herein, for those of merit ignorance is a condition in two ways: it is a condition in two ways, namely, as object condition and as decisive-support condition. For ignorance is a condition, as object condition, for formations of merit of the sense sphere at the time of comprehending [by means of insight] ignorance as liable to destruction and fall; and it is likewise for those of the fine-material sphere at the time of knowing a confused mind by means of direct-knowledge consciousness [through penetrating others’ minds, and so on]. But it is a condition, as decisivesupport condition, in two cases, that is to say, [for the sense-sphere formation] in one who, for the purpose of surmounting ignorance, fulfils the various instances of sense-sphere merit-making consisting in giving, etc., and [for the fine-materialsphere formation] in one who arouses the fine-material jhānas [for the same purpose]. Likewise in one who effects that merit while aspiring to the delight of sense-sphere becoming and fine-material becoming because he is confused by ignorance.

103. And for the next in many ways: it is a condition for formations of demerit in many ways. How? As object condition at the time of the arising of greed, etc., contingent upon ignorance; as object-predominance and object-decisive-support respectively at the times of giving importance [to ignorance] and enjoying [it]; as decisive-support in one who, being confused by ignorance and unaware of danger, kills living things, etc.; as proximity, contiguity, proximity-decisivesupport, repetition, absence, and disappearance, for the second impulsion and those that follow; as root-cause, conascence, mutuality, support, association, presence, and non-disappearance, in one doing anything unprofitable. It is thus a condition in many ways.

104. But for the last kind only once: [542] it is reckoned as a condition in one way, namely, as decisive-support condition only, for formations of the imperturbable. But its relation as decisive-support condition should be understood as stated under formations of merit.

[No Single Fruit from Single Cause]

105. Here it may be asked: But how is this? Is ignorance the only condition for formations, or are there other conditions? What is the position here? For firstly, if it is the only one, there follows the assertion of a single cause;^[8] but then if there are others, the description of it as a single cause, namely, “With ignorance as condition there are formations,” is incorrect—It is not incorrect. Why not? Here is the reason:

Nor from a single cause arise
One fruit or many, nor one fruit from many;
’Tis helpful, though, to utilize
One cause and fruit as representative.

106. Here there is no single or multiple fruit of any kind from a single cause, nor a single fruit from multiple causes, but only multiple fruit from multiple causes. So from multiple causes, in other words, from temperature, earth, seed, and moisture, is seen to arise a multiple fruit, in other words, the shoot, which has visible form, odour, taste, and so on. But one representative cause and fruit given in this way, “With ignorance as condition there are formations;with formations as condition, consciousness,” have a meaning and a use.

107. For the Blessed One employs one representative cause and fruit when it is suitable for the sake of elegance in instruction and to suit the idiosyncrasies of those susceptible of being taught. And he does so in some instances because it is a basic factor, and in some instances because it is the most obvious, and in some instances because it is not common to all.

In the passage “With contact as condition, feeling” (M I 261) he mentions a single cause and fruit because they are basic factors. For contact is the basic cause of feeling since the kinds of feeling are defined according to the kinds of contact [as “eye-contact-born feeling” and so on], and feeling is contact’s basic fruit since contact is defined according to the kinds of feeling [that it produces]. He mentions a single cause in the passage “Disease due to phlegm” (A V 110) because that is the most obvious. For here what is obvious is the phlegm, not the kamma, etc., [mentioned later in the same sutta]. He mentions a single cause in the passage “Bhikkhus, any states whatever that are unprofitable are all rooted in unwise attention” (cf. S V 91) because it is not common to all. For unwise attention to unprofitable things is not common to all [states] in the way that, say, physical basis and object are common to all.

108. Consequently, although other causes of formations such as physical basis and object, conascent states, etc., are actually existent, still ignorance may be understood as the representative cause of formations [firstly] because it is the basic factor as the cause of other causes of formations such as craving, etc., as it is said: “Craving increases in one who dwells seeing enjoyment” (S II 84), and “With the arising of ignorance there is the arising of cankers” (M I 55); and again because it is the most obvious, “Not knowing, bhikkhus, in ignorance, he forms the formation of merit” (cf. S II 82); and lastly because it is not common to all. [543] So the use of one representative cause and fruit should in each instance be understood according to this explanation of it.^[9]

109. Here it may be said: “We admit that. But ignorance is reprehensible and has entirely undesirable fruit. How then can it rightly be a condition for formations of merit and of the imperturbable? Sugarcane does not grow from [bitter] nimba seeds.” Why should it not be right? For in the world [that is, even among thinkers outside the Dispensation it is recognized that]

Both as opposed and unopposed
A state’s conditions may be found,
And both as like and unlike too:
That does not make it their result.

110. It is established in the world that when states have a condition, it may be opposed or unopposed to them as to presence, individual essence, function, and so on. For a preceding consciousness is a condition, opposed as to presence, for the succeeding consciousness; and the preceding training is a condition likewise for the plying of crafts, etc., which take place subsequently. Kamma is a condition, opposed as to individual essence, for materiality; and so are milk, etc., for curds, and so on. Light is a condition, opposed as to function, for eye-consciousness; and so are molasses, etc., for intoxicants, and so on. But eye-cum-visible-data, etc., are respectively a condition, unopposed as to presence, for eye-consciousness, and so on. And the first impulsion, and those that follow, are a condition, unopposed as to individual essence and function, for the impulsions that follow them. And just as conditions operate as opposed and unopposed, so also they operate as like and unlike. Materiality—for example, temperature and nutriment—is a condition for materiality: the like for the like. And so are paddy seeds, etc., for paddy crops, and so on. The material is a condition for the immaterial, and so is the immaterial for the material: the unlike for the like. And so are ox hair and ram’s hair, horns, curd, and sesame flour, etc., respectively for dabba grass, reeds, bhūtanaka grass, and so on.^[10] And those states for which these are the opposed and unopposed, like and unlike, conditions are not the results of these states as well.

111. So although this ignorance has entirely undesirable fruit for its result and is reprehensible in its individual essence, yet it should be understood as a condition, opposed or unopposed and like or unlike as the case may be, as to presence, function, and individual essence, for all these formations of merit, etc. And its state as a condition has already been given in the way beginning, “For when unknowing—in other words, ignorance—of suffering, etc., is unabandoned in a man, owing firstly to his unknowing about suffering and about the past, etc., then be believes the suffering of the round of rebirths to be pleasant and he embarks upon the three kinds of formations, which are the cause of that very suffering” (§62).

112. Moreover, there is this way of explanation as well:

Now, when a man is ignorant
Of death and rebirth and the round,
The characteristics of the formed,
Dependently-arisen states, [544]

And in his ignorance he forms
Formations of this triple kind,
Then ignorance itself will be
Condition for each of the three.

113. But how does a man who is confused about these things perform these three kinds of formations? Firstly, when he is confused about death, instead of taking death thus, “Death in every case is break-up of aggregates,” he figures that it is a [lasting] being that dies, that it is a [lasting] being’s transmigration to another incarnation, and so on.

114. When he is confused about reappearance, instead of taking rebirth thus, “Birth in every case is manifestation of aggregates,” he figures that it is a lasting being’s manifestation in a new body.

115. When he is confused about the round of rebirths, instead of taking the round of rebirths as pictured thus:

The endless chain of aggregates,
Of elements, of bases too,
That carries on unbrokenly
Is what is called “the round of births,”

he figures that it is a lasting being that goes from this world to another world, that comes from another world to this world.

116. When he is confused about the characteristics of formations, instead of apprehending their specific and general characteristics, he figures that formations are self, belong to a self, are lasting, pleasant, beautiful.

117. When he is confused about dependently-arisen states, instead of taking the occurrence of formations to be due to ignorance, etc., he figures that it is a self that knows or does not know, that acts and causes action, that appears in rebirthlinking, and he figures that atoms, an Overlord, etc., shape its body in the various states of the embryo and endow it with faculties, and that when it has been endowed with faculties it touches, feels, craves, clings, and endeavours, and that it becomes anew in the next becoming; or he figures thus, “All beings … [are] moulded by fate, coincidence and nature” (D I 53).

118. Thus he figures, blinded by ignorance. He is like a blind man who wanders about the earth, encountering now right and now wrong paths, now heights and now hollows, now even and now uneven ground, and so he forms formations now of merit, now of demerit, now imperturbable.

119. Hence this is said:

As one born blind, who gropes along
Without assistance from a guide,
Chooses a road that may be right
At one time, at another wrong,

So while the foolish man pursues
The round of births without a guide,
Now to do merit he may choose
And now demerit in such plight.

But when the Dhamma he comes to know
And penetrates the truths besides,
Then ignorance is put to flight
At last, and he in peace may go.

This is the detailed explanation of the clause, “With ignorance as condition there are formations.” [545]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

“This refers to the teacher Revata” (Vism-mhṭ 582).

[2]:

“‘Which are contingent upon other such states’: because it is said without distinction of all visible-data bases … and of all mental-data bases, there is consequently no dhamma (state) among the formed, unformed, and conceptual dhammas, classed as sixfold under visible data, etc., that does not become an object condition” (Vism-mhṭ 584).

[3]:

“Proximity and contiguity conditions are not stated in accordance with the distinction between making occur and giving opportunity, as the absence and disappearance conditions are: rather they are stated as the causes of the regular order of consciousness [in the cognitive series]” (Vism-mhṭ 585).

[4]:

“This refers to the Elder Revata too” (Vism-mhṭ 586).

[5]:

“The state of proximity condition is the ability to cause arising proximately (without interval) because there is no interval between the cessation of the preceding and the arising of the subsequent. The state of contiguity condition is the ability to cause arising by being quite proximate (without interval) through approaching, as it were, identity with itself owing to absence of any distinction that ‘This is below, above, or around that,’ which is because of lack of any such co-presence as in the case of the [components of the] material groups, and because of lack of any co-positionality of the condition and the conditionally arisen. And [in general], because of the uninterestedness of [all] states (dhamma), when a given [state] has ceased, or is present, in a given mode, and [other] states (dhamma) come to be possessed of that particular mode, it is that [state’s] mode that must be regarded as what is called ‘ability to cause arising’” (Vism-mhṭ 586).

[6]:

“Reviewing change-of-lineage” (the consciousness that precedes the path consciousness) applies to stream-enterers. “Reviewing cleansing” (the “cleansing” that consists in attaining a higher path than the first) applies to once-returners and non-returners (see Vism-mhṭ 589).

[7]:

“The presence (atthi) condition is not applicable to Nibbāna. For a presence condition is that which is unhelpful by its absence of existingness (atthi-bhāvābhāva) and becomes helpful by obtaining existingness. And Nibbāna does not, after being unhelpful by its own absence of existingness to those states that have Nibbāna as their object, become helpful to them by obtaining existingness. Or alternatively, the presence condition, which by its non-existingness is the opposite of helpfulness to those states that are associated with arising, etc., is helpful to them by its existingness. So Nibbāna is not a presence condition” (Vism-mhṭ 597).

It may be noted that atthi has more than one use, among which the following two may be mentioned: (1) atthi (is) = upalabbhaniya (is (a) “apprehendable,” and (b) not a self-contradictory impossibility)—“atthi, bhikkhave, ajātaṃ—There is an unborn' (Ud 80), and the discussion on the existence of Nibbāna (XVI.67ff.). (2) Atthi (is) = uppanna (arisen)—see “Yaṃ, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ jātaṃ pātubhūtaṃ atthī ti tassa saṅkhā—Of the materiality that is born, manifested, it is said that ‘It is’” (S II 71f.). The atthi-paccaya (presence condition), being implicitly equated with the latter, cannot be applied to Nibbāna because Nibbāna is not subject to arising (A I 152).

[8]:

“The assertion of a single cause (kāraṇa) is undesirable because it follows that there would be production of everything all the time, and because it follows that there would be a single homogeneous state;” (Vism-mhṭ 599) cf. XIX.3.

[9]:

Parihāra-vacana—“explanation”: not in PED in this sense.

[10]:

Avi—“a goat or sheep”: not in PED. The Vism text reads “golomāvilomavisāṇadadhitilapiṭṭhādīni ca dubbāsarabhūtanakādīnaṃ.” Vism-mhṭ explains thus: “Golomāvilomādī ti ādisu golomāvilomāni dubbāya avī ti rattā eḷakā veditabbā visāṇaṃ sarassa dadhitilapiṭṭhagūlāni bhūtiṇakassa sevālaṃ taṇḍuleyyakassa kharavalavā assatarassā ti evam ādi ādisaddena saṅgahito,” which renders thus: “As to ‘Ox hair and ram’s hair, etc.,’ and the rest: ox hair and ram’s hair [are conditions for the unlike] dubbā (dabba) grass—a ram (avi) should be understood as a red sheep (eḷakā); horn is for reeds (sara);curds, sesame flour and molasses are for bhūtiṇaka grass; moss is for the taṇḍuleyyaka plant; a she donkey is for a mule; and so on in this way as included by the word ‘etc.’” (Vism-mhṭ 601). Except for the last-mentioned, it seems problematical why these things, if rightly interpreted, should be conditions for the things mentioned.