Chapter 5i - Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

Rāmānuja (1017-1137 A.D), the chief propounder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta School of philosophy accepts pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama as valid sources of cognition, and is indifferent about the rest. Later Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntins add one or two to this list. According to Rāmānuja, pratyakṣa has for its object what is distinguished by difference, possessing a general character which constitutes its form.^[1]

Rāmānuja admits the distinction between the savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. According to him, these two stages of pratyakṣa alike involve a complex content. Rāmānuja does not accept the true and rigorous forms of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is neither the apprehension of an absolutely undifferentiated object or pure being, nor the apprehension of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to one another. It is not the former , since it is impossible to apprehend objects devoid of all elements of distinction. The essential feature of consciousness is discrimination, and we cannot apprehend an object without apprehending some special features of it. All cognition consists in the apprehension of an object qualified by some specific quality (saviśeṣavastuviṣayatvāt sarvapramāṇānām);^[2] for, even in savikalpaka pratyakṣa, only those qualities which were apprehended in nirvikalpaka perception are remembered and recognized.

Rāmānuja defines nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as:

“nirvikalpakaṃ nāma kenacidviśeṣaṇa viyuktasya grahaṇaṃ na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya, tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśanāt, anupapatteś ca”^[3]

I.e. nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is the apprehension of an object as devoid of some qualifications, but not as devoid of all qualifications, for a cognition of that kind is, in the first place, not found ever to take place; and in the second place, it is impossible.

All cognition takes place as characterized by some qualification–‘This is such and such’, for no object can be cognized apart from such individual configuration (some particular form or structure) as for instance, the triangular face, dewlap, etc. in the case of cows. Thus the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is the first apprehension of the individual (instance) out of a number of things belonging to the same class–‘eka-jātiya-dravyeṣu prathamapiṇḍa-grahaṇam’. The savikalpaka pratyakṣa is the second and subsequent apprehension of the same individual (instance), ‘dvitiyādi-piṇḍa-grahaṇam savikalpakam ity ucyate’.^[4] In the cognition of the first instance, there is no apprehension of the pervasiveness of the generic character like cowhood etc.; and it is only when in the second and subsequent occasions, it is cognized then it becomes an apprehension of the pervasiveness of the generic character. The cognition of the second and the subsequent instances is called savikalpaka, because it is characterized by the pervasiveness of the generic character cowhood, etc. As a result of the connection of the present cognition with the first cognition, pervasiveness of the generic character can be ascertained.^[5]

In Nyāya Pariśuddhi, Veṅkaṭanātha (1300 A.D), a disciple of Rāmānuja, says,

“saṃskāra sahakṛta-indriya janyatayā sapratyavamarṣam jñānam savikalpakam; saṃskāra nirapekṣa kevala-indriya-janya-jñānam nirvikalpakam”^[6]

I.e. savikalpaka pratyakṣa is the apprehension involving recognition because of its being produced by the sense organs influenced by saṃskāra; nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, on the other hand, is the apprehension which is produced by the mere sense organs without the association of saṃskāra.

The real distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa is that in the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa we perceive an object along with its quality or class essence but we do not know that its quality or class essence is common to all the other objects of that class, for instance, we perceive a cow along with its class essence ‘cowhood’, but we do not know that the ‘cowhood’ is also common to all other cows. In the savikalpaka pratyakṣa we perceive an object along with its quality or class essence and we also know that its quality or class essence is common to all other objects of that class, for instance, we perceive a cow along with its class essence ‘cowhood’ and we also know that its class essence ‘cowhood’ is common to all other cows. In other words, in the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa there is only the apprehension of the generic character and there is no awareness that this character is common to the other individuals of the same class as there is no perception of the other individuals. But in the perception of the second individual and so on, the generic character is recognized as common to the whole class. Thus, in the pratyakṣa of the first individual the cognition is of the form ‘this’ and in the pratyakṣa of the subsequent individuals, because they belong to the same class, it is of the form ‘such it is’. Therefore, pratyakṣa whether it is savikalpaka or nirvikalpaka, reveals an object qualified with some characteristic.

In the words of Rāmānuja,

“ataḥ pratyakṣasya na kadācidapi nirviśeṣa viṣayatvaṃ”^[7]

I.e. pratyakṣa never has for its content an object that is devoid of all characteristics.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-II, by S. Radhakishnan, p. 628.

[2]:

Quoted from: Ibid. p. 629.

[3]:

Śri Bhāṣya, p. 29. Quoted from Jwala Prasad’s ‘History of Indian Epistemology’, p. 189.

[4]:

Quoted from: Ibid. p. 189.

[5]:

“prathama pratity-anusaṃhita-vastu-saṃsthāna-rūpa-gotvāder anuvṛṭṭi–dharma viśiṣṭatvam dvitiyādi-piṇḍagrahanāvaseyam iti dvitiyādigrahaṇasya savikalpakatvam”.—-Śri Bhāṣya, p. 29. Quoted from: Ibid. p. 190.

[6]:

Nyāya Pariśuddhi, p. 81-82. Quoted from S.M. Srinivasa Chari’s ‘Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita’, p. 40.

[7]:

Śri Bhāṣya, I.1.1. p. 27. Quoted from: Ibid. p. 40.