Discussion on Nibbāna

67. [Question 1] Is Nibbāna non-existent because it is unapprehendable, like the hare’s horn?

[Answer] That is not so, because it is apprehendable by the [right] means. For it is apprehendable [by some, namely, the nobles ones] by the [right] means, in other words, by the way that is appropriate to it, [the way of virtue, concentration, and understanding]; it is like the supramundane consciousness of others, [which is apprehendable only by certain of the Noble Ones] by means of knowledge of penetration of others’ minds. Therefore it should not be said that it is non-existent because unapprehendable; for it should not be said that what the foolish ordinary man does not apprehend is unapprehendable.

68. Again, it should not be said that Nibbāna does not exist. Why not? Because it then follows that the way would be futile. [508] For if Nibbāna were nonexistent, then it would follow that the right way, which includes the three aggregates beginning with virtue and is headed by right understanding, would be futile. And it is not futile because it does reach Nibbāna.

[Q. 2] But futility of the way does not follow because what is reached is absence,[that is, absence of the five aggregates consequent upon the cutting off of the defilements].

[A.] That is not so. Because, though there is absence of past and future [aggregates], there is nevertheless no reaching of Nibbāna [simply because of that].

[Q. 3] Then is the absence of present [aggregates] as well Nibbāna?

[A.] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since if they are absent their non-presence follows. [Besides, if Nibbāna were absence of present aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of excluding the arising of the Nibbāna element with result of past clinging left, at the path moment, which has present aggregates as its support.

[Q. 4] Then will there be no fault if it is non-presence of defilements [that is Nibbāna]?

[A.] That is not so. Because it would then follow that the noble path was meaningless. For if it were so, then, since defilements [can be] non-existent also before the moment of the noble path, it follows that the noble path would be meaningless. Consequently that is no reason; [it is unreasonable to say that Nibbāna is unapprehendable, that it is non-existence, and so on].

69. [Q. 5] But is not Nibbāna destruction, because of the passage beginning, “That, friend, which is the destruction of greed … [of hate … of delusion … is Nibbāna]?” (S IV 251).

[A.] That is not so, because it would follow that Arahantship also was mere destruction. For that too is described in the [same] way beginning, “That, friend, which is the destruction of greed … of hate … of delusion … is Arahantship]” (S IV 252).

And what is more, the fallacy then follows that Nibbāna would be temporary, etc.; for if it were so, it would follow that Nibbāna would be temporary, have the characteristic of being formed, and be obtainable regardless of right effort; and precisely because of its having formed characteristics it would be included in the formed, and it would be burning with the fires of greed, etc., and because of its burning it would follow that it was suffering.

[Q. 6] Is there no fallacy if Nibbāna is that kind of destruction subsequent towhich there is no more occurrence?

[A.] That is not so. Because there is no such kind of destruction. And even if there were, the aforesaid fallacies would not be avoided.

Also because it would follow that the noble path was Nibbāna. For the noble path causes the destruction of defects, and that is why it is called “destruction”; and subsequent to that there is no more occurrence of the defects.

70. But it is because the kind of destruction called “cessation consisting in non-arising,” [that is, Nibbāna,] serves figuratively speaking as decisive-support [for the path] that [Nibbāna] is called “destruction” as a metaphor for it.

[Q. 7] Why is it not stated in its own form?

[A.] Because of its extreme subtlety. And its extreme subtlety is established because it inclined the Blessed One to inaction, [that is, to not teaching the Dhamma (see M I 186)] and because a Noble One’s eye is needed to see it (see M I 510).

71. It is not shared by all because it can only be reached by one who is possessed of the path. And it is uncreated because it has no first beginning.

[Q. 8] Since it is, when the path is, then it is not uncreated.

[A.] That is not so, because it is not arousable by the path; it is only reachable, not arousable, by the path; that is why it is uncreated. It is because it is uncreated that it is free from ageing and death. It is because of the absence of its creation and of its ageing and death that it is permanent. [509]

72. [Q. 9] Then it follows that Nibbāna, too, has the kind of permanence [claimed] of the atom and so on.

[A.] That is not so. Because of the absence of any cause [that brings about its arising].

[Q. 10] Because Nibbāna has permanence, then, these [that is, the atom, etc.] are permanent as well.

[A.] That is not so. Because [in that proposition] the characteristic of [logical] cause does not arise. [In other words, to say that Nibbāna is permanent is not to assert a reason why the atom, etc., should be permanent]

[Q. 11] Then they are permanent because of the absence of their arising, as Nibbāna is.

[A.] That is not so. Because the atom and so on have not been established as facts.

73. The aforesaid logical reasoning proves that only this [that is, Nibbāna] is permanent [precisely because it is uncreated]; and it is immaterial because it transcends the individual essence of matter.

The Buddhas’ goal is one and has no plurality. But this [single goal, Nibbāna,] is firstly called with result of past clinging left since it is made known together with the [aggregates resulting from past] clinging still remaining [during the Arahant’s life], being thus made known in terms of the stilling of defilement and the remaining [result of past] clinging that are present in one who has reached it by means of development. But [secondly, it is called without result of past clinging left] since after the last consciousness of the Arahant, who has abandoned arousing [future aggregates] and so prevented kamma from giving result in a future [existence], there is no further arising of aggregates of existence, and those already arisen have disappeared. So the [result of past] clinging that remained is non-existent; and it is in terms of this non-existence, in the sense that “there is no [result of past] clinging here” that that [same goal is called] without result of past clinging left (see It 38).

74. Because it can be arrived at by distinction of knowledge that succeeds through untiring perseverance, and because it is the word of the Omniscient One, Nibbāna is not non-existent as regards individual essence in the ultimate sense; for this is said: “Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an unformed” (It 37; Ud 80).

Notes regarding the discussion on Nibbāna:

This discussion falls under three headings: Questions one to four refute the assertion that Nibbāna is mythical and non-existent; questions five to seven refute the assertion that Nibbāna is “mere destruction;” (further argued in the Sammohavinodanī—Vibh-a 51f.) the remaining questions deal with the proof that only Nibbāna (and not the atom, etc.,) is permanent because uncreated.

The Paramatthamañjūsā (Vism-mhṭ) covers the subject at great length and reinforces the arguments given here with much syllogistic reasoning. However, only the following paragraph will be quoted here, which is reproduced in the commentaries to Ud 80 and It 37.

(The last sentence marked ** appears only in the Udāna Commentary. Readings vary considerably):

“Now, in the ultimate sense the existingness of the Nibbāna-element has been demonstrated by the Fully Enlightened One, compassionate for the whole world, by many sutta passages such as ‘Dhammas without condition,’ ‘Unformed dhammas’ (see Dhs 2), ‘Bhikkhus, there is that base (sphere) where neither earth …’ (Ud 80), ‘This state is very hard to see, that is to say, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all substance of becoming’ (D II 36; M I 167), ‘Bhikkhus, I shall teach you the unformed and the way leading to the unformed’ (S IV 362), and so on, and in this sutta, ‘Bhikkhus, there is an unborn …” (It 87; Ud 80). So even if the wise trust completely in the Dispensation and have no doubts, though they may not yet have had direct perception of it, nevertheless there are persons who come to understand through another’s guidance (reading paraneyya-buddhino);and the intention here is that this logical reasoning under the heading of deduction (niddhāraṇa) should be for the purpose of removing their doubts.

“Just as it is owing to full-understanding (reading yathā pariññeyyatāya) that from the sense desires and from materiality, etc (reading rūpādīnaṃ), that have something beyond them, there is made known an escape [from them] that is their opposite and whose individual essence is devoid of them, so there must exist an escape that is the opposite of, and whose individual essence is devoid of, all formed dhammas, all of which have the aforesaid individual essence (reading evaṃ taṃ-sabhāvānaṃ), and it is this escape that is the unformed element.

“Besides, insight knowledge, which has formed dhammas as its object, and also conformity knowledge, abandon the defilements with the abandoning consisting in substitution of opposites, being unable to abandon them with the abandoning consisting in cutting off. Likewise, the kind of knowledge that has conventional truth (sammuti-sacca) [that is, concepts] as its object, in the first jhāna, etc., abandons the defilements only with the abandoning consisting in suppression, not by cutting them off. So, because the kind of knowledge that has formed dhammas as its object and that which has conventional truth as its object are both incapable of abandoning defilements by cutting them off, there must [consequently] exist an object for the noble-pathknowledge that effects their abandonment by cutting them off, [which object must be] of a kind opposite to both. And it is this that is the unformed element.

“Tathā nibbāna-saddo katthaci (pi) visaye yathābhūta-paramatthavisayo upacāravuttimattasabhāvato (pi) seyyathā pi sīha-saddo. *Atha vā atth’eva paramatthato asaṅkhata-dhātu itaraṃ tabbiparītavimutta-sabhāvattā seyyathā pi pathavī-dhātu vedanā vā ti.”*

The discussion is summarized and additional arguments are added in the Abhidhammāvatāra. The later Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha appears to have shelved the problem. It may be noted that in the whole of this discussion (particularly in the answer to Q. 4) no mention is made of the abandoning of the inherent tendencies (anusaya) in the attainment of Nibbāna (see, e.g., MN 64; S II 66). For derivations of the word “Nibbāna” see VIII.247 and note 72.

“Likewise, the words, ‘Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an unformed’ and so on, which demonstrate the existingness of Nibbāna in the ultimate sense, are not misleading because they are spoken by the Blessed One, like the words, ‘All formations are impermanent, all formations are painful, all dhammas (states) are not self’ (Dhp 277–79; A I 286, etc.).

“Likewise, in certain instances as regards scope, the word ‘Nibbāna’ has the correct ultimate meaning for its scope [precisely] because of the existence of its use as a mere metaphor—like the word ‘lion’ (see Ch. XV, note 12, for the word lion). *Or alternatively, the unformed element exists in the ultimate sense also, because its individual essence is the opposite of, is free from, that of the other kind [of element such as] the earth element and feeling*” (Vism-mhṭ 534–40). The Pali of the last two paragraphs is taken to read thus:

“Tathā ‘atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhatan’ ti idaṃ nibbāna-padassa paramatthato atthibhāva-jotakaṃ vacanaṃ aviparītatthaṃ bhagavatā kathitattā; yaṃ hi bhagavatā bhāsitaṃ taṃ aviparitatthaṃ yathā taṃ ‘sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā sabbe dhammā anattā’ ti.