Sūtra 8.1.11 (The exception explained)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 8.1.11:

कारणायौगपद्यात् कारणक्रमाच्च घटपटादिबुद्धीनां क्रमो न हेतुफलभावात् ॥ ८.१.११ ॥

kāraṇāyaugapadyāt kāraṇakramācca ghaṭapaṭādibuddhīnāṃ kramo na hetuphalabhāvāt || 8.1.11 ||

kāraṇa-ayaugapadyāt—from non-simultaneity of causes; kāraṇa-kramāt—from succession of causes; ca—and; Ghaṭa-paṭa-ādi-buddhīnāṃ of the cognitions of the water-pot—the cloth, etc; kramaḥ—succession; na—not; hetu-phala-bhāvāt—in consequence of the relation of cause and effect.

11. The sequence of the cognition of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., (results) from the sequence of their causes, due to the nonsimultaneity of the causes, and not in consequence of the relation of cause and effect (among the cognitions.)—320.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be urged that the sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is observed, and that that sequence is due only to the relation of effect and cause. So he says:

[Read sūtra 8.1.11 above]

The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is dependent upon the sequence of their causes, and not dependant upon the relation of cause and effect. If it be asked, where the sequence of causes itself comes from, so he says, ‘from the non-simultaneity of the causes.’ Simultaneity of cognitions has been denied or disproved. Hence there is not simultaneity also of diverse causes of cognition. If, on the other hand, there were simultaneity of causes, it would entail simultaneity also of effect, and thus the argument that non-production of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of the mind, would be shattered. This is the import.—11.

Here ends the first chapter of the eighth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

The sequence or order, in the form of antecedence and subsequence, of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., arises, not from the relation of cause and effect amongst them, but from the order, or the antecedence and subsequence, of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot, cloth, etc., (with the senses), which contacts are the causes of those cognitions. The word ‘ca,’ and, implies the addition of non-simultaneity which is not mentioned here, and this word is to be construed after the word sequence or order. The meaning, therefore, is this that the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., is due to the non-simultaneity of their causes, e.g., contacts with senses, etc. Where, however, simultaneity of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot and the cloth exists, there is simultaneously produced a collective cognition of all the objects in contact with the senses for the time being. Hence it is also to be understood that simultaneity of effects follows from simultaneity of causes, and non-sequence of effects from nonsequence of causes.

Understanding or Intelligence, buddhi, is primarily divided into presentation, anubhūti, and representation, smṛti. Presentation, according to the doctrine of Kaṇāda, is again two-fold, being divided into perception pratyakṣa and inference, anumāna. Perception is of six kinds, as derived from smelling, etc., (i.e., from the five external, and the internal, senses); and is two-fold, as discirminative, savikalpaka, and non-discriminative, nirvikalpaka; and two-fold, as ordinary or popular, laukika, and super-ordinary or hyper-popular, alaukika. Inference, again, is three-fold, as produced by illation from only positive conditions, kevala-anvayi, or purely agreemental; from only negative-conditions kevala-vyatireki or differential; and from both positive and negative conditions Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, or inference from commonly observed marks. For example, “This is expressible by words, inasmuch as it is knowable,” etc., are illations from purely positive condition (or by Mill’s method of agreement). “Earth differs from other substances, inasmuch as it is possessed of odour,” and the like are illations from purely negative conditions, (or by Mill’s method of difference); and “The mountain is fiery, inasmuch as it smokes,” and the like are illations from both positive and negative conditions (or by Mill’s method of agreement and difference.) Representation, reproduction or memcry, on the other hand, is uniform, dependent on that form of Saṃskāra which is called Bhāvanā or permanent mental impression, having the same form as the original presentation and dependent upon certain cognition in which inattention played no part. In another point of view also, understanding is two-fold, science or correct knowledge, pramā, and nescience or incorrect knowledge, apramā. Science is cognition a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience is cognition in certain form of that in which there is non-existence of that form. Understanding or Intelligence is also two-fold accordingly as it is divided into doubt, saṃśaya, and certitude, niścaya. Doubt is a cognition whereof the form is (mutually) repugnant existence and non-existence in one and the same object; certitude in regard to a thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the non-existence thereof. In this doctrine, in the case of cognition of similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an inference takes place by the production of a judgment respecting the inferential mark, subsequently thereto. Evidence or proof, pramāṇa, is of two kinds, perception and inference; and science is exact experience or correct presentation or presentation in accordance with reality. This will be explained by the author of the aphorisms himself in the sequel.