Vakyapadiya of Bhartrihari
by K. A. Subramania Iyer | 1965 | 391,768 words
The English translation of the Vakyapadiya by Bhartrihari including commentary extracts and notes. The Vakyapadiya is an ancient Sanskrit text dealing with the philosophy of language. Bhartrhari authored this book in three parts and propounds his theory of Sphotavada (sphota-vada) which understands language as consisting of bursts of sounds conveyi...
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Verse 3.1.1
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.1.1:
द्विधा कैश्चित्पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा ।
अपौद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ॥ १ ॥dvidhā kaiścitpadaṃ bhinnaṃ caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā |
apauddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivat || 1 ||1. Some analyse a sentence as consisting of two kinds of words, others of four kinds and others still of five kinds, just as a word is analysed into base, suffix etc.
Commentary
[In the Vākyapadīya, the eight topics mentioned in Chapter I, 24-26, are dealt with, namely, the two kinds of meanings, the two kinds of words, the two kinds of relation and the two kinds of purpose. In Chapter I, the purposes and other matters were considered. In Chapter II, the sentence which is to be grammatically analysed (anvākhyeya) and its meaning which has a fixed character (sthitalakṣaṇa) were determined. In Chapter III, words and their meanings, obtained by artificial division (apoddhāra) are going to be considered. Words are obtained by artificially analysing sentences and a sentence may be analysed in different ways according to one’s point of view. Strictly speaking, a sentence is indivisible and it is such a sentence which is expressive (vācaka). The cognition of individual words and their meanings is really an illusion (vibhrama) and they are the result of an artificial analysis of sentences. This artificial analysis is a means of understanding and explaining the indivisible sentence, just as the division of a word into stem and suffix is a means of explaining the indivisible word. Sentences are infinite in number and no two sentences are alike. Their artificial parts seem to resemble one another and these parts are abstracted from the sentence as that is the only way of explaining the sentence. The individual word which is abstracted from the sentence on the basis of meaning is as unreal as the stem and suffix abstracted from the individual word on the basis of meaning by following the method of anvaya and vyatireka (agreement and difference) mentioned by Kātyāyana in his Vā. 9 on P. 1.2.45—
Siddhaṃ tv anvyayavyatirekābhyām When the sentence is divided into individual words, the sentence-meaning is automatically so divided. The former depends upon the latter. That is why we cannot divide a word into so many phonemes, because these would have no meaning. The sentence-meaning is of a fixed character (sthitalakṣaṇa). It is really indivisible, but we divide it artificially and we get two kinds of meanings out of it: action and accessory to action. That which expresses the former is called the verb (ākhyāta) and that which expresses the latter is called noun (nāman). Thus we get two kinds of words. In a noun, there are two parts: the root and the suffix. Number and the like are the meaning of the suffix and even though, formally, it is the meaning of the suffix which is the predominant one in a noun, from the point of view of the meaning, that which comes from the word as a whole, namely, the individual (dravya) qualified by the universal (jāti), something which is in the nature of a thing (siddha), is the predominant meaning, because it is this individual which is the substratum of number and the accessories (śādhana [sādhana?]). Particles (nipāta), Prepositions (upasarga) and Postpositions (karmapravacanīya) come under nouns and verbs. Some particles express some peculiarity belonging to the thing (siddha), the meaning of nouns and, therefore, come under them. It makes no difference whether a word expresses a thing (siddha) directly or expresses a peculiarity in it. Some particles like svaḥ are primarily expressive of things (sattvapradhāna). Thus they also come under nouns. Particles like hiruk come under verbs, because they are primarily expressive of actions. It is not merely words ending in verbal affixes (tiṅ) which are verbs. Any word which is primarily expressive of a process is a verb. That is why prepositions (upasarga) and postpositions (karmapravacanīya) and particles (nipāta) are also verbs, because they also can express some peculiarity in a process.
But, if one wants to emphasize their special feature, particles and prepositions are classed separately. They do not express a meaning directly, but express a peculiarity in the meanings expressed by nouns and verbs and so they are classed separately. Particles (nipāta) and prepositions (upasarga) differ from one another also, because the former express a peculiarity found in things and processes whereas the latter can express a peculiarity in processes only. Postpositions (karmapravacanīya) on the other hand express a relation brought about by some particular action. Thus, they also denote a peculiarity in processes and come under prepositions. In this way, we get four kinds of words, according to some.
Others consider postpositions (karmapravacanīya) to be a fifth kind of word. They argue that they differ from upasargas because they refer to an action that is past and not to one that is present. The delimitation of a relation with reference to some action or other, is their function. Relation is brought' about by action or some service (upakāra) rendered through action. Sometimes the verb expressive of the action is actually heard and sometimes it is not. Where it is actually heard, the understanding of a particular relation is direct as in mātuḥ smarati, mātuḥ smṛtam, sarpiṣo jānīte. Action can spontaneously and directly enter into relation with things, without another action coming in the middle. Where the verb is not used, there are two possibilities: the very nature of the things related brings the action to the mind and, without the help of the karmapravacanīya, we understand that the relation must have been preceded by a particular relation of action and accessory between two things, upagor apatyam, vṛkṣasya śākhā are examples. In upagor apatyam, there is the relation of father and offspring, it is brought about by the act of procreation. In vṛkṣasya śākhā, there is the relation of whole and part, brought about by the action of standing and supporting (sthitikriyānimittaḥ). Sometimes, the relation has not the power of bringing any particular action to the mind. For instance, in the sentence rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ, the relation is that of master and servant (svasvāmibhāva)
and it may have been due to one of many actions: maintenance, abduction, purchase and begging. (Cf. M. Bhā I. p. 463, 1. 12). From the expression ‘the King’s man’ (rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ) the particular action which was the cause of the relation of sva and svāmin is not understood. Sometimes, it is the presence of the post-position which tells us about the particular action which has brought about the relation in question. For example, in the sentence Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat, there exists the relation of cause and effect between the saṃhitā and rain and this relation is due to the action of reciting the saṃhitā text. The postposition anu tells us that it is due to this action. (Cf. Vāk. a. II, 109-201; 204-205). The word anu is found associated elsewhere with the action of hearing, as in anu-niśamya. But that is not a reason for considering it as directly expressive of the action here. Nor does it suggest action because a verb expressive of the act of reciting is not used here at all. Nor can anu suggest a verb here in the way in which vi suggests the gerund vimāya in prādeśaṃ vi-parilikhati. In Prādeśam, there is a suffix (case-ending) expressive of an accessory to action; therefore, vi can suggest a word expressive of action. But in Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu pvāvarṣat, there is a caseending expressive of śeṣa in saṃhitām. Nor does anu directly express the relation of cause and effect, because that is done by the accusative case-ending which is specially taught instead of other case-endings. (P. 2.3.8.). The real function of anu is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is brought about by the particular action called ‘recitation’ (paṭhanam). This is what is called Sambandhavaccheda, the delimitation of the relation. This is made clear in the verse Kriyāyā dyotako nāyam, sambandhasya na vācakaḥ etc. (Vāk. a. II, 204). This is the function of anu. There is no use of attributing to anu something which is the effect of something else.
Nor can if be maintained that the delimitation of the relation, referring it to a particular action, is the function of the sentence and that anu merely expresses the idea of posteriority. Those who maintain this rely on the principle that the meaning of the sentence is that which is understood over and above those of the individual words. But it must be remembered that ‘over and above’ does not mean going against the meaning of individual words. Sentence-meaning, even when it is an ‘extra’, must be based on those of individual words. It really consists of the relation of the process or the thing primarily conveyed by a sentence with its accessories or its attributes. This delimitation of the relation cannot be considered to be the sentence-meaning, because it is not based on that of any individual word. It is, therefore, better to consider it as the meaning of the Karmapravacanīya. About this delimitation of the relation by the post-position, there are two views: (1) that it is delimited in its own form (svarūpeṇāvacchidyate); (2) that it is delimited as brought about by a particular action. According to Bhartṛhari it means that it is delimited by reference to the particular circumstance (nimittaviśeṣāvacchedaḥ). Thus in adhi brahmadatte pañcālāḥ, adhi indicates that the relation of ruler and ruled (svasvāmibhāva) is due to the act of protection which is the particular circumstance (nimittaviśeṣa).
Thus the abstraction of words from a sentence on the basis of meaning is the only means of explaining a sentence.]
The nature of the abstructed [abstracted?] meanings is now explained.
Other Vyakarana Concepts:
Discover the significance of concepts within the article: ‘Verse 3.1.1’. Further sources in the context of Vyakarana might help you critically compare this page with similair documents:
Karmapravacaniya, Figurative Expression, Individual word, Sentence-meaning, Indivisible sentence, Extra meaning.
Concepts being referred within the main category of Hinduism context and sources.
Infinite in number, Particular action, Relation of Cause and Effect, Master and servant.