Text 2.30

कस्माद् इत्य् आह, ज्ञानस्य विषयो ह्य् अन्यः फलम् अन्यद् उदाहृतम् ॥ २.१८ab ॥

kasmād ity āha, jñānasya viṣayo hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhṛtam ||2.18ab||

jñānasya—of a means of acquiring knowledge^[1]; viṣayaḥ—the object; hi—because; anyaḥ—is another; phalam—the result [of purposeful Indication]; anyat—as being different; udāhṛtam—is exemplified.

“Why?” Therefore he says: The object of a means of knowing is one thing, and the result is shown to be another.

pratyakṣāder hi jñānasya śuklādir viṣayaḥ, phalaṃ tu jñātatā hānopādāna-dhīr vā. viṣayo jñānasya hetuḥ, phalaṃ tu tasya kāryam iti yugapad apratīter na saha lakṣyetety anuśayaḥ. yat tūktam, tīraṃ śaityādi ca lakṣaṇayaiva bodhayet iti tan na, śabda-buddhi-karmaṇāṃ viramya vyāpārābhāvāt.

The object of a means of knowing, like direct perception, is the white color, for instance, but the result is either the fact of being known, or the mind processes the notion either by giving it up or by continuing to accept it. (In any case there is no indicated sense nor an implied meaning.) The object of a cognition is a cause, but the result is the effect of it. Consequently, since there is no simultaneous perception, they are not indicated together. It is wrong to say that the word Ganges can make one understand both the shore and coolness, etc., because a word, or a means of knowing, or an action, has no more function after its function has been used.

Commentary:

Mammaṭa’s elaboration on the above sūtra is simply this: pratyakṣāder nīlādir viṣayaḥ phalaṃ tu prakaṭatā saṃvittir vā, “The object of a means of knowing like direct perception is the blue color, for instance, but the result is either the state of being manifest or a mental perception” (Kāvya-prakāśa 2.18). Narahari Sarasvatī Tīrtha elucidates: bhāṭṭa-matānusāreṇa jñeya-dharmaḥ phalam ity uktam, vaiśeṣika-matānusāreṇa saṃvittir jñātṛ-dharmaḥ phalam ity uktam, “In accordance with the Mīmāṃsakas it is said that the result is an attribute of the thing to be known (“that blue thing is being perceived by me”), and in accordance with the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the result is said to be an attribute that pertains to the knower (“I am perceiving that blue thing”) (Bāla-cittānurañjinī 2.18).

Though not seen in Kāvya-prakāśa, the above passage śabda-buddhi-karmaṇāṃ viramya vyāpārābhāvāt is sourced in Sāhitya-darpaṇa 2.13,^[2] where Viśvanātha Kavirāja paraphrases Abhinavagupta’s words: viramya vyāpāraḥ śabda-karma-buddhy-ādīnāṃ padārtha-vidbhir niṣiddhaḥ, “After it has been used up, a function that relates to either a word, an action, or a means of knowing, and so on, is stopped by those who know the meaning of declined words” (Locana 1.4).

The details are as follows: When one hears “The cowherd settlement is located on the Ganges” and looks at the Ganges, the blue color of the water is the object of direct perception. This is the means of knowing called pratyakṣa (direct perception). Then, by anumāna (inference), one rejects the idea that the water can be a foundation for a hamlet, understands, by Indication in the form of arthāpatti (presumption), that the shore is indicated by the word Ganges, and perceives, by Suggestiveness, the purpose of the statement (either from the word Ganges or from the sense of shore) that the cowherd settlement is permeated by much coolness and purity. This happens in sequence, not at the same time, thus there is no direct link between the indicated meaning (shore) and the implied sense (much coolness and and purity in the cowherd settlement). The word Ganges is lākṣaṇika (the indirectly expressive word), and the meaning of ‘shore’ is the lakṣya (the indicated sense of the lākṣaṇika word).

The rule is that a rhetorical function cannot be used twice in the same word. This applies to Denotation too when there is a śleṣa (literal double meaning) (Commentary 9.29).

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Narahari Sarasvatī Tīrtha explains: jñāyate’neneti jñānaṃ pramāṇam ity abhipretyoktaṃ pratyakṣāder iti, “It is said pratyakṣādeḥ (of direct perception, and so on) by intending to express this derivation of jñāna: “knowing is done by means of this,” which denotes a means of obtaining valid knowledge”(Bāla-cittānurañjinī 2.18). This usage of the word jñāna in seen in: etaj jñānam iti proktam (Bhagavad-gītā 13.12), according to Śrīdhara Svāmī: etad jñānam iti proktam, jñāna-sādhanatvāt (Subodhinī 13.12).

[2]:

Śeṣarāja Śarmā elucidates the passage “śabda-buddhi-karmaṇāṃ viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ” as follows: śabda-buddhi-karmaṇām = śabdasya (ghaṭādeḥ) buddheḥ (jñānasya pratyakṣādeḥ) karmaṇaś ca, teṣāṃ viramya = sva-viṣayam upasthāpya virāmānantaraṃ, vyāpārābhāvaḥ = punaḥ sva-viṣayopasthāpanābhāvaḥ (Candrakalā 2.13).