Abhāva as a Separate Category

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who are realists forward the view that every experience has its counterpart in the external world. This view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas reaches its extreme limit in this conception of abhāva or on-existence. Everybody experiences a piece of ground where there is no jar, or when a jar is destroyed, people cognize its destruction. In these cases, what is experienced is the absence (abhāva) of the jar. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas here opine that this experience must have its counterpart in the external world. In other words, the absence of jar must have an objective reality. And hence, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept abhāva (non-existence or negaton) as a separate category. This category is a negative one is opposed to other six categories which are positive categories. The theory of the reality of abhāva is related to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation which is known as asatkāryavāda. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, abhāva has a existence. According to asatkāryavāda effect is not existent in the cause before its production. A jar is nonexistent on the ground before its production or after its destruction. Before the production and after the destruction abhāva exists. Abhāva is not like sky flower. It has a negative reality.^[1]

According to the Buddhists reality is always existence. This does not accept any negative or non-existent reality. Hence, abhāva is not reality. The Buddhists oppose the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of non-existence. They argue that non-existence is always determined by its positive counterpart. Again the negatum is to be regarded as the adjective of the corresponding negation. Hence, the object negated is the adjective or the qualifier of the negation. But the Buddhists point out that this is not possible for a non-existent object to qualify another object.

Bhattacharyya contends,

“According to the Buddhists negation and the object negated are contradictorily opposed to each other. There is an unbridgeable gulf fixed between them. They cannot be predicated of the same thing at the same time. Thus, negation should not be qualified by the object negated. An undetermined non-existence is unreal. It can never be cognized. Negation cannot, therefore, be a mode of reality”.^[2]

According to the Buddhists, non-existence is only a vikalpa (mental construction), and not an external reality.^[3]

The Prābhākaras also do not accept the objective reality of negation. According to Śālikanātha, negation is subjective. The Prābhākaras also maintain that negation is identical with its locus. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers to the view of the Prābhākaras in his Nyāyamañjarī thus: when the non-existence of a jar on the ground (bhūtate ghaṭābhāvaḥ) is cognized, what actually experienced is the vacant condition (kaivalya) of the ground. No positive reality like the non-existence of the jar is experienced here. According to the Prābhākaras, in all such cases, actually the jar is not comprehended, it is not that its non-existence is comprehended.^[4] However, the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept the objective reality of negation just like the NyāyaVaiśeṣika.

According to some Jaina philosophers abhāva is cognized in time and space. If negation is bare non-existence then it cannot qualify space and time. On the other hand, if an object does not qualify space and time, it cannot be located on space and time.^[5] Prabhācandrasuri criticizes the view that negation has distinct reality. He holds that negation is nothing but the positive locus qualified by some unique property.^[6]

According to Kaṇāda, all objects of knowledge come under six categories. These are: dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa and samavāya.^[7] So, he does not accept the abhāva as a separate category. Because if the knowledge of abhāva depends on bhāva padārtha. So, abhāva is not mentioned as a separate category.^[8] Praśastapāda, also accepts the six categories which are dravya, guṇa, etc. He states that mokṣa (liberation) depends upon the right knowledge of these six categories.^[9]

Mādhava opines that the knowledge of the abhāva of a jar is the abhāva of its object. It is known as abhāva. The jar or ground is not the object of the abhāva of a jar. The abhāva of the jar is the object of its knowledge. Therefore, he states that abhāva is a distinct category. Abhāva has a pratiyogī (counter entity).

Abhāva of a jar depends on it which is its pratiyogī.^[10]

“The six categories, from substance to samavāya, which alone were accepted by the old orthodox Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, were held to be of a positive kind to which a seventh category ‘non-existence’ or ‘negation’ (abhāva) was added at a later period.”^[11] All the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers adopt the seven categories.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, pp.395-397

[2]:

Bhattacharyya, Janaki Ballabha, Negation, p. 20

[3]:

Vidhivikalpatulyatvāt. Nyāyamañjarī, p.55

[4]:

Nyāyamañjarī, p. 54

[5]:

Negation, p.28

[6]:

Ibid.

[7]:

dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyāṃ tattvajñānānniḥśreyasam. Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 1.1.4

[8]:

abhāvasya pṛthag anupadeśaḥ bhāvaparatantryāntvabhāvāt. Nyāyakaṇḍalī. p. 6

[9]:

… sannāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyatattva jñānāṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ. Vaiśeṣikadarśana [Vaiśeṣikadarśanam] with Praśastapādabhāṣya

[10]:

Mitabhāṣiṇī on Saptapadārthī, p. 90

[11]:

The Philosophy of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, p.396